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Yet this agency was not what it seemed. While Franklin Roosevelt claimed the UN signified the emergence
of a new "world civilization," his Administration planned to use UNRRA to construct and manage a global
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advance its ideological agenda and achieve its geo-strategic aims. The UN, in effect, was imagined and
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ABSTRACT

THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
ADMINISTRATION, 1939-1943
Charles W. Sharpe, Jr.
Walter A. McDougall

This dissertation analyzes the bureaucratic origins and diplomatic processes that
led to the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA), established in November 1943 to aid destitute populations and battle-scarred
countries after the Second World War. Based on archival work in Canada, Europe, and
the United States, the author argues that UNRRA was not only a test case for the United
Nations organization set up after the war; it also served as a model for the whole system
of postwar global governance.
Yet this agency was not what it seemed. While Franklin Roosevelt claimed the
UN signified the emergence of a new “world civilization,” his Administration planned to
use UNRRA to construct and manage a global order in America’s image. UNRRA would
provide the U.S. government an instrument with which to advance its ideological agenda
and achieve its geo-strategic aims. The UN, in effect, was imagined and conceived in
Washington as a tool of informal empire. American officials had little desire to surrender
U.S. resources or freedom of action to any international authority. They therefore devised
a scheme that, while giving the impression of wide participation, would enable the U.S.
to dominate the organization and act unilaterally if necessary.
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However, wartime exigencies, criticism from countries all over the world, and
the presence of Soviet power forced American diplomats to compromise when
negotiating the UNRRA agreement. The resulting concessions limited Washington’s
strategic options vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and various regions of the world, particularly
Eastern Europe. This fact certainly pleased Moscow, but a series of subsequent revisions
to the agreement hardly appeased the other concerned countries. Yet they accepted it:
these countries needed and feared the United States. As a result, UNRRA came into being
in late 1943, but the process that made it possible damaged Washington’s clout.
This research challenges accepted views of the United Nations and America’s
place in the world. It revises our understanding of Franklin Roosevelt’s grand strategy,
the Cold War’s origins, and the international system in existence today. It also unearths
the roots of post-Cold War anti-Americanism.
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PREFACE

I might never be able to fully explain the persistence of my interest in the United
Nations. But if “the study of history is the study of causes,” as E.H. Carr once put it, then
I suppose it makes sense for me to explain how I came to write this book.3 The process
began some years ago, when I took a job at the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in New York City. For better or worse, this experience has had a profound
impact on my journey. While the corruption and inefficiencies of UN bureaucracy
frustrated me, the humanitarians who risked their lives and careers to fulfill the UN
Charter inspired me. These contrasting impressions stuck, and I entered the graduate
problem in history at the University of Pennsylvania eager to learn more about these
international agencies.
Serendipity handed me a dissertation topic my first year. A fellow historian
suggested I begin reading the Herbert Lehman papers at Columbia University. Lehman, a
former Governor of New York State, had been the first Director General of the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), an agency set up in late
1943 to administer relief and other services to suffering individuals in the wake of the
Second World War. It was the first international organization of its type, and it undertook
the largest humanitarian relief operation in history. Following its dissolution in 1948, its
responsibilities devolved to many of the UN agencies in existence today. It therefore
seemed to me that this agency provided an excellent platform from which to investigate
questions I had as a result of my own experiences. The topic also passed muster in terms

3

Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 113.
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of those jazzy buzzwords driving current debates. I thought that UNRRA was
“international,” “transnational,” and “global” all at once.
As a result, I set out to write a book that would somehow meet the methodological
requirements of these labels. Using both state and non-state archives in countries all over
the world, I hoped to tell the story of UNRRA’s creation, development, operations, and
liquidation in 1948. With this agenda in mind, I turned to archives in several Western
capitals and looked for published materials from other relevant places. After months of
collecting documents, I returned home to read, study, and write, but quickly came to an
unfortunate realization. Though able to draw some conclusions about the organization’s
development, the nature and scope of its operations, and even the causes of its
liquidation, I could not answer the most important question of all, which seemed to have
bearing on everything else: Why was the organization created in the first place?
On the face of it, it appeared that UNRRA had been established to address a series
of problems the Allies expected to face at the war’s end. They worried, for example,
about famine, pestilence, and a displaced persons crisis. If left unaddressed, any one or
combination of these problems could have set off revolutionary upheavals threatening the
entire postwar peace. Consequently, the challenges these difficulties posed had to be met.
While the “transnational” nature of these problems required an “international” solution,
the geographic scope and extent of the devastation meant that some sort of coordinated
action would have to be undertaken on a “global” basis. UNRRA, therefore, seemed to be
a logical outgrowth of the problems at hand. Yet a series of extraneous factors led me to
believe that this was not the whole story.

xvi
First, I could not quite understand why the United States had so suddenly
abandoned its tradition of unilateralism in foreign affairs, especially when it had tackled
similar problems on a national basis after the First World War. Second, it was clear that
most if not all of the world’s nations remained deeply suspicious of UNRRA, particularly
of the motives behind the four powers apparently responsible for its creation: China,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. Finally, the most recent research
on the United Nations, at least in my mind, raised serious questions about the intentions
and plans of the United States. At the San Francisco Conference in the summer of 1945,
the American Government successfully broke the cable codes of every delegation to the
conference with the exception of the Soviet Union, in what is now the largest known
peacetime spy operation in United States history.4
Thus unlike previous historical works on the United Nations, I decided to reject
the public statements and press releases of the wartime leaders and other responsible
policymakers. Methodologically, it seemed wiser for me to follow the guidance of Marc
Bloch. “True progress,” he wrote “began on the day when, as Volney put it, doubt
became an ‘examiner.’”5 Until evidence proving the honesty of their statements became
available, I assumed their remarks were either incomplete, misleading, or outright lies.
This assumption caused me additional work and even embarrassment. Not only did I find
myself at odds with a basic American judicial tenet – the assumption of innocence until
proven guilty – I suddenly realized that in many cases I had looked at the wrong archival
collections, and in some instances, had shown up at the wrong archive.
4

Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United
Nations: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and their
Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).
5
Marc Bloch, The Historians Craft (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), 81.
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A second round of archival visits led me to reframe the project. New materials
I found gave me every reason to focus exclusively on the period leading up to UNRRA’s
establishment. Indeed, I realized that it would be impossible to even begin evaluating the
organization’s development, operations, and liquidation before a sustained study of its
origins and creation had been undertaken. Thus what began as an effort to study an
international organization as an independent “transnational” actor turned into a story
about one country – the United States – and its relations with the rest of the world. After
considerable analysis and long reflection, I concluded that UNRRA was not only a model
for the entire postwar international system; it was also at the center of a deliberate and
conscientious effort on the part of American policymakers to create and administer a
global empire.
It was this important realization that brought me back to my time as an
international relations student at Yale University. During my first year in Yale’s MA
program, a professor assigned me Walter Russell Mead’s essay, “The Jacksonian
Tradition.” Though I have come to disagree with aspects of the argument, Mead’s
analysis and descriptions of one faction in the American electorate, which he improperly
labels the “Jacksonians,” are in many ways accurate. These people, according to Mead,
are “suspicious of untrammeled federal power… skeptical about the prospects for
domestic and foreign do-gooding (welfare at home, foreign aid abroad), [and] opposed to
federal taxes but obstinately fond of federal programs seen as primarily helping the
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middle class…” They are often religious, militaristic, pessimistic, and quite adept at
mismanaging money.6
This professor – whose stature and identity meant nothing to me at the time –
asked the class if anyone knew of people who might fit this description. To my surprise, I
was the only person to respond affirmatively. This fact placed me in the unenviable
position of having to answer the professor’s follow-up question. “Who do you know who
is a Jacksonian?” I answered with four words: “Everyone in my family.” As the professor
urged me to elaborate, I watched as my classmates’ jaws dropped – either from disbelief
or outright disdain – with each new word: “Harley Davidson… too many Budweisers…
357 magnum revolver… bankruptcy… the hell with ‘em or just bomb ‘em.” I gave the
class and the professor an accurate description, supported by true stories about real
people in my life. But most important, this experience reminded me just how far I had
come. This august Yale professor knew first-hand what it meant to come from my neck
of the woods – the edge of Appalachia – and went out of his way to encourage me.
Born in Cookeville, Tennessee, William Eldridge Odom graduated from the
United States Military Academy at West Point in 1954. Over the next twenty years, he
served his country in Germany, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. He obtained a Ph.D. in
government from Columbia University, and became one of the United States’ preeminent
intelligence officers and experts on Russia. Odom was also responsible for sneaking large
portions of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s invaluable archive out of the Soviet Union. He also
served as Zbigniew Brzezinski’s military assistant in the Carter White House, and then as
Director of the National Security Agency in the Reagan Administration. In the military he
6

Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Tradition,” The National Interest 58 (Winter
1999/2000): 5-29.
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achieved the rank of Lieutenant General. A gifted teacher who felt an obligation to
future generations, Odom blessed me with his time and talents.
General Odom taught me the basics of American foreign policy; he also shared
with me and the other students an argument that would later appear in a book he coauthored with Robert Dujarric, America’s Inadvertent Empire. The book assesses
elements of American power at the turn of the twenty-first century, and argues that an
enormous gap still existed between the United States and the rest of the world. It also
asserts, as Odom did in our class, that this gap could be quickly closed if America’s
leaders act foolishly. The book, in effect, strove to provide current and future leaders the
knowledge with which to make proper policy decisions. As such, it provides both
quantitative and qualitative description of America’s assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world
along with an explication of the limits and possibilities of the global system created by
the United States.7 Walter Russell Mead commented best on the book:
“Their basic argument is that the United States is strong because it has a depth
and breadth of liberal practices and institutions that other societies cannot match –
and that because liberal institutions generally reflect long-term cultural habits and
trends, they will not soon catch up. This case is a sort of synthesis between
Francis Fukuyama’s end of history and Samuel Huntington’s class of
civilizations: liberal values lead to success, but not everyone can get there.”8
True, perhaps. But what should one make of the book’s title? Odom and Dujarric
chose it reluctantly. As they write, understanding America’s relations with the world
7

William E. Odom and Robert Dujaric, America’s Inadvertent Empire (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004.
8
Walter Russell Mead, “America’s Inadvertent Empire by William E. Odom; Robert
Dujaric,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March-April, 2004): 164.
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“requires recognizing that the United States has created, perhaps inadvertently, a new
type of imperial regime. It is an empire, but not the traditional kind. Structurally and
qualitatively it differs fundamentally from all past empires. Using the terms imperial and
empire risks confusion because those words convey notions of a hierarchy of power,
subordination, and dominance that are either missing from the American empire, or only
loosely institutionalized.”9 Thus Odom and Dujarric chose the word “empire” for lack of
a better term. Whether the American imperium emerged “inadvertently” remained for
them an open question, one to be answered by future historians.
During my tenure at UNDP, I frequently complained to Odom of my frustrations
with the organization. One conversation I had with him has persisted in my mind to this
very day. “Do you know when the United Nations works well?” he once asked me. “No,”
I replied, “but I’m stuck in this morass and am wondering if there is any chance that it
can ever work.” Upon hearing my reply, Odom responded with his usual Tennessee
frankness, which endeared him to many, but occasionally angered others. “It works best
when the United States dominates it. That is the way it was designed,” he proclaimed. I
later learned that Odom studied under Leland Goodrich while at Columbia. Goodrich
served on the International Secretariat to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco
in 1945. He helped write the United Nations Charter, and later became one of the
country’s leading experts on international organizations.
It was General Odom who first encouraged me to pursue my Ph.D. Thus, I tried to
keep him abreast of my progress at Penn. In late 2007, I informed him of my intention to
write a dissertation on UNRRA. His snappy dismissal of the idea disappointed me. Like

9

Odom and Dujarric, America’s Inadvertent Empire, 5.
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several other distinguished scholars, he considered it an intellectual road to nowhere.
Perhaps a little Jacksonian pessimism had gotten the best of him. But I feared he had
legitimate concerns. He warned me, “Given the historical profession’s current preference
for cultural and social history, you’ll have difficulty getting a job.” His concern for my
wellbeing was, above all, a testament to his character. Odom saw his students playing a
key role in the future of his country, and he wanted them to be successful. Thus, he
persisted with his usual pep talk and dollops of advice about finishing as quickly as
possible. “Race, race, race,” he often said before hanging up the phone.
It was a jarring conversation. He wasn’t on board. But I was still riveted by my
experiences at UNDP. Moreover, a number of younger historians, and even a few older
ones, fully supported the project I had proposed. I therefore decided to stay the course
and held out hope that I would one day be able to convince General Odom of its merits,
regardless of its popularity. By the spring of 2008, I had begun to see more clearly the
path my research would take, and planned to schedule a visit with him when he returned
to Washington D.C. But I never got the chance. On May 30, 2008, General William
Odom passed away at his vacation home in Lincoln, Vermont. America had lost a great
patriot. I lost my teacher. It is to him that this work is dedicated.

1
INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 1943, members of the alliance fighting the Second World War
signed an agreement establishing the first-ever international organization tasked with
administering relief to war-ravaged populations. Known as the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), this organization would undertake the largest
humanitarian relief effort in history. At the time of its dissolution in 1947, UNRRA had
delivered food, medicine, housing, farming, and industrial supplies to countless millions
of men, women and children in more than twenty countries.10
Nothing like it had ever been attempted before. Up until the First World War,
efforts to aid suffering peoples during and after military conflicts had typically been the
purview of religious groups, voluntary societies, and non-governmental entities.
Occasionally governments sponsored or aided these efforts, but rarely did they administer
relief on their own, and never had there been a full-scale international effort bringing
together governments from all over the world to do this type of work. UNRRA was a
radical departure from the past.11
During the October 1918 armistice negotiations that brought the First World War
to an end, several Allied countries proposed that existing international food agencies take
on the task of relieving destitute populations. But the American Food Administrator,

10

It remains unlikely that we will ever know exactly how many people UNRRA assisted.
On this issue, see Herbert Lehman, Reminiscences of Herbert Henry Lehman, Columbia
University Oral History, 1961 (New York: Columbia University, 1972), 458-459.
11
Several scholars have argued, quite correctly I think, that this change has led to the
“increased secularization of relief work.” See, for example, Gerhard Daniel Cohen, In
War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 61.
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Herbert Hoover, rejected the proposal. The United States, in his view, would supply
most of the economic resources after the war, and its preferences should not be subject to
veto by some inter-allied body. Thus with President Woodrow Wilson’s approval,
Hoover arranged for the United States Government to deliver food and other relief
supplies to Europe on an independent basis. The Allies had little choice but to send
representatives to work with the American relief missions he established, which became
the American Relief Administration (ARA). On February 24, 1919, Congress
appropriated $100,000 million for this governmental agency. An inter-allied body was
established to tackle problems related to relief, but it had little control over America’s
relief efforts.12
By July 1, 1919, the United States reverted to its usual way of doing things. The
ARA expired as a government agency, but continued its work as an independent nongovernmental organization. Hoover remained in control, even after he became the
Secretary of Commerce in 1921. The ARA would raise an additional $100 million from
private donations and work with the newly established Quaker group, the American
Friends Service Committee, to supply four million tons of relief supplies over the next
five and half years to a number of European countries.13

12

Apparently no monograph has ever been written on American relief efforts
immediately after the First World War. Typically scholars have focused on the Belgian
relief efforts during the war, and the relief mission to Soviet Russia in 1921-23. As far as
I can tell, the most exhaustive account of the efforts undertaken during the armistice is
included in Kendrick A. Clements, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Imperfect Visionary,
1918-1928 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 1-34. For very limited coverage see
Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York:
Random House, 2001), 60-62; for documentary and first-hand account, see Herbert
Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958), pp. 91-114.
13
Clements, Life of Herbert Hoover, 1-34.
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During the Second World War, the Administration of Franklin Roosevelt, when
planning for postwar relief, apparently departed from all past formula and chose to
construct an international agency to provide assistance to war-torn populations. Why?
Stated succinctly, policymakers in the Roosevelt Administration hoped to establish an
American-led international system at the end of the war. UNRRA provided both a means
to this end, but also a model for postwar global governance. How the United States
arrived at this decision, and the process that brought this organization into being is the
subject of this dissertation.

Guiding Principles and the International Approach to Relief

The Roosevelt Administration’s postwar planners believed that America’s failure
to remain sufficiently engaged abroad after the First World War had, in part, caused the
Second World War. This failure did not reflect negatively on the United States, but on the
Europeans, who remained too weak, too divided, and too immoral to construct a stable
economic and geopolitical system, either in Europe or anywhere else in the world,
capable of creating prosperity, guaranteeing basic freedoms, and respecting human rights.
They believed the United States, despite its blemishes, was an exemplar of stability,
freedom, and constitutional democracy, and its management of affairs in the Western
Hemisphere a model for the world to follow. Thus they concluded that American forms
of government, and the hemispheric system should be erected on a global scale.
Two impulses underlay their thinking. First, they wanted to defend and advance
the interests of the United States, while also serving the “general interest.” To accomplish
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this aim, they hoped to put in place an American system, one which Roosevelt
idealistically called a “world civilization.” As revisionist historians have long pointed
out, they were especially concerned with economics.14 They knew that a free and open
international trade regime supported by a dollar-backed monetary system would provide
opportunities for American financiers and industrialists hoping to push their capital and
sell their products all over the world. In turn, this economic exchange would create jobs
and growth at home. It would also, they hoped, stabilize Europe and facilitate the
transformation of backward societies abroad. Yet the apparent obsession with economics
concealed one of their lesser known aims, namely to open naval bases around the globe,
and to keep some troops abroad to help police the earth.15 Stability, they reasoned,
depended upon American power.
American history shaped their aims. Sumner Welles, Roosevelt’s chief postwar
architect until mid 1943, invoked 1776, when “American statesmen determined to weld
into a nation thirteen separate colonies differing in religion, in social structure, in
commercial interest, and to some extent even in race and language.” This endeavor, he
believed, should be attempted on a global basis.16 Other officials shared his views. Oscar
Cox of the Lend-Lease Administration believed that “many of the problems which
Europe face[ed were] very similar to the ones the Founding Fathers took on when they
14
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started to draft the Constitution. There were fights and vested interests.” But Cox and
other officials believed that if the nations of the world could hold something akin to the
American constitutional convention, then they might be able to forge a political system
for the entire world like that of the United States.18 The outcome – some form of
international organization – would serve not only the American interest, but also the good
of mankind.
Righteousness constitutes the second impulse that shaped American thinking.
Officials were not so blind that they could not see the possibility of missteps, or the
extraordinary challenges they faced, but they were supremely confident of the moral
correctness of what they were doing. They gave the impression that it was their Biblical
duty to go into the world just as Christ had done to save humanity, and that if they had
not inherited the work of God, then at least they had his blessings in the grand project
they undertook. One of Roosevelt’s advisors, Adolf Berle, spoke in this manner:
“Strength will be there; but with strength will be the power which God has given to our
fertile earth to relieve suffering, to satisfy need, to make production do what it ought to
do; to preserve not only the freedom of free peoples, but to give elsewhere an example of
what freedom can do for mankind.”19 These words capture the spirit of many officials in
the Roosevelt Administration, particularly the so-called New Dealers.
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While such officials faced opposition from conservatives in the Administration
who opposed the scope of their plans, they agreed on what constituted the basis of their
ability to act. Whether given to them by God or not, power was the ultimate arbiter in
international affairs, and the United States, at this juncture in history, had more of it than
any nation on earth. If as Kant asserted, “the state of peace must be founded,” then the
Americans believed that power provided the essential ingredient to not only make it
happen, but to ensure its preservation over time.20
For American policymakers, this fact translated into two problems. First, how
could the United States ensure a sufficient concentration of power within a federation of
states or world organization that could reestablish stability immediately after the war and
prevent in the future the breakdown of the international order? Though several of his
diplomats disliked the idea, and would become increasingly hostile to it as the war
progressed, the problem was resolved, at least in Roosevelt’s mind, with the so-called
four policemen of the world: China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States
would collaborate to stop would-be or potential aggressors. In appearance each country
would maintain responsibility for a particular sphere: China in East Asia and the Western
Pacific; Britain in Western Europe and its Empire; the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe
and the Eurasian landmass; and the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
But in reality this arrangement was conceived to ensure the United States assumed
the hegemonic position in the international system. Roosevelt knew well that two of these
powers were weaker than the others: China remained backward and decrepit despite its
potential might; and Great Britain was in obvious decline, both financially and militarily.
20
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Roosevelt appears to have reasoned that these two countries would align with the United
States against the Soviet Union in possible disputes, and that Washington would have to
fill the power vacuum created by their weaknesses. Furthermore, Britain’s hostility to
Stalinist doctrine, and China’s fear of a communist insurgency increased the probability
that they would look to the United States for assistance. In this way, Washington would
be in a position to protect American interests; and it would maintain sufficient power to
forge unity within the broader multilateral system of states that they envisioned.
Yet the latter fact presented policymakers with a second problem. While they
believed a multilateral system could not function without a hegemonic state, they also
espoused the view that hegemony, by its very nature, tends to undermine the legitimacy
of a multilateral system. This conundrum puzzled decision-makers in the Roosevelt
Administration. How could they erect a global system led by the United States that would
not succumb to this paradox? Oddly, the answer to this question emerged during
discussions over postwar relief, and American plans to provide relief and rehabilitation
assistance to war devastated societies became the model for the postwar international
system. As one official put it, “The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Authority –
which you doubtless know about – is, to my mind, an empiric foundation – stone for the
consideration of the kind of world order that I am sure we both have in mind.”21
In subtle terms, another official suggested there would be means to resolve the
tension between the need for multilateral support and the occasional requirement for
speedy action: “Late-war and post-war affairs should be under the broadest possible
international determination,” he wrote. “As in all organized affairs, there must be a
21
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structure which expedites the process of agreement for action. But this structure should
begin in full participation of the largest possible number of nations to the end that
decisions may be of a character so representative as to be most probably in world
interest.”22 The message was clear: the United States would seek broad international
support at the outset, but if agreement were not immediately in the making, then there
would have to be procedures to forge a consensus rapidly.
The international approach to postwar relief was not what it seemed. Apart from
its immediate propaganda benefits, American officials believed it would win legitimacy
for U.S. leadership in the postwar era, while also convincing the American people to
remain engaged in the world. But because officials in the Roosevelt Administration
abhorred the idea of relinquishing control over their resources or sacrificing their
independence to an international agency, they crafted a proposal that would allow them to
dominate the agency and even ignore it if necessary. UNRRA may have been designed to
address a wide array of functional problems, but it was also a device to convince reluctant
nations to accept America’s postwar plans. Yet Washington’s apparent commitment to
multilateralism actually worked to conceal the country’s unilateral methods, global
pretensions, and hegemonic aspirations.

The Wartime Debate Over Humanitarian Relief

With underutilized source materials from Canada, Europe and the United States, I
have constructed a narrative that follows the allied debate over humanitarian relief during
22
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the Second World War. The story I tell starts at the moment when Herbert Hoover
precipitated exchanges over relief just before the outbreak of the war, and continues until
the agreement establishing UNRRA was signed at the White House on November 9,
1943. It covers five stages: (1) the debate over wartime or cross-blockade relief; (2) the
internal bureaucratic discussions in the American and British Governments over postwar
relief; (3) the informal Anglo-American talks over the structure of the desired relief
organization; (4) the subsequent four-power negotiations between China, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union and the United States over relief agency; and (5) the efforts to convince
the American people, Congress, and the world to accept the relief agreement.
The heated debates over humanitarian relief offer an unusual perspective into the
formation of the wartime alliance. This seemingly unimportant topic assumed heightened
significance shortly after the war’s outbreak. Herbert Hoover, who by then was a former
President of the United States, insisted that the belligerents accept a program to feed
people suffering in Europe due to the British blockade. To deflect his demands, the Prime
Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, pledged in August 1940 to provide relief as
soon as Europe could be liberated from Axis oppression. This promise, coupled with the
political problems Hoover continued to cause, had diverse impacts. It facilitated the
formation of the Anglo-American alliance, the Grande Alliance, and ultimately the wider
political and military alliance known as the United Nations.
The scholarship on the United Nations has been devoted almost exclusively to the
charter and international organization that bears its name. Yet no work provides an indepth understanding of why and how the actual United Nations alliance came into being.
This fact is astonishing: the United Nations did not win the Second World War. It was
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won primarily by the Soviet Union, which lost more than 23 million people, roughly
14 percent of its population, and the United States, which provided the money, guns, and
much of the technological prowess. The British Empire certainly played an important role
as well, but it was insufficient for ultimate victory. These facts beget a question: why was
the United Nations alliance needed in the first place? What purpose did it serve? By
examining wartime diplomacy via the lens of postwar relief, we see that it facilitated
allied propaganda first and foremost, which poses another question: did the United
Nations organization serve an identical purpose?
Here again the wartime debates on relief provide an answer. The scholarship on
the United Nations organization has focused primarily on the meetings at Dumbarton
Oaks in 1944, and the San Francisco Conference in 1945; these works are almost
exclusively concerned with the questions of how to set up a postwar international
organization, and the actual form that the organization should take. Many of these works
take the speeches and press releases of wartime leaders, politicians, and diplomats for the
absolute truth.23 Related scholarship on the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, and more
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recently, the Food and Agriculture Conference of 1943, is similarly devoid of answers
to the question.24 The debate over humanitarian relief provides an excellent opportunity
to reevaluate the stated intentions of policymakers: indeed it was in the context of the
discussions on relief that American officials determined why they should set up a postwar
international organization under the United Nations rubric.
Relief also provides a new perspective from which to analyze Anglo-American
relations. The British, in fact, wanted the Americans to take decisive action. But when it
became apparent that the American proposal for a relief agency would provide a model
for postwar international organization, they pursued a policy not unlike the one they
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underlines the role domestic opinion played in shaping the Roosevelt Administration’s
postwar plans. See also Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal For the World: America’s
Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Belknap Press at Harvard, 2005). Borgwardt takes
the words of the politicians and diplomats and shows how they have become international
law whether they intended it or not. Paul Kennedy has also published a book on the
United Nations, but is more concerned with the organization’s future than the past: Paul
Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations
(New York: Random House, 2006).
24
On Bretton Woods, see Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 1978); Alfred E. Eckes, A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the
International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975);
Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996). On the Food and Agriculture Conference, see Amy L.S.
Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture
Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965 (Kent,
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006). For a brief but excellent article on FAO, see
Craig Alan Wilson, “Rehearsal for a United Nations: The Hot Springs Conference,”
Diplomatic History, (Spring 1980), Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1980): 263-281. Craig points
out that the FAO Conference was staged for public relations purposes, but he is unable to
connect this to the wider United Nations project. We also have a number of official
histories on the United Nations. See, for example, Maggie Black, The Children and the
Nations: The Story of UNICEF (New York: UNICEF, 1986); Craig N. Murphy, The
United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Vol. 1-3 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1950).

12
followed with respect to the League of Nations. As Mark Mazower writes, “From
Whitehall’s pragmatic perspective, [the League] was thus an imperial project that looked
as if it could simultaneously cement the alliance with the United States, shore up Eastern
Europe against Bolshevism, and link Britain’s European and imperial commitments.”25 In
anticipation of this behavior, American policymakers sought to knock Britain out of the
equation. As a result, the visit of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the British official responsible
for relief, to Washington in the summer of 1942 ended in failure. The Americans spurned
his efforts to augment British power and preserve their empire.
The State Department planners based the structure of the organization on the
American constitutional system, yet their vision of how it would operate paralleled the
New Deal idea of how the American government should function – the executive would
be supreme. Thus while a strong Director General position – reserved for an American
citizen – would play the presidential role, overseeing a vast global executive that would
implement relief programs in accordance with American interests, a Council consisting of
the United Nations would serve functions not dissimilar from those of the American
Congress. The latter’s real purpose, however, would be to provide the agency legitimacy.
Additionally a four-power Central Committee consisting of China, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and the United States would operate as a steering committee. This
arrangement had no parallel in the American Government, but Roosevelt preferred it and
State Department officials supported it with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
When the British realized they had little choice but to accept what the Americans
proposed, the draft for an international relief organization was shared with China and the
25
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Soviet Union, which in turn necessitated four-power talks. The relief negotiations thus
provide an unexploited opportunity to examine the feasibility of Roosevelt’s four
policemen. At no other point during or immediately after the war did high-level
representatives of the four powers meet for the purpose of discussing a postwar matter of
a constitutive nature. The discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, it should be pointed out,
included the four powers, but the Russians refused to meet directly with the Chinese,
which meant that the Anglo-Saxons met first with the Russians, and then with the
Chinese. The four-power talks that led to the creation of UNRRA, by contrast, included
all four of the powers at once. Apart from the regular meeting of the Central Committee
after the establishment of UNRRA, this was a rare event.
The results were surprising. On the critical issue of the Director General’s
authority to operate in a given territory, which would have given Washington the freedom
to utilize the agency as a proxy for its broader postwar project, the Soviets refused to
bend. Though with important distinctions, the Chinese supported their position. The
British also came to Moscow’s defense, arguing that the agency could always withhold
aid if a prospective recipient state refused to meet its demands. Washington’s freedom of
action was therefore compromised even before the organization came into being, but with
the war still raging, the United States could not endanger the Grand Alliance.
The four-power talks would also make another fact abundantly clear. Canada, at
least in early 1943, was the second most bountiful country in the Western Alliance, and
arguably the second most powerful, behind the United States. The Soviet Union would
emerge victorious at Stalingrad during this period, but the decisive Battle of Kursk that
signified an inevitable Russian victory still lay in the future. The relief organization
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would need Canadian resources, but officials in Ottawa rejected Roosevelt’s fourpower formula and resented their exclusion from so many of the wartime conferences and
meetings. While the Chinese and Soviets held tenaciously to the four-power formula, the
British, who were as dependent on Canadian as they were on American resources,
insisted on the enlargement of the Central Committee to provide a seat for Ottawa. This
fact dragged out the process for weeks, and almost forced the United States to scuttle the
proposal altogether.
This aspect of our story provides a window into the conflicting dynamics of five
overlapping configurations in the international system: the Grand Alliance fighting the
war; the Four Policemen who would guarantee the security of the postwar world; the
informal Transatlantic Triangle linking together Britain, Canada and the United States
economically, militarily and culturally; the British Commonwealth connecting the
independent elements of the British Empire with London; and the Inter-American system
unifying the Americas under Washington’s leadership. If the four-power talks preserved
the Grand Alliance, and left open the possibility of a postwar world run by the Four
Policemen, it also weakened Canada’s bonds with the Commonwealth, and signified a
postwar alignment between Ottawa and Washington.
The relief portfolio also discloses the central paradox of the United Nations: its
members were not united. When the American Government shared the draft relief
agreement with the alliance and the so-called associated powers, they read the document
with complete trepidation. While many governments, especially those exiled in London,
abhorred the four-power Central Committee, others feared the Director General, who, in
their view, would function as an international dictator. Yet because the Allied countries
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remained divided, either over how to respond to the draft or due to extraneous issues,
they were simply incapable of presenting any sort of unified opposition to the American
plan. While key players such as Brazil and France considered it in their interest to play
along, even though they disliked the proposal, others worried that they would arouse the
wrath of the world’s most powerful country, and thereby forfeit any possible influence
they might have at the peace table. Thus the appearance of unity resulted; but underneath
the spectacle lay deep discontent.
Efforts to secure Congressional approval for the relief agreement colored the
closing act with irony. To win allied support, American diplomats repeatedly told them
that the UNRRA Council would function like the American Congress. An elaborate
system of Council committees would assume policymaking functions similar to the
legislative responsibilities of the powerful committees in Congress. American officials
argued that the Council would wield considerable power. Yet just as they made this case,
these same officials endeavored to force the hand of Congress on the relief agreement.
Instead of presenting it as a treaty, which would have required a two-third majority vote
of the Senate, they cajoled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into a formula
whereby they would relinquish this power, not only for the UNRRA agreement, but for
most all of the planned postwar arrangements.

Analytical Frameworks: Transnationalism and Imperialism

The story I tell rarely uses the word transnational: the actors in it never employed
this term. But the word, if properly defined, can help the reader analytically: the ideas it
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connotes played a central role in the thought process of many of the characters in this
story, who worried about problems and actors that might be described as transnational.
This term obviously signifies movement across the borders of sovereign states. But it
should be distinguished from just any movement across frontiers; these movements entail
actors, forces, or phenomena that transpire against or despite the system of states. Only
with this distinction can we really understand the use of the prefix “trans,” which not only
connotes across, but also beyond, through, and changing thoroughly, as it relates to the
system of states. As such, transnational developments are intrinsically destabilizing, or
purposely revolutionary in terms of their effects on international affairs.26
This definition points to another aspect of my argument: UNRRA was explicitly
anti-transnational. It was a creation of states, to be used by states, for the purpose of
preventing and containing cross-border problems such as pandemic and famine.
Policymakers also worried about a displaced persons crisis, which constituted both a
problem and an actor deserving of the descriptor, transnational. UNRRA worked to
manage, survey, and control these people. It served similar objectives for other actors,
particularly those working in relief or a related field. Here the aim was to utilize and
exploit transnational actors to resolve problems, but to do this in a way that centralized
control. Entities such as the American Friends Service Committee would be subsumed in
a superstructure that would allow states, primarily the United States, to control them,
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coordinate their efforts, and use them for their own purposes, whether in obtaining
resources or administering relief programs.
This interpretation exhibits a degree of disrespect to the terms intellectual origins.
Most likely, the writer and intellectual, Randolph Bourne, first used the word in a 1916
essay entitled “Trans-National America,” which was a reaction to what one author calls
“a nation rent by crusades for ‘Americanization.’” Bourne’s essay attacked American
imperialism abroad, and the melting pot at home. While touting a non-interventionist
message, he suggested the United States accommodate immigrant cultures into what he
referred to as a “cosmopolitan America,” as opposed to forcing the country’s newcomers
to assimilate into one Anglo-Saxon culture. In turn, this “trans-national” or multicultural
America would provide a model for the nations of the world to emulate.27
Even if we were to accept this interpretation of the transnational label, it does not
alter our argument. On the one hand, UNRRA sought to unify the nations of the world
around American ideas. The New Dealers, especially Adolf Berle, accepted neither the
merits nor the possibility of multiculturalism; rather, they believed new communications
foreordained the creation of a homogenous global culture. Doubtless they preferred that it
take on an American quality.28 On the other hand, UNRRA constituted an interventionist
ploy on the part of the United States to advance American interests, which Bourne would
have opposed. UNRRA, in fact, tilted the United States towards empire, and should be
analyzed in “imperial” terms. Here again Berle’s words of years later are astute: “If
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empire cannot be avoided, it can be made fruitful. It may even be made to move
toward an effective system of world order.”29 For diverse reasons, this argument is ironic.
Imperialism constituted a central concern of the major Allied powers. The idea
weathered attacks well before Bourne wrote his essay, notably in John A. Hobson’s 1902
classic, Imperialism, which influenced the Bolsheviks in Russia, and helped turn opinion
against the 19th century empires.30 Woodrow Wilson’s calls for self-determination at the
end of First World War dealt the empires a further blow, fueling anti-colonial nationalism
and independence movements around the world.31 By the outbreak of the Second World
War, imperialism was a dirty word. Yet it still constituted a pillar of European power in
the world: the Belgians, British, Dutch, and French planned to hold onto their colonies
after the war. But the upstart states on the periphery – the Soviet Union and the United
States – attacked the notion. They hoped to smash the old imperial structures, and replace
them with something new. Yet they had different ideas about what should replace the old
system, which brought them into conflict, and led them to make accusations of empire
against one another. Imperialism became a political football.
For this reason, we focus not on what constitutes an empire, but on how power
works within one. If the American-led system set up during and after the Second World
War remains undeserving of the imperial label – and that may be the case – the analytical
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benefits of thinking of it as an empire are simply too rich to ignore. It not only allows
for comparison with other systems over time; it provides a device by which to understand
how the system functions, which, for better or worse, still exists. Indeed this approach
points to a second aspect of my argument, namely, that American officials designed
UNRRA not only for the purpose of setting up and administering this new global order,
but also as a means of placing or integrating the United States more firmly in the world.32
How did American officials hope to accomplish this objective? How did they plan to
execute their power in the new international system? The answer, simply put, is gently,
carefully, and surreptitiously, but with force only if necessary.
Here the ideas Elias Canetti articulated in his magnum opus, Crowds and Power,
shed light on the logic of American policymakers. Canetti had the wisdom to realize that
crowds create a feeling of equality among those who are in them, which makes it easier
for an individual in a crowd to obey the orders of a ruler than if he or she were alone. He
defined crowds broadly enough to include fans at a football game and members of a
parliament, but also nation states and religious denominations. Canetti, however, drew a
distinction between crowds that exist for centuries, like the Catholic Church, and those
that dissipate rapidly, like short-lived political movements or a frantic gathering around a
haphazard fight. The creation of institutions, he argued, elongates the existence of a
crowd, or the sense of equality for those who are in one; simultaneously, they offer a
hierarchy through which orders can be given.33 American officials believed it would be
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easier to issue commands and maintain influence over global affairs through
institutions than if they had to deal with countries on an individual or ad-hoc basis.
In Crowds and Power, Canetti explained the logic behind these ideas quite
precisely. A number of American policymakers, though not all of them, instinctively
understood them. Canetti likened the issuance of a command or order to the strike of a
bullwhip, which arrives with momentum and stings upon contact. The sting, he
suggested, constitutes the problem with power. Overtime these stings build up and create
resentment towards, or cause for rebellion against the individual or entity delivering the
commands. He suggested two possibilities exist to relieve the subject of the sting. Either
he or she has the opportunity to give orders, and thereby reduce the stings from his or her
own inner being, or he or she joins a “reversal crowd” that turns against the person or
entity giving the orders, just as the mobs of the French Revolution turned on Louis XVI.
Thus Canetti concluded: “If we would master power we must face command openly and
boldly, and search for means to deprive it of its sting.”34
After the Second World War, American officials hoped to avoid the resentment
caused by Wilson and Hoover’s unilateral management of relief after the First World
War.35 As a result, they sought to institutionalize relief in a framework that would serve
as a model for postwar global governance. In this way, those who voluntarily chose to
become a part of the organization would feel a sense of equality with one another, even if
it did not exist in reality. Presumably they would have the chance to influence the
contents of the commands, or, of giving commands themselves, within or on behalf of the
34
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organization. This right would in turn relieve them of the stings incurred when the
great powers or the international community ordered them to undertake some action. The
result would be legitimacy, stability, and general acceptance of the system. In sum,
American policymakers sought to take the sting out of the execution of power, or, where
this was not possible, to mitigate against its consequences.
The Latin root of imperial is imperium, which translates into command.36 If the
sting is removed from the command, or its consequences eliminated, then it follows that
an imperial structure might not feel or seem as though it is an empire. Britain might have
hoped to shore up its empire with the League of Nations, as Mazower suggests, but the
imperial stigma could not be removed. The American planners therefore believed
European imperial power should be smashed. For this reason, UNRRA could not become
a means to preserve empire; the United States, in fact, would obstruct all possible efforts
by the British to use it for this end, and would instead employ the organization as an
instrument to establish something purportedly new. Though outside the parameters of this
study, it is an astonishing fact that when the State Department began setting up this
agency’s bureaucracy, its officials looked to the British Empire as a model.37
The system they imagined shared attributes with an imperial structure, but turned
many of the ideas associated with imperialism upside down, if not in reality, at least in
appearance. Historian Paul Kramer’s definition of “the imperial” offers a framework with
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which to assess American action and the system they envisioned. It allows one to
assess how distinct imperial structures influence the way commands are issued, enforced,
and obeyed. Kramer writes that the “imperial refers to a dimension of power in which
asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of
exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline,
dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.” It serves our purpose to break this definition
down into its constituent parts so that their applicability to our case can be understood.38
First, Kramer’s definition accounts for what he calls “scalar power,” which can be
“expressed in military, economic, political, or cultural terms.” Relative weight constitutes
the basis of this form of power: one country would be more powerful in economic terms,
for example, if its gross domestic product exceeded that of another country.39 This, in
fact, was the case for the United States, which used its economic strength to secure the
preeminent position in UNRRA for itself. Thus its economic weight, or ability to provide
the organization with resources on a scale that exceeded all other countries combined,
translated into political weight: the United States reserved a seat for itself on the fourpower Central Committee, but also secured a promise from China, Great Britain and the
Soviet Union that an American would serve as the Director General of the organization’s
executive. American officials hoped this economic and political weight would allow the
United States to increase its influence in areas where the military balance did not fall in
America’s favor, as they anticipated the case would be in Eastern Europe.
Second, Kramer’s definition stresses “the material, institutional, and discursive
organization of space.” But instead of limiting “the imperial to the state control of
38
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territory,” as other definitions do, it “remains open to non-territorial networked forms
of spatial order.”40 The United States exploited or manipulated each of these dimensions
of power, whether in territorial or networked forms. Linkages of all sorts – military,
economic, political and cultural – made it significantly easier for Washington to secure
the participation and resources of Latin America; countries in the region did not want to
experience the repercussions of their failure to cooperate: thus they obeyed what was
called an invitation. American officials took the lead in preparing UNRRA’s institutional
framework: here they worked to reduce British influence, while ensuring themselves the
dominant position in the agency. In the discursive realm, Roosevelt and diverse officials
employed anti-imperial language, which challenged the legitimacy of any polity that
considered or referred to itself as an empire. At the same time, they spoke the language of
freedom, thereby contradicting the raw use of power altogether.
Even more striking, they manipulated a third aspect of Kramer’s definition,
namely that the imperial “stresses the importance of exceptionalizing difference.” Here
Kramer argues that imperial regimes seek to create power by drawing contrasts between
“populations that lend shape to its vertical gradations of sovereignty.” By emphasizing
racial distinctions, or feminizing a population, for example, the imperial polity seeks to
justify and enhance its power.41 But here the Americans did the exact opposite. China
was allowed a seat on the Central Committee to counter impressions that the United
States was racist towards Asians;42 Roosevelt insisted that women serve on the American
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delegation to the first UNRRA conference to impress populations at home and abroad
of America’s commitment to gender equality.43 Yet paradoxically, this was also done to
exceptionalize America’s values, culture, and system of government, which officials
throughout the Roosevelt Administration hoped to export to the entire world.
Finally, Kramer insists that his definition focuses on the “consequences” of “the
imperial,” as opposed to the motivations of historical actors.44 This approach makes
sense. Systemic developments often have nothing to do with human actions. And when
they do, this focus discourages the historian from assigning blame for an outcome, while
still allowing for a discussion of causes. Despite these advantages, this approach has
to world stresses of economic and political character is a stress of racial character. There
can be no hope of lasting world order in any arrangements which does not provide for
political amalgamation – principles of participation and opportunity free from racial
discrimination. Chinese placement in key positions is to be regarded as only an essential
beginning.” Paul Appleby to Oscar Cox, November 10, 1942, File UNRRA 1942-45, Box
105, Cox Papers, FDRL. “The fundamental premises for such combined action that you
point out are exceedingly well taken. Not only the Declaration of Independence, but all
the experience up to date very well indicate that, on a non-emotional and non-prejudiced
basis, we have got to assume, contrary to Mr. Hitler and the Nazis, that, in terms of
possibilities, there is no such thing as a superior race. All peoples have and should have
the opportunity for getting the same benefits of civilization and the same elements that go
to make up a reasonable standard of living.” Oscar Cox to Walter Nash, December 1,
1943, File UNRRA 1942-45 (1), Box 105, Cox Papers, FDRL.
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problems. It reduces human beings to cogs in a system, when, in fact, they sometimes
play decisive roles in creating an imperial structure, and they almost always determine
the contents of a command pushed through the system. The personality of the individual
can and does impact outcomes, and what motivates them matters for how we interpret
historical processes. It therefore seems imperative that intentions receive consideration in
certain cases. In this study, the divergence between the secret motivations of officials and
their publicly stated intentions sheds light on how they hoped to execute power in the
postwar international system.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE MAELSTROM OF RELIEF POLITICS

Herbert Hoover was determined to prevent the barbarous byproducts of total war.
“Starvation by blockade and killing from the air have become weapons of attack, and that
[has meant] the wholesale killing of women and children,” he told the international
convention of Christian Endeavor Societies on July 6, 1939. In his view, something had
to be done to eliminate this needless carnage. Thus repeating a plea he made on Armistice
Day in 1929, Hoover called for an international moratorium on the blockading of ships
carrying food. Citing a further proposal he had made in 1932, he urged the nations of the
world to end air attacks on civilian populations. In this way, the former President’s
crusade to help suffering and destitute populations during the Second World War
began.45
Hoover knew the likelihood that these proposals would ever receive consideration
was low, especially in July 1939, when the international situation stood at the precipice;
but by advancing them, he sent a message to would-be belligerents. Under his proposals,
the enforcement of these bans would fall to neutral nations, which would manage food
shipments to blockaded countries and serve as observers in nations under aerial assault. If
violations occurred, the perpetrators would be excoriated in the eyes of public opinion.
Hoover hoped the United States would again remain aloof if conflict broke out: it could
assume the moral high ground and role of adjudicator. The losers in the last war “lost not
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by lack of valor or courage,” he reminded his audience. “They lost by failure to heed
the public opinion of what were originally neutral nations.”46
For the first two years of the Second World War, Hoover was at the center of the
debate over wartime relief for civilian populations. He understood the full impact of the
British blockade of Europe before they did: if it aimed to deprive Germany of its warmaking capacity, it would also deprive nations dependent on European markets of their
livelihood. He anticipated his opponents’ arguments against him, and refuted them before
they were made. The last war had revealed the fallacy “that putting the screws on the
civil populations gets war over quicker.” But this attitude only “sharpened hate and
hardened resolution to continue.” Hoover, in effect, created major problems for the
British and American Governments, both of which bitterly resented his efforts.47
The impact of his program was not inconsequential. In his efforts to force the
British to open the blockade for food aid, the former President precipitated the debate
over postwar relief, which in turn ignited discussions of the whole postwar economic
system and international organization. His efforts also led Churchill to make statements
that would burden the British Government until the end of the war. Inadvertently, they
also facilitated Britain’s efforts to forge an alliance with the United States. But to
Hoover’s dismay, both countries endeavored to undermine his program. If he waged his
crusade for food relief using the instruments of public relations, the resulting propaganda
war was one he lost. How did this happen? What were its consequences?
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The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Great Humanitarian

“It has been said, and I think correctly, that Herbert Hoover was responsible for
saving more lives than any person who has ever lived.” Such is the judgment of President
Hoover’s preeminent biographer, George Nash.48 During and after the First World War,
Hoover would, by his own estimation, organize relief and reconstruction assistance for
more than a billion people in forty-five nations.49 For his efforts, he would become a
global celebrity and a giant in the life of his nation. Yet his importance for America’s
relations with the world remains scant in the popular imagination.
Hoover’s life is the quintessential American success story. Born in West Branch,
Iowa in 1874, the death of his parents left him an orphan at age nine. At seventeen, he
enrolled in the first class at Stanford University.50 After graduating in 1895 with a degree
in geology, he left the United States for Australia to pursue a career as a geologist. By
1914, he held mining investments on every continent and had an estimated fortune of $4
million, more than $92 million in today’s terms. He had learned fluent Mandarin, written
the standard textbook on mining, and translated Georgius Agricola’s 1556 classic De re
metallica into English.51 It was an astonishing set of achievements.
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With the outbreak of the First World War, Hoover’s business interests, as he
wrote at the time, were “absolutely shot to pieces…” He turned his attention to public
service. The German requisition of food in occupied Belgium, a country that had
historically relied on imports to meet its nourishment needs, provided Hoover his long
desired opportunity. Ambition, to be sure, but also the humanitarian impulse of his
Quaker faith drove him to establish, organize, and lead the Commission for Relief in
Belgium (CRB), which spent $895 million to buy and ship 11.4 billion pounds of food to
9.5 million civilian victims of the war.52 These efforts revealed the engineer’s diplomatic
and administrative skills. When the United States entered the conflict, President
Woodrow Wilson appointed him head of the U.S. Food Administration. After the war, he
would direct the American Relief Administration (ARA), which delivered four million
tons of relief supplies to 23 war-torn nations,53 most remarkably to Soviet Russia during
the famine of 1921.54
These accomplishments made Hoover a natural contender for the Presidency.
Though denied the Republican nomination in 1920, he served as Secretary of Commerce
under Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. In this position, he implemented a vast
regulatory regime that increased the efficiency of the economy. He revolutionized the
relationship between government and business, establishing partnerships that reduced the
adversarial climate of previous decades. By 1928, when Hoover finally secured the
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nomination, the nation considered the Republicans responsible for the roaring twenties.
Boom times and divisions among the Democrats propelled him to a landslide victory.55
But the Great Depression shattered Hoover’s presidency. However one might
assess his policy response to the sharp economic collapse that turned into a global
conflagration by 1932, bank failures, high unemployment, and contraction in domestic
consumption and international trade mortally damaged Hoover’s reputation, while his
management of the press and inability to radiate anything but gloom guaranteed his
plunge. The Great Humanitarian became the topic of incessant jokes, and the object of
scorn for everything that had gone wrong.56 The result was a humiliating loss in 1932 to
Franklin Roosevelt, in which his share of the popular vote declined by 32 percent over
the 1928 returns.57
Roosevelt paradoxically embraced many of Hoover’s domestic and foreign
policies. The Good Neighbor Policy towards Latin America became his own,58 and much
of the New Deal derived from Hoover programs.59 Yet the new President continually
used his predecessor as a scapegoat, lashing out at him in the 1936 campaign even though
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his opponent was someone else. He also insulted him with petty acts, such as removing
his name from the Hoover damn.60 The relationship would be strained.
The importance of these developments cannot be denied, but in the wider context
of America’s relations with the world, Hoover’s significance derives from his efforts to
aid suffering populations. Of course he was not the first individual in American history to
provide relief to victims of war or natural disasters. As early as the Revolutionary War,
the Quakers negotiated an agreement with Generals George Washington and William
Howe to permit relief into the besieged city of Boston, an act repeated with most every
war and natural catastrophe in American history thereafter.61 Hoover, moreover, was not
the first American to help peoples abroad: protestant missionaries had undertaken aid
work throughout the world during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.62
Hoover’s distinction rests on the geographic scope and the financial scale of his
relief activities, which symbolized the rise of the United States in global affairs and
produced the necessity for governmental involvement, if not in the actual implementation
of relief schemes, certainly in the financing of them. His penchant for administrative
efficiency and technocratic methods distinguished his endeavors from previous relief
efforts, and led to calls for increased centralization to coordinate and synchronize the
actions of diverse groups working in this field.63 These methods constituted a response to
the advent of total war. But the effect was that Hoover’s work contributed significantly to
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the rise of what one historian has called “global meliorism,” or “the socio-economic
and politico-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better
place.”64

Hoover and Roosevelt: War Relief and the Global Crisis

The deteriorating international situation of the late 1930s provided Hoover a
chance to resuscitate his reputation. After having already taken Manchuria in 1931, the
Japanese invaded all of China in 1937. The following year, Hitler consumed Austria and
the Sudetenland, acts he would follow up with the seizure of Czechoslovakia in March
1939. This environment made Hoover’s unrivaled international experience important. He
would play significant roles in the resulting foreign policy debates, first, during the
Congressional elections of 1938, in which the Republicans, while failing to obtain a
majority, would pick up 81 seats in the house and six in the Senate, and then during
debates in Congress over various defense and foreign policy measures. Hoover’s accurate
predictions and astute analysis made him a prized speaker. With his popularity on the
rise, he was touted as a possible presidential nominee for the Republican Party in 1940.65
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Roosevelt did not underestimate these developments. His wife, Eleanor,
suggested he reach out to Hoover.66 Thus on September 9, 1939, a little more than a week
after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Myron Taylor, the former leader of U.S. Steel then
serving as the President’s ambassador at large, informed Hoover that Roosevelt would
like to confer with him on relief measures for Europe. Hoover thereupon told Taylor that
the Red Cross should assume responsibility for this task. With chapters all over the
country, it had the infrastructure to raise funds. It also maintained a fully trained staff,
which had proven itself during the Chinese famine of 1920-21, following the Japanese
earthquake of 1923, and after the catastrophic Mississippi floods of 1927. It simply
needed a “capable administrator” to head its European division. As for a meeting at the
White House, Hoover claimed it “would only create speculation and unnecessary
discussion in the country.” After all, he had “responsibility in the Republican Party,” but
was sure the President would have its support if he kept the country “out of war.”67
Roosevelt was tenacious, and instructed Norman Davis, Chairman of the Red
Cross, to reach out to Hoover. During a four-hour meeting on September 14, 1939, the
former President reiterated his argument: the Red Cross should serve as the central
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coordinating and operating agency for the whole relief task. If it agreed to do this
work, then he would accept Davis’ invitation to serve on the Red Cross Executive
Committee. He also agreed to attend the Committee’s next meeting, but only if his views
were published in advance. Davis refused. And in Hoover’s absence, the Executive
Committee rejected his proposals on September 18, 1939.69 The situation, according to
Davis, remained too fluid “to lay out a general program of relief for the civilian victims
of war.” Any program “of mass feeding and relief over an extended period,” he argued,
would require “substantial outlays of money as to necessitate Governmental financing.”
Thus it could only undertake emergency relief in accordance with its traditional policy of
providing medical assistance, clothing and blankets.70 Hoover lamented the Red Cross’s
reluctance to undertake “one of the greatest obligations that has ever come to them.”71
Poland constituted the country of immediate concern. With the Red Cross
unwilling to provide more than emergency relief, the Polish Government exiled in France
appealed to Hoover for assistance. On September 25, 1939, he and his WWI lieutenants
organized the Commission for Polish Relief. 72 With the assistance of the Polish
Government, the Commission negotiated agreements with Britain to permit supplies
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through the blockade of Germany, and with the Nazis to allow for their distribution.

Financed largely through private donations and gifts from the Polish Government, these
resources provided succor to suffering Poles, both home and abroad in the case of those
who fled, until mid 1940. For its part, the Red Cross delivered medical aid: the small size
of the deliveries and their use of the German Red Cross for distribution allowed them to
avoid negotiations with the belligerents, which had been one of the chief reasons they
rejected Hoover’s plan in the first place. By contrast, the size of the Commission’s
deliveries required shipment through the blockade, and the British would not consent to
this if the German Red Cross maintained responsibility for distribution.74
As the saga over Poland unfolded, another country’s problems entered the
discussion. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland over territorial
disputes, igniting the so-called Winter War. Here again the Red Cross refused to
undertake any program beyond its traditional activities, which drove the Finnish
Government to seek Hoover’s assistance. But where Hoover’s men established the
Commission for Polish Relief to act “as the distribution agent of [existing] fund-raising
groups,” they incorporated the Finnish Relief Fund on December 6, 1939 so that it could
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This decision had two apparent causes. While Poland had

numerous groups raising funds in the United States, Finland did not. And while Hoover
took a backseat role in the Polish Commission to avoid possible “smears” from the New
Dealers, he now intended to play a very public role in raising funds for Finland.76 He also
decided to begin publicly supporting fundraising drives for Poland as well.77 Thus his
organization increasingly came into conflict with the Red Cross over available funds.78
Hoover also obtained considerable attention in the media,79 a fact that irritated President
Roosevelt.80
Mixed motives had driven Roosevelt to turn to Hoover. The worsening
international situation, for one, meant that he would need bipartisan support to conduct
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foreign policy. When seeking revisions to the Neutrality Acts of 1936 to permit U.S.
firms to sell arms to belligerents, a move Hoover disliked, he reached across the aisle.81
Roosevelt began considering the inclusion of Republicans in his Cabinet, which led in
July 1940 to the appointments of Henry Stimson and Frank Knox as Secretaries of War
and the Navy, respectively.82 He had other motives as well. It served him no purpose to
have Hoover, whose rising popularity made him a possible presidential candidate,
repeatedly attacking his Administration for embarking on a path to war: “It is a poor
national policy,” Hoover would assert, “to go around the world sticking pins in
rattlesnakes.”83 If Hoover would join his administration as a manager of war relief, it
might restrict his behavior and compromise any presidential aspirations he had. Perhaps
these factors led Eleanor Roosevelt to initiate the outreach to Hoover in late September
1939, and then to publicly laud his abilities and tout him as a possible American relief
chief in November 1939.84
Yet the First Lady’s praise did not persuade him. Hoover harbored deep
resentments. He considered Roosevelt responsible for the withdrawal of his secret service
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protection the day he left office. As he apparently told Norman Davis, Roosevelt had
done this at a time when he feared assassination.85 Hoover, moreover, had no intention of
sacrificing his political independence. Just days after Eleanor’s public statements, he
argued that if the country “became involved in the European war, liberty would perish in
the United States.”
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Eleanor attributed Hoover’s behavior to his presidential

aspirations.87
This view has merit. Hoover took steps to obtain the nomination. Winning the
presidency, after all, was the best way for him to keep the United States out of the war.
Hoover’s private relief activities bolstered his image as a humanitarian, which also served
a possible candidacy. But his efforts to obtain the nomination were lackluster: he never
publicly stated his intent. And as one scholar explains, his relief efforts reduced the time
he could devote to politics.88 However, this fact probably stems from media attacks he
weathered on account of his public involvement with the Finnish Relief Fund.
These efforts annoyed Roosevelt. In mid December 1939, someone, possibly
Davis but probably Roosevelt, informed the press that the President had asked Hoover to
head “all relief activities in the United States,” but that he refused due to his desire to take
part in the presidential campaign.89 When Hoover denied this allegation on December 14,
1939, the White House press secretary, Stephen Early, confirmed the president’s offer.
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This salvo infuriated Hoover, who quibbled over inaccurate details in Early’s
statement, but more importantly, shared his complete correspondence with Davis to the
press.90
Though George Nash has suggested that this affair hurt the former President’s
standing, the letters may have rectified the controversy in Hoover’s favor: they made it
clear that his rejection resulted from the Red Cross’s refusal to take on the relief task.91
Roosevelt, in any case, blamed Davis, who “had let [Hoover] get away with this.” In his
view, the Chairman of the Red Cross needed a “good publicity man.”92
In January 1940, the President attempted to regain the initiative. He proposed,
firstly, that Congress help Finland. 93 Then the following month, he embraced an
appropriation for Polish relief. Hoover supported both proposals and even testified in
favor of the Polish measure before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.94 The bills
passed, but Hoover’s testimony aggravated the President. He attacked the Roosevelt
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Administration for its failure to take the lead on cross-blockade relief. The maneuver
backfired. Hoover’s outfit for Polish relief never received any of the money appropriated
for the country.96 Indeed the wide discretion Congress granted Roosevelt allowed him to
divert portions of the appropriation to British relief.97 As for Finland, the President
escaped further criticism when the Winter War came to an end on March 13, 1940.
But the dispute over war relief would not disappear. Following the Nazis invasion
of Poland, the British and French declared war on Germany. The Germans took no
further action until April 9, 1940, when, to everyone’s surprise, they assaulted Denmark
and Norway in Operation Weserübung. Events unfolded so rapidly that the Danish
Government had neither time to declare war nor to flee. The Danes surrendered within
hours; the Germans left them in power in return for their collaboration. The Norwegian
capitulation would not come until early June. Meanwhile, on May 10, 1940, the Nazis
unleashed Blitzkrieg on Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg and France. The Wehrmacht’s
success astonished everyone, especially Hoover, who had predicted a stalemate.98 By mid
May 1940, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg had surrendered. A month later the British
Expeditionary Force, which had been deployed to the Franco-Belgian border following
the Nazi attack on Poland, had been captured or pushed off the continent. On June 25,
1940, France surrendered. Most all of Western Europe now lay under Nazi domination.
These developments had four effects relevant to our story. First, most of the
invaded countries established a government or authority in London recognized by the
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British. Second, many of these governments appealed to Hoover for assistance in
relieving their home populations: Belgium and Luxemburg sought help in May; the
Netherlands acted in July; and Norway requested aid in September.100 Third, the British
widened the blockade to include all of Europe, even the neutral countries such as
Portugal and Spain.101 This decision, in part, resulted from the Italian assault on France
and declaration of war on Britain in late 1940, which justified the move. Finally, Winston
Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister of Britain. A “militarist of the
extreme school,” according to Hoover, Churchill unified the exiled governments under
the Allied banner and defended British blockade policy tenaciously.102
By mid August 1940, The Washington Post reported that relief “shipments to
portions of Europe under German control” had “virtually stopped.”103 The need for
deliveries to Finland declined after Helsinki signed a peace agreement with Moscow. But
in the case of Poland, where American pressure led Chamberlain to permit shipments
through the blockade in March 1940, the arrival of Churchill meant a sudden reversal of
this policy. These circumstances brought Hoover, who had called for an international
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convention banning food blockades in the summer of 1939,
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into open confrontation

with the British. They also made the Roosevelt Administration’s position more complex:
in addition to the Poles, the State Department now had several of the governments in
exile pleading with them to advocate for relief shipments to their home populations.
Hoover, for his part, rejoined the chorus after the Republican convention in June 1940,
where he lost the party’s nomination for president.
On July 26, 1940, Hugh Gibson and John Hartigan, Hoover’s associates in
London and Berlin, respectively, presented a detailed version of his relief plan to the
British and German governments.105 In Washington, Hoover shared the proposal with the
Marquees of Lothian, Britain’s Ambassador to the United States.106 It requested that
Britain permit food shipments through the blockade if Germany agreed to certain
conditions: not to attack ships carrying the food, to take none of the domestic produce of
the recipient country, to furnish the equivalent of any food already taken, and to permit
imports from Russia and the Balkans into the country. To ensure the Germans upheld
these guarantees, Hoover’s organization would control distribution. If the Germans failed
to meet their responsibilities, then the aid would cease immediately. Hoover’s plan also
stipulated that Holland, Belgium, Norway and Poland would finance the organization’s
work with their resources. Hoover designed these stipulations to meet anticipated British
objections.107
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At Hugh Dalton’s Suggestion, Churchill Speaks

This proposal and media reports that the occupied countries would soon face
famine and starvation created problems for the British. Hugh Dalton, Churchill’s Minister
of Economic Warfare, believed the government should not relax the blockade to permit
food into Europe, but feared that if it did not, advocates of cross-blockade relief would
accuse Britain of causing a humanitarian catastrophe for which it was not responsible.
Dalton also worried about the unusual situation in France. While the Nazis occupied the
northern areas of the country to have control of the Atlantic coastline, they allowed
Frenchmen to govern the southern half from Vichy so long as they collaborated with
Germany. It would be difficult, Dalton reasoned, to deny Vichy food given its status,
which made it easy for neutral countries, including the United States, to maintain
relations with it. But if Britain permitted foodstuffs into unoccupied France, he feared
that it would precipitate demands from the exiled governments of countries under Nazi
occupation, which, if denied, would weaken Britain’s relationship with its natural
allies.108
These problems had to be confronted. But Dalton still believed that Britain should
not permit food through the blockade. A “depressing and monotonous diet” in the
“enslaved areas,” he argued, would create “a great inclination towards discontent and
even violent revolt.” This threat would force the Germans to feed these people, thereby
Neutral Organization Would Send Food for Three Invade Nations,” August 12, 1940,
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reducing the amount of food available for their army.
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The British believed the Nazis

would never abide by any guarantees if the Hoover scheme were adopted. As one
historian advising the British government put it: when, during the First World War, “the
Germans felt that the situation had become desperate, they ignored the guarantees they
had given against seizing native food.”110 Despite Hoover’s assertions to the contrary,
historical scholarship has confirmed the view that his relief efforts during WWI abetted
the German war effort, and that the balance of food and raw material resources proved
decisive in that conflict’s outcome.111 The British certainly believed this to be the case.112
Dalton proposed a propaganda effort to correct misinformation and outmaneuver
the interests driving the campaign for cross-blockade relief. “The plain truth,” he wrote
on August 7, 1940, “is that there will be no famine in any part of this area, unless the
Germans snatch away food which is there now, or refuse to allow food which is not far
away to be moved to where it is most needed.” Food supplies in Europe exceeded those
in India, Africa, Japan, China, possibly Russia, and even undernourished areas of the
United States. This information needed to be propagandized lest the situation “develop
into a formidable obstacle to British victory.” It would serve no benefit to experiment
with food shipments, only to terminate them because the Nazis failed to meet obligations.
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The British had permitted food into port at Marseilles, he explained. But local
authorities bragged that they had busted the blockade.113
These circumstances did not mean that Britain should not give the Allies hope.
Dalton proposed that Britain declare its intention to “not only permit but to arrange in
advance” the shipment of food relief into “any part of the enslaved area” when it has been
“wholly cleared of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom.” “Let us
declare that food shall go in when, but only when, Hitler’s hordes go out.” He warned
against “any obvious trap, such as the pretended ‘independence’ of Petain’s France.” If
Britain worked to “build up… large stocks of food,” he believed it “could be advertised
both to Hitler’s victims and to American citizens,” who, he implied, were subject to the
humanitarian appeals of men like Hoover. The American people might even pay for it.
This stockpile could then be “held in trust for the Free Europe of to-morrow.” “Such a
provision,” he argued, “might inspire a great propagandist and moral appeal, on both
sides of the Atlantic.”114 Despite his disdain for Dalton, Churchill agreed with this
assessment.115
On August 20, 1940, he acted on his minister’s advice. But his fiery speech of that
day in the House of Commons had as much to do with the wider context of the war as it
did relief. In July 1940, just as the guns fell silent in Western Europe, the Nazis initiated a
ferocious air assault on the British Isles, attacking the country’s assets in and along the
English Channel before turning the Luftwaffe on the airfields of the Royal Air Force in
August. These attacks were being launched from the very countries to which Hoover and
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other individuals with the “highest motives” proposed to provide relief. By September,
the Nazis would revert to full-scale terror bombing of British cities and towns.116 Yet
even before this tactical shift the losses were apparent: Britain incurred the highest
casualty levels of the Battle of Britain two days prior to his August 20th speech.117 Thus
while seeking to shore up his alliances and reach out to the United States, Churchill
described the nature of total war and evoked the resilience of the British people.118
He sarcastically reminded the world that Hitler, like the Kaiser in the last war, had
“proclaimed a strict blockade of the British isles.” Britain would therefore “maintain and
enforce a strict blockade, not only of Germany, but of Italy, France, and all the other
countries that have fallen into the German power.” He rejected the “many proposals…
that food should be allowed to pass the blockade for the relief” of Europe’s “subjugated
peoples.” And he refuted the claim that this decision was inhumane. “What indeed would
be a matter of general complaint would be if we were to prolong the agony of Europe by
allowing food to come in to nourish the Nazis and aid their war effort, or to allow food to
go in to the subjugated peoples, which certainly would be pillaged off them by their Nazi
conquerors.” If problems of famine or undernourishment developed in Europe, Britain
was not to blame: the invaded countries had ample food when the Nazis attacked, and
with the harvest only then being gathered, it would have food into the foreseeable future,
unless Germany chose to steal these supplies.
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Churchill proclaimed that he would not abet the Nazi war machine so that it
could in turn attack the British people. “Many of the most valuable foods,” he explained
“are essential to the manufacture of vital war material. Fats are used to make explosives.
Potatoes make the alcohol for motor spirit. The plastic materials now so largely used in
the construction of aircraft are made of milk. If the Germans use these commodities to
help them to bomb our women and children, rather than to feed the populations who
produce them,” he argued, “we may be sure that imported foods would go the same way,
directly or indirectly, or be employed to relieve the enemy of the responsibilities he has
so wantonly assumed. Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full,” he thundered, “and
let the peoples of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the
day when that yoke will be broken.”
Churchill concluded this section of his speech with a promise that, while serving
immediate propaganda benefits, would prove a burden for the British in the future:
“Meanwhile, we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food
into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of
German forces, and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our best to
encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will
always be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including – I say
deliberately – the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering
of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.”119
Reaction to the Prime Minister’s statement was very enthusiastic in the United
States. Hoover, of course, took notice of the speech, but declined to comment or refute
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any of its central claims until after the presidential election of November 1940. As he
put it, he did not want relief to become a subject of political dispute.120 Thus reception of
Churchill’s categorical refusal to permit food through the blockade aroused little if any
comment in Washington.121 Indeed the only public rebuttal of it came from Vichy France,
where the French Foreign Minister denounced Churchill’s policy as “an inhumane
dictatorship of famine.”122 But in the United States, where Americans read daily of
British heroism in the face of the Luftwaffe’s ghastly attacks on British civilians, the
policy appeared justified. On September 1, 1940, the American Institute of Public
Opinion revealed that Americans opposed sending food to Nazi-occupied territories by a
62 to 38 percent margin. This opinion existed in both parties and in all sections of the
country.123
However, Churchill’s pledge to bring aid to Europe after liberation did not resolve
the dilemma many of the refugee governments faced. They had justifiable concerns over
the wellbeing of their people, and worried that Hitler might exploit perceptions that they
had failed to help them. This possibility, they argued, would hurt the war effort,
especially if the Nazi propaganda machine used Churchill’s policy to turn the people
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living in the occupied territories against the British.
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They must have worried that it

would also trigger challenges to their legitimacy after the war. Yet they recognized the
validity and power of Churchill’s argument. Food relief might abet the Nazi war machine
and delay the liberation of Europe. For this reason, they sought ways around the
quandary.
Two possible solutions emerged. The Dutch believed the British placed too much
emphasis on Berlin. “It was not a question of getting a guarantee from the Germans,
whom one could not trust, but rather from the United States authorities, whom one
could.” If the American Government could convince the British Government that they
would be able to “exercise the necessary control” over the distribution of relief, then they
would support a proposal for cross-blockade relief. 125 The Norwegians, by contrast,
thought the British Government should place more emphasis on the Germans. Britain,
they suggested, might agree to cross-blockade relief, but increase their demands over
what Hoover proposed in his relief scheme. In this way, the Germans would refuse to
cooperate, making it easier for them to blame any humanitarian catastrophes on Hitler.126
The British, however, held steadfast in their decision to refuse cross-blockade relief.127
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Economic Havoc and the Problem of Surpluses

Churchill’s speech converged with another difficulty Britain faced in mid 1940.
Prior to the war, a number of countries had endured problems with overproduction,
particularly those with economies based exclusively on agriculture or raw material
extraction. When Britain expanded the blockade of Germany to include areas overrun by
the Nazis as well as neutrals, these countries instantaneously lost one of their most
important markets. For many of these nations, this development spelled catastrophe.
Before the war, Europe absorbed more than half of Latin America’s exports; without this
market, valued at more than a billion dollars annually, many of these economies risked
outright collapse.128
The implication, according to Lord Halifax, was that the blockade would arouse
not only the ire of countries under Nazi occupation; it would anger areas of the world that
had historically exported to Europe. As he explained to the War Cabinet on July 19,
1940: “We must expect shortly to be held up to the execration of the World as the Power
responsible for starving parts of Europe (including very possibly France) at a time when
North and South America had large surpluses of food-stuffs, which they were unable to
sell.”129 Yet the risks were not confined to the Americas. Similar possibilities existed to
varying degrees for the Dominions and Colonies of the British Empire. Indeed all of the
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Allied Empires – Belgian, French and Dutch – faced the threat of economic havoc due
to the rapid buildup of surpluses.130
This problem had ironic implications. The blockade aimed to deny Germany and
Italy strategic materials that would allow them to wage war, but it also worked to incite
unrest and revolt in the occupied territories by creating conditions of starvation.131 The
British, however, quickly recognized that in pursuing this policy they might inadvertently
create conditions of instability in countries producing the world’s staple commodities. If
the problem of surpluses could not be solved, it might lead to the “drastic collapse of the
economic life of a large part of the world.” The resulting “social instability” could lead to
“native unrest and even revolt” in the British and Allied colonies. This possibility or even
its threat might lead producing countries to blame the blockade. “Public opinion” would
then “turn against the British policy of a fight to the finish.” “Pro-Nazi regimes” might
come to power and, with public approval, support attempts at “blockade running.” The
effect would be to cripple loyalty to the allied cause and undermine the war effort.132
Even worse, the surplus problem, if left unaddressed, could have deleterious
effects for the postwar world. The logical reaction of producing countries to the
accumulation of agricultural surpluses, the British reasoned, was to reduce production. In
Canada and the United States, and to a lesser extent, Australia and the Dutch East Indies,
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the anticipated decline in agricultural profits could be offset by increases in
manufacturing production, which, by mid 1940, was well underway due to rearmament
programs, primarily in the United States. But in countries where agriculture constituted
the sole engine of economic activity, the blockade could permanently damage their
economies, leading to a reduction in global production capacity. If this occurred, it might
well prove impossible to meet the expected demands for food and raw materials in
Europe following the defeat of Germany and Italy. “We may well find that though the
war is won,” one analysis surmised, “the restoration of European civilization is
impossible.”133
In theory, the solution to the problem seemed obvious, but in practice, it presented
difficulties. If Great Britain intended, as Churchill promised on August 20, 1940, to build
up stockpiles for the immediate relief of any liberated territory, then it naturally follows
that Britain would propose to buy up surpluses for that purpose. “The problem,” as one
analyst wrote, was “to facilitate the accumulation of foods in producing countries without
bringing temporary economic ruin on those countries, so that these accumulations may in
due course be available to take a least the edge off the appetite of a starving Europe and
so that the producing countries will not be faced with permanent heavy damage to their
economies.”134 But how was this to be done? Who would finance the purchase, transport,
and storage of these surpluses? What would prevent affected countries from increasing
production to exploit a purchasing program? Should the problem be addressed globally
for each commodity, or could it be attacked at the country level?
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British officials agreed that the problem was best solved in collaboration with
the United States. Washington had an interest in avoiding political and economic
instability in the Western Hemisphere, and it possessed the resources to make purchases
on a scale well beyond the means of Britain. With its dollar reserves diminishing, Britain
had become reluctant to make purchases in Latin America. Officials also worried that if
the two countries failed to coordinate action, they might undercut one another in cases
where surpluses existed for a given commodity in the Americas and in the British and
Allied Empires. Collaboration would also provide countries in the sterling area access to
dollars, thus providing additional export opportunities for American firms holding
surpluses. In return, officials thought the British and Allied Empires might be allowed to
supply the Western Hemisphere with its surplus commodities, when those items were in
demand.135
In June 1940, American officials, too, began to worry about this problem, but they
did not consider the issue in global terms. Instead, they tried to concoct a hemispheric
solution, whereby an Inter-American Cartel would buy up surpluses, regulate production,
fix prices, and enact marketing schemes.136 But in July 1940, they abandoned the plan,
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not so much because of opposition to it from American producers, who worried of
foreign competition, or from Latin American countries, who feared American
imperialism, but due to a fundamental transformation of strategic thought among key
policymakers in the Roosevelt Administration. As David Haglund argues, the
Administration abandoned its isolationist tendencies in July 1940, and threw its lot in
with England, even though this shift might lead to war. Increasingly American officials
came to consider Britain the first line of defense against Axis incursions in the Americas.
If Britain collapsed, they worried of one day having to fight the Germans in Latin
America without Allies.137
Now for reasons that will become apparent, this shift in thought did not translate
into cooperation with Britain over surpluses; but it did lead the United States to take steps
that would make the blockade more effective. While in June 1940 Roosevelt rejected
Churchill’s pleas for destroyers, which the Royal Navy needed to protect British ships
from Nazi U-boat attacks, by August he was ready to play ball. On September 2, 1940,
the United States transferred fifty destroyers to Britain in return for land rights on various
British possessions in the Western Hemisphere.138 To keep surpluses of strategic value
out of Nazi hands, Roosevelt also requested that Congress increase the Export-Import
Banks lending powers by $500 million. These funds could be used to keep the Latin
American countries from selling excess production to Europe.139 Though these unilateral
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measures strengthened the British blockade, they fell short of the collaborative efforts
the British urged upon the Americans beginning in July 1940.140
In the meantime, the British established machinery to devise a policy and manage
the problem, hopefully in collaboration with the Americans. In July 1940, Dalton
suggested that the War Cabinet’s Economic Policy Committee, led by the Minister
Without Portfolio, Arthur Greenwood, appoint a Ministerial Sub-Committee on Exports
to study and report on the problem.141 The War Cabinet accepted this proposal,142 but by
the fall of 1940, it became apparent to Dalton that the Ministry of Economic Warfare
would need to play a greater role in managing the problem. The issue of surpluses
collided with Britain’s policy of “control at the source,” for which his Ministry
maintained responsibility. Announced in July 1940, this policy sought to implement
export controls overseas so that ships filled with contraband would never leave their
homeport. It was hoped that this policy would relieve pressure on Royal Navy, which was
in need of warships.143
If “control at the source” made Dalton’s authority over the surpluses problem
logical, the ineffectiveness of Greenwood’s team made it certain. In September, Dalton
exploded when officials in Greenwood’s office circulated to ministers a shoddy report
bearing his name. Then, he excoriated the Minister for his team’s failure to work on
weekends during a time of heightened crisis.144 By mid November 1940, Dalton, with
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Churchill’s approval, took control of the issue by proxy. The Director-General of the
Ministry of Economic Warfare, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross assumed complete control of the
surpluses problem for the British Government. Though responsible to the Ministerial
Sub-Committee already established, Leith-Ross would chair an inter-departmental
committee of his own, the Official Committee on Export Surpluses, through which he
would coordinate and manage the overlapping efforts of the various British departments
and ministries involved.145 A central figure in our story, we will learn more of him later.
But for now, he undertook two tasks. First, he followed up a memo Ambassador
Lothian had shared with the State Department in September 1940. In doing so, LeithRoss widened the discussion to include the postwar period. It was his belief, he wrote the
American Assistant Secretary of State, Henry Grady, that “in cooperation real solutions
may be initiated which, combined with temporary war-time measures, should not only
tide the world over the present emergencies but also lay the foundations for a definite
improvement in the economic organization of the post-war world.” To avoid the failures
of 1919-20, he argued that Britain and the United States should establish a “joint AngloAmerican committee” to “agree to general lines of policy and to initiate action.” He
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thought this mechanism might in time be forged into some sort of “international
committee.” But these views, he explained, remained purely personal.146
Second, Leith-Ross articulated the most elaborate policy outline for the problem
to date. This document is remarkable for two reasons. It formally advocated for an
Anglo-American committee to manage the purchase of surpluses, and called for an
international organization to direct the production, stockpiling, and marketing of these
commodities. Second, it lamented the fact that so little had been done to build up
reserves, provide for future marketing, or to discourage overproduction, despite the fact
that Britain and the United States had begun spending large sums to relieve suffering due
to the blockade. More alarming, the State Department had informed the British
Government that it was unprepared to act on their “proposals for joint consideration of
the whole problem,” but that it was willing to “consult… as to ad hoc measures.” The
problem, as Leith-Ross explained, was that it wasn’t quite clear what the Americans
meant by this statement.147

Churchill’s Propaganda Efforts: A Call for Inter-Allied Action

Churchill supplemented Dalton’s efforts with a grandiose initiative of his own. On
October 24, 1940, he proposed a revival of the Supreme War Council, which, following
the pattern of the First World War, had been established by the British and French in
1939 to jointly oversee military strategy. The Council ceased to exist after the fall of
146
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France, but Churchill now hoped to reconstitute this body to include Belgium, Holland,
Luxemburg, Norway, Poland and the United Kingdom as well as the Dominions. He also
wanted to include the Czech National Liberation Committee, but declined to offer
membership to the Free French Forces of General Charles De Gaulle on grounds that the
exiled governments had not recognized this organization. Unlike the original Supreme
War Council, this new body would not make decisions.148
Rather, it would facilitate British war propaganda. Churchill believed Britain
“should appear to be marching forward in a good company of nations, both Dominions
and Foreign States, and that the war should not appear to be narrowed to a conflict
between Britain and Germany.”149 The War Cabinet agreed with this aim, but rejected
allusions to the “Supreme War Council.” To avoid the impression of a decision-making
body, they preferred that Churchill merely call a “Meeting of Allied Representatives.”150
Inasmuch as they did not want to relinquish control over strategy, they certainly did not
want any such misconceptions fueling the Nazi propaganda machine.151 The arguments
convinced Churchill, who thought the meeting an occasion for a grand speech, and an
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opportunity for the participating governments to pass a resolution pledging to assist
one another and continue the struggle until victory was won.152
After the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, developed the proposal, the Dominions
Secretary, Viscount Cranborne, presented it to the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand
and South African governments.153 With one exception, each of these countries accepted
the idea, consented to the proposed resolution, and agreed to participate in the meeting.
The Canadians, however, expressed severe skepticism towards the idea. In part, the
hostility out of Ottawa stemmed from the fact that the telegram mistakenly referred to a
“revival of the Supreme War Council.” “To set up a façade of such doubtless
impressiveness might in fact lessen the effect of the great and substantial effort now
being put forth by the United Kingdom and supported by the Dominions,” the Canadian
Prime Minister, Mackenzie King wrote.154
This expression of disapproval angered Churchill, who wanted to know how the
phrase “Supreme War Council” had been used when the War Cabinet had decided against
it. It was “quite easy,” he wrote, “to see how Mr. Mackenzie King was misled. With his
particular isolationist tendencies, this was a puddle at which he was sure to shy.”155 He
then took steps to correct the misinformation in a telegram to King. But he also made it
clear to the Canadian Prime Minister that he intended to hold the meeting whether Ottawa
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This threat annoyed King, and may have played a role in

the resolution of the issue. 157 As Churchill explained, “If the Canadian High
Commissioner did not attend the meeting, Mr. Mackenzie King might find difficulty in
explaining his absence to the Canadian people.”158
Though Churchill’s intervention ultimately resolved the issue, it did not remove
the force of Canada’s argument. According to King, the constitution of an Allied Council,
irrespective of its name, could serve three possible purposes: it might influence world
opinion, provide value in directing the war effort, or assist with postwar planning. He
doubted whether a “Council composed largely of governments in exile which no longer
control[ed] their own countries, would carry authority or impress the world…” If the
Council had no decision-making powers or responsibilities for postwar planning – and he
thought that it should not – then it would only reinforce the impression of a façade, which
would “offset any value its establishment would have as demonstrating to the world of
continuing Allied solidarity.” King also doubted whether the Allies would accept the
“role of silent partner” indefinitely. While he did not dispute the need to encourage the
Allied Governments, he considered victory on the battlefield the best propaganda.159
King also expressed concerns over the United States. He did not believe that aid
from Washington would “come within the operations of such a body.” His reasoning was
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two-fold. First, the American commitment to that date had been to Britain, which the
Roosevelt Administration had only recently come to view as its “first line of defense.” It
could possibly make it more difficult to obtain American assistance if it appeared to serve
a more offensive posture. This problem pointed to the second aspect of his argument. It
remained unlikely, he suggested, that the United States would commit itself to aid a body
of members if they had already attached themselves to postwar commitments, no matter
how vaguely stated. In this regard, he fiercely disputed the final clause of the proposed
resolution, which implied a postwar commitment to the “military, economic, and social
security” of Europe. It was too early to make such commitments, and doubtful whether
his country would ever agree to them. Yet he pledged to participate if the arrangements
were “temporary,” and the “resolution” more appropriate.160
The resolution consisted of three parts. In the first paragraph, the signatories
pledged their countries to “continue the struggle to liberate Europe from German and
Italian aggression until victory is won,” and to “mutually assist each other in this
struggle.” The second clause claimed that “no settled peace and prosperity” could be
obtained so long as “free people are coerced by violence into submission to German or
Italian domination, or live under threat of such coercions.” The final phrase stated that the
“only true basis for a new order in Europe” would be “cooperation of free peoples in a
system of military, economic, and social security,” and it committed the signatories to
“work together, both in war and peace, to this end.”161
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For the Canadians, the third clause presented the greatest difficulty. Officials in
Ottawa could not accept a resolution that addressed the postwar world order, and they
expressed particular dissatisfaction with the language suggesting a military commitment
to Europe.162 Ever eager to show imperial solidarity, the British cut references to “a
system” altogether and deleted the word “military” from the draft.163 The new version
made no references to Europe. Satisfied, the Canadians accepted the resolution.164
When Britain shared the revised draft with the governments in exile, they, too,
requested alterations. Belgium and Poland asked that references to “Italy” be deleted
from the draft. Mussolini’s fascist state had declared war on Britain and France in July
1940, and then attacked Greece on October 28, 1940. But none of the other allies were at
war with Italy, and they did not want to provoke Rome into a declaration.165
Quite distinct from this problem, the Poles wanted the resolution directed at the
Soviet Union, and rightly so: no sooner had the Nazis stormed into their country than the
Red Army joined in the fray. Thus the Poles proposed to substitute the phrase “alien
domination” for the words “German or Italian domination.” But the British objected for
the same reason that they refused to place the word “democratic” between “free” and
“peoples” in the third clause, another Polish suggestion. They did not want to offend
“actual or potential allies.” They also worried about increasing unrest in their colonies.
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References to “alien domination” or “democracy,” they feared, might abet “enemy
propaganda… engaged in seeking to stir up trouble among the different races of the
British Empire.” This risk had to be avoided.166
Yet in an effort to help the Poles without provoking Moscow, the British
suggested the phrase “Germany and her associates.” If any of the Allies asked who these
“associates” were, they could deflect the question by saying that it depended on whether
they regarded themselves as associates of Germany.
This formula was not without dangers. In addition to the tumultuous events
unfolding in Europe, the deteriorating situation in Asia left everyone worrying about
Japan, which had invaded all of China in 1938. Holland, for example, did not want to
give Tokyo a reason to attack the Dutch East Indies. But now that specific references to
Europe had been deleted from the resolution due to Canadian complaints, this risk
increased. 167 Though the Dutch withheld their criticisms of the new language, they
insisted the resolution was propaganda and not legally binding.168
By the end of November, all of the Dominions and Allies had agreed to the
proposal. The British had also decided that the Secretary of State for India and Burma
should attend the allied meeting to deflect criticism that these colonies were being
“committed to war without [their] consent.” In this way, it would appear that the entire
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British Empire, both Dominions and Colonies, were unified with the other allied
nations in a war to the finish against the Germans and any Nazi accomplices.169
This appearance, however, still had one problem. Though the British permitted
the Czech National Liberation Committee to participate – the Nazis had consumed
Czechoslovakia with a combination of diplomatic chicanery and outright occupation prior
to the attack on Poland – they would only permit the Free French Forces of General
Charles De Gaulle, observer status. None of the other Allied governments had recognized
De Gaulle, and the British did not want to push his organization over on them, and
inadvertently sabotage the show.170
But another country, Greece, did just that: while many of the Allies hoped to
avoid war with Italy, the Greeks did not want the Germans to use the Allied meeting as a
pretext to make war on them. Thus they refused to participate, and on November 25,
1940, the War Cabinet decided to postpone the meeting.171 As Churchill explained, “I
should not like those people in Greece to feel that for the sake of what is after all only a
parade, we had pressed them into action which could be cited by Germany as justification
for marching. The only thing to do is to put the meeting off until we can see a little more
clearly on this very confused chessboard of Eastern Europe.”172 Halifax concurred with
this assessment. To hold the meeting without Greece, he argued, would be like removing
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the “gilt” from the “ginger-bread house.” “It will be said,” he wrote Churchill, “that the
only ally who was fighting successfully had declined.”173

With the Presidential Elections Over, Hoover Goes on the Attack

On November 5, 1940, Franklin Roosevelt defeated his Republican rival, Wendell
Willkie, to win an unprecedented third term as President of the United States. If these
results renewed “Hoover’s lease in purgatory,” as one scholar interprets them, they also
removed political restraints on his campaign to advocate for cross-blockade relief.174
During a speech at Vassar College broadcast live on November 15, 1940, the former
President resumed his crusade for wartime relief. His proposals had not changed, but the
arguments had. Famine, he warned, leads to cesspools of contagion, which spreads
“regardless of borders or nations or ideologies.” It was a clear allusion to the influenza
epidemic of 1918: if America failed to act, the results could be catastrophic for the United
States as well.175 Three days later, Hoover launched the National Committee on Food for
the Small Democracies, which, with the assistance of 2,500 local committees across the
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country, aimed to raise funds for food relief and awareness of the pitiful plight of
people living in Belgium, Finland, Holland, Norway and Poland.176
Propaganda played a central role in Hoover’s strategy. To maximize his impact,
he kept his efforts confidential until he had obtained the endorsements of as many
prominent figures as possible.177 When he struck in November, his target was clear. “I
simply refuse to believe, and I am going to continue to disbelieve that American public
opinion, when it understands, is going to condemn 15,000,000 people to die, upon flimsy
arguments and informal polls.”178 If he could persuade the American people that food
relief was in their interests and in line with the morals of Christianity it would restrict
Roosevelt’s flexibility and force the British to agree to his plan. For Hoover, the British
were “dumb to their own interests” and “to the terrible and unnecessary suffering of the
small democracies, and to American reactions.” He planned to “pursue a course,” as he
wrote at the time, “which they will think against [their interests] until they become
intelligent.”179
Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill could permit Hoover’s appeals to go unanswered.
On November 29, 1940, the President met with Cordell Hull, Norman Davis, and the J.P.
Morgan banker, Thomas Lamont, who had served as mentors to President’s Wilson and
Hoover. The media suspected that Lamont that attended as a liaison between the Red
Cross and Hoover, which was partly true.180 But Lamont, a diehard Anglophile, strongly
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Thus he promised Roosevelt to “keep Hoover in

control.” If milk could be provided to unoccupied France, he thought criticism of the
Administration would be kept to a minimum.182 Roosevelt agreed. Hoover’s crusade
would “fall on its own weight,” he wrote Lamont, “especially if you are able to carry out
your wise plan of letting condensed milk into France.”183 In this way, the maneuvering
began. The British rehashed their arguments against Hoover’s proposal on December 10,
1941;184 then they reluctantly accepted the scheme to allow milk into France in January.
Roosevelt’s support remained too important to deny a scheme that had his support.185
Meanwhile, war broke out in the press. Within days of Roosevelt’s conference
with Davis and Lamont, supporters of the administration went to work. Led by the
President of the Union Theological Seminary, Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, a group of
prominent churchmen assailed Hoover’s plan. His assessments of the food situation in
Europe, they charged in a press release of December 1, 1940, were “gravely inaccurate,”
“not responsible,” and an “exaggeration.” Echoing arguments advanced by the British,
they asserted that food relief would only assist the Nazis.186 A week later, the well-known
journalist, Dorothy Thompson, argued in The Washington Post that efforts to consolidate
all “foreign national relief agencies – Finnish, Belgian, Polish, Dutch and Norwegian –
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into the Hoover organization” might compromise American foreign policy. If Hoover’s
movement became organized “in opposition to official policy,” she argued, it would
“paralyze and confuse [American] diplomacy…”187
Hoover and his associates altered their plan to make its rejection difficult. Instead
of mass feeding, they would rely on existing “soup kitchens” set up by “devoted citizens”
in the occupied territories to feed “children, the aged, and the destitute.” If the Germans
would agree to provide 25,000 tons of cereals for these soup kitchens, an additional
20,000 tons of special foods would be permitted through the blockade for the same
purpose. Imported stocks would not exceed 10,000 tons at any one time, an amount that
would be less than a one day’s supply for Germany if the Nazis chose to seize it.
Shipments, moreover, could be immediately stopped in this event. Initially the scheme
would be undertaken on an experimental basis in Belgium. If it worked, then it would be
widened to include the other small democracies. 188 In January and February 1941,
Hoover and his men presented the plan in Berlin, London and Washington. 189 On
February 16, 1941, Hoover shared it with the American people.190
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His timing presented the British with difficulties, which were exacerbated by
media reports of impending starvation in Belgium,191 German acceptance of the plan,192
positive reactions to the scheme from the Allies,193 and favorable newspaper coverage of
it. 194 British officials did not want to compromise passage of the Lend-Lease Act,
introduced by Roosevelt in January 1941 to permit his administration the right to provide
Britain with war materials at no immediate cost to London.195 Hoover, they correctly
believed, disliked the bill. If they appeared to oppose his plan of aiding Europe while
legislation to assist them remained before the Congress, they might cause a backlash
against lend-lease. This outcome would embolden Hoover and “advance” the so-called
“non-intervention movement.”196 Victory over the Nazis depended on America’s entry
into the war.
Consequently, the British looked to outmaneuver Hoover. Halifax, by this point,
had become Britain’s Ambassador at Washington. (Lothian died unexpectedly in
December 1941.) Under instructions from Anthony Eden, who now served as Foreign

Hoover Warns: Describes Test Plan to Feed Belgians,” February 17, 1941, CDT, 1;
“Hoover’s Relief Plan,” February 18, 1941, LAT, A4.
191
“Starvation Near In Belgium, Hoover Says,” January 28, 1941, WP, 4; “Belgian
Famine Seen By Hoover,” January 28, 1941, NYT, 3; “Belgians’ Food Supply Fading:
Herbert Hoover Says Ration Will Be Gone in Another Month,” January 28, 1941, LAT, 3;
Percival Knauth, “Only 2 Weeks’ Food Found in Belgium,” February 2, 1941, NYT, 24;
Alex Small, “Predict Famine to Hit Belgium in Two Weeks,” February 2, 1941, CDT,
D1.
192
“Say Germany Would Not Object,” February 18, 1941, NYT, 7.
193
See Belgian reaction to the plan as described in documents listed in previous notes.
194
“Hoover’s Relief Plan,” February 18, 1941, LAT, A4.
195
Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).
196
This logic is suggested but not explicitly stated. See Telegram No. 512, Viscount
Halifax to Mr. Eden, February 3, 1941, W 1137/49/49, Document 18; Telegram No. 648,
Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden, February 11, 1941, W 1415/49/49, Document 25, both in
FO, BDFA, Vol. 1, 349, 353.

70
Secretary, the new Ambassador confronted the former President on February 4, 1941.
Hoover disagreed with Halifax’s claim that there was enough food in Europe if properly
distributed, and the idea that his soup-kitchen scheme would aid the Germans. To the
annoyance of Halifax, Hoover refused to back down. He “inferred that he knew more of
the situation than we do,” Halifax reported. “He is out to make trouble.”197 Back in
London, Eden complained to Roosevelt’s envoy, Harry Hopkins, that Hoover was
causing the British Government considerable embarrassment. Eden wanted Roosevelt to
make a statement attacking the Hoover scheme.198 The following day, Halifax sounded
out Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State. But he thought it best to merely
emphasize German responsibility, and to allow milk shipments into unoccupied
France.199
All the while, the State Department misled the former President. In late January
1941, officials left Hoover’s aids believing that Hull was “interested and sympathetic”
with cross-blockade relief. By the end of February, he had convinced one Hoover
associate that Roosevelt and the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, constituted the
real obstacles. This same aid then persuaded Hoover to hold his fire on the
Administration to avoid politicizing the relief issue. 200 Then during a tête-à-tête on
February 28, 1941, Hull led Hoover to believe that the Roosevelt Administration might
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agree to his soup kitchen plan. Clearly impressed with the Secretary’s candor,
encouragement, and willingness to divulge highly sensitive information – the Nazis had
deployed over a million troops to the Soviet frontier – Hoover refrained from initiating an
assault on Roosevelt, despite incessant attacks being levied against him in the press.
Apparently he believed the winds of public opinion were blowing in his favor.201
But the journey of lend-lease through Congress dictated tactics more than he
knew. On March 8, 1941, the Senate, which had held up the bill for weeks, passed the
landmark act. Within hours, even before Roosevelt had signed the legislation, the British
smashed Hoover for engaging in a campaign of “false humanitarianism.” In a statement
released on March 9, 1941, Halifax rehashed Britain’s policy, arguing that Hoover’s
latest scheme would “prolong the war and… add in the long run to the sum of human
misery.”202 Four days later, Hull made the Administration’s position clear. In responding
to Hoover’s complaint of “increasing reports that the Administration” was “opposed to
relief for the occupied democracies,” Hull suggested the Administration supported the
British position, and would approach the matter on “an ad-hoc basis.” It would support
certain relief schemes, such as milk for unoccupied France, but not Hoover’s.203
The Great Humanitarian had miscalculated. By believing the Administration
might support his soup-kitchen scheme, he sacrificed his ability to fully combat the lendlease legislation. It was an astonishing misstep for someone who opposed America’s
201
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entry into the conflict and believed the act was “a war bill” disguised as “aid to
Britain.” Hoover had refrained from denouncing the bill, reasoning that it would
undermine his food relief plans if he maligned legislation ostensibly designed to assist
Britain. Instead, he privately worked with Senate Republicans to secure amendments to
the Lend-Lease Act construed to reduce the “near dictatorial powers” it granted
Roosevelt.204 Yet the amendments failed; and his relief scheme came under immediate
assault from Britain after the Senate approved the bill. Even worse, Hull now evinced
support for the British position, yet three weeks prior, if we are to believe Hoover’s
account, he encouraged the former President take up negotiations with the Germans.205
Yet Hull’s apparent turnabout did not convince Hoover to hang up his coat.
Rather, he exploited the Lend-Lease Bill to advance his cause. During a conversation
with the British diplomat Sir Ronald Campbell on March 26, 1941, and then in a letter to
Hull the following day, he insinuated that the United States now had leverage over the
British. The American people, he told Campbell, would expect their “government to
express a definite interest in the war.” If the Roosevelt Administration “came out on the
side of starvation it would be a shock” to the American people. Food assistance, he
argued, could be used to win both the war and the peace. Hoover also believed the milk
shipments into southern France had largely discredited British opposition to crossblockade relief. His soup kitchen proposal would work, but with the United States more
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intimately involved in the war effort, he thought a neutral country, Switzerland, should
take up negotiations with the Nazis.206 His proposals, however, were duly rejected.207
Hoover considered aborting his efforts. On April 9, 1941, he learned that the
Belgians had told Sumner Welles that their country needed no food aid. Under the
impression that the British and Americans had pressured the Allies to oppose him, he
threatened to recall his lieutenant in London, Hugh Gibson. He could not proceed if the
Allies privately appealed to him, but then created obstructions. Newspapers, in fact,
reported in April that Hoover had secretly connived with isolationists to defeat the LendLease Bill, “which every intelligent citizen of his ‘little democracies’ hailed as the
brightest hope for their future liberation.” But Hoover provided the Belgians leverage,
and they convinced him to abandon the recall. Then, on April 29, 1941, they told the
former President that he was a “stumbling block to their relief.” Hoover thereupon agreed
to step down as Chairman of the Committee on Food for the Small Democracies if they
obtained assurances from Washington that food would be shipped to Belgium if he
resigned.208 It did not happen.
While the Roosevelt Administration refrained from using lend-lease to impel
Britain to open the blockade, the British recognized the possibility that Washington might
force their hand in other ways. The problem, in Churchill’s view, was that the
relationship between London and Washington had not been sufficiently defined. “So far
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all that has been agreed,” he wrote Halifax on April 10, 1941, “is that the British
Empire and her Allies shall be used as the agent to do the actual fighting, while America
furnishes the means in the form of material and money. How far the agent is to retain a
free hand has yet to be decided.” “America,” he continued, “has appeared wanting in any
recognition of the… principle that creditors must do nothing calculated to impair the
earning capacity of a bankrupt and must leave his resources sufficient to finance his dayto-day living and working.” The Americans, Churchill surmised, believed that Britain had
not yet recognized “that fundamental principle of parliamentary government,” namely,
“that the party voting supplies shall determine how those supplies are to be used.”209
Although Churchill defended the American Government – it had to protect its
interests and maintain public support – the evidence, even at this early date in the war,
suggested the Americans planned to hustle the British. On March 11, 1941, the famous
British economist then working for the Treasury, John Maynard Keynes, wrote his
colleagues from Washington complaining of the American Treasury Secretary, Henry
Morgenthau’s tactics. “He has been aiming, partly for political reasons to placate
Congress and partly perhaps for other reasons connected with his future power to impose
his will on us, at stripping us of our liquid resources to the greatest possible extent before
the Lease-Lend Bill comes into operation, so as to leave us with the minimum in hand to
meet during the rest of the war the numerous obligations which will not be covered by the
Bill.” Upon reading these words, Churchill predicted that “America’s large holding of
gold” would “prompt her to favor one method of conducting international trade [in the
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postwar period], while our lack of gold will probably incline us to something
different.” “Even Luxembourg and Latvia will be better off than us in this respect,” he
wrote.210
With the Administration loath to force Britain’s hand on relief, Hoover lambasted
Cordell Hull. “I do not believe the American Government, in the long corridor of history,
can escape the moral responsibility of making an effort on behalf of these millions of
human beings who have sacrificed their all on the altar of democracy,” he wrote on April
24, 1941.211 On June 3, 1941, he accused the Administration of bowing to British
preferences and turning down an immoral path. “When in Christianity or morals,” he
asked, “has the idea appeared that because person A [Germany] fails in his moral
responsibility to person B [Belgium] that his friends C [Britain] and D [United States] no
longer have such moral responsibilities?” “History will never justify the Government of
the United States siding with the starvation of these millions.”212 These letters he shared
with Republican Senators, who leaked them to the newspapers. They had introduced a
resolution supporting his plan. But Hull used his influence to obstruct it.213 Roosevelt, for
his part, exploited the resolution to obtain another $50,000,000 for food relief.214
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The Problem of Surpluses Revisited: Keynes Narrows the Gap

Two factors impaired British efforts to collaborate with the United States in their
endeavors to resolve the problem of surpluses. First, Leith-Ross framed the issue both in
terms of its wartime and postwar significance. “Neither the United States nor the British
Empire, acting alone, can hope to do more than supply expensive short lived palliatives,”
he wrote Grady in November 1940. But “in cooperation real solutions may be initiated
which, combined with temporary war-time measures, should not only tide the world over
the present emergencies but also lay the foundations for a definite improvement in the
economic organization of the post-war world.”215
The State Department, by contrast, did not want to discuss postwar economic
reconstruction at this point in the war. Grady, at least until the end of 1940, appears to
have preferred the unilateral purchase of strategic materials, and the extension of credits
to distressed Latin American countries through the Export-Import Bank. He remained
lukewarm towards ambitious schemes to solve the problem, especially the British idea to
construct an international organization to address the problem.216 Though his fellow
Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf Berle, remained more disposed to ambitious schemes,
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he was suspicious of British motives and believed the problem would resolve itself. He
gave little “impression of wishing to pursue the subject seriously.”217
Second, disputes within the Roosevelt Administration left the American
Government divided over what to do.218 While the State Department adhered to the
minimalist methods favored by Grady, the Department of Agriculture preferred an
international approach. In January 1941, Leslie Wheeler, Director of the Office of
Foreign Agricultural Relations, proposed the negotiation of international commodity
control agreements, in which producing countries would commit to regulations designed
to align the supply and demand for certain surplus commodities.219
This suggestion ultimately moved official opinion in the United States closer to
that of British policymakers, but it failed to close the gap. Leith-Ross mistakenly
considered Grady’s departure from the State Department in early 1941 an opportunity to
forge a comprehensive approach to the problem in collaboration with the United
States.220 In a February 1941 letter to his successor, Dean Acheson, he welcomed the
possible use of international control commodity agreements, but maintained the view that
the issue required a broad approach that considered the whole postwar system of
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Yet Acheson, like his predecessor, proved unwilling to discuss

postwar economic issues. For nearly six months, he refrained from responding to LeithRoss.
John Maynard Keynes broke the logjam. If Sir Frederick sought to “awaken in
America a sense of her postwar responsibilities,” as Churchill advised, Keynes displayed
the Prime Minister’s “sympathy for the American point of view.”222 In Washington to
negotiate the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, he told Acheson that “after reading the
Leith-Ross letters” he must have been “baffled by their vagueness.” He also suspected the
Roosevelt Administration did not want to embark on any scheme that would permit
Britain the opportunity to peddle in the Western Hemisphere. If Acheson would only
agree to discuss the matter with him, he would be able to clarify the general proposals.
Since Leith-Ross wrote his letters, “much more thought had been put on the matter.”223
On May 27, 1941, Keynes suggested overlapping spheres of influence. “Where
financial conditions and other conditions render outside help essential,” he wrote, “Great
Britain is looking after the problem in her own Dominions, apart from Canada, and in
Africa.” The Dutch could “deal with their own problems.” Washington should maintain
“responsibility towards her own surpluses and those of Central and South America.” But
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in cases “where an important commodity overlaps more than one of these areas,” he
considered international control schemes preferable. In time, Keynes thought that these
schemes might lead to a more ambitious program, but he concurred with the American
view, namely, that the war made it difficult to finalize long-term arrangements.224
In the short-term, he believed the Allied Governments in London should “prepare
a preliminary list of their probable post-war requirements in order of priority.” These
needs, he suggested, should “be studied by a joint Anglo-American Committee” and
“compared with the actual surpluses in hand” as well as “prospective surpluses.” This
procedure, he added, would not only have “real practical significance,” especially if it
were done with the long-term surplus problem in mind, it would also “form habits of
association” and be of “value and importance for propaganda purposes.”225 Such efforts
could be broadcasted to “the populations of occupied countries and perhaps of Germany”
along with plans to “set aside specific amounts of wheat, cotton and other important
foodstuffs and materials to be delivered” after liberation.226
Though Keynes made it clear that Britain would not interfere in Washington’s
sphere of influence, he implicitly criticized American policy. In cases where financial
assistance was needed, the Americans had employed unconditional loans from the
Import-Export Bank. Britain, by contrast, had either made outright purchases or entered a
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partnership with the producing country. The first method provided Britain control over
the surpluses for either wartime or postwar use. The second approach gave Britain the
leverage needed to convince the producing country to stop overproducing and agree to
orderly marketing procedures once the raw materials or foodstuffs were sold. Though
careful not to insult the Americans, he suggested that British methods were wiser.227
If Acheson’s conversations with Keynes led American officials to believe they
should respond to Sir Frederick’s letter, at least to make arrangements for addressing the
relief aspects of the problem, they also raised questions pertaining to the postwar
economic order. They believed nationalistic economic policies had caused the problem of
surpluses even before the outbreak of war, but thought it would be difficult to avoid this
tendency in the future due to the anticipated need for employment after the war. At the
same time, the war strengthened their bargaining power vis-à-vis producing countries. It
therefore seemed logical to pursue international commodity control agreements
immediately.228 By the summer of 1941, discussions had begun on wheat, cotton, sisal,
cocoa, and sugar.229
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Yet another problem worried the Americans. Unless Britain returned to a
“completely free commercial and monetary system” after the war, Keynes’ proposal of
dividing the world into two spheres made less sense. The result, according to one official,
“would be to create enormous balances of blocked sterling” in “areas of the world outside
the Western Hemisphere, with implications of clearing and preferential arrangements in
order to utilize the sterling.” He thought it might be wiser for the United States to provide
60 percent of funds and the British 40 percent for schemes to mollify producing countries
in the Western Hemisphere, with the proportions reversed elsewhere. Washington could
then insist “upon participation on an equal basis with the British in all world markets.”230
But this never took place. The Roosevelt Administration, even after Acheson
vaguely suggested the idea to Leith-Ross in July 1941, 231 could not stomach any
arrangement that would grant Britain a stronger arm in its negotiations with the United
States over trade relations in the Western Hemisphere. But more importantly, the British
did not have the resources to contribute, and they were equally eager to keep the
Americans out of their Empire. As a result, American officials used the Lend-Lease
Master Agreement to pry open Britain’s imperial trading system.232 For these reasons,
cooperation on surpluses fell short of expectations. Increased demands due to the war
effort, as Keynes and Berle predicted, helped resolve the issue as well. But this outcome,
as we will soon see, had undesirable consequences.
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CHAPTER TWO
RELIEF AND THE WARTIME ALLIANCES

Before it became an international organization, the United Nations was a military
and political alliance forged to fight the Second World War. As such, its origins were
initially distinct from the history of international organizations. This fact presents a
problem. If we seek to ascertain the origins of the United Nations as an alliance, as
opposed to an international organization, which goes back to the League of Nations,
when and where shall we begin? Perhaps the creation of the Anglo-American alliance
constitutes the best starting place. After all, it became the Grand Alliance in June 1941,
following the Nazis attack on the Soviet Union. From here, we might then argue that it
became the United Nations on January 1, 1942 with the signing of the UN Declaration.
While this proposition is true, it is also misleading. The Grand Alliance was
distinct from the United Nations in several ways, even though its members were part of
it. Both coalitions, to be sure, served the purpose of winning the war. But the importance
of the United Nations for the war effort resided more in the domain of propaganda than in
the realm of military operations: its purpose was to make a show of unity, to give the
impression that there was a broad front fighting the Axis Powers. Yet this show had less
to do with what the Allies were fighting against, which was the principal raison d’être of
the Grand Alliance, than with what they were fighting for: a set of principles for the
postwar era. If we follow this reasoning, then the logical starting point of our discussion
should be the first articulation of principles.
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This occurred on January 6, 1941 during Roosevelt’s State of the Union
Address. In this speech, the President made the first public declaration of what would
become a larger program of Allied war aims. He articulated the famous four freedoms:
the freedoms of speech and worship, and freedom from fear and want. He must have
hoped that these principles might in time become the ideas around which the global
alliance, or the United Nations, would coalesce. They constituted part of an ideological
program, the scope of which was universal. “Freedom,” as Roosevelt put it, “means the
supremacy of human rights everywhere.”233 Indeed the timing of his speech correlated
with a general shift in his rhetoric: Roosevelt used the word “world” twenty-one times on
January 6, many of these he added himself.234 At roughly the same time he also began
referring to the conflict as a “world war.”235
If Roosevelt’s discourse captured the geographical realities of a “world at war,”
and stressed the universal applicability of an ideological program, it implicitly cast the
United States in the role of world leader. Ironically, Roosevelt’s aspirations exceeded the
Germans’.236 This self-regard and supporting program were bound to come into conflict
with the aims and views of the other nations, particularly those in the Grand Alliance, but
also members of the wider United Nations. This chapter explores some of these conflicts
and their impact on the emerging alliance. It reveals how great power rivalries on the
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Allied side brought the history of the wartime alliance together with that of
international organization. In these developments, postwar relief constituted a driving
force.

The St. James Palace Resolution: First Meeting of the Allied Governments in Exile

In late April 1941, Athens and Belgrade fell to the Nazis, and both Greece and
Yugoslavia capitulated.237 With the situation in Eastern Europe now clarified, it became
possible for Churchill to call a formal Allied Conference. He suggested sometime in the
month July so that it would coincide with the anticipated visit of the Dominions Prime
Ministers to London for an Imperial Conference.238 But Anthony Eden disliked the idea
of setting a firm date. It would only take three weeks to make the arrangements: with the
exception of Greece and Yugoslavia, all of the Allies had already accepted the proposed
resolution. Why not wait to see if a more opportune moment arose before making such
plans?239
In early June 1941, the British received their cue. From German newspapers they
learned that Hitler intended to hold a “European peace parade” to be attended, as one
British official wrote, “by a motley crew of Quislings, who will declare that the only
hope for their countries is entry into the ‘New [German] Order.’” This official suspected
that Hitler hoped to “encourage isolationists and non-interventionists, and other faint-
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hearted persons in America.” But the plan was directed at the exiled governments and
the people living in the occupied territories as well. Thus this official suggested that
Churchill “forestall” Hitler by holding “an Allied Council in London” immediately. In
this way, “all the enchained countries” could “declare that their people will have no part
or lot in the gangster ‘New Order.’”240
With German propaganda sarcastically attacking Churchill as the “friend of all the
little nations,” and making plans for a grandiose show, the British decided to act.241 On
June 8, 1941, the Prime Minister informed Roosevelt of his plans to hold the first Allied
meeting of the war in four days. “At a time when the Germans are trying to declare peace
in Europe,” he wrote, “it will be useful to show that the inhabitants of the occupied
countries are still alive and vigorous, and that their lawful Governments are carrying on
the war from overseas with all the resources at their command.” He concluded his note
with a plea: it would be “an accession of strength” if “the United States felt it possible to
be associated in some form or another with the proceedings.” 242 The War Cabinet
approved the meeting the next day;243 Roosevelt did not respond.244
But as scheduled, representatives of the Allied Governments in exile convened at
the old Palace of St. James on June 12, 1941 to “cheer the hopes of free men and free
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peoples throughout the world.”
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Still the official resident of the British monarchy, no

sovereign had resided there for nearly two centuries. Journalists and photographers were
allowed in to witness and capture the proceedings for the entire world.246 Churchill
opened the gathering with his usual bombast and grandiloquence. He heralded the
presence of the “lawful constitutional governments of Europe” and “representatives of
the British Commonwealth and Empire.” Then he commenced to smash the Nazis for
placing the peoples of Europe “under conditions indistinguishable… from actual
slavery.”247
“Your excellences, my lords and gentlemen,” he cried out, “it is upon this
foundation that Hitler, with his tattered lackey, Mussolini, at his tail and Admiral Darlan
by his side, pretends to build out of hatred, appetite and racial assertion a new order for
Europe. Never did so mocking a fantasy obsess the mind of mortal man.” Hitler, he
proclaimed, may “turn and trample this way and that through tortured Europe. He may
spread his course far and wide and carry his curse with him.” But the British Empire, in
unity with its Allies, would “be on his track wherever he goes.” Victory was his aim.
“With the help of God,” he asserted, “we shall continue steadfast in faith and duty till our
task is done.”248
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He concluded by looking across the English Channel to Europe, and then out
over the Atlantic to the American people. Roosevelt, he privately lamented, had failed to
respond to his plea of four days prior. According to the American Embassy, it was
“inadvisable for domestic considerations.”249 But in no way did this shatter the Prime
Minister’s optimism. “To our Allies and well-wishers in Europe, to our American friends
and helpers drawing ever closer in their might across the ocean, this is the message – lift
up your hearts, all will come right. Out of depths of sorrow and sacrifice will be born
again the glory of mankind.”250 Thereupon the Allied representatives spoke and took the
first step towards the creation of what would become the “United Nations.”
They signed the St. James Palace Resolution, which Churchill duly shared with
the American President afterwards. This document, agreed upon in late 1940, pledged the
Allies to “continue the struggle against German or Italian oppression” and to “mutually
assist each other in this struggle” until victory had been obtained. It asserted that “no
settled peace and prosperity” was possible “so long as free peoples are coerced by
violence into submission to domination by Germany or her associates.” It also established
that the only “basis of enduring peace is the willing co-operation of free peoples” in a
world “without the “menace of aggression” and where “all may enjoy economic and
social security.” To this end, the Allies pledged to work in common.251
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If the meeting constituted a success – and the War Cabinet believed it did
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88
– it

failed to make everyone happy. Several of the Dominions expressed disappointment: they
had not been given the opportunity to consider the event before it was called. Though
they had no substantive complaints with the resolution, they believed this procedure
could not become a precedent. The problem, in their view, was that the British had
permitted the Free French to partake in the proceedings as full-fledged participants. For
several of the Dominion High Commissioners, this decision was problematic: Canada and
South Africa maintained relations with the Vichy regime.253 But in Eden’s view, wartime
exigencies trumped Britain’s constitutional requirements vis-à-vis the Dominions. The
decision had been taken only hours before the inter-allied meeting “for the rather
exceptional reason that the Free French were about to take an active part in the Syrian
campaign.”254
Naturally the Germans ridiculed the gathering. “The meeting on Thursday to
which Mr. Churchill invited Kings without countries and Prime Ministers without
Governments who are in London resembled a ghost dance,” one German news outlet
reported. The Prime Minister was a “magician” making promises “set off by rhetorical
juggling.” If he boasted of Britain’s tenacity and command of the air, the Germans
bragged of sinking shiploads of food and arms moving across the Atlantic. How could
they make such absurd promises to Europe? According to Nazi reports, even Roosevelt
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had admitted that England is “unable to replace more than one third of the tonnage
sunk.” “What Churchill convened was a death dance of the old Europe.”255

The Titanic Turn: Operation Barbarossa and the Blockade of Europe

On June 22, 1941, just as Herbert Hoover predicted, 256 nearly four million
German troops stormed across the Soviet frontier along a 1,800-mile front in what the
Nazis called Operation Barbarossa.257 If Hitler endeavored to obtain Lebensraum, or to
obliterate Bolshevism, as it is so often explained, it was also a central objective of his “to
obtain by the German sword sod for the German plow and daily bread for the nation.”258
The pursuit of this aim granted Britain a much-needed ally. On July 13, 1941, the two
nations agreed to cooperate against the Nazis and make no separate peace treaty.259 It also
led the United States to extend lend-lease assistance to the Russians.260 One scholar has
even argued that the Roosevelt Administration embraced policies vis-à-vis Japan to help
Moscow avoid a two-front war.261 These developments would have global consequences.
But for Europe, Operation Barbarossa meant an inevitable decline in food resources: it
destroyed crops in a region that had historically supplied much of the continent.
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Anthony Eden reopened the possibility of permitting food through the blockade
on July 19, 1941. But Barborossa factored little in his immediate calculations. That
morning, the Belgian Foreign Minister had complained to him that the Ministry of
Economic Warfare had “ignored entirely the political side of this problem.” They had
repeatedly refused his requests that some scheme be devised to aid the Belgian people. If
the circumstances remained unaddressed, Eden wrote the War Cabinet, public opinion
would “be seriously affected.” “Children were suffering cruelly; schools were closed
from 11 A.M. onwards; women and children fainted in the streets for the lack of proper
food;” and “tuberculosis was already on the increase.”262 Hoover, in fact, had made these
conditions clear, but British propaganda refuted such claims at every step.263 Now Eden
felt that an exception should be made for Belgium. Famine, he argued, has “more
disadvantages than advantages.” It would be difficult for Britain to disavow responsibility
for this problem indefinitely. Belgium had always relied heavily on imports.264
But Dalton remained unwavering. In a memorandum presented to the War
Cabinet on July 28, 1941, he wrote that what Britain chose to “concede to one Ally,” it
“must be prepared to concede to all.” The Germans would manipulate the situation, he
argued. The harvest had only just been gathered, and it was Germany’s responsibility to
see that the Belgians obtained their fair share. “The food blockade is an essential weapon
262
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of economic warfare. If we let in food,” he explained, “we make possible the transfer
of German man power from food production to the production of munitions or service in
the armed forces.” Britain stood to gain no propaganda benefits by lifting the blockade.265
When Eden replied with the proposal that the American Red Cross assume responsibility
for Belgian relief, Dalton asked that the War Cabinet defer decision. Churchill agreed.266
In defense of this position, Dalton argued that his Ministry, as of April, had
agreed to provisions permitting the Allies to buy relief supplies within the blockaded
area, either from neutral countries or the Soviet Union. In this way, the purchases would
not increase the total supplies available in Europe, but would “divert food towards the
areas in greater need.” Belgium, under this scheme, had been authorized to buy
Portuguese products, and the Greeks had been allowed to purchase food from the Soviet
Union. The Ministry of Economic Warfare believed it would reduce the overall pool from
which the Germans might benefit. But following the onset of Operation Barbarossa, the
Greeks, who faced a situation every bit as dire as the Belgians, could not longer obtain
supplies from Russia. Thus they requested permission to purchase food in Turkey. The
British agreed to such arrangements, but two difficulties ensued.267
First, Greece’s dollar resources had been frozen in the United States, which
restricted the country’s capacity to make purchases; second, transporting Turkish food
resources to Greece by land posed challenges; the Aegean Sea offered the best
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alternative, but the British had blockaded this route.
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While Dalton initially refused to

open the blockade for this purpose, he ultimately acquiesced to Eden’s view. The British
knew the Turks had been supplying produce to the Germans. Dalton therefore convinced
himself that it would be better if these supplies went to the Greeks. Eden concurred. The
Greeks had depended on imported food before the war; they had also put up a fierce fight
against the Italians and Germans. But the Americans, who worried of undesirable
publicity – probably as a result of Hoover – refused to release dollars for this purpose, at
least until January 1942. Thus the shipments amounted to little, and they angered the
Belgians.269
The American refusal highlights the growing power asymmetries between Britain
and the United States. As we have seen, the British, at Roosevelt’s request, agreed to
permit milk into unoccupied France in January. But in May, only after two shiploads had
arrived, they terminated the deliveries upon learning that the Vichy Government had
concluded a large barter deal in food with the Germans. Roosevelt raised no protest. But
when the resolution supporting Hoover’s scheme came up for consideration in the Senate,
he again requested that Britain permit milk into France. Both Eden and Dalton worried
that they would anger the Allies, especially the Belgians and Greeks, if they acquiesced.
But the need for American assistance led the War Cabinet to agree on two conditions:
any deliveries would have to be undertaken by the American Red Cross; the number of
deliveries would have to be kept to a minimum. To rebut allied complaints, they would
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maintain the distinction between occupied and unoccupied territory.
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Ironically, the

Greek relief scheme, which the Americans obstructed, undercut this argument altogether.

Second Meeting of the Allies Suggested to Discuss Relief

On June 13, 1941, one day after the signing of the St. James Palace Resolution,
Leith-Ross convened a group of officials from the various British Ministries to discuss a
second Allied meeting. This gathering, suggested by the Foreign Office, would provide
the British an opportunity to formally explain their relief policy, and take concrete steps
to meet Europe’s postwar needs. The Allies would be asked to prepare and prioritize
estimates of their requirements, and to commit to the principle that the relief of Europe as
a whole should have first claim on shipping resources, as opposed to the needs of
individual countries. Britain would also use the meeting to announce the establishment of
a British Bureau under the direction of Leith-Ross, which would collate and coordinate
the Allied estimates. Before the meeting, Britain would ask the exiled governments to
agree to a resolution encapsulating these arrangements.271
Sir Frederick’s desire to hold the meeting in early July proved wishful thinking.
Arthur Greenwood thought the United States should be consulted first if only “as a matter
of tactics.”
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Commissioner to London, Stanley Bruce, asked Leith-Ross on July 1, 1941 whether
the meeting had “been suggested for propaganda purposes,” or, if it served to manage
“the ‘surpluses’ problem.” Sir Frederick confessed: the meeting “was being staged” from
the “propaganda standpoint.” But, he explained, it would cover a “wider field than that of
the supply of Europe of surplus products.” The Allies would pass a resolution agreeing to
prepare lists of their requirements. Bruce disapproved. If propaganda constituted the
primary aim, would it not be better, he asked, to obtain a resolution that included not only
the consumer but the producer countries as well? “A full-dress meeting at this stage
without United States participation would be of little use and might even be
dangerous.”273
Leith-Ross agreed there was no need “for a full-dress meeting” if “progress could
be made” in formulating “the various countries’ requirements.” But, he added,
Washington had “been very slow on the ‘surpluses’ problem.” Something akin to “trench
warfare…. between the State Department and the United States Treasury” had been
holding up progress. A meeting on relief, he implied, would entice them along. It
remained similarly important, he explained, to help the exiled governments, who were
“anxious to have some public resolutions to which they could point in endeavoring to
rally their peoples in the occupied countries.” A second inter-allied meeting would meet
this demand.274
The High Commissioners from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
appeared receptive to this explanation. Bruce replied that if the Foreign Secretary
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believed the meeting necessary to help the Allies, then it should be done. Yet he still
believed “the right course would be not to hold a meeting of this sort… until the
Ambassador had put the whole position to the President [of the United States] and
exchanged ideas with him,” or, even better, “until there was some hope of a common
broad declaration made” by Roosevelt and Churchill. The High Commissioners from
New Zealand and South Africa shared the view that Britain should obtain American
support before calling the meeting.275
How to accomplish this aim constituted the question. Although Leith-Ross
appears to have believed that unilateral British action would encourage the Americans to
resolve their interdepartmental disputes, he worried that attempts to “press the U.S.
Government for an immediate formal declaration of cooperation might well raise
suspicious and prove bad tactics.” He assumed the Roosevelt Administration would
prefer that Britain “work out plans before making any formal approach for their
collaboration.” However, this line of thought did not necessarily mean that the British
should refrain from requesting the views of the United States, or seek a statement of
support to be presented at the meeting. In fact, Leith-Ross embraced a suggestion from
the High Commissioners that the British exploit Roosevelt’s recent “Four Freedoms”
speech to win their acquiescence. 276 Eden therefore discussed the matter with the
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American Ambassador in London, John Winant, on July 4, 1941, and provided him a
letter including the proposal and the resolution.277
While the six-point resolution served propaganda purposes, it also sought to
resolve the tension between national action and international cooperation. It committed
each of the Allies to the common aim of seeing that supplies of food and raw materials
would be made available to meet their postwar needs. But while it asserted that each
government would be responsible for its own requirements, and would draw up and
prioritize its own estimates, it committed them to coordinate their plans with one another.
It tied them to the principle that “Europe as a whole” should have priority claim on
national shipping resources. Yet Britain, not an international authority, would facilitate
this cooperation. In the case of requirements, the resolution called for the establishment
of a British bureau headed by Leith-Ross, which would collate and coordinate the
estimates. The Ministry of War Transport would work with the Allies to give effect to the
shipping clause.278
If the British hoped the gathering would entice the Americans into speedy action
on surpluses, it did the opposite. Acheson had been working on a reply to the Leith-Ross
letter of February 1941 regarding surpluses, and he had also discussed and shared the
draft with Keynes.279 But the Foreign Office failed to inform the British Embassy of the
proposed allied meeting on relief, which placed Keynes in an embarrassing position vis-
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à-vis Acheson, who complained that he should have been informed of the proposal
since the subject was so closely related to the problem of surpluses. This failure only
increased suspicions, and led Acheson to reconsider his letter before sending it on July
22, 1941.280
Though seemingly unrelated, blotched communications also angered the
Canadians, who learned of the allied meeting not from the British but from the
Americans. Oddly, the Canadian High Commissioner to London, Vincent Massey,
neither attended the meeting with Bruce and the other High Commissioners in early
July,281 nor informed Ottawa of the proposal. As a result, the Canadians complained as
well. 282 This failure of communication may seem unimportant, but in time, the
cumulative effects of such mishaps would undermine Britain’s relationship with Ottawa.
This fact would have time-consuming consequences, and even dangerous impacts for the
construction of the entire postwar order. But in this instance Ottawa blamed Massey, and
considered announcing a contribution of wheat for postwar relief at the proposed InterAllied meeting.283
On July 21, 1941, the Americans responded cautiously to the proposed inter-allied
meeting. By this point in the war, certain commodities previously in surplus had suddenly
280
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become scarce. Attempts to accumulate supplies now or in the immediate future for
relief, they worried, might impact the American and British defense efforts. They could
also influence future commercial relations or plans for the postwar settlement. Current
and future shipping arrangements, moreover, would have bearing on all of these factors.
Thus they considered paragraph five of the resolution on shipping “too categorical.”
Shipping could not be reserved exclusively for relief. It would have to be coordinated
with other demands, which could not be seen at the present time. If the resolution were
revised to address this concern, and if the meeting’s discussions were “exploratory,” the
Americans agreed to countenance the event with a statement stipulating these views.284
The next day, Acheson replied to the Leith-Ross letter of February 1941 on
surpluses. The idea of providing for spheres of influence suggested by Keynes only
seemed logical, he wrote, if Britain and the United States returned to a “substantially free
commercial and monetary system” after the war. Otherwise it made little sense. He
agreed, however, that focusing on relief in the short-term seemed appropriate. Yet he
believed Britain and the United States should take advantage of Europe’s present
weaknesses to obtain long-term commitments. Solution to the structural causes of the
surplus problem required an end to “economic nationalism” and the “preposterous trade
barriers” that created it in the first place. On the demand side of the equation, relief could
be used to extract concessions from Europe. On the supply side, multilateral commodity
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agreements could be employed in tandem with other ad-hoc measures to obtain
assurances from producing countries.285
Acheson then concluded his letter with a plan of action. The United States, he
wrote, would continue its studies of marketing agreements between producing and
stockholding countries, and in preparation for negotiations on commodity control
schemes. The exiled governments, he added, should estimate their postwar requirements;
Britain and the United States would simultaneously initiate studies of available supplies
to meet these needs, while also investigating means of financing and holding stocks.
Acheson agreed with Leith-Ross’s suggestion that the two countries establish an informal
joint Anglo-American committee to coordinate these efforts.286 With one exception, all of
these steps were taken: events made the Anglo-American committee unnecessary. As a
result, cooperation with Britain was undertaken on an ad-hoc basis.
Acheson’s letter and the State Department’s views on the proposed allied meeting
provided the British the opening they desired. Eden made it clear to Winant that the
meeting would be exploratory. “No position or commitments would be notified without
consultation” with the United States.287 If the meeting produced satisfactory results, he
wrote, Britain planned to approach the American Government and later other producing
countries with the aim of establishing an organization to examine the supply side of the
relief problem. The British then revised the resolution in accordance with the American
views. Instead of giving the whole of Europe first claim on shipping resources, the new
draft called for “the most efficient employment… of [all] the shipping resources” and it
285

Acheson to Leith-Ross, July 22, 1941, 840.48/4988, FRUS, 103-107.
Acheson to Leith-Ross, July 22, 1941, 840.48/4988, FRUS, 103-107.
287
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the SOS, July 22, 1941,
840.48/5012: Telegram, DOS, FRUS, Vol. 3, 102-103.
286

288

committed the allies to collaborate towards this end.
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Once this revision had been

settled, the British shared the meeting proposal and resolution with the Dominions,289
which appeased the Canadians,290 and all of the other concerned governments.291

The Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941

Meanwhile, a momentous event took place the second week of August 1941 off
the coast of Newfoundland: Churchill and Roosevelt secretly met for their first
conference of the war. The meeting’s most enduring document, the rationale of which
was pure propaganda, emerged in the form of a statement released to the press on August
14, 1941, the so-called Atlantic Charter.292 A statement of principles, this eight-point
declaration met what Bruce considered an essential prerequisite for a second meeting of
the Allies. It implicitly linked the United States to the war effort, and directly committed
the country to the construction of the postwar order. As such, it ultimately abetted the
second meeting’s propaganda objectives – to make a show of allied unity, embolden the
exiled European governments, and incite individuals in the occupied territories to rise up
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against Nazi rule. But it undermined one of Great Britain’s central postwar aims as
well, the economic and political preservation of the British Empire.293
The most contentious aspect of the declaration concerned economic liberalization.
As we have seen, the Roosevelt Administration, particularly the State Department, hoped
to crack open the system of imperial preference established by the Ottawa Agreements of
1932, which reduced barriers to trade within the British Empire and erected tariff walls to
prevent the entry of goods from outside into the empire. American policymakers believed
these arrangements, along with protectionist policies enacted by the United States, had
prolonged the Great Depression and created prewar surplus problems. The Americans
hoped to remove these structural impediments to global economic wellbeing, which they
believed poisoned the wellsprings of economic growth and stability: trade, consumption,
and high employment. For this reason, Acheson tried to use his negotiations with Keynes
over the Lend-Lease Master Agreement in July to crush imperial preference. But the talks
broke down in late July 1941, when Keynes rejected Acheson’s proposed agreement.294
As a result, Sumner Welles tried to ensconce the principles of trade liberalization
into the fourth point of the declaration. This effort precipitated heated exchanges between
293
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the two parties, one of which depicts Roosevelt lambasting the system of imperial
preference for undermining competition and perpetuating the economic and political
backwardness of peoples living in the colonial empires.295 But Churchill managed to
guard his flank. Though unable to expunge a clause in point four committing the
countries to work towards “equal access” to the “trade and raw materials of the world
which are needed for their economic prosperity,” he managed to insert qualifying clause,
“with due respect for their existing obligations” into the text. If Roosevelt could not agree
to this emendation, then constitutional stipulations would require him to consult the
Dominions, which would prevent the immediate release of the statement to the press.
Roosevelt, who was more interested in public relations than the State Department’s
preferences, acquiesced.296
The seed had been planted nonetheless, and the American President still managed
to strike at the whole political structure of the British Empire. The third point of the first
draft, prepared by the British, committed the two countries to “respect the right of all
peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” The British
certainly aimed this clause at countries then under Nazi rule.297 But Roosevelt, without
any explanation, added the phrase, “and the hope that self-government may be restored to
those from whom it has been forcibly removed.”298 If this phrase served to make selfdetermination explicit, Churchill’s insertion of the words “sovereign rights” before the
phrase “self-government” probably constituted an effort to make Roosevelt’s addition, as
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one historian writes, “inapplicable to the dependent British Empire.”
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But the

President made no complaint. Mostly likely, he believed Churchill’s change meant little.
Roosevelt endeavored to create worldwide support for American leadership in the
management of global affairs. If aspects of the British draft and subsequent revisions
inadvertently facilitated this aim – and they undoubtedly did – the Americans welcomed
them; they also sought changes of their own that looked beyond the traditional European
system of states. The charter appealed to individuals of all races in all nations all over the
world. 300 Roosevelt clearly hoped it would entice peoples living in the occupied
territories to rise up against the Nazis in accordance with British desires; but he also
wanted to inspire independence movements within the colonial empires. 301 The
Americans sought to fashion global public opinion towards the creation of what
Roosevelt would later call a “World Civilization,”302 as opposed to Churchill’s hope of
preserving the preeminence of “Western Civilization.”303 Aspects of the language chosen,
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which seemed to be Roosevelt’s, legitimized American leadership in this new world
order.
The British draft embraced individual rights, but the language they employed
served ulterior purposes. First, they aimed to topple the Axis order, and restore and
stabilize the European system of states: thus they could commit to “respect the right of all
peoples to choose” their “form of government…”304 But this right did not apply to their
colonies.305 Second, they strove to lure Washington into the war. One clause in point
three of the British draft stated that signatories were “only concerned to defend the rights
of freedom of speech and thought,” which the Nazis had attacked. Third, the British
wanted Washington engaged in global affairs through institutions that solidified AngloAmerican cooperation; this they deemed essential to salvage their global power.
Churchill therefore asked Roosevelt, in the final point of the declaration, to agree to the
establishment of “effective international organization,” which would create a “peace” that
affords “to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own
bounds.”306
While the Americans had no problem with the first aim, anything that directly
linked them to the war effort, or the creation of a postwar international organization
presented problems. Neither a direct reference to “freedom of speech,” nor an implied
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overture to individual “security” could trick them into accepting language that would
create domestic political problems among the non-interventionists. Welles deleted the
clause on the “freedom of speech and thought.” The Congress, he explained, would not
want to “defend” such rights “when those rights were abrogated in every Axis country.”
Perhaps he worried about offending the Soviet Union as well, where such rights did not
exist. As for pledges to establish “effective international organization,” Roosevelt deleted
this phrase, against the wishes of Welles. He had no intention of revisiting the Treaty of
Versailles debate at this point in the war, or at all, if possible. He also believed world
organization insufficiently realistic to solve the problems of global stability.307
The Americans then inserted the most enduring phrase of the declaration, a direct
citation from Roosevelt’s four freedoms speech. Though they deleted the reference to
“international organization,” as we have seen, they retained portions of the text,
specifically the “hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the
means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries.” Next, Roosevelt added the
phrase, “and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their
lives in freedom from fear and want.”308 In this way, Roosevelt placed his stamp on the
Atlantic Charter, and appealed over the heads of the British to the entire world.
An additional paragraph suggested by the British War Cabinet allowed Roosevelt
to assume even greater ownership over the document. Ernest Bevin, the Minister of
Labor and National Service, suggested the signatories assert their “desire to bring about
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the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of
securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.”
It was a clear reference to the New Deal. Bevin attributed the suggestion to Roosevelt’s
speeches, but also similar usage in the St. James Palace Resolution of June 12, 1941.309
Yet it seems inconceivable that he did not have his party’s own political fortunes in mind.
Then in a coalition with Churchill’s conservatives, the Labor Party had its eye on the
premiership, which led them to advance an agenda in accordance with their ideological
program.310
But if such phrases helped the British Labor Party in domestic politics after the
war, they benefited Roosevelt globally: by guaranteeing rights to people everywhere
using words first articulated by the American President, the esteem of the United States
would grow. Roosevelt, as Churchill later reported, was “very pleased” by the War
Cabinet’s suggestion.311 Bevin, however, shied away from the global application of such
rights. He argued that the exclusion of such a paragraph “would have an unfortunate
effect on public opinion in [Great Britain]… the Dominions and on the Allied
Governments.”312 Apparently the rest of the world did not matter. Roosevelt, by contrast,
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always considered the war and the postwar settlement in terms of what he called “the
world-wide arena.”313
With one exception, these changes presented little controversy. Churchill
preferred a pledge to construct a world organization. If he was willing to accept the line
that the draft should not be phrased so as to agitate non-interventionist opinion in the
United States, then Roosevelt should accept his argument that failure to reference
“international organization” would arouse “extreme internationalists” in Britain.
Roosevelt refused to alter his stance. He could not sanction any new “Assembly of the
League” until after a transition period, during which the United States and Great Britain
would police the world. Churchill ultimately retreated to phrasing that accounted for
Roosevelt’s transition period, but left the door open to a future world organization
without saying so: “pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of
general security.”314
The Atlantic Charter constitutes an odd confluence of two worldviews: one that
celebrated “Western Civilization,” and one that sought to construct a new “American
Civilization,” which Roosevelt shrewdly called “World Civilization.” The first view,
championed by Churchill, insinuated that what had existed before the destabilization of
global politics in the 1930s should be preserved, including the imperial systems of the
past. But with the British too weak to accomplish this task alone, they hoped to construct
an Anglo-American partnership that would work through global institutions to preserve
the peace and stability of the old order. The second view, by contrast, sought to displace
PM of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States, W.P. (41) 203, August
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the old order, in which Europe dominated the globe, with one led by the United
States. To achieve this end, the imperial structures, both economic and political, had to be
destroyed. This objective necessarily required an assault on the old empires by applying
pressure on Europe in its time of weakness, and by appealing to global public opinion
with promises of independence, economic development, and individual rights.
At this point in the war, the precise place of postwar relief in these vague visions
remained unknown, except for the fact that it constituted a necessary prerequisite for the
stability essential for the construction of the postwar order. For the British, relief also
provided an avenue to construct a partnership, embedded in global institutions, with the
United States. The proposed meeting of the Allies to discuss relief would work towards
this objective. For the Americans, relief became a means by which to assert their
leadership; the Atlantic Charter served as the master blueprint. That this document would
assume importance so rapidly doubtless owes a great deal to the British, who used the
second Inter-Allied meeting to obtain adherence to the charter by the Dominions and the
Allies. This step abetted American aspirations and moved the Allies closer to the creation
of the wartime alliance known to posterity as the United Nations.

Allied Adherence to the Atlantic Charter and the Relief Resolution

On August 18, 1941, Eden made the case for a second gathering of the Allies to
the War Cabinet. “I hope that this meeting may represent the inauguration of a new phase
of collaboration and that it may form part of the machinery through which victory will be
won and by which [the] peace will be maintained [after the war].” The exiled
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governments, Eden wrote, had shown interests in the possibility of holding another
meeting as a “symbol of allied unity” and “for the discussion of specific problems.” The
British had broached the matter with Dominion and American officials, who agreed with
the proposal. Eden also explained that ongoing consultations with the Allies needed to be
put on a “more formal footing,” and arrangements made for the coordination of future
inter-allied activities. This meeting would provide such an opportunity.315
Eden’s assessment was correct. Most of the Allies had done little to prepare for
the postwar period; several had taken minimal action, but with little coordination. The
Poles had drawn up and shared their requirements with the British; the Czechs had begun
the process; others had done nothing. The Belgians established a Commission to study
their country’s postwar relief and reconstruction needs. With minimal shipping resources,
they remained eager to coordinate their actions. The Dutch, by contrast, paid lip service
to inter-allied cooperation, but began purchasing postwar relief supplies independently in
early 1941.316 Such activities, we will soon see, led to disputes with the British and later
the Americans. As supplies became scarce, and other Allies commenced buying as well,
these purchases strained the alliance. Eden anticipated these problems, and, like LeithRoss, wanted these and other actions coordinated.
His colleagues readily assented to a second meeting scheduled for August 27,
1941. But they expressed two concerns. First, they disliked the use of the word
“territories” in a public resolution, which, they reasoned, might imply a “commitment to
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The British

Government, largely at the instigation of the United States, had avoided such
commitments. Eden therefore deleted the word or found suitable substitutions where
possible.318 Second, they worried that the meeting would be anticlimactic following the
Atlantic Conference, especially if it were limited to passing a resolution on postwar
relief. For this reason, the War Cabinet decided the Allies should also sign a resolution
adhering to the Atlantic Charter.319 The War Cabinet formalized and agreed to these plans
on August 21, 1941.320 But again the proposed date proved wishful thinking.
Adherence to the Atlantic Declaration presented the first problem. The Dutch and
Russians requested time to discuss the proposed resolutions, which led the War Cabinet
to postpone the meeting on August 25, 1941.321 Officials in Moscow took their time
assessing the Atlantic Charter.322 With the Nazis at the gates of Leningrad, and Stalin
pleading with Churchill to offer all assistance and open a second front, their priorities lay
elsewhere.323 The Russians, moreover, took offense at not having been properly consulted
about the Charter before its release. The Soviet Ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky,
said his government might like to have altered “phrasing of some [of its principles] and to
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The Russians nonetheless accepted it in late

September 1941, but made it clear that “the practical application” of its “principles will
necessarily adapt itself to circumstances, needs and historic peculiarities of particular
countries.”325
The Dutch, for their part, welcomed the spirit of the Atlantic agreement. Yet in it
they spotted an unfortunate contradiction. “The words ‘with due respect for their existing
obligations’ appear to be in the nature of a reservation,” they wrote. Though they
considered these words understandable in a strict legal sense, they felt that if the “object
expressed in this fourth point of the Declaration is to be achieved, such existing
obligations should not be perpetuated, even as exceptions.” To do so would “seriously
impair or diminish the beneficial effect which is to accrue to all from the application of
the general rule.” Despite this defect, the Dutch, like the Russians and all of the other
Allies, agreed to the declaration, but they made it clear that preexisting obligations could
not be perpetuated. Otherwise the Atlantic Charter would be no different than expressions
of similar principles at the end of the First World War.326
The Canadians agreed with this view, but never complained. Time constraints, the
British wrote, made consultations with the Dominions on the declaration’s content
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impossible; thus Churchill tried not to “prejudice [the] future of imperial
preference.”327 But the Canadians, like the Dutch, disliked the imperial trading regime,
and considered the reservation to point four of the declaration its “most serious defect.”328
Yet they never voted or commented on it. The British thought it would have been
“inappropriate” for the Dominions to adhere to the Charter alongside the Allies: they
would “prefer to be treated as being already associated” with it. This “clumsy” procedure,
as one Canadian diplomat called it, presented Ottawa with a predicament. If they agreed,
it would confirm their foreign policy subservience to London. If they opposed, it would
reduce their stature to that of an invaded country.329 The Canadians chose not to object,
and, like the other Dominions, begrudgingly played along.330
The resolution on postwar relief proved more difficult than the Atlantic Charter.
A rift existed between countries preferring a national approach to relief and those hoping
for an international scheme. Most of the exiled governments preferred a multilateral
program because of anticipated inabilities to meet their immediate needs. These countries
had little in the way of shipping, financial, or material resources. Thus internationalism
seemed the best way to secure influence and meet their needs. By contrast, countries with
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resources, notably Holland and Norway, hoped to preserve their freedom to act
independently so as to avoid relinquishing control over their resources and responsibility
for their affairs.331 Yet ironically, these countries used the relief resolution to assert their
desire to work within an international framework. How does one explain this
contradiction?
The Dutch case provides a window into this problem. In an August 29, 1941 note,
and then during subsequent discussions with Leith-Ross, it was apparent that they
considered themselves exclusively responsible for relieving and rehabilitating the
Netherlands.332 They would only provide resources for the general cause once their needs
had been met. This stipulation, Leith-Ross pointed out, accorded perfectly with point two
of the resolution, which asserted that “each of the Allied Governments and authorities”
would “be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs of its own
peoples,” but that they would coordinate “their respective plans… in a spirit of
collaboration.” He also argued that their viewpoint did not conflict with point five of the
resolution, which called for “the most efficient employment after the war of the shipping
resources controlled by each Government and of Allied resources as a whole…”333
The Dutch, however, disliked both provisions, and suggested revisions as
guarantees against any loss of control over their resources, which, by contrast with the
other allies, were significant in mid-1941. The previous year, the Dutch Government
331
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requisitioned all assets held abroad by its nationals still residing in the occupied
territories; it maintained a small shipping fleet and still had the resources of the Dutch
East Indies at its disposal.334 Despite this position of strength, Leith-Ross convinced them
to abandon their suggested revisions to points two and five of the resolution. By
September 5, 1941, he could write that difficulties with the Dutch over shipping had been
“overcome – though not perhaps completely solved.”335 Two weeks later, the problems
with point two had been met as well. Yet they still insisted on stating reservations in a
statement at the Allied meeting.336
Point six of the resolution caused the most controversy. It called for the
establishment of a bureau to collate and coordinate the relief estimates. The Dutch, who
disliked the idea that British officials would staff the bureau exclusively, preferred the
creation of an office similar to the Economic Section of the League of Nations
Secretariat, which would include allied representatives. This bureau, they argued, would
provide a framework for managing the economic reconstruction of Europe on an interallied basis.337 The Dutch worry, according to the Norwegians, was that the proposed
bureau would put Britain in a position to “settle the lines of the reconstruction of Europe”
in “association with the Americans,” leaving the Allies with “nothing to do but sign along
the dotted line.”338
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Most all of the Allies shared this view, but only the Dutch, whose strength
exceeded the others at this point in the war, advanced it forcefully.339 The Norwegians, to
be sure, proved willing to accept a British bureau, but only if its terms of reference were
limited, and one or more inter-allied committees established thereafter.340 The Belgians,
who at this time sought immediate relief for their home population, played a more tactful
game, trying to ingratiate themselves with the British to secure a position on the bureau
should its establishment occur on an inter-allied basis.341 The Czechs, the Free French,
and the Poles said little, but shared the Dutch views.342 The Russians hinted at their
dislike of the British bureau, but waited until the actual meeting to state their
reservations.343
For the moment, the British worried about the Dutch and Norwegian complaints.
Two views emerged. Eden and Orme Sargent at the Foreign Office worried that the
Norwegian proposal would lead to a multiplication of inter-allied committees. It would
be better if they supported an Inter-Allied Bureau at the outset, but with terms of
reference limited to preparing estimates of requirements. This proposal fell short of
Dutch wishes. But they did not want to anger the Americans, who had cautioned them
339
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against taking actions that might prejudice the postwar economic structure. For this
reason, the Foreign Office thought Britain should insist that these arrangements were not
permanent. Eden, however, thought the British might invite the Americans to participate
in the bureau’s work as an observer. Full-fledged membership, he reasoned, would be
bizarre given the bureau’s mandate: to ascertain requirements, not available supplies.344
Leith-Ross opposed the Foreign Office vehemently. He considered it pointless to
set up a bureau of allied representatives, who would jockey for the available posts and
have nothing to do once they got them. They would, in turn, spend their time “putting up
all sorts of suggestions” that would needlessly distract him from his responsibilities in the
British Government.345 The bureau might also offend the United States.346 It made no
sense. If the Allies could not trust Great Britain, then Leith-Ross believed the effort was
hopeless in any case.347 Yet he still remained sensitive enough to their views to propose a
compromise: the creation of an Inter-Allied Committee that would operate as a steering
committee for the British bureau.348 The Dutch agreed to the proposal, and the Foreign
Office did so as well, but only after Leith-Ross threatened resignation.349
Officials in London readily acknowledged the inadequacy of the proposed British
Bureau and Inter-Allied Committee. These instruments were temporary expedients, and
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they failed to address critical issues such a supplies, shipping, and distribution in warravaged countries. But there was a greater problem. Even if an agency were designed to
meet such challenges, it could hardly address the larger questions of policy that would
inevitably arise. According to one official, the relief negotiations had opened a Pandora’s
box. “Immediate relief has led on to economic reconstruction,” he wrote, “and that in turn
to the widest question of trade policy and international organization.” Decisions on these
complex problems, and their bearing on relief would have to be taken.350 For the next two
years, such matters would confound American and British policymakers.

The Second Meeting of the Allies, September 24, 1941

On September 24, 1941, the Allies convened for a second time. It was the first
official occasion since the commencement of Barbarossa that Britain had the chance to
welcome a representative from Moscow into the Allied camp. Eden immediately turned
the floor over to the Soviet Ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, who exploited the event
to maul “Hitlerite marauders” and “murderers” attempting to “dominate the world.” The
first task of the Allies, he asserted, was “to bring about the speediest and most decisive
defeat of the aggressor.” But it was also important, he explained, to lay down “the basis
for the organization of international relations” and the “postwar world in such a way as to
spare… future generations the monstrous crimes of Nazism.”351
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Maisky, however, whitewashed over Moscow’s earlier behavior towards
Finland and Poland. The Soviet Union, he asserted, not only supported “the sovereign
rights of people,” it “was [also] guided by the principle of self-determination of nations…
one of the pillars on which the political structure of the U.S.S.R. was built.” He claimed
that his country had “consistently and with full force denounced all violations of
sovereign rights of peoples, all aggression and aggressors, [and] all attempts of
aggressive States to impose their will on other peoples and to involve them in war.” The
Soviet Union, he implied, would continue to oppose such behavior. Maisky therefore
proclaimed Moscow’s agreement with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.352
The other Allies followed suit, but, as anticipated, the Dutch drew a reservation to
point four of the famous declaration, notably the phrase “with due respect for their
existing obligations.” If Great Britain and the United States hoped to establish a global
economy based on liberal principles, they believed these countries should not hold onto
the imperialistic and nationalistic policies that had aggravated economic recovery in the
1930s.353 No other ally formally endorsed this point of view, buy many of them shared it.
Though this fact presented the British with problems, the war effort led them to do
whatever it took to create the impression of a unified front fighting stalwartly against the
fascist powers: the Atlantic Charter provided the emerging United Nations alliance
principles around which to coalesce.
But this focal point drove the Dominions, European allies, and colonial peoples
around the world to restate and exalt ideas in the declaration to suit their purposes.354 In
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time, this behavior not only undermined the legitimacy of the British Empire, but also
the Belgian, French and Dutch Empires. Its impact for the Soviet Union was no less
consequential. By publicly embracing ideas they had violated and would continue to
disregard, Moscow placed itself in the crosshairs of global public opinion, which made it
far easier for the United States to win the propaganda wars of the postwar period.355 For
the Americans, the Charter had enormous benefits, but it created risks as well. If
Washington proved incapable or unwilling to effectuate its principles, it, too, might have
to weather negative attacks on its credibility and global legitimacy.
Here again the Allies heightened the risks by praising the declaration’s
commitment to “general security,” “prosperity,” and “social justice,” even though they
knew “it would not be easy to put” these ideas “into practice,” as the Yugoslavs
cautioned the conference attendees. The application of these principles to the entire
world, or to “all men in all lands,” as the declaration put it, had enormous implications.356
On the one hand, everyone knew that this could not be done on this scale without the
United States. If it refused, failure was inevitable; but if it undertook what it signed up to
do, it risked overextension. On the other hand, the Charter opened the possibility that
these rights would be applied not only at the state level, but at the individual level as
well. Any development of this sort would inevitably lead to infringements on the
sovereignty of states, including the United States of America. The Atlantic Charter was a
radical and risky document.
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The resolution on relief constituted a modest first step towards the fulfillment
of the Charter’s promises. According to Eden, resources would have to be pooled to meet
the needs of Europe as it transitioned from war to peace. The resolution facilitated this
objective. Indeed he suggested that stocks of certain foodstuffs were being accumulated
for this purpose.357 Yet in Britain’s case, nothing could have been further from the truth.
The British had bought up some surplus crops, but none of these purchases had been
designated for a common pool.358 The Dutch, too, had begun purchases, but they made it
clear that they agreed to sign the resolution only “on the condition that nothing in it
would prevent them from carrying out on their own responsibility arrangements made by
them for the relief of the Netherlands after the war.”359
The resolution, in effect, fell far short of the actions required to meet the needs of
postwar Europe. As we have seen, it committed the Allies to common aims, principles of
cooperation, and pledges to prepare lists of their requirements. But it failed to reconcile
the tension between national and international action. Point six of the resolution, to be
sure, led to the establishment of a British bureau that would work with each of the Allied
governments in framing their estimates, and it committed the signatories to the creation
of a steering committee, the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements, as it was
357
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But these proposals encountered obstacles. To everyone’s surprise, the

Soviet Union refused to adhere to the sixth point of the resolution, despite having given
impressions to the contrary several days before the meeting.361
Thus what began as an effort to make a show of unity, resulted in disunity. Absent
the resolution adhering the Allies to the Atlantic Charter the meeting would have been a
setback. But Eden cited a joint Czech-Polish declaration of adherence to the Charter as a
sign of cooperation between the two countries, whose disputes had made them vulnerable
to manipulation by their larger neighbors in the past. If stability were to be achieved in
the postwar period, they would have to work together. He therefore reported to the War
Cabinet that the event had “passed off satisfactorily,” despite the Dutch reservation to
point four of the Atlantic Charter, and the last-minute Russian decision, which denied the
British Bureau and Inter-Allied Committee legitimacy.362
Russia’s behavior shocked the British. To obtain Moscow’s goodwill, Eden had
shown Maisky the draft resolutions and invitation in August, well before he had shared
the materials with the other Allies, and he made a point to obtain Russia’s views before
setting a date for the conference.363 Maisky reciprocated, and provided an advance copy
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He expressed concerns over the

bureau: his government preferred an international setup with the authority to work on the
problem of providing economic aid to occupied Europe. 365 As a substitute, Maisky
accepted the Inter-Allied Committee, but told Sir Frederick that he still needed to obtain
Moscow’s approval. He also requested one meeting of the committee before the bureau
began its work, which Leith-Ross granted.366 Thus when Maisky suddenly objected to
point six of the resolution during the meeting, it took the British by surprise.
The situation worsened. On September 26, 1941, Leith-Ross requested of Maisky
the name of Soviet representative to the Inter-Allied Committee.367 If the Russians used
the committee’s first meeting to reopen the question of the bureau, he would try to align
the other Allies against them.368 This never happened. On October 15, 1941, Maisky let it
be known that his Government would not participate in view of its reservation to point
six of the resolution. Instead, he would submit a new relief proposal to the Allies.369
Leith-Ross seemed unfazed. A week later he wrote Maisky that the British Government
would “be happy to consider this [Soviet] proposal,” but that he hoped to see their
representative at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee the following week to discuss a
“purely statistical question.”370 But he told Sargent he would “feel bound to oppose”
Maisky’s proposal.371
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Just before the Committee’s first meeting, the Soviet Ambassador convinced
Eden to postpone it. Leith-Ross speculated that the Russians preferred to delay all
discussions of postwar reconstruction, an unreasonable position. As a result, he tried to
convince the Foreign Office that Britain should precede without Moscow. Establishing
the bureau on an international basis, he argued, made no sense if the United States were
not on board: the Americans would ultimately have to pay for most of what would be
needed after the war. For this reason, the bureau’s composition and mandate had been
restricted, leaving it with insufficient work to justify an international staff. 372 On
November 17, 1941, the British Government shared these views with Maisky.373 Whether
the Russians responded remains unclear, but they were conspicuously absent from the
first meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee held on December 19, 1941.374

Power Asymmetries in the Anglo-American Relationship

While these events unfolded, Lord Halifax had the time to reflect upon the two
great problems of Anglo-American relations: how could London convince the United
States to collaborate with Britain and shoulder its responsibilities in international politics,
and how could Britain, despite its weaknesses, maintain its strength, influence, and even
equality with the United States in the governance of global affairs? In a telegram
addressed to Eden but meant for Churchill’s eyes, he suggested that America’s
372
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isolationist tendencies had far less to do with a desire to disengage from world affairs
than with a wish “to be isolated from, and insulated against, the mismanagement of
them…” But now, he believed the American people had awoken to the “realization that
the United States are inescapably ‘part of the world’ for good or ill.” The war, he
believed, would discredit isolationism, and make the American people aware of their
interests and responsibilities in other areas of the world. The Lend-Lease Act, various
public statements from government officials, and recent instances of Anglo-American
cooperation made the likelihood of this development more apparent.375
But with regard to the second question, Halifax admitted that in American opinion
there existed a “continuing though vague desire… to inherit the influence and power of
Great Britain and the Commonwealth.” “I am aware too,” he wrote, “that on occasions
the proposals of individual officials may seem to be based on a desire to promote such a
development, and that indiscriminate acquiescence in such proposals, if cumulative,
might unduly impair our position in relation to this country.” Yet despite this evidence,
Halifax could “detect neither in the attitude nor in the measures of the Administration as
a whole any intention to convert such sentiments into terms of policy.”376
At this juncture, Halifax may have been correct in his observations. But if in time
he maintained this viewpoint, it had more to do with tactics than the reality of American
policy: officials in Washington, as we will see, hoped to dismantle the British Empire,
assume its power under an anti-imperial guise, and establish an international system
ostensibly led, but in reality, dominated by the United States. Even in the face of this
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policy, it remained far more intelligent for British officials to work from positive
suppositions and seek to influence the Americans than to assume sinister motives, which
might have led to a deterioration of relations and complete loss of influence.
Halifax believed Britain should seek to cement its ties of cooperation with the
United States. The Roosevelt Administration, he reported, wanted to conclude a series of
agreements before the end of hostilities to safeguard “against a recrudescence of political
and economic isolationism after the war.” The best way to achieve this end, he pointed
out, was through a treaty, but this procedure required a two-thirds majority vote in the
Senate. To avoid the difficulties this avenue posed, the Administration had resorted to a
“new procedure” whereby it used its executive powers and domestic legislation to
achieve “what otherwise would have required a treaty.” The problem herein, Halifax
lamented, was that future presidents could easily reverse such arrangements.
Consequently, he thought Britain should encourage “a foundation of future policy which
it would be difficult for its successors to reverse” and to “frame its own action in such a
way as to assist the Executive in securing its objectives by these means.”377
For Halifax, success depended in large part on the approach. It was unreasonable,
he suggested, to think that long-term cooperation could be achieved with one broad
stroke of the brush. It would have to be obtained “piecemeal, and by the gradual means of
solving concrete problems as they arise.” To avoid acrimony, he believed all British
officials should “demonstrate real understanding and a real wish to meet the needs of the
United States.” “We must eschew any appearance of trying to impose a solution of any
question by insistence on a superior British wisdom,” he advised. “When difficulties
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arise, we must avoid recriminations that will create an atmosphere of mutual
suspicion.” It was also important to avoid the impression that they sought “to promote
merely selfish interests.” If in its interactions with the Americans the British Government
held to these tenets, he believed it would “be in a favorable position to place” its “talents
and experience at the service of the desired Anglo-American partnership…”378

Anglo-Soviet Relations: the Historical Context

Context illuminates events. As one of the interventionist powers during the
Russian Civil War, Britain aroused suspicions in Moscow. The Labor Government had
recognized the Soviet state in 1924, and then again in 1929 after the conservative Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin severed relations in 1927. But appearances, as one scholar
explains, are deceiving: “Whatever their political complexion, [all] British governments
in the twenties viewed Russia as an irritant, if not quite an outright enemy.”379 British
attitudes changed little with the Nazi rise; if Hitler could be appeased, cooperation with
Moscow seemed unnecessary. But opinion changed when it became apparent that he
could not. Hoping to reconstitute the Triple Entente of WWI, Britain tried to link the
Soviet Union to the Anglo-French alliance.380 But missteps and miscalculations wounded
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these efforts. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of NonAggression with Germany.381 Not long thereafter, the British Government recalled its
Ambassador in Moscow, William Seeds, who had warned London of Soviet doubledealing.382
Caution and chance kept the doors between the two countries open. A secret
protocol to the Anglo-Polish Treaty of August 25, 1941 stated that Britain would only
assist Poland if it came under attack by Germany, not the Soviet Union.383 Britain thus
avoided legal obligations to act against the Soviet state when Russian troops invaded
Poland on September 17, 1939. Equally beneficial, the war between Finland and the
Soviet Union ended before the British could launch a planned expedition to seize the
Norwegian city of Narvik, which risked a confrontation with Moscow.384 If such factors
kept Britain away from armed conflict with the Russians, a desire to offset German
influence in the Soviet Union led Churchill to send Stafford Cripps, an avowed Marxist
who had been expelled from the Labor Party the previous year for supporting the

3-26; Robert Manne, “The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet
Rapprochement,” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 4 (Oct. 1981): 725-755. Of
course there is also the indefatigable A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 212-16, 220-228.
381
“The Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,” August 23, 1939, Avalon Project:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/nonagres.asp (accessed September 11, 2012).
382
On these points, see Ross, ed., Foreign Office, 6; Taylor, Origins, 229.
383
“Secret Protocol Attached to the Agreement of Mutual Assistance Between the United
Kingdom and Poland,” August 25, 1939, in Anthony Carty and Richard A. Smith, Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice and the World Crisis: A Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office, 19321945 (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 312. See “Agreement of Mutual
Assistance Between the United Kingdom and Poland,” August 25, 1939, “Atlantic
Charter,” August 14, 1941, Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk19.asp
(accessed September 11, 2012).
384
J.A. Bayer, “British Policy Towards the Russo-Finnish Winter War, 1939-40,”
Canadian Journal of History 16, no. 1 (April 1981): 27-65.

128
principle of popular fronts, to Moscow. But the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Vyacheslav Molotov, would only accept Cripps as the successor to Seeds. Churchill
appointed him Ambassador.385
Though this strange confluence of events made it easier for Britain to build an
alliance with the Soviet Union after the Nazi attack on June 22, 1941, it also had other
ramifications. Cripps sought trade agreements in Moscow that would have stiffened the
blockade of Germany. When these efforts failed, he suggested a de facto recognition of
the Soviet Union’s new territories, acquired after the signing of the Non-Aggression
Treaty, to win countervailing influence in Moscow. The War Cabinet concurred, but
excluded Poland from the territorial equation. It also agreed to consult the Soviet Union
about all postwar settlements, and to avoid any anti-Soviet alliance. In return, they
expected benevolent neutrality from Moscow, and would be open to a Non-Aggression
Pact if circumstances permitted. The Russians proved disinterested, but the damage was
done. Cripps exceeded his instructions on Poland, which caused the Foreign Office to
loose confidence in him, and the British had dangled a postwar political settlement before
Russian eyes, which they never forget.386
Operation Barbarossa brought the two powers together, but historical animosities
and the peculiarities of each nation’s predicament pulled them apart. For the Soviet
Union, the assault constituted a monumental disaster. Within four months, Leningrad was
under siege; the Wehrmacht stood within 19 miles of the Kremlin; and the Germans had
385
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can only imagine the sheer panic among officials as these events unfolded. While
maneuvering the Red Army to prevent a complete collapse, and transferring the whole of
their industrial heartland behind the Urals, the Russians begged the Americans and
British for material assistance, and pleaded with London to open a second front or send
troops to the Soviet Union.388 They obtained assistance,389 but Churchill’s refusal to
overrule the objections of his generals to meet the Soviet Union’s military requests
rekindled old suspicions.390 As a compromise, Cripps therefore suggested Britain seek
Moscow’s goodwill by proposing a postwar political settlement.391 Naturally his ideas
were suspect.392
It is plausible that the Soviet Union hoped to delay discussions of all postwar
matters at this point in the war, as Leith-Ross surmised in October: their military
predicament suggested a position of weakness.393 But this view conflicts with Soviet
attempts to secure a postwar political settlement a few weeks later. The Russians
apparently believed Britain’s inability or refusal to assist them with direct military
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intervention strengthened their hand with regard to postwar matters. Moscow led
Cripps to believe that “relations between the two countries” were “getting worse and not
better.” 394 The Foreign Office downplayed these reports. 395 But the Soviet military
situation made it difficult to dismiss them, especially after November 8, 1941, when
Stalin wrote Churchill one of the most undiplomatic letters of the war. He complained
that there was neither an “understanding” between their “countries concerning war aims
and plans for the post-war organization of peace,” nor a “treaty… on mutual military aid
in Europe against Hitler.”396

Soviet Efforts to Negotiate a Harder Bargain with Britain

It is in this context that we must consider the Soviet reservation to point six of the
September 24, 1941 relief resolution, and their refusals to cooperate with the Inter-Allied
Committee. The Russians did not want to delay discussions of postwar matters; rather,
they hoped to negotiate a harder bargain while the British, particularly individuals like
Cripps, felt guilty about their inability to provide meaningful relief to Russia during its
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In this way, they could test the sincerity of

Britain’s commitment to their present and future security.398 Moscow also hoped to make
a deal with the British before the United States became involved in the war or postwar
planning. For this reason, Maisky promised to submit a Soviet alternative to the relief
resolution of September 24, 1941; officials in Moscow prepared two treaties and a secret
protocol; and Russian officials heightened the urgency of their situation.399
Whether a test of London’s goodwill or a ruse to secure an advantageous postwar
political agreement, the British had little choice but to respond to the appearance of
Russian anxiety. Inasmuch as the success of the war effort depended on Soviet victories
in the East, stability in the postwar period required some attempt at cooperation or
accommodation with Moscow. British officials felt obliged to placate their fears. On
November 12, 1941, the Soviet Ambassador “mentioned the suspicion that prevailed in
Russia” and complained of the “many people” in Britain who “advocated allowing
Germany a free hand in the East.” Britain’s failure or inability to “form a second front,”
Maisky told Eden, had revived these worries. The British attributed “Stalin’s desire to
secure a definite understanding on war aims and on plans for the post-war organization or
peace” to these suspicions. But they also believed Stalin feared “an Anglo-American
peace from which” they would “be largely excluded.”400
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Thus Churchill deployed Eden to Moscow in December 1941, where Stalin
presented him with the two treaties and secret protocol. The first treaty was an AngloSoviet military alliance against Germany and her European allies; it pledged the powers
to conclude no separate peace. The second treaty called for cooperation in postwar
affairs. The secret protocol asked for British recognition of the Soviet Union’s frontiers at
the time of the Nazi attack; it harkened back to the de facto recognition proposed by
Cripps a year earlier. The treaty proposals led the two countries to conclude the Twenty
Year Mutual Assistance Agreement on May 26, 1942. But Eden rebuffed the secret
protocol. Britain had promised the United States it would conclude no secret accords. The
Atlantic Charter committed its signatories to seek no territorial changes “that do not
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned” and to “respect the
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live…”401
Yet these commitments meant little. Stalin thought the Atlantic Charter was
“directed against those who were trying to get world domination.” But when Eden cited it
to reject his postwar aims, he complained that it was “beginning to look as though it were
directed at the Soviet Union.” He must have anticipated this moment. Russia’s adherence
to the declaration had been “ponderous” and stated in a “qualified way.”402 In Maisky’s
opinion, the Charter sounded “as if England and the USA fancied themselves as
Almighty God, with a mission to judge the remainder of the sinful world, including my
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As for the British, Churchill never believed the Atlantic Charter

applied to the dependent Empire, but in early 1942, it became apparent that he was
willing to exempt Eastern Europe from its statutes as well. He asked Roosevelt to make
an exception for the Soviet frontiers on March 7, 1942.404 But the President disapproved.
Whether the Americans genuinely supported the principles enshrined in the
Atlantic Charter remains to be seen; here they stood by them because it served their
interests; and the British, who were dependent, acted accordingly because they had no
choice. The Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Richard Law, may have been correct
when he confessed some years later that the Atlantic Charter “was mainly a dodge to get
the U.S. a little bit further into the war,” but he was decidedly incorrect when he blamed
the difficulties it caused Great Britain on the fact that “nobody at any time believed in
it.”405 The difficulties had nothing to do with beliefs; they were the result of power
disparities and incongruent interest structures that underlay Anglo-American relations.
The Americans also discouraged British temptations to mollify the Russians on
relief. Leith-Ross informed Maisky that Britain would “be very happy to consider” the
Soviet proposals to reorganize the Inter-Allied Committee and Bureau.406 But secretly he
told the Foreign Office that he would be bound to oppose any Soviet plans for an InterAllied Staff, or any suggested reorganization that excluded the United States.407 The
Americans had made it clear that they “would regard the creation of an Inter-Allied body
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to distribute relief, which must largely come from the US, as premature.” For Sir
Frederick, the circumstances were just fine. Britain’s financial position made American
participation essential, and he did not want to be “the chairman of an inter-allied staff,
who either have nothing to do or waste their time doing unnecessary work.” If these
arrangements were accepted, he wrote, “I must ask that someone else be put in charge of
it.”408
Thus while Leith-Ross gave Maisky the impression that Britain remained open to
the Russian point of view, he obstructed their efforts. Behind the scenes he worked to
turn his colleagues against the anticipated Soviet proposals. Among the Allies, he secured
the support of governments who disapproved of any suggestion to internationalize the
relief efforts at this stage in the war. “The French and Belgians,” he wrote Eden, “have
had experience of these inter-Allied organizations, [and] are as strongly convinced as I
am that it would be an absolute waste of money and energy to create such an organization
at present.”409 Perhaps it was sheer coincidence, but it also bears noting that he chaired
the first meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee on December 19, 1941. No Russian
representative was present. Maisky, at that time, was in Moscow with Eden.410
By this point, the events of the previous days had dramatically changed the
context of all inter-allied cooperation. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese launched a
daring assault on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, which led the United States to
declare war on Japan. Shortly thereafter, the Germans issued their own declaration of war
on the United States, a decision that obliged the Roosevelt Administration to fight a two408

“Organization of the Bureau,” November 4, 1941, T 188/253, PRO.
Ibid.
410
“Minutes… of the Inter-Allied Committee…. December 19, 1941…” Acheson Papers,
NARA.
409

135
front war across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Now the conflicts in Asia and
Europe were linked. Though Franklin Roosevelt, as we have seen, spoke of the erupting
conflagration in global terms as early as January, it was now apparent to everyone that
humanity faced a world war. These developments make Soviet behavior the following
month understandable, but also bizarre.

The First Wartime Proposal for an International Organization

When the Soviet Ambassador returned to London, he delivered on his promise of
three months prior. On January 13, 1942, he presented the British with his government’s
plan for cooperation on postwar relief. The memo he shared with Eden is remarkable for
many reasons, but one is noteworthy. In the introduction, the Russians acknowledged the
“international character” of many of the challenges they would face after the defeat of
Nazi Germany. In so doing, they admitted that these problems could not be solved by one
state alone. They therefore proposed the establishment of “an international organization,”
the first such proposal of the war. It would initially focus on the supply of foodstuffs and
raw materials, but Maisky believed it could be expanded to cover other problems later.411
The Russians drew upon the Inter-Allied Committee and British Bureau advanced
on September 24, 1941 when constructing their proposal. To facilitate the planning
function of the committee, they suggested two commissions, one on Foodstuffs and Raw
Materials, and one devoted to the problems of Transport. In time, Maisky believed the
411
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Allies might establish additional commissions to address other problems. As for the
bureau, its functions would remain “day-to-day business and technical preparatory work,”
but under the Soviet plan its membership would have been widened to include a Russian
and two or three representatives from the other allied countries.412
The proposal provided no place in the organization for the United States, not even
on the Inter-Allied Committee, which the Americans joined in late December 1941.413
Equally striking, Maisky presented the plan to the exiled European governments, but did
not share it with the Americans.414 Yet the Russians still hoped the United States would
provide foodstuffs and raw materials to the organization. The plan specified that the
committee would prepare estimates of not only requirements, but of the resources in its
member states as well, which included the British Commonwealth and Empire in addition
to the refugee governments. The proposal then singled out the United States as a country
with significant supply sources the committee would be empowered to evaluate.415
Under the Soviet plan, the Inter-Allied Committee obtained the authority to
allocate supplies and recommend credits and loans to obtain them. Here again the
absence of the United States requires explanation: how the organization could obtain
resources from the Americans without giving them influence over their allocation, or the
ability to recommend the financial terms by which the recipient states would secure those
412
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resources, remains unknown. Similarly confusing, the Soviet plan gave the InterAllied Committee the power to elaborate “measures” to control prices and “combat
speculation on the post-war needs” of victims of Hitler’s aggression. Yet it made it clear
that the “purchase and sale” of resources “should not come within the province of the
Inter-Allied Committee,” thereby stripping it of the best tool to effectuate its desired
price.416
Finally, the Soviet proposal provided that decisions of the Inter-Allied Committee
should be taken “by the unanimous vote of all the representatives taking part in the
proceedings.” The Committee’s decisions would only come into effect after each of the
respective governments had endorsed them. The first stipulation meant that any country
could have blocked progress on any matter, whether of interest to them or not. The
second meant that affected nations could have obstructed the Committee’s decisions from
being implemented, even after its members had overcome the formidable hurdle of
unanimity.417 These rules would have made the organization’s work near impossible,
unless the Soviets planned to take action through the Inter-Allied Bureau and occupying
military forces. Without Soviet documents, such determinations remain impossible.
If the Soviet proposal was a ploy to derail all postwar discussions until later in the
war, the evidences suggests otherwise. The previous month Stalin had sought territorial
guarantees from London against the wishes of Washington. These efforts would continue.
Per his involvement, Maisky dismissed Sir Frederick’s central criticism of the Soviet
proposal: “the Russian memorandum had been prepared before the entry of the United
States into the war.” But when Leith-Ross inquired about the organization’s executive
416
417
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machinery, the Soviet Ambassador showed his colors: “The people at the top in
America took broad views,” he claimed, “but there was little knowledge or understanding
of European problems.” “[Capitalist] and speculative influences were very strong in
business circles.” As a result, Maisky “wanted a real Inter-Allied system of control.”418
This goal presupposed the exclusion of Washington. The Soviet Ambassador
wanted “the relief work to be planned by the European powers… and [with] as little
[American] influence as possible.”419 As he told Leith-Ross, “he wanted to keep them…
in the background.”420 And to achieve this objective, he stressed the importance of
establishing the organization in Europe, as opposed to in the United States.421
While these opinions worried Leith-Ross, the mechanics of the Soviet plan
appeared impractical as well. “The objective of the Russian Government seems to be to
set up a planning organization here, whose decisions would be binding on the supplying
countries,” he wrote. But it was doubtful whether the Americans would provide their
food and raw materials if they were not a part of the Inter-Allied Committee, which,
according to the Soviet plan, would maintain responsibility for allocating supplies and
recommending credits and loans to obtain them.422
Leith-Ross criticized the Soviet proposal in other ways as well. He lambasted the
idea of an Inter-Allied Bureau. He attacked the two proposed commissions on grounds
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that they would seek “to obtain a vested interest” and “claim to constitute the final
form for Inter-Allied control in these fields.” Such interests, in turn, would make
negotiations with the United States more difficult. The Soviet memo also excluded the
Far East, neutral countries, and enemy countries. The later fact, Leith-Ross pointed out,
came into conflict with Churchill’s statement of June 1940 and the Atlantic Charter,
which stipulated “that there should be no differentiation between victor and vanquished.”
He criticized the requirement of unanimous voting on all decisions taken by the InterAllied Committee: this would make it difficult for the committee to act. The scope of the
organization, too, received his opprobrium. It not only addressed the question of relief; it
also suggested the Soviet formula would apply to the whole “economic life of post-War
Europe.”423

Back to the United States: Regrouping for the Next Stage

The Russian proposal hardened the British in their determination to pursue the
fullest possible cooperation with the United States. Within days, they shared the memo
with the American Embassy. 424 Leith-Ross also gave them records of confidential
conversations he had with Maisky, in which the Ambassador made his Government’s
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determination to exclude the Americans apparent.
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Determined to forge the

strongest of relations with the United States, even to the detriment of a possible treaty
with Russia, Sir Frederick also provided them other documents without authorization.426
The Americans, of course, welcomed such breaches, but insisted that Britain should not
reply to the Soviet memorandum before obtaining their views.427 This process took
months, and aroused immense suspicion in Moscow. For the British, it delayed an
impending war between pro-Russian and pro-American factions in the Foreign Office.428
In the interim period, they shared with the Americans a proposal of their own
calling for an international relief organization, which will be discussed in subsequent
chapters. In this context, we must note that Leith-Ross believed the United Kingdom
should provide some estimate to the Americans of its potential contribution to postwar
relief in order to embolden its leadership aspirations. It also needed to build up stocks in
accordance with the Prime Minister’s pledge of June 1940, which had not been done.
Worse, many of the possible sources for planned stockpiles had vanished: increased war
demands had turned the surplus problem into one of scarcity. Several of the exiled
governments had also commenced purchasing materials for their own postwar use, a fact
that taxed supplies further. Thus available resources for relief were rapidly dissipating.429
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The Treasury believed the country could make no commitment to postwar
relief from its resources due to the country’s perilous financial situation. “We have to try
to reconcile our desire for political and prestige reasons to take a leading part in
organizing relief with the probability that after the war we shall ourselves greatly need to
obtain relief.” For this reason, the Treasury thought it all the more imperative that Britain
should reach out to the Americans.430 Yet Leith-Ross disliked the idea of pursuing
negotiations with the United States while evincing no willingness to make a commitment.
“The question is obviously one which will have to be considered by the Ministers,” he
wrote, “but if the decision is that we cannot offer any definite contribution, I hope that the
Treasury will arrange for someone else to take responsibility for our future leadership of
relief planning.”431
The changed circumstances led to a reordering of the planning machinery for
postwar relief in the British government. In January, the War Cabinet abolished the
Ministerial Committee on Export Surpluses for lack of purpose.432 It maintained the
Official Committee on Export Surpluses, which Leith-Ross chaired, but changed the
name several months later to reflect the new situation: it became the Official Committee
on Post-War Commodity Policy and Relief.433 In February 1942, Churchill transferred
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Hugh Dalton from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Board of Trade.

434

Thereupon, the Minister Without Portfolio lost his seat in the Cabinet, and the new
President of the Board of Trade assumed responsibility for the Official Committee. Sir
Frederick’s relief operation, moreover, was re-housed in the Board of Trade.435
Leith-Ross also directed the Bureau that facilitated the work of the Inter-Allied
Committee for Post-War Requirements, which he chaired.436 Though the Inter-Allied
Committee became a clearinghouse for intelligence on the postwar needs of Europe, as
planned, it served other purposes as well: it provided the British a propaganda tool vis-àvis the Nazis and the populations in the occupied territories; it gave them a means with
which to satisfy and unify the allied governments; and it became a tool with which to
apply pressure on the United States and carve out a position of prominence for Great
Britain in the postwar world order. With these ends in mind, the committee met four
more times: on June 17, 1942; October 1, 1942; October 20, 1942; and on April 16,
1943.437 It also established an elaborate system of technical advisory committees that
prepared estimates for agriculture, medical supplies, nutrition, and inland transport. These
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committees met repeatedly throughout 1942 and early 1943. The Soviet Union simply
refused to participate in any of these meetings.438
Through all of the turmoil, Leith-Ross never resigned, despite unending
challenges and repeated threats. When Hugh Dalton became the Minister of Economic
Warfare, he tried to undercut Sir Frederick’s authority as Director-General by placing
two civil servants under him, whose loyalty would be to the Minister instead of LeithRoss. These arrangements angered Sir Frederick, and ensured their relations would be
stormy in the beginning. Dalton, on one occasion, issued a peremptory order for LeithRoss to see him instantly. When his private secretary informed the Minister that Sir
Frederick was not available, Dalton reissued the order. The secretary thereupon visited
the Director-General in the restroom. Upon reading the note the secretary passed under
the stall, Leith-Ross replied: “Tell him that I can only deal with one shit at a time.”439
That, we might say, was Sir Frederick’s motto. How well it served him remains a
question for our consideration, but it certainly captures his frustrations.
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CHAPTER THREE
ROOSEVELT’S BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM

The December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor presented the Roosevelt
Administration with a global opportunity. The question for officials was how best to
exploit it. Obviously the President would obtain a Congressional declaration of war on
Japan, but whether he should seek one on Germany remained unclear. Henry Stimson and
Cordell Hull thought he should. The Cabinet, however, decided against it. Apparently
several of its members had learned through intelligence intercepts that Berlin had
promised to enter the fray on Tokyo’s side if war broke out between Japan and the United
States.440 This information turned out to be true. On December 11, 1941, Adolf Hitler
saved Roosevelt much trouble by declaring war on the United States. With this step, the
conflict had become a global affair in all but one aspect.441
The alliance fighting the war was still European. Thus in late December 1941, the
Roosevelt Administration worked with the British to craft a new declaration that would
adhere a geographically more comprehensive group of nations to the Atlantic Charter.442
It would pledge them to defend “life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to
preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands.” They
would also agree to exert their full resources against Germany, Italy and Japan, and to
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make no separate armistice or peace with the enemies.
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To maximize the impact of

this declaration, and to ensure its openness to all, Roosevelt labored over what to call it.
When speaking to Congress, Churchill had “fumbled with the words ‘allied nations’ and
then had called them ‘associated nations,’” as Wilson did during the First World War.
These formulations could not work.444
At some point between Christmas and New Years Eve of 1941, a “bright idea”
struck Roosevelt. He thereupon rolled into the Rose Room, where Churchill, then visiting
the President at the White House, was taking a bath. The group of countries fighting the
Axis Powers, he suggested to the Prime Minister, should be called “the united nations.”
Churchill mulled over the idea for a moment, and then agreed to the proposal. Roosevelt
wrote out the heading: “Declaration by United Nations.”445 On January 1, 1942, twentysix nations signed the document, including China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the
United States; the Dominions and India signed, as did the exiled European Governments
and a handful of Latin American countries. By the end of the war, an additional twentyone nations would adhere to the UN Declaration.446
Its name is wildly important. When Roosevelt conveyed this story to one of his
chief advisors, Adolf Berle, he explained that in speaking with Churchill he had refrained
from making “the analogy to the ‘United States’ – a name worked out by a somewhat
443

“Declaration by the United Nations,” January 1, 1942, The Avalon Project:
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law Library,
Yale Law School, 2008): http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp (accessed
September 11, 2012).
444
See entry for January 6, 1942, in Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs, eds.,
Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), 394-395.
445
Entry for January 6, 1942, in Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 394-395.
446
“Declaration by the United Nations,” January 1, 1942, Avalon Project:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp (accessed September 11, 2012).

146
similar process of mind in 1776…” The title merely suggested the nations of the
world were “united in purpose,” and “if it led to a greater degree of working together, so
much the better.”447 But for Roosevelt, the idea of a “world civilization” was “American
civilization writ large.”448 His choice of name, “United Nations,” implicitly captures the
idea. While it may be easy in the present to criticize such a grandiose project, it behooves
us to remember that the self-image of the United States as well as perceptions of the
country abroad were more positive than negative at this point in history.449
Consequently, a central task of the Roosevelt Administration was to ensure the
maintenance of this benevolence through whatever system it constructed. This aim meant
that the country would have to plan. Vague statements of principle, such as those
enunciated in the Four Freedoms speech, the Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations
Declaration, were insufficient to build a new international system, even if these
documents provided blueprints at times. With this observation in mine, we turn to the
planning process, particularly the role of Roosevelt’s administrative style in it. Although
much of these matters have been discussed before, I have elected to include them here
because they are so fundamental to our story.
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The Pressure to Prepare: Establishing a Planning Apparatus

On December 28, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt authorized the Department of
State to recommence its preparatory activities for the postwar world. The President’s
decision came after more than two years of uncertainty, during which the United States
found itself responding to events rather than controlling them. Despite its rich resources
and industrial might, the country was unprepared to deal with the global conflagration
that would absorb its attention. The size of the government had expanded under the New
Deal, but these programs and agencies had been designed for domestic purposes, not the
global management of international relations. The State Department had weathered
budget cuts and reductions in personnel throughout the 1930s. Many civil servants had
left the department for the private sector, such that when storm clouds engulfed the globe,
a mere 730 civil servants remained in the Foreign Service.450
Every State Department effort to plan for the future before December 1941 had
ended in failure. Within four months of its creation, the Advisory Committee on
Problems of Foreign Relations established following the Nazi invasion of Poland had
ceased to exist. With no support staff and a few resources, the Committee met seldom
and left few records.451 The Committee’s successor, the Interdepartmental Group to
Consider Post-War International Economic Problems and Policies, which included
agencies from outside the State Department, became so consumed in the problems of
450
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Hemispheric defense that it had little time to think about the future, much less plan
for it. By December 1940, events had so overwhelmed the United States government –
the collapse of France, the Congressional fight for lend-lease, the raging battle over the
skies of Britain, and the deteriorating situation in the Far East – that the Interdepartmental
Group ceased meeting, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull did nothing to resuscitate it.452
Throughout 1941 the Roosevelt Administration accomplished little in the way of
planning, despite repeated pleas from bureaucrats and several of the President’s closest
advisors.453 The Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, frequently urged the President
to speak out about the need to plan for peace.454 The Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf
Berle, wrote Roosevelt in June 1941, asking that he be allowed to begin preparing
tentative outlines for the postwar world order.455 Inside the State Department, the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State, Leo Pasvolsky, wrote Welles in April and the
Secretary in September, urging them to create an apparatus to plan for all phases of
postwar foreign policy.456 Welles privately raised the issue with Roosevelt, but not until
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early October did Hull discuss the creation of a new postwar advisory committee with
him.457 Yet even after this meeting, nearly four months passed before anything was done.
For Adolf Berle, a member of Roosevelt’s original brain trust and one of the
architects of the First New Deal, these delays were worrisome. Like his friend and
confidant, Sumner Welles, Berle feared the British might secretly cede the Baltic States
to the Soviet Union. Equally disturbing, he worried that the British planned to use the
Inter-Allied Committee for Postwar Requirements to channel the trade and economics of
the Western Hemisphere through London when the war ended. Berle never doubted these
efforts were partly humanitarian, but he was suspicious of the British and understood that
this work had implications that extended beyond the relief portfolio. As a result, he
believed that planning should begin at once so the United States could define its interests
and be in a position to preempt British economic designs or any other ulterior motives.458

The Bureaucratic Politics of Postwar Planning

Why did the Roosevelt Administration postpone preparations for the postwar
period for so long? Harley Notter suggests the answer has a lot to do with the late date on
which the United States entered the war: it made little sense to expend precious time and
resources planning while more pressing matters remained on the table and uncertainty
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loomed in the air.
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The Administration also feared possible political fallout should

postwar planning become public knowledge: political factions opposed to American
participation in the war would have exploded were they to learn that Roosevelt was
making plans to end a war in which the United States had not yet entered.460 Both of
these explanations possess merit, but they are inadequate. The Administration had made
failed attempts to plan before, and the potentially damaging effects of leaks did not
vanish with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In fact, they remained throughout 1942 and
much of 1943.
These explanations, moreover, accord little with the underlying character of the
United States. Americans have never lacked ambition and have never been risk averse.
The people of the United States, as Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote, have always been
“devoured by the desire to rise.”461 The aspiration for world power has been present since
the nation’s founding, and has been sustained by the belief that divine Providence
bestowed upon the United States a special mission in the world.462 Thus from the moment
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the Germans attacked Poland, policymakers in the Roosevelt Administration smelled
opportunity. Even while worrying over the defense of the Western Hemisphere, most of
them wanted the United States to begin preparing at once. So why did the United States, a
country that boasted a level of economic output in 1937 that exceeded the next four
countries combined, delay for so long?463 The answer, simply put, is that Americans,
while ambitious and righteous, can also be shrewd and crafty. Franklin Roosevelt, in the
latter regard, suffered no deficit.
Whether by design or incompetence, Roosevelt’s administrative style meant that
decisions were brought to him. 464 He ignored established lines of authority within
governmental bureaucracies, and assigned overlapping responsibilities to competing
departments or agencies. As a result, territorial wars often erupted between various
bureaucracies and fighting would break out within them, leaving but one person, the
President of the United States, to arbitrate. With this administrative style in play, it is
hardly surprising that the New Dealers behaved like gangsters, always engaged in
territorial gunfights and protracted intramural feuds over policy.465
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Once a decision came before the President, a complex intuitive process of
deciding ensued. First, Roosevelt heard all sides of the issue. His administrative system
and his habit of giving each of the main actors access to his office ensured that he would
become well informed of the issue at hand; it also encouraged members of his
administration to saddle up for the fight. Second, Roosevelt wanted to know that the
decision would be executed. He usually consulted all major actors with a stake in the
issue. Roosevelt, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. explains, appears to have believed “that
clear-cut administrative decisions would work only if they expressed equally clear-cut
realities of administrative competence and vigor.”466 And finally, the President tended to
weigh into the equation a variety of external issues: the proper timing for decision, the
potential reaction and role of Congress, possible partisan impacts, and the public interest.
In conformity with this approach, Roosevelt divided the State Department against
itself. In July 1937, he appointed his long-time associate and friend, Sumner Welles, to
the position of Undersecretary, despite protests from Hull. 467 Then, to exacerbate
tensions between the two men, he increased Welles’s influence and authority by giving
the Undersecretary unfettered access to the White House and selecting him instead of the
Secretary to undertake special missions and represent the United States at major
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diplomatic events. In September 1939, Welles, at Roosevelt’s request, attended the
hastily called Inter-American Conference in Panama, where the American states pledged
hemispheric neutrality.468 During February and March 1940, the President sent Welles on
a highly publicized but futile peace mission to Europe.469 The following August, Welles
accompanied the President to Argentia, where Churchill and Roosevelt issued the
Atlantic Charter.470 All of this, of course, angered Cordell Hull.471
This was a risky game. A handsome soft-spoken man from central Tennessee,
Cordell Hull became Roosevelt’s top man at the State Department in 1933. At the age of
62, he had served in the House and Senate for twenty-three years, a factor that made him
popular in Congress, especially the Senate. Though he contributed to the development of
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, he devoted most of his time to trade liberalization.
Hull believed that lowering tariffs and duties prevented war and promoted economic
growth. 472 His detractors often made fun of his speech impediment, mocking his
“wecopwocal twade agweements progwams.”473 But after the passing of the Reciprocal
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Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Hull concluded 27 trade agreements, mostly with
Latin American countries.474 It would prove a model for the future.
His longstanding achievements notwithstanding, Hull’s flaws impeded his
influence and made him surprisingly dangerous. Slow, deliberate, and excessively
cautious, Hull struggled to make decisions. When his Department or behavior came under
criticism, he became angry and petulant, often erupting in vulgar tirades. Favoring
compromise and consensus, he shied away from conflict, allowing them to brew in his
mind. In doing so, he permitted small problems the time to germinate into full-scale
affronts to his honor, which, in turn, led him to pursue the offender with the cold-blooded
determination of a feuding mountain boy.475
Yet the reach of Sumner Welles’s authority grew. Inside the State Department, he
assumed enormous responsibility and obtained considerable power. Aside from his duties
for Inter-American affairs, the President informally assigned Welles tasks on a wide array
of matters, usually without bothering to inform Hull. Formally he put him in charge of
refugee issues and Russian affairs, and made him the chief liaison officer between the
White House and the State Department.
For Hull, this access must have bespoke preferential treatment. Of the crème-dela-crème of mid-twentieth century American society, Welles attended the same schools as
the President and mingled in the same crowds. At Groton, he roomed with the brother of
Eleanor Roosevelt. At Harvard, he distinguished himself academically, graduating in
three years, while having spent the third one abroad. Hull, by contrast, was born in a log
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cabin, learned to read to understand the Bible, and studied at a relatively unknown
law school in Tennessee. He could not benefit from the wisdom of Franklin Roosevelt,
who, as Secretary of the Navy, encouraged Welles to pursue a career in diplomacy, and
then promoted him until the diplomat’s time in government came to a sudden and tragic
end.476
The President, however, was not exclusively responsible for Welles’s heightened
importance. Unknown to the public at the time, Hull had both tuberculosis and diabetes,
factors that led to bouts of illness that forced the Secretary to remain away from the
department for weeks at a time, particularly in 1941 and 1942. 477 These absences
provided Welles the room to assert his control over the bureaucracy and increase his
influence in both Asian and European affairs. Such developments irritated Hull.
The President and his closest confidant, Harry Hopkins, welcomed these changes
nonetheless. Hull had failed to reform the State Department. “You should go through the
experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy and action of the career
diplomats and then you’d know what a real problem was,” Roosevelt explained to
Marriner Eccles of the Federal Reserve Board.”478 The President was so distrustful of
State that he bypassed the Department altogether when setting up the administrative
machinery for lend-lease. Hopkins concurred with Roosevelt’s approach. The Foreign
Service, in his opinion, was a gang of “cookie-pushers, pansies” and “isolationists to
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Hull had done little to change this perception. Worse, most everyone in the

Roosevelt Administration believed he had mismanaged the Department. His caution and
survivor instincts had been welcomed in 1933, but, as Robert Sherwood writes, it was
inevitable that the President would “become impatient with anyone whose primary
concern was the maintenance of a personal record of ‘no runs – no hits – no errors.’”480
Weary of actions that might lead to war, Hull simply took too few risks.481 By 1941, the
President wanted in the fight.482 Hull, by contrast, did not.483
Despite Hull’s weaknesses, Roosevelt could not afford to lose him. Like William
Jennings Bryan in the Administration of Woodrow Wilson, the Secretary of State still
wielded considerable influence in the Congress, and was very popular among the public.
A nasty resignation had the potential to do serious harm to the Roosevelt Administration.
Hull’s prestige, moreover, was insurance against a replay of Woodrow Wilson’s
disastrous showdown with the Senate over the Treaty of Versailles.484 Consequently,
Roosevelt nourished Hull’s sensitive ego and kept him at the State Department. He
praised the Secretary of State incessantly in public and nominated him for the Nobel
Peace Prize on an annual basis.485 In the past, this tactic had worked. Despite Roosevelt’s
machinations, Hull had consistently helped the President. In 1939, for example,
Roosevelt abetted gossip that Hull would be his successor, even though the President had
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plans of his own for 1940. Then, days before the election, Roosevelt brazenly called
upon Hull to push for revision of the Neutrality Act of 1937 to provide for “cash-andcarry,” which allowed Great Britain to purchase war materials from the United States.
Hull carried out Roosevelt’s request honorably.486
However the Secretary also had the capacity to make trouble. When Roosevelt
asked the Treasury to prepare legislation for lend-lease in late 1940, Hull took offense.
The State Department disliked the idea of aiding Great Britain for fear that it was
throwing resources at a lost cause; and Hull reasoned that lend-lease still resided in the
Department’s purview. The Secretary also thought he had been inadequately consulted
during the lend-lease preparatory discussions, and that his advice on the matter had been
disregarded by Roosevelt and other governmental officials. Thus when the Treasury
Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, asked Hull to testify before Congress in support of the bill,
the Secretary of State behaved, as Warren Kimball writes, like a “petulant little boy,”
agreeing to speak only after much bickering and whining. He then undermined the
Administration’s legislative strategy in his testimony by refusing to concede that lendlease was necessary for the defense of the United States. He evaded concerns that the
proposal expanded the President’s powers unreasonably and revealed that the Treasury
had controlled the legislative drafting process.487
Though lend-lease passed in March 1941, the President clearly had a problem on
his hands. Was there anything that could be done to ameliorate this state of affairs? How
486
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long could the President continue along a path that offended his Secretary of State
without precipitating a disastrous rupture? Could the President rely on Cordell Hull when
the time for Congressional action arose once again? Did there remain any domain of
policy where Roosevelt could concede ground to his Secretary of State? With war
seemingly on the horizon, the movement for reciprocal trade agreements that had so
excited Hull in the 1930s seemed a dead end. Postwar planning, perhaps, constituted one
area that could be ceded to Hull, at least in the short-term. But the Secretary of State,
throughout the whole course of 1941, simply refused to take the initiative.
Hull’s personality and bouts of illness explain his behavior in part – he was absent
from work for almost three months in 1941.488 But the Secretary also had preferences. If
Hull had little desire for war, he showed equally little desire to plan for the postwar
era.489 Earlier efforts to prepare for peace were couched largely in economic terms, which
accorded with his risk-averse nature and obsession with trade liberalization. Nominally
the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations made no mention of the
postwar era, and the press statement announcing the committee emphasized “the field of
economic activity and relations” while ignoring the political and military fields.490 The
mandate of the Interdepartmental Group, which succeeded the Advisory Committee,
referred to the end of the war, but limited the group’s activities to economics.491 In this
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Hull saw few risks. But that was 1940 and the United States was now edging closer to
war. Planning had to begin.
On June 22, 1941, as soon as Hull departed the capital – doctors had insisted the
Secretary rest for a month in Sulphur Springs, West Virginia – the President immediately
went to work.492 First, he approved Berle’s request to begin tentative outlines for postwar
world, but insisted the Assistant Secretary concentrate on broad objectives rather than
detailed methods, and that his work remain secret.493 Then, to begin the arduous process
of shaping public opinion, Roosevelt permitted Welles to speak on the postwar era. In a
July 22 address at the Norwegian Legation broadcast nationwide and throughout
occupied Europe, Welles advocated the creation of world organization that would, as
Christopher O’Sullivan writes, “restore law and order and ensure peace at the close of
hostilities.” Further, Welles argued that military, political, and economic planning would
have to take place on a global scale.494 Hardly a week later, Roosevelt established the
Economic Defense Board (later the Board of Economic Warfare) and put his
administration’s most combative and quirky member in charge, Vice President Henry A.
Wallace. This group, among other tasks, would advise the president on the establishment
of sound peacetime international economic relationships.495
None of this was lost upon the Secretary’s Special Assistant, Leo Pasvolsky, who
had been put in charge of the State Department’s new Division of Special Research in

492

On Hull’s sickness, see Gellman, Secret Affairs, 236.
Reynolds, Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 256-257.
494
O’Sullivan, Postwar Planning, para. 149.
495
Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy, 57.
493

496

February 1941.

160
A man who ostensibly shunned the limelight, Pasvolsky was the

invisible bureaucrat who everyone saw: he weighed over 200 pounds, but was only five
feet, five inches tall. Hull called him “Friar Tuck.” Others, for good reason, have called
him the Secretary’s “think-tank.” Pasvolsky possessed a sharp analytical mind and a vast
knowledge of world affairs, accumulated as a reporter during the First World War and
researcher at the Brookings Institute, where he spent most of his career. Pasvolsky served
two years as Hull’s assistant during Roosevelt’s first administration, and returned to the
Department in 1936 at the Secretary’s request. A Russian-born economist, he had a knack
for translating Hull’s folksy speech on trade liberalization into erudite policy statements,
which he supported with rigorous economic argumentation. 497 As such, Pasvolsky
became Hull’s principal speechwriter, or, if the witty Dean Acheson is to be believed, “he
wrote Hull’s principal speech.”498 The Secretary rarely spoke on anything other than
trade. Pasvolsky shared his passion, and like his boss, viewed postwar planning largely,
though not exclusively, in economic terms.
Just as Pasvolsky pressed Hull to pursue postwar planning in 1939, he wrote the
Secretary again on September 12, 1941, urging him to create an advisory committee for
preparatory work on all phases of postwar foreign policy. To frighten Hull, who had just
496
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returned from convalescence in West Virginia, he warned that the Department of
State risked losing control of an area of policy residing in its domain. He explained that
other agencies of the government had begun working on these matters, and he highlighted
the creation of the Economic Defense Board under the leadership of Henry Wallace. If
planning for the postwar period remained decentralized, he argued, it could prove
disastrous for the entire process. 499 The Economic Defense Board had wartime
responsibilities, and may not have the time and resources to plan sufficiently. Pasvolsky
suggested the President create an advisory committee and designate the Secretary of State
as its Chairman. To undertake the work of this committee, he recommended three
subcommittees: one for political and territorial problems, one for armaments questions,
and one for economics and financial issues. Aware of the President’s preference for the
interdepartmental approach, he suggested the committee’s membership include
individuals from outside the Department of State.500
Pasvolsky’s approach to postwar planning revealed his knack for assessing power
dynamics within the Roosevelt Administration, but also his ability to defend his own
interests. He continued his outreach to Sumner Welles, meeting and corresponding with
the Undersecretary regarding their mutual desire to reinitiate the planning process.501
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Quietly he met with Norman Davis, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations
and the Chairman of the American Red Cross.502 Davis, like Hull, came from Tennessee,
and was a friend of the Secretary and the President. These interactions culminated in a
meeting between the President, Hull and Welles in early October, during which they
discussed postwar planning.503 Pasvolsky welcomed these developments, for it appeared
that the preparatory process would ultimately find a home in the State Department. The
Division of Special Research, which Pasvolsky had been chosen to lead, had been created
to backstop for the entire planning process. The bespectacled Special Assistant also
wanted to chair one of the subcommittees. Yet the Secretary of State remained reluctant,
distracted, bedraggled and unwilling to take decisive action.
In contrast to Pasvolsky, who worked quietly within the State Department to
accomplish his objectives, Sumner Welles maneuvered outside the halls of government.
As he had done in 1939-40, he looked to individuals and non-governmental institutions to
work on postwar planning, notably Hamilton Fish Armstrong at the Council on Foreign
Relations, but also journalists such as Anne O’Hare McCormick at the New York
Times.504 Welles, with the President’s approval, also intensified public relations efforts in
favor of advance planning for the postwar era. In October, he spoke in New York City,
urging that planning begin immediately. More dramatically, during his November 11th
Armistice Day remarks at the tomb of Woodrow Wilson, he called for a postwar era
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based on the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, but also Wilson’s
Fourteen Points. In addition to an American-led international organization, the
Undersecretary argued for free markets, free trade, and free access to the world’s
resources. In these speeches, Welles warned against the “wait and see” approach to
postwar planning.505 But Hull did just that: he waited, and he saw his influence diminish.
During the final months of 1941, the Secretary of State remained involved in the
diplomacy that brought the United States into the war, though only in the Pacific theatre,
where his views accorded with Roosevelt’s. Neither he nor the President wanted conflict
with Japan, at least in the short-term. Consequently Hull managed U.S. diplomacy vis-àvis the Japanese, a privilege that left him in the awful position of having to receive the
Japanese declaration of war on the morning of December 7, 1941.506 It also led to
accusations that he had helped precipitate the attack.507 With respect to the Atlantic,
Hull’s influence plummeted after the Greer incident of September 1941, in which an
American destroyer pursued a German submarine and broadcast its position to the
British. Roosevelt wanted to use the incident to dramatize the Nazi menace, and as an
excuse to implement his policy of escorting and “shoot on sight.” It also provided an
opportunity for him to press the Congress to change the neutrality legislation once again.
Aware of these aims, Hull recommended a stern and aggressive speech from the
President, but then criticized the draft prepared by Harry Hopkins and Robert Sherwood,
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which labeled the “Nazi submarines and raiders… the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.”
The Secretary of State was the only figure in the Cabinet to oppose the speech.508
Cordell Hull’s position ironically remained far more consistent than Roosevelt’s.
While Hull advocated similar approaches to the Atlantic and Pacific theatres, Roosevelt
preferred an aggressive stance in the Atlantic, but a more cautious policy towards Japan.
The result left the United States looking more like the double-headed eagle of ancient
Byzantium than the monolithic predator that bestrides the nation’s coinage. The doubletalk defied reality: Japan had allied itself with Nazi Germany in June 1940, and then
found itself with a free hand in Asia once the Soviet Union became bogged down in
Eastern Europe. The only remaining threat to Japan in this context was the United States.
Under the erroneous assumption that Washington would seek terms to avoid a two-front
global war, the Japanese launched a daring attack on American naval power at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941. Four days later, the undeclared war in the Atlantic became
official and Roosevelt suddenly found himself at war with the Axis Powers.
Cordell Hull, who had been marginalized on the issue of war and peace, now
found himself cornered on postwar planning. With the United States poised to engage in
a two-front war, the uncertainty that had clouded planning in the months following the
German invasion of Poland had faded. An allied victory, though far from certain,
suddenly appeared more likely, and the primary focus of the previous two years,
hemispheric defense, less apropos. On December 22, 1941, the Secretary of State wrote
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the President requesting the creation of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign
Policy.509 Roosevelt consented six days later.510
In reading the Secretary’s letter, the historian informed of the inner workings of
the Roosevelt Administration cannot help but to sense the underlying tension between
Cordell Hull and the President. Whereas Welles, Berle and Pasvolsky had all sought
permission to take action, either by direct appeal to the President or through
intermediaries, Hull informed Roosevelt that he would act in accordance with the
President’s “wishes.”511 Contrary to the impression he gave in his memoirs, Hull was not
the primary mover in the field of postwar planning, at least in 1941 and 1942.512 That
honor belongs to his subordinates. But even this statement is misleading. Though Welles,
Berle and others drove the process for a time, the President always remained in charge.
The manner in which these developments unfolded is more a tribute to his Machiavellian
designs than anything else.
As a result, Hull’s letter of December 22, 1942 did more than simply concede to
the President’s “desire.” It put the rules of the game in writing. From Hull’s perspective,
the chain of command needed clear definition. Pasvolsky had advised him to propose a
committee that included individuals from outside the Department of State. For practical
reasons, this approach made sense: the technical issues at hand far exceeded the
Department of State’s capabilities and the implementation of any postwar schemes would
inevitably involve multiple actors. But for political and bureaucratic reasons, it posed
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serious problems. It had the potential to weaken Hull’s authority and influence
further. Thus the letter insisted “all recommendations regarding post-war problems of
international relations for all Departments and agencies of the Government be submitted”
to the President “through the Secretary of State.” Hull also prescribed similar
arrangements for “all conversations or negotiations with foreign governments bearing on
post-war problems.” In closing, Hull asked that the heads of “the various Department’s
and agencies concerned be apprised” of these arrangements.513
While the President accepted and approved of Hull’s proposal, he reserved
flexibility for himself and carefully guarded his power. The Secretary of State, he wrote
Hull, should assume “primary responsibility for this work.” But Roosevelt, for the time
being, conceded no ground in the field of actual negotiations and he never formally
endorsed the chain of command Hull proposed. Instead, he charged the committee “with
the conduct of the necessary studies and the preparation of recommendations,” which, he
insisted, would be submitted to the President. In accordance with Hull’s wishes, he also
expressed his desire that “adequate research and other facilities… be created in the
Department of State or under its leadership” to facilitate the work of the committee.514
The Secretary of State must have been irritated by the President’s response, for
his attitude and condition deteriorated rapidly thereafter. One of his closest friends and
confidants in the Department, Breckenridge Long, wrote in his diary that Hull was
beaten, and clearing out his desk. On January 16, 1942, he even prepared a letter of
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resignation, but could never bring himself to submit it, despite the fact that he was
terribly sick. At this juncture in his career, Hull might have slid off his boots and placed
his weapons on the shelf – his achievements were enough – but he did not. The affronts
to his honor aggravated him. When Hull denounced the Free French for seizing the tiny
island of St. Pierre in the North Atlantic, Roosevelt refused publicly to support him and
his Department, a decision that left him exposed to attacks from not only the press, but
also Winston Churchill. Further exacerbating the matter, Sumner Welles was winning
praise in the media. Roosevelt had sent the Undersecretary to Rio de Janeiro to win an
accord on hemispheric solidarity. When Welles, against Hull and the Department of
State’s wishes, compromised to win Argentine acquiescence, the Secretary of State
exploded. But the President stood firmly by the Undersecretary.515
On February 2, 1942, Sumner Welles returned to Washington D.C.; on that same
day, Cordell Hull departed for Miami, where he would spend the next two months
recuperating from fatigue and sickness, but also licking his wounds and brooding over the
events that had besmirched his honor and taunted his pride. Hull would not be the stuff of
Greek tragedy had his problems been limited to medical illness and physical exhaustion.
He would have recognized slights for what they were: the inevitable elbows that are
thrown among those who dare to hustle in the rough and tumble of American politics.
Hull, after all, had leverage he might have used with the President. He remained the most
popular figure in the Roosevelt administration, even after the assaults he withstood in the
media over the previous months. But he behaved pettily. He left the nation’s capital
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having never signed the order drawn up by his staff establishing the Advisory
Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy.516

Structure of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy

With Hull safely in Miami, Sumner Welles sought to assert his control over the
planning process. The committee structure he created with Roosevelt’s approval in
February 1942 differed from the proposal suggested in October 1941 by Pasvolsky.517 As
one might expect, the power Welles wielded in the process increased under the new
516
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formula, while the influence of Pasvolsky diminished. Originally, four subcommittees
had been proposed to do the work of the Advisory Committee. Berle had been chosen to
lead the subcommittee on political problems. Pasvolsky had assigned himself the
chairmanship of the subcommittee on international economic relations. Norman Davis
was chosen to head the subcommittee on security; while another friend of the President,
Isaiah Bowman, a world-class geographer and President of Johns Hopkins University,
was tapped to lead the subcommittee working on territorial problems.518
Under the new structure, Davis and Bowman remained in charge of the
committees they had been given at the outset. Welles assigned himself the chairmanship
of the political subcommittee, while remaining Vice Chairman of the Advisory
Committee, a position that allowed him to act as Chair in Hull’s absence. The economic
subcommittee was divided into two groups: a subcommittee for reconstruction, which
Berle led, and a subcommittee for economics, which Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, Dean Acheson, chaired. Leo Pasvolsky was not asked to chair any of
the groups. Instead, he served as the Executive Officer and Director of research for the
entire effort. In these capacities, he coordinated the efforts of the subcommittees, while
providing essential research and administrative services. Though his ability to set the
agenda was somewhat diminished, he attended most of the meetings.519
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To avoid the problem of inadequate resources, which had plagued the
Department’s efforts during 1940, Pasvolsky received funding to hire additional research
staff, which widened the capacities of his office. 520 Individuals from various other
agencies and departments of the government were also called upon to partake in the
planning process. In cases where the expertise of their particular home – the Department
of Agriculture, for example – proved more suited to the Advisory Committee’s research
needs than Pasvolsky’s division, that work was outsourced. Finally, the mandate of the
committee was limited to postwar planning to prevent wartime imperatives from
distracting the planners, as had occurred with the Interdepartmental Group to Consider
Post-War International Economic Problems.
In theory, the planning apparatus should have functioned hierarchically. The five
subcommittees would undertake most of the work, from brainstorming to the formulation
of actual policy proposals. Pasvolsky’s Division of Research would facilitate this process
through scholarly investigations and analysis.521 When necessary, various other entities of
the government would be called upon to provide advice and aid in areas where their
expertise might prove invaluable. Periodically, the subcommittees would report to the
Advisory Committee, where the preparatory work could be coordinated into a broader
strategy.522 All policy proposals, including those from other areas of the government,
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would then flow through the Secretary of State to the President. However, a variety of
factors served to impede this design.
The President left the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) partially in control of
post-war planning. To consolidate power for planning in the State Department, Welles
established the subservience of the Board’s work to the Department of State’s during the
opening meeting of the Advisory Committee on February 12. The Vice President’s group,
he stated, would channel all postwar recommendations through the Secretary of State.523
In March, Wallace protested this procedure to the White House, demanding that the
Board of Economic Warfare be allowed to bypass the State Department on foreign
economic matters. Despite protests from Welles, the President agreed.524 As a result, the
demarcation lines between the Department of State and BEW remained murky.
The inclusion of other departments in the planning process also posed problems.
Hull had attempted to contain these individuals from other Departments by permitting
them membership in the subcommittees only.525 But when the Secretary left for Miami,
representatives from the Treasury, Department of Agriculture and the Board of Economic
Warfare suddenly appeared on the roster of the Advisory Committee. Their participation
at this level, made it more difficult for the Department of State to control the policy
message to the President, but this, as we have seen, is how Roosevelt’s administrative
design, I believe the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy and the Research
Division constitute its antecedent. Randall Bennett Woods, A Changing of the Guard:
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system worked. As Sumner Welles explained to the Advisory Committee on February
12, “the President had specifically asked” individuals from non-governmental
organizations and other agencies and departments of the government to join with the
Department of State “in considering post-war problems.”526
In view of these and other factors, it was almost inevitable that the work of the
Advisory Committee would encounter bureaucratic obstacles at every turn. Welles and
the President appear to have never even considered including the military. Other agencies
and departments of the government excluded at this early stage, such as the Lend Lease
Administration, would eventually seek to influence the process. The makeup of the
Advisory Committee, moreover, created too many opportunities for its members to
circumvent the Secretary of State. Of the subcommittee chairmen, all had direct access to
the President, with the exception of Dean Acheson, who never managed to penetrate
Roosevelt’s inner circle. Worse, the Department of State had descended into rival
factions, with Hull (and to a lesser extent Pasvolsky) pitted against Welles, and Berle
(despite his efforts to remain neutral in these fights) pitted against Acheson.
These conflicts, to a certain degree, would remain on ice until Hull returned, but
their presence and importance for planning merit further emphasis. The rivalry between
Hull and Welles, as we have seen, was a direct product of Roosevelt’s administrative
style, which gave the Undersecretary too many opportunities to ignore his direct superior.
If the Secretary’s poor health aggravated the situation, the Undersecretary’s insensitivity
to Hull’s insecurities made it worse. Welles rubbed the Tennessean the wrong way. When
526
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Hull learned of the Undersecretary’s careless behavior in a railroad car in 1940,
Welles’s fate was all but sealed. The Undersecretary, in a drunken stupor, had
propositioned a black Pullman for sex in the heat of a September night while the
President and his Cabinet slept in neighboring railroad cars. It would take more than three
years, but this incident would eventually ruin the brilliant career of Sumner Welles.527
The unfolding saga between Hull and his Undersecretary left Adolf Berle
exposed. In 1938, the famous New Deal economists had become Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin American Affairs after serving as general counsel to the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC). Hull admired Berle’s intelligence and capabilities: a child
prodigy who graduated from Harvard College and Law School before the age of twentyone, Berle published an instantaneous classic with Gardiner Means in 1932, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, which catapulted him into Roosevelt’s inner circle.
But his achievements and “quicksilver” mind, as one observer wrote of him, were
insufficient to save him from Hull’s feuding.528
The Assistant Secretary remained too close to the Undersecretary. Old drinking
buddies from New York, the two collaborated extensively when Welles was Ambassador
to Cuba, and they worked closely in Hull’s State Department. Berle, like the
Undersecretary, had unfettered access to the White House, which dated back to his days
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as speechwriter and advisor to the President during Roosevelt’s first term. Though he
displayed far more caution than Welles vis-à-vis the Secretary of State, Berle increased
his exposure by refusing to improve his relationship with Acheson, who hated the New
Yorker’s guts.529
The longstanding conflict between the two Assistant Secretaries resulted in part
from ideological differences.530 Acheson, who had studied law under Felix Frankfurter at
Harvard, and clerked under Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, believed, like his
mentors, that government policy should favor decentralization and competition. Berle, by
contrast, preferred centralized planning. Under the First New Deal, the planners had held
the balance of power in the Roosevelt Administration, but by 1935, when the Second
New Deal arrived, the balance had changed in favor of those who preferred
decentralization. Felix Frankfurter, the preeminent exponent of this view, had the ear of
the President.531 He never ceased promoting Acheson, who had purportedly resigned as
Treasury Undersecretary in November 1933 over a dispute involving monetary policy.
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By 1941, Acheson had sufficiently improved his standing with Roosevelt to win an
appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.532
However the appointment came with a bureaucratic shuffle in the State
Department. The economics portfolio was divided into commercial and financial matters.
Berle was given the financial side of the file; Acheson was assigned the commercial side.
In all likelihood, Roosevelt bore responsibility for this division; indeed he ultimately
placed Berle in charge of all negotiations dealing with international postwar finance,
though this arrived much later and in a different context. In the meantime, the new
Assistant Secretary and his chief financial advisor, Herbert Feis, disagreed with the
formula; they believed the two aspects should be coordinated and firmly under Acheson’s
control.533 But the division, at least at the departmental level, would persist for much of
1942. As a result, the economics subcommittee originally proposed under Pasvolsky’
proposal for postwar planning was divided as well, a fact that forced the two Assistant
Secretaries of State to collaborate on postwar economic matters.
The rivalry between the two men might not have been so contentious had their
personalities been less distinct, but they possessed an odd assortment of similarities and
differences that sensationalized the animosity between the two men. At six foot two,
Acheson was stately, vigorous, and terribly funny. Some have said he resembled an
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Englishman with his black Homburg hats, dashing waistcoats and dark town suits.

534

But the bristling moustache made him look more like a 19th century ringmaster, or the
Spanish artist, Salvador Dali, than a British gentleman.535 His tongue could be sweet yet
loose, his actions sincere yet devious, but underneath the hat, behind the bowtie, resided a
brutally realistic conception of power. At the Brookings Institute to deliver a speech some
years later, he requested a martini. Told that spirits were not available that evening, he
evoked the Athenians at Melos: “No martini, no lecture.” Acheson got his martini.536
Berle was no showman like his colleague from Connecticut, but he was perfect
for a show. In all, he was only five foot seven inches tall. An Englishwoman with whom
he once dined commented that “he looks like a hunchback, but isn’t one.”537 Berle’s head
was abnormally large, and sustained by a small torso, stick legs and enormous feet. If
Acheson’s face resembled that of a Spanish artist, Berle’s looked like Franz Kafka.538
With his big ears, sharp eyes and an angular face, he came across as supremely arrogant,
and he was. He sweated profusely and smoked incessantly. Berle could flatter when
necessary, but more often than not he was ruthlessly blunt, a fact that led many to dislike
him and miss his affable and generous side. Unlike Acheson, he was, according to one
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report, a “misanthrope” who maintained an image of stern seriousness.
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Though

famous for his vanity, he never wrote a memoir. Acheson did. His conception of power,
too, displayed a realistic side, though he preferred persuasion and nuanced ways of
executing it. For Acheson, it was about the pistol tucked away under his belt.540
On February 20, 1941, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
maneuvered against Berle. The two economic subcommittees met jointly to allocate
responsibilities between the two groups. In Berle’s absence, Acheson employed a
formula for assigning tasks that permitted him to assert control over most financial issues.
The Subcommittee on Economic Policy would address longer-term matters, while the
Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction would handle short-term issues. Pasvolsky
had prepared a list of possible topics, which the group allocated between the two
subcommittees. The group rapidly assigned relief, displaced persons, and the
reconstruction of productive facilities to Berle’s subcommittee. Commercial policy,
monetary relations, commodity agreements, and credit and investment became the
prerogative of Acheson’s group. In this way, Adolf Berle was left in charge of postwar
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relief and related issues, but on the official statement of his committee’s
responsibilities, it was duly noted that he would also manage the “financing thereof.”541
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CHAPTER FOUR
AMERICAN PLANNING FOR POSTWAR RELIEF

It seems odd, at first glance, that politics and personalities drove so much of
America’s postwar relief policy. The problem had been assigned to the Reconstruction
Subcommittee due to its obvious economic implications: global economic renewal
seemed impossible if desperate peoples the world over were left to wither away in the
wake of the war. How that relief was provided for and the manner in which it was
administered would also have enormous importance for the economic position of
recipient countries after the war, as well as those who provided the requisite funds and
materials. If the United States bungled the task, as the postwar planners believed the
country had done following the First World War, it might mean another destabilizing
period of economic malaise, and with it all of the accompanying social and political
fallout that led to the Second World War. Hence at the outset, many people in the State
Department viewed the issue in economic terms.
However, the postwar planners quickly realized that the relief portfolio provided
political opportunities. Doubtless the influence of the New Deal weighed heavily in their
calculations. Its manifold programs sought to aid suffering Americans and rectify the
country’s economic problems. But in so doing they also earned the political allegiance of
those on the receiving end of New Deal programs. This inescapable reality led the
postwar planners to believe the United States might accrue tremendous political benefits,
both present and future, if it undertook the implementation of relief programs with
America’s larger postwar objectives in mind. As a result, the planning for relief occurred
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in two separate subcommittees. The Reconstruction Subcommittee discussed the
underlying mechanics for the implementation of relief, while the Political Subcommittee
debated their broader strategic context. In turn, the Advisory Committee for Post-War
Foreign Policy coordinated and approved the work of these two subcommittees.
From the beginning, the process was beset with conflict. Personality differences
and bureaucratic competition created innumerable obstacles. At times the planners looked
likes snakes maneuvering through a complex labyrinth of problems, hissing at one
another and striking at potential rivals. Participants in the debates often contrived to
undercut opposition, and stall the entire process when developments failed to suit their
fancy. But this behavior in no way lessened the importance of the central problem they
faced: How could the United States obtain the widest possible legitimacy for its postwar
plans, while also maintaining supreme control over the institutions and processes
considered necessary for the achievement of a sustainable peace? Attempts to answer this
question would turn on a ferocious debate over the role of power and the place of
spectacle in international affairs. What began as a narrow search for a solution to the
relief problem, turned into a debate over the whole postwar international structure. How
did this happen? What did the planners propose? And what did they ultimately decide?
As we will see, three little-known individuals would play a decisive role in the
course of these debates. The educator and career diplomat, Harry Colvin Hawkins of the
State Department, would first propose a United Nations approach to relief problem. The
lifelong journalist and international correspondent of the New York Times, Anne O’Hare
McCormick, would highlight the intractable nature of Joseph Stalin’s regime, thereby
forcing the American planners to reshape their thinking on the country’s postwar plans.
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And the inveterate New Deal lawyer and boy genius, Benjamin Cohen, would argue
that propaganda should play a primary role in the entire effort.

The Decision to Make Relief a Political issue

When the Reconstruction Subcommittee began its work on March 6, 1942, two
competing but interrelated perspectives framed the group’s consideration of postwar
relief. Most of the committee members viewed the issue primarily in political terms.
These individuals, who might be referred to as “New Dealers,” believed the relief
portfolio constituted an opportunity for the United States to advance the war effort and
assert its leadership in global affairs. A smaller but more conservative faction within the
Subcommittee viewed the relief question somewhat differently. They preferred that the
American role be defined in terms of supply and demand: what would be needed after the
war and what could the United States provide? Neither of the factions disavowed the
importance of the other’s point of view. The dispute was over where to begin: would the
United States frame its position in terms of what it wanted to do politically, or in terms of
what it was capable of doing economically?542
Adolf Berle clearly preferred the former option. “Among the first things to be
considered,” he exclaimed, “was the relationship between the work of this subcommittee
and the discussions now proceeding in London under the auspices of the Leith-Ross
Committee.” The work of the London group overlapped with the subject matter allotted
to his Subcommittee and he believed the British might utilize the relief portfolio to
542
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advance their own narrow interests.
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Berle also hated the British. “There is nothing

more second rate than a second rate Englishman,” he once grumbled. Haughty, arrogant
and self-serving, they could not be trusted to handle the relief portfolio. “The salvation of
the world will be the building of a system more nearly like that which we have in this
hemisphere than anything which the British are likely to produce.” The United States
could not permit Great Britain the opportunity to obstruct its designs. The planners
should outmaneuver them politically.544
Berle also feared the Soviet Union. Although he shared their preference for
centralized planning, he worried that the Russians were discussing relief in Moscow and
making plans for Eastern Europe and possibly Central Europe. The Soviet Pact with Nazi
Germany had confirmed his view that the Russians were immoral and untrustworthy.
Now the British were courting the Soviets on relief and other matters. The United States
needed to intervene to defend and advance its interests. Churchill’s apparent recognition
of the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe in 1941 had angered Berle. “If America had to
fight,” he wrote, “would it fight for Britain’s imperial hegemony and an economic system
of imperial preference and/or a Soviet-Pan Slavic eastern empire that obliterated the
national promises of 1919?” The wartime alliance should not lead the United States to
concede its interests and forget its values. Washington had to be intimately involved in
the planning of postwar relief from the beginning. These problems, according to Berle,
were inherently political even if their economic implications were enormous.545
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Developments in London presented the United States with an opportunity.
Mumbling out of the side of his mouth, as Berle was known to do, he explained that
conflict existed between the British and several allies over relief.546 The Russians and
Dutch had expressed dissatisfaction with the Leith-Ross setup on grounds that the British
dominated the arrangement. These two powers had reserved their right to act alone if they
desired. The Soviet Union had made a counter-proposal to the British setup. In this Berle
discerned an opportunity. But the planners, he explained, had to first make a decision:
should the United States “work through the Leith-Ross Committee,” or have “post-war
relief and related matters centered in Washington.”547 Berle’s explication of the situation
and well-known distrust of the British and Russians left no doubt where he stood. The
United States should exploit the divisions in London to assume political control over the
relief portfolio and place it in Washington. But did his colleagues share this view?
The answer depended on an assessment of the Leith-Ross Committee’s work.
Formally entitled the Inter-Allied Committee for Postwar Requirements, the group had
been established in September 1941 to unite the governments exiled in London around a
common program for postwar relief. Its mandate, according to Leo Pasvolsky, was
restricted to estimating relief requirements of the various countries in Europe overrun by
the Nazis. The more important question, he asked, was whether the United States should
take action to have the procedure of making estimates extended to other areas.” Yet this
inquiry raised more questions: how far was the United States prepared to go in providing
relief? Should Washington limit the provisioning of food and supplies to Europe, or
should it include other regions of the world? Pasvolsky thought the United States should
546
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contact the Leith-Ross committee. If it were producing good estimates, Pasvolsky
thought it could continue in that task while the United States calculated supplies.548
No one disputed the importance of resources. Berle explained that the United
States would need to consider potential production, not merely stocks on hand, when
assessing its ability to provide relief. The assumption that the “Western Hemisphere
would be a huge reservoir for everything that is needed by the rest of the world after the
war” was no longer true. With the United States’ entry into the war, the situation had
changed dramatically. Industry in the United States and elsewhere was no longer
concentrating on peacetime needs, and would have to be quickly reconverted after the
war. The industrialist, Myron Taylor believed private industry could do this alone if
government created the right conditions and provided the right incentives. In fact, the
demand for relief and related supplies might help prevent a relapse into a depression. But
in the meantime, the planners would have to ascertain the future needs of afflicted
societies and determine how much the United States could provide.549
Yet this was no easy task. The unpredictability of the future made it impossible to
base relief planning on potential supplies or requirements. With war raging, the planners
had little idea of what would be available for relief at the war’s end. On the requirements
side, the uncertainty was equally daunting. When Berle’s Subcommittee revisited these
issues weeks later, Pasvolsky told the Chair that it would be extremely difficult to
estimate requirements within ten to fifteen percent accuracy. The Luxembourg
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government in exile had complained to him that it was simply impossible.
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It all

depended on whether the Axis forces employed a scorched-earth policy when they
retreated. Berle conjectured that relief would be needed well before the collapse of the
Axis powers. Planning could not wait until there was complete certainty about supply and
demand. The United States would have to conceive of ways to maximize resources
available for relief, and devise estimates for both worse and best case scenarios.551
History underscored the wisdom of this approach. After the First World War,
relief had not been delivered to most of Europe until January 1919, nearly three months
after the armistice. Worse, Germany did not obtain aid until July, and Russia received no
assistance until 1921. These delays permitted the seeds of instability and revolution the
time to germinate. The delay did not stem from an absence of relief machinery, but from
American failures to allocated funds and pledge relief stocks well in advance.552 As a
result, Europe waited for American legislators to debate relief, make required
commodities available, and approve legislation authorizing the financing. With this
history in mind, the planners knew they would have to set up the required machinery, and
then hedge their bets on what would be needed and what could be supplied. But given the
requirement for legislative support, the Subcommittee also had to conceive of ways to
convince Congress to authorize machinery and resources well in advance of the war’s
end.553

550

ER-4, Chronological Minutes, April 17, 1942, File Chronological Economic Minutes,
Box 80, ACPFP, Notter Papers, RG 59, NARA.
551
ER-1, Chronological, March 6, 1942, Notter Papers, NARA.
552
“Relief Deliveries and Relief Loans, 1919-1923,” November 1, 1941, File E
Documents 1-25, Box 80, ACPFP, Notter Papers, RG 59, NARA.
553
ER-1, Chronological, March 6, 1942, Notter Papers, NARA.

186
A host of additional questions also required answers. What did the
subcommittee mean by the word “relief,” Taylor asked? “Would it consist of free gifts or
loans? Would it come from private or governmental sources?” Berle argued that “relief
would unquestionably need to be financed on a governmental basis whether the medium
were loans or gifts, since the magnitude of the amounts required would exceed the
capacity of private sources.”554 But Pasvolsky suggested that it would have to be gifts.
After the last war, “the major part of the war debts of many continental European
countries were in reality… loans granted by the United States Treasury… for purposes of
relief and reconstruction.” 555 Credits financed 85% of the aid provided to liberated
countries,556 and 93% of the aid that went to allied countries.557 The allies required exenemy countries to pay cash for 91% of the total net value of the relief they received.
Altogether, 68% of the value of deliveries was financed using low interest credits, while
32% was purchased with cash. Net gifts amounted to less than .1%.558
This approach, Pasvolsky argued, created a counterproductive situation. In cases
where credits were granted, ill will arose because something dubbed an act of charity
looked more like a business transaction. The monopolistic position of American suppliers
assured higher prices and only exacerbated the situation. The whole arrangement
damaged America’s relations with the Allies. In cases where states were required to pay
cash, they depleted their foreign reserves to purchase desperately needed supplies, which
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forced them to devalue their currencies. The consequent inflation wrecked the
economies of former enemy states and defeated the whole purpose of the relief and
reconstruction loans. Revolutionary outbreaks occurred and the seeds for the Second
World War were sown.559 Gifts, it seemed, would be essential. But this conclusion did
not resolve the problem of knowing how much would be needed or how much aid the
United States could afford to supply. Another approach was needed.
A possible solution to this dilemma came from career Foreign Service Officer
Harry Colvin Hawkins.560 Born in Reed City, Michigan, and educated at Olivet College
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Whereas most of the planners have biographical sketches in Wikipedia and other
encyclopedic indexes, there is virtually nothing available on Hawkins. Here I include a
brief timeline of his life: born in Reed City, Michigan on March 24, 1894; graduated
from Olivet College in 1917; served in U.S. Army 1917-1919; graduated 1921 from
Harvard Business School with MBA; Special Agent in the Department of Commerce
1921-22; passed Foreign Service exam June 23, 1921; Assistant Professor at University
of Virginia, 1922-23; Drafting Officer in Department of State 1924; faculty and member
of the School of Business at the University of Oregon 1925-27, 1930-31; returned in
1927 to the State Department as an Advisor in the Office of the Economic Advisor;
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following capacities: Divisional Assistant 1931; Assistant Chief of Division of Trade
Agreements 1935; Chief of Division of Trade Agreements 1936; Chief of Division of
Commercial Treaties and Agreements 1940; Chief of Division of Commercial Policy and
Agreements 1941; Director of Office of Economic Affairs 1944; Economic Counselor in
London with status of Minister 1944; Director Foreign Service Institute 1950-52; retired
from State Department in March 1952 to become William L. Clayton Chair of
International Finance at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I am unable to
determine when Hawkins died. I am unable to determine when and who he married and
whether he had children. He authored of two books: Commercial Treaties & Agreements;
Principles & Practice (New York: Rinehart, 1951); Survey of Foreign Trade Activities of
Oregon Manufacturers (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1931). This information
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and Harvard University, Hawkins entered the Department of State in the 1920s after
short stints in the Department of Commerce and as Professor of Commerce and Trade at
the University of Virginia. An affable man with a warm and generous touch, Hawkins
rose to prominence in the American government during the Depression.561 He is the
primary architect of the postwar multilateral trading regime. He took Hull’s notions of
free trade and transformed them into a complex network of agreements with 27 countries
during the 1930s. Later he became a central player in the creation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Trade Organization
(ITO).562 But in 1942, while serving as Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and
Agreements, Hawkins became one of the most important participants in the postwar
planning meetings.
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For someone who spent his entire life working on economics, his proposals
are ironic. It would be foolish to determine the American attitude towards relief using
criteria constantly subject to change; instead the United States should focus on the
“political implementation” of relief. An organization “fully representative of all the
United Nations” was preferable to one under American or Anglo-American leadership. In
1942, this included 26 nations, but the numbers would swell to 47 by the end of the
war.563 The United Nations, Hawkins argued, could “show to the world a common front
for the organization of peace not only in order to win the peace but also to help in
winning the war itself.” His idea aroused excitement. David Niles of the War Production
Board immediately recognized the public relations benefits. “We should make some
announcement of our intentions soon,” he exclaimed. Berle believe this approach would
help win domestic political support for relief during the war. It would also address
resource concerns: the United States could contribute within its means to a “global pool
for world relief.”564
No one disagreed that postwar relief should be undertaken on a worldwide basis,
though they may have silently disapproved of the United Nations approach. Even Taylor,
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the most conservative of the planners, thought it would be “an error to leave any
country out.” Supplies should not come purely from the United States; the rest of the
world should contribute too. The New Dealers were ecstatic. Asia and Europe would
need relief, especially Russia, but also Africa and Latin America! Berle therefore asked
Harry Hawkins to formulate his views in a memorandum to be discussed at the group’s
next meeting. To ensure cooperation from the Board of Economic Warfare, he asked
Louis Bean to help.565 The committee accepted this proposal, but Dean Acheson listened
in silence.

Integrating Relief into America’s Postwar Political Strategy

It was only natural that the relief issue ended up before the Political
Subcommittee. From the outset, the New Dealers believed politics should precede
economics on this question. For these policymakers, relief constituted a devise that could
be exploited to advance American interests and resolve a litany of political problems at
home and abroad. From a bureaucratic point of view, it also made sense to put the issue
before the Political Subcommittee. Several of the individuals most skeptical of the United
Nations approach to relief, Dean Acheson and Herbert Feis, were not members of the
political group, while the individual most inclined to support the proposal, Sumner
Welles, was not only a member of the group, he was the Chairman. This did not mean
that Berle and Welles would face no opposition. Myron Taylor, who shared many of
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Acheson’s views, was also a member of the Political Subcommittee. Other
participants would find much to dispute as well.
However, the group’s interest in the relief portfolio only arose inadvertently. At
their first meeting on March 7, 1942, they considered two simple but perplexing
questions: What must be done to obtain peace and stability? How could this be achieved
in a manner commensurate with the interests of the United States? Put in more practical
terms, the group contemplated the precise actions that would be required for peace and
the order in which they must be undertaken. Sumner Welles wondered “whether there
should be a general peace conference, regional conferences, consultations, or some other
arrangements for a peace settlement immediately after the end of the war, or later after a
period of armistice.” 566 Two factions emerged, but they would ultimately converge
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around the view that the United States should plan for an immediate armistice,
followed by a transition period that might last years, which would then unfold into a
period they termed, “perpetual peace,” apparently after the 1795 essay of the philosopher
Immanuel Kant.567
Initially the postwar planners disagreed over whether a peace conference should
be held directly after the war. Many believed that the Versailles Conference had taken
place too soon. As a result, Welles and Berle advocated delaying any such conference,
and then downplaying its importance if and when it occurred. After the First World War,
“the pressures and compulsions toward haste,” Welles explained, “were clearly
responsible… for some of the ‘unsatisfactory’ decisions in the Treaty of Versailles.” The
United States should allow “sentimental and psychological” pressures to weaken before
calling a conference, he argued. It will take time for military operations to cease. With
armies still in the field, territorial and political dynamics will remain fluid.568 Economic
forces will also have to be brought under control, lest instability and chaos wreak the
peace efforts. Flux always has the potential to derail a controlled process. Consequently a
“cooling off period” seemed wise.569
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In contrast with this view, several individuals argued for an immediate peace
conference. Taylor feared that the peace would be lost if a conference were postponed for
any length of time. He worried of a subsequent decline in the “courage and steadiness” of
the American people. “The national will to handle the peace problem, with all of its
difficulties, might be dissipated.” The United States might even “show kindness to its
enemies.”570 The New Dealer Benjamin Cohen worried of another matter. Following the
armistice of 1918, the “victorious powers then had unquestioned moral and military
power to effectuate their desires…” But the strength declined rapidly in the months
following November 1918. Had the peace conference been postponed, it “might have
been less satisfactory even than the one that was made.” Cohen also questioned the
wisdom of delaying settlement of territorial questions. Why would anyone seek to
“reestablish industrial life in any area that might be subject to dispute?”571
Welles sought to subsume this opposition with an appeal to the Atlantic Charter.
The phrasing of the eighth point had been carefully chosen and implied an armistice
period, he explained. “‘Pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of
general security… the disarmament of such aggressor nations is essential.”572 With regard
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to the settlement of boundaries, he reminded the planners that the Charter stipulated
that “territorial changes” should “accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people
concerned.” The peace should “respect the rights of all people to choose the form of
government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and selfgovernment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” These aspects of
the Charter had been fully discussed between Roosevelt and Churchill. They envisioned
an interim period with an armistice throughout, “though not in the accepted technical
sense of the word ‘armistice.’573
To bolster this argument, Leo Pasvolsky criticized the approach employed at the
peace conference after the First World War. “In 1919 the Versailles Conference regarded
the establishment of general international relations as an accomplished fact through the
completion of a formal peace.” The statesmen at Versailles focused on a narrow set of
questions that concerned relations between the two groups of powers. This approach
fatally neglected the need to create a general system of international relations. As a result,
Pasvolsky thought it would make more sense to have a “transition period in which formal
peace was not to be definitive and so formal, and to focus ahead on general international
relations.”574 If the Atlantic Charter made this approach essential, it became apparent that
the question before the committee had changed: what would have to happen as soon as
the war ended and what should take place during the subsequent interim period?
Cohen accepted these points and dissected the question. The postponement of
certain aspects of the peace had advantages, but in other areas, such as postwar relief and
rehabilitation, it would be disastrous to delay. What was needed, he argued, was
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“flexibility.” Unless certain issues received prompt attention, “there would be an
accentuation of unrest and rise of partisan rivalries which might become strongly
disturbing factors.” Immediate disarmament might be foolish in certain instances.
Economic problems would also require immediate and constant attention. If some of the
larger economic problems remained unresolved, then “an ultimate general settlement
might be rendered more difficult by failure to gain an early settlement of some at least of
the larger economic difficulties.” He also worried that a long armistice might precipitate a
counterproductive “armistice mentality.”575
These concerns led the planners to consider steps that might be taken before and
immediately after the war’s end. Security and policing measures would be required
behind the advancing armies. Some authority would have to be established to deliver
relief rapidly. Early plans for resettlement and reconstruction would be essential.576 The
occupying powers would need to return taxing, policing and other such powers to local
state authorities as quickly as possible.577 Disarmament would have to begin. And where
circumstances permitted, the Allies would need to make wartime arrangements with
refugee governments to facilitate the entire process. 578 Above all, the United States
government would have to prepare public opinion at home and abroad. Most of the
planners believed that the United Nations approach to many of these problems would aid
this process. It would lead to the “construction of a genuine world feeling.”579
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Taylor remained unconvinced. He still preferred a single peace conference
that would occur immediately after the war. If the peace conference were delayed,
territorial arrangements could only be tentative and military force would be needed to
maintain stability.580 If every country in Europe were forced to disarm with the exception
of France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States would
have no choice but to maintain a military presence on the continent to convince the
smaller states to disarm.581 Even if this outcome were accomplished within the context of
a United Nations security apparatus, the United States would still have to remain in
Europe. This might endure for years. 582 The costs would require Congressional
appropriations and this would be difficult to obtain: “military expenses would have to be
moderated,” he insisted, and “public opinion would insist on it.”583
But Welles and his supporters refused to alter their position. The expenditures
required for an American military presence would have to be assumed if the United
States “were to proceed to any reformation of the world order” that accorded with the
national interest. Permitting an extension of the armistice period would allow the
President to utilize Executive Agreements, thereby avoiding the requirement that he turn
to Congress at each and every step. Welles implied that the Congress, within limits,
would have little choice but to fund the President’s programs if they were already in
place at the end of the war. For the time being, the group should simply “assume that an
international political organization would be established.” It should initiate actions to
avoid the pressures placed upon “negotiations by interested groups seeking to have
580
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decisions made in their favor.” And it should decide what questions needed to be
answered quickly and what could be left for settlement at a later date.584

The Strategic Framework for Europe Emerges

These issues became the topic of the March 14, 1942 meeting, but the discussion
took an unexpected turn when Anne O’Hare McCormick of the New York Times
assaulted the idea that the United States could expect cooperation from the Soviet Union.
Unlike her peers, she had sat face to face with the Soviet dictator. After winning the
Pulitzer Prize for her coverage of Benito Mussolini, she won interviews with Hitler,
Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, the Pope, and an assortment of other world leaders. Born in
the United Kingdom to American parents, McCormick studied at the College of Saint
Mary of the Springs in Columbus, Ohio, where she met and married an Ohio
businessman, with whom she traveled the world. These experiences whetted her appetite
for foreign affairs and paved the way for her work as a journalist. In time, she became
one of America’s sharpest thinkers in international affairs. Of the postwar planners, she
was perhaps the most suspicious of the Soviet Union, and because of her reputation and
experiences, her opinion mattered.585
Anne O’Hare McCormick was tough. “The uncertainty ahead did not revolve
about how the United States and Great Britain” would work together, “but whether
Russia would work with them.” She warned that if Russia were “active all over the
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continent of Europe, disastrous difficulties could be expected…” Welles tried to
dismiss McCormick. In the fields of policing and the distribution of food and relief, it
would not matter, he asserted. The feisty little woman fired back: how would the United
States deal with the territory where no American or British forces were present? But
Welles refused to watch his castles wash away in the tide. “The Soviet Union would have
to be brought into all arrangements.” The Subcommittee, he asserted, should make the
assumption that Russia will agree to cooperate. McCormick refused to bend. “I do not see
how that would be possible… Russia will pursue her own objectives regardless of
arrangements for cooperation.”586
On the latter point, the New York Times columnist forced Welles to concede
ground. McCormick explained that the Soviet Union would most certainly claim
territories for itself. Welles agreed, but he was unprepared to permit an outright surrender
of Eastern Europe to the Soviets. For those territories, the United States would need its
“own guidelines in the form of proper solutions.” The United States and Great Britain
could not exclude the Soviet Union from Western Europe and Germany, and then expect
“Russia to admit them to participation in the zone left to Russia’s primary control. We
would have to try to get tripartite action all over.” But this approach, Welles conceded,
would be unreasonable. The United States could not accept a Soviet presence in Western
Europe and none of the countries there would permit it. In effect, he implied that those
areas of Europe occupied by Anglo-American forces would remain in the American
sphere of influence, but the territory under Soviet occupation would be up for
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negotiations. But how could the United States have influence in Eastern Europe
without permitting the Soviet Union into Germany and Western Europe?
The answer contained elements of a strategy that would guide the United States
for the duration of the Cold War. From the moment the liberation of Europe began,
Washington would pursue policies to ensure the stability and strength of Western Europe.
In this way, the region would become a shining example for Eastern Europe. The
planners also believed the United States needed to forge alliances with Eastern European
countries that would serve as a “make-weight” against the Soviet Union. If the United
States could maintain formal or informal relationships with groups or governments in
Eastern Europe, it would enhance American power in the event of Russian recalcitrance.
And finally, the United States would utilize its superiority in resources to win friends in
Eastern Europe, and to secure at least a modicum of cooperation from the Soviet Union.
In this area, relief and rehabilitation supplies would play a critical role. After the war the
Americans knew the Russians would be in desperate need, and the planners believed
American resources might increase American influence in Moscow and Eastern Europe.
This framework emerged piecemeal. But Western Europe was their initial
concern. The United States, Berle argued, should first determine “military zones of
responsibility.” With the British, it would then have to “work out the ranges of…
cooperation in all the non-Russian areas.” The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union would also need to consult the governments in exile to reach agreement on action
for the armistice. Speed and coordination were essential. As Welles explained, Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France should be put “under the control of interAllied forces” as soon as possible. Once local governments had been reestablished, they
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would quickly resume control of their respective countries. At the same time, relief
and food measures would be implemented. If this approach were successful, it would
have positive psychological effects on the whole of Europe.587 Hamilton Fish Armstrong
of the Council on Foreign Relations believed the Soviets would be in no position to
protest. “From an ideological point of view,” he exclaimed, “Russia had no claim” on the
Western democracies.588
The situation in Eastern Europe required a different approach. The United States
would attempt a similar program in Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece, but the planners
realized the likelihood of success in these countries remained much lower. Regardless,
the West could not be perceived as abandoning Eastern Europe. “All of those small
countries fear Communism,” Armstrong explained, “and they likewise fear Russian
nationalistic aggression.” Would it not be possible to bring them to “our side in peace
talks?” If so, “they could be utilized in effect as a make-weight for us against Russia.”
After the First World War, the United States had alienated many of the small countries to
the detriment of peace, Armstrong explained. This had to be avoided. The planners
needed to find a way to include the small countries in the armistice framework to ensure
the long-term success of the peace. But how could this be done with so many countries,
Welles asked? If the United States became engaged in protracted disputes over relief or
policing, it could create delays and undermine the war effort.589
Here one of the Roosevelt Administration’s brightest talents intervened: Benjamin
Cohen. Like Dean Acheson, Cohen owed his position and prominence in the American
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government to Felix Frankfurter. After obtaining a J.D. and Ph.D. in law, political
economy and political science from the University of Chicago – all before the age of 22 –
he entered Harvard Law School, where he earned a S.J.D. under the guidance of
Frankfurter. Perhaps the most respected lawyer in the entire government, he had played a
crucial role in drafting many of the New Deal’s most important pieces of legislation,
including the Truth in Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934. In preparing these laws, his primary responsibility had been to outwit the most
brilliant lawyers on Wall Street. Now he reframed the entire debate over postwar political
strategy in an effort to outwit America’s present and future enemies. His thought, while
hardly original, is important. His colleagues would use it in a scheme to outwit the entire
world and Cohen would later play a role in drafting the Dumbarton Oaks agreement
establishing the provisions of the United Nations organization.590
Instead of relying exclusively on power, he thought the planners should utilize
blanket pretense to achieve their objectives. It would be foolish to rely solely on “who
had the requisite force,” he explained. This approach “left out the entire realm of
psychological factors.” By this, he meant that the United States should consider and
utilize public relations when formulating and implementing its postwar program for
Europe. “It might be possible to counteract or combat the propaganda of the enemy by
using in such a program the term United Nations, including therein of course, the smaller
countries on our side.” In this way, the United States might be able to extend its influence
590
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into areas occupied by the Soviet Union, while also achieving wider acceptance of the
American postwar peace program. In his reference to “the propaganda of the enemy,” the
context makes it clear that Cohen considered two periods and two enemies. During the
war, the effort would be directed at the Axis powers; after the war, it would be turned on
the Soviet Union in the event of obstinate or unruly Russian behavior.591
These proposals provoked Berle to present the relief proposal of Harry Hawkins.
“We ought to have a United Nations organization for relief which would accompany the
United Nations troops in occupying the liberated states anywhere and everywhere.”
Officials working for this organization “should comprise the commission to contact the
submerged administrative units which still exist in those countries and areas.” Welles
concurred: “Our primary task would be to make an exact and specific determination of
the areas where machinery will be needed to handle the problem, and to establish the
United Nations machinery that will be necessary.” The United States “should bring into
the necessary organizations the other American Republics who will be called upon as
sources of supply and in many other ways to contribute to the reconstruction
solutions.”592
America’s possession of relief supplies provided the United States a strategic
advantage. As Armstrong put it, all of the small countries and Russia will “depend on the
U.S. for food and rehabilitation” after the war.593 Pasvolsky believed it might even lead
the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of cooperation. “It would be well to remember,” he
cautioned, “that Russia would in various respects be strong or weak and might find
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But even if the Russians refused to cooperate, food

could be used as a weapon: the “principal United States forces would be food and relief,”
Armstrong asserted.595 Several members questioned the rectitude of this tactic, but the
larger concern was whether it could work. McCormick thought moral concerns might
trump political and economic considerations. Once the United States got into the business
of helping suffering people, the human element would be too strong to maintain a strict
adherence to America’s political and economic objectives.596
This use of relief to exact leverage was also questioned on practical grounds. The
career diplomat, John V.A. MacMurray believed the “starved and exhausted people” of
Europe would be “desperate, bitter, and blind.” They would “look to their own group to
obtain what they desire in exact accordance with the dictates of their national traditions.”
He predicted “more revolutionary activity than ever before.” Food and relief would not
be sufficient to maintain the peace. In the Balkans, the Bulgarians were already “outside
their borders.” They would try to “keep their gains,” which would probably provoke the
Greeks and Yugoslavs into the fray. Only an Allied army could take control of the
situation. If the United States sent a relief administration into the region, it would have to
clearly understand America’s political objectives. During the armistice following the
First World War, the Relief Administration had abetted the foreign occupation of the
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Transylvania regions in Hungary by turning supplies over to the Rumanian army.
These actions countered the political objectives of the peace conference.597
The secret was to maintain control. The United States could not permit the wrong
persons to emerge out of the social and revolutionary chaos they expected, and then
assume power over a region or state’s military or existing bureaucracies. “Whoever
would do so would probably be obeyed,” Pasvolsky argued. Welles agreed, and
explained that the United States “could not safely leave to chance the determination of
who will rise to such power.” This “would be a most inefficient way to handle the
problem.” The planners agreed. The United States should provide a “recognized authority
to resume control in each of the states to be liberated.” This would have to take place at
the local level. As Welles explained, “Persons should be selected in advance to take
control of the ports and various small but important administration posts.” Everything
needed to be planned meticulously and well in advance. If successful, the payoff would
be great. As the famous geographer and President of John Hopkins University, Isaiah
Bowman put it, “It would place great psychological weight behind our objectives.”598
The planners therefore insisted that the relief administration have a reliable staff.
It would need individuals that could be depended on to uphold political decisions,
particularly those of the United States. In cases where nationals rapidly assumed control
of a country or region’s administrative machinery, the United Nations representatives
would work in an “advisory” capacity. Their task, as Cohen described it, would be to
“assure order and proper motives.” In areas where no reliable nationals were available to
assume control immediately, the relief agency could run the administrative machinery. In
597
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regions where no functioning machinery existed, the organization would construct it.
To do this work, the relief agency would need “men who had sufficient force of
character, great personal ability, innate power, and common sense.” It would need
“statesmen with an accurate and full knowledge” of the countries to which they were
assigned. And the very best men would have to be sent to the “problem spots.” Yet there
was a problem: finding these men, as Bowman predicted, would prove no easy task.599
These challenges in no way discouraged the planners away from the United
Nations approach. Berle explained that he had considered four options for organizing
activities in the armistice period: unilateral U.S. action, Anglo-American leadership, a
tripartite arrangement between the Americans, British and Soviets, or a United Nations
approach. In his view, the UN approach had clear benefits over the other possibilities. In
terms of supplies, it created opportunities that may not otherwise exist, particularly in
Latin America. It would also make it easier to secure supplies from countries such as
Australia and Canada, and it may open the way for Argentine participation. In terms of
public relations, it would shed legitimacy on U.S. leadership in the postwar era and create
an environment more susceptible to peacemaking.600
But the relief agency would be a spectacular show. The organization would not be
controlled by the United Nations. It would merely employ the United Nations mantra “for
psychological reasons.” The presentation would work as a “façade.” It would give a
“semblance of control” to the United Nations.601 But concealed behind carefully managed
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stagecraft, executive authority for the organization would be invested in a few
nations, perhaps the United States, Great Britain and Russia. But even this, Welles
explained, would probably defy reality. “In any event, the United States should dominate
the relief organization.” His reasoning did not stop here. This grand experiment would
provide a superb example for the future. The relief organization “would set a pattern for
future world organization.” No one disagreed with this reasoning and everyone
understood that the stakes were enormously high. As Armstrong reminded his colleagues:
“the pattern of the future was being set by everything that was going on.”602
But important questions remained on the table. Who would the relief organization
help? Was it designed to advance American interests alone? Would it be a humanitarian
effort? The answers remain to be seen, but at this juncture, humanitarian considerations
hardly found a place in the discussions. The planners were concerned with stability,
control and power. The dreamers among them wanted to create conditions that would
allow the United States to erect a global system of “perpetual peace.” Economically it
would be based on a multilateral trading order that gave preference to full employment,
expanding markets, and rising standards of living all over the world. Politically it would
be based on a democratic system of states organized in a global organization led by the
United States. America’s aspirations were universal. In the long run Washington would
permit no competing system.
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The Problems of the Atlantic Charter

But in the short run the planners had to worry about the Soviet Union. Moscow
might forcibly bring the Baltic States into its sphere of influence. In all likelihood it
would also keep the Polish territories it consumed in 1939. If this occurred, East Prussia
would probably become a part of Poland. These developments might then create major
problems with minority groups or populations who disapprove of the regime in power.
Citizens of the Baltic States might prefer evacuation from their home countries. It might
even make sense to remove the German populations from East Prussia and supplant them
with Poles. Scenarios of this sort frightened the planners, not because of their
humanitarian implications, but because of the negative impression they would have on
the world if the United States violated the Atlantic Charter of August 1941.603
The planners became concerned that these developments might appear to
contravene points two and three of the Charter. In the Declaration of August 1941,
Churchill and Roosevelt had written that they desired “to see no territorial changes that
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,” and that they
intended to “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under
which they will live.” The two leaders also maintained that they wished to see “sovereign
rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcible deprived of
them…”604 Welles believed that if the United States failed to uphold such rights, it might
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undermine the peace agreement and anger interest groups in the United States
promoting specific national groups.605
Several members of the committee wondered if the integrity of the Charter might
still be preserved in the event of such undesirable developments. Welles asked if
plebiscite privileges might be granted to the peoples of the Baltic States so that those
unwilling to remain under Russian rule might leave? Bowman wondered whether any
decision had been made “as to the size of the people which ought to be recognized as
rightfully entitled to sovereignty.” The authors of the Atlantic Charter had intentionally
avoided the phrase “self-determination,” but the President was now using it in public
speeches. Eventually the United States would have to define what it meant by “selfdetermination.” Bowman believed that a narrow definition might assist the United States
in upholding the principles of the Charter, at least in a strict legal sense.606
But in truth, Roosevelt never planned to uphold the Atlantic Charter. No piece of
evidence supports this claim more than the existence of the so-called “M-Project,” a top
secret undertaking to find a definitive answer to the problem of displaced persons and
minority populations. As one historian explains, Roosevelt contemplated “the large-scale,
and presumably enforced, movements of population of an immensity which makes
Hitler’s and Stalin’s efforts in this direction seem quite small scale.”607 As late as October
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1943, during a meeting with “M-Project” staff, Roosevelt made it clear that “the
resettlement of millions of refugees would not only be desirable from an humanitarian
standpoint, but essential from a military point of view.”608
A similar consensus emerged within the Political Subcommittee. The planners
concluded that it was wiser to resettle religious and racial minorities than to leave them in
an environment where the majority remained hostile towards them. Welles, who had been
so adamant to seek cooperation with Russia, felt that Moscow would probably be willing
to pledge itself internationally to protect individual liberties, but it was unlikely that
Russia would actually fulfill these obligations within their own territory. Several of the
planners contemplated an international Bill of Rights, but this was rejected as
impracticable. Berle likened the idea to the Kellog-Briand Pact. Who would enforce the
doctrine, and what states would be willing to submit their sovereignty to some
international Court, he asked? Most everyone agreed with his assessment. Welles
maintained that, while desirable, it would be simply impossible to guarantee Roosevelt’s
“Four Freedoms” all over the world.609
The idea of protecting minority rights as opposed to individual rights was also
discussed, but rejected in favor of migration and resettlement. One participant insisted
that these regimes don’t work because they leave the proclaimed minority in a
subservient position. They create jealousies and rivalries that undermine the internal
peace of a society. Berle shared this view. In pre-war Europe, he explained that a number
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of men had built their careers fighting for minority rights. His implicit message was
clear. What interest did these men have in ever removing the status of minority if their
careers depended on its maintenance? Several asserted that it would be difficult for
people to move, but that in the long run it was the best solution. Bowman, who had been
intimately involved in the “M-Project,” thought the massive removal of millions of
people wouldn’t be such a problem in terms of public relations. “People were getting
used to the idea of moving minorities because Hitler had carried the process so far.”610
In sum, the Atlantic Charter did not provide a realistic set of principles on which
to base American policy towards certain populations and areas of Eastern Europe.
Perhaps the United States could save face through narrow legal interpretations, but the
policymakers knew there would be large-scale population movements regardless of what
specific groups ideally preferred. It remained to be seen whether these people would
move voluntarily or whether force would be required. McCormick thought they would
move on their own. “The question today most at issue is not ‘sovereignty,’ but under
what ‘system’ people will want to live.”611 Her assessment was remarkably prescient.
Even if the United States failed to uphold the Atlantic Charter, this did not mean that it
would have to overtly violate it. The Soviet Union would do that for them. The United
States simply needed a system in place to relieve and facilitate the movement of people.
Berle informed the group that his Subcommittee was considering a resettlement agency.
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Harry Hawkins and the British Relief Plan

When the Reconstruction Subcommittee reconvened on March 20, 1942, the
Department of State had received a report from the Leith-Ross Bureau recommending a
reorganization of the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements along lines
similar to those suggested by Hawkins.612 The British, as Berle explained, “are now
proposing to change” the Inter-Allied Committee “from an organization to study
estimates into an all-embracing organizing committee.” Should the United States agree to
the Leith-Ross initiative, or should it pursue an alternative that would either compete with
the British effort or simply subsume it? To guide their thinking, the committee members
had agreed at their last meeting that Harry Hawkins should formulate his proposal for an
international approach to relief in a memorandum with the assistance of Pasvolsky.613
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The Hawkins memorandum paralleled the British proposal. Both documents
recommended the establishment of a Council, which would include the United Nations
and Free French. Hawkins stipulated that associated powers could attend the Council as
observers, and nations entering the war on the Allied side would be admitted as members.
In this way, he hoped to entice other nations to participate, such as Argentina, a country
with wheat resources that had refused to join the alliance against the Axis powers. But
with potentially 27 members, the Council would be too wieldy for executive decisionmaking. It would have to be a mere “ratifying organization.” By contrast, the British
proposal granted the Council powers to address “broad questions of policy.” Both
proposals suggested the creation of an Executive responsible to the Council and including
up to seven members, four of which, Hawkins wrote, would be “the United States, the
United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union.” The British excluded China. To aid the
Executive, the British proposed the creation of technical and advisory committees to
manage matters such as finance, shipping and the distribution of relief in the field. The
Hawkins memorandum agreed to the necessity of committees but lacked specificity.614
The proposals are surprising in that they do the opposite of what one would
expect. The British plan provided for American leadership of the Council and the
Executive. It proposed to internationalize the Leith-Ross Bureau and convert it into a
planning section subservient to the Executive. The Hawkins proposal made concessions
to the British. The Inter-Allied Committee and Leith-Ross Bureau would be maintained,
and the center of gravity for relief would remain in London. The Inter-Allied Committee
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and the Leith-Ross Bureau would form the nucleus of the Council and Executive
respectively. He even argued that Leith-Ross be named “Chairman of the Council.”
Beyond these specifics, the Hawkins outline is remarkable in that it paralleled the British
system of government. Like the Leith-Ross proposal, the Executive would spring from
the Council just as the British government springs from Parliament. The technical
committees would function like governmental departments.615
How does one explain these oddities in view of the competition between Great
Britain and the United States? On the British side, the answer is quite evident. In 1942,
British policymakers were well aware of their country’s perilous financial situation. They
knew Britain would be unable to pay significant sums for relief, and they were also
terribly suspicious of the Soviet government. Unlike many of his colleagues in the British
government, Leith-Ross was also pro-American. He not only preferred a close postwar
alignment with the United States in geo-strategic matters, he welcomed America’s liberal
ideas with regard to trade, a fact the Americans never appreciated.616 Much of this
remains clear in the proposal Leith-Ross sent to Washington. From the outset, he made it
readily apparent that resources would constitute the most important problem, and he
warned that the Soviet government would “undoubtedly claim a position of equality with
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the United States and the British Empire.” In effect, the concessions made to
Washington were both genuine and tactical.617
On the American side, Hawkins explained his conservatism explicitly. He
proposed no major changes to the Leith-Ross setup, except to internationalize the
secretariat and increase the number of countries represented. On the one hand, this
approach acceded to the Soviet preference for an “international bureau composed of the
various participating countries.” On the other hand, it met the American desire for a
global approach while preventing the Roosevelt Administration from having to consult
Congress. As Hawkins put it, “if a permanent international bureau were established in the
beginning, the question of contributions for its support would immediately arise.” This
would require Congressional support. Therefore it was best to leave the Leith-Ross
structure in place and take “full advantage” of its facilities.618 “Later developments,” he
argued, “would guide further changes.” But for now, “it was impossible to make practical
decisions with regard to sweeping reorganization.” The creation of an entirely new
organization would be impossible “without visualizing all major problems which would
need to be dealt with.”619
Hawkins’ proposal encountered immediate opposition. “If we were to commit
ourselves now to keep the center in London,” Bean rebutted, “it might prejudice much
that we would want to do later.” In disapproval, Pasvolsky came to Hawkins’ defense.
The allied governments in exile “are located in London,” and it “is at present the best
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place to work out the requirements for European countries.” He believed there would
be sufficient opportunity to mold the Leith-Ross organization into an international
organization. But Berle, the obstinate Anglophobe, remained unconvinced. Even if the
Subcommittee postponed consideration of the Leith-Ross proposal, as Hawkins and
Pasvolsky suggested, the group should decide “as soon as possible the question of where
the main center should be located.” Acheson agreed. “We may be nearer to the stage of
requiring operations than we think.”620
The Subcommittee recognized serious risks in permitting the relief operation to
remain in London. Berle believed the Leith-Ross organization lacked legitimacy.
“Conquered peoples” would have “more confidence” in the United States than the
British, he argued. Niles added that he “could visualize an expansion of the Leith-Ross
group on all fronts to study relief needs and possibly methods of distribution.” This
would reduce American influence. The United States “should not allow any international
organization to determine the extent of our own contribution,” he asserted. “We should
make use of the power coming to us from the possession of the principal resources; we
might, for instance, wish to decide who should be the government in some country.”
Taylor and the others concurred. It would be foolish to “permit the Leith-Ross Committee
to expand into ‘the whole works.’” Otherwise the United States might loose control.
Instead “we should place another body in authority over it and make ourselves important
on that higher body.” The Subcommittee concurred.621
Dean Acheson agreed too, but he had a different problem: “The kind of Relief
League of Nations proposed in the Leith-Ross document might not correspond to the
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realities of power.” His critique was not of the British, but of the United Nations
approach. With the joker now on the table he continued: “An international corporation”
should be “given a charter valid in the territories of all the United Nations” and it should
“be equipped with an appropriate staff for operations.” Apparently caught off guard,
Berle intervened. “I doubt whether this is appropriate… Whatever executive is set up, it
must be responsible to some higher authority… The United Nations is at the present an
abstract idea and not a concrete organization. The relief task… provides a favorable
opportunity to knit these nations together into a real organization.” Acheson listened
dispassionately, and the debate rolled on.622
Berle proposed a structure to reduce the influence of the Leith-Ross organization.
He suggested the United States call a meeting of the countries who signed the United
Nations Declaration. At this meeting, the countries present would establish a United
Nations Committee. This committee would then set up an agency to implement relief
programs. Regional entities would be established under this agency and the Leith-Ross
organization would become one of those entities. Initially it would be assigned the task of
estimating European requirements, but may acquire other responsibilities at a later date.
Berle admitted that the UN Committee would be too unwieldy as a policy-making body.
He therefore proposed the creation of a much smaller steering committee. Everyone
agreed that the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union should be
members of that smaller committee, but some formula would have to be worked out to
include Australia, Canada and possibly Argentina.623
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With this structure now on the table, the issue of bringing the relief
organization into being became a matter of debate. Herbert Feis, an ally and friend of
Acheson, contended that a meeting of 25 or more states would be chaotic. How could a
UN conference be called and then trusted to create the organization Berle described? To
meet this concern, Berle suggested his proposed steering committee be allowed to first
work out a project for relief, which would then be put before the UN Committee for
consideration. Cohen wondered if separate conferences should be called to address other
postwar problems such as finance and resettlement. Berle suggested they should all be
dealt with at once, but that different agencies might be created to address distinct
problems. Whatever the case, everyone recognized the benefits of a United Nations
Conference. It would arouse public opinion at home and abroad. It would give the United
States legitimacy as the global leader.624
The approach proposed by Hawkins was not disavowed altogether. Separate from
the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements, the British had also established
an Inter-Allied Information Committee in September 1940, presumably as a
clearinghouse for the information services of the nations at war with the Axis powers.
But in reality, the committee organized propaganda in the United States to win support
for the British-led war effort.625 After Pearl Harbor, Britain invited the United States to
join the committee. Berle recommended the United States form a committee of its own to
take the group over, but instead his colleagues employed the strategy Hawkins suggested
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for relief. The United States joined the Committee and changed its name to the United
Nations Information Organization, which became the first international agency of the
allied powers in the Second World War. It was also the first to bear the “United Nations”
name.626 These developments had no consequences for relief, but they underscore the
tactical flexibility of the United States in achieving its aim of complete control.

Competing pathways to international consensus

On March 21, 1942, the Advisory Committee convened to coordinate the work of
the Subcommittees. Welles presented the three periods the Political Group envisioned.
Aside from military arrangements, he explained that an “over-all United Nations
authoritative body should be instituted” during the armistice period. Authorities to
undertake relief and reconstruction would be put in place and provisional government
would be set up for enemy and liberated territories. In the transition period, the individual
states of Europe would be determined, governments constituted, and regional, political
and economic groups established. Boundaries would be delineated, populations
transferred and resettled, and various economic institutions established. In the final
period, the full functioning international organization would come into being and a
definitive peace treaty would be signed. Welles explained that the armistice would be
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relatively short, the transition period might last several years, and the final period,
“Perpetual Peace,” would have “no termination.”627
Once this framework had been discussed and accepted by the Advisory
Committee, the remaining subcommittees explained how their work would be
contextualized in the broader timeline. Two unresolved issues of relevance to relief
emerged in the ensuing debate. The first received virtually no discussion. Bowman of the
Territorial Subcommittee explained that American resettlement plans would require
elaborate transportation schemes, food support and relief. To meet these needs, Berle
stated that the Reconstruction Subcommittee planned to study the problem. Its next task
included the preparation of a project to create another organization in addition to the
relief agency that would concentrate on the resettlement of populations, returning
prisoners of war, repatriating displaced persons, and other related problems.628
The second issue concerned the process of achieving international consensus. The
first alternative was presented in a context unrelated to relief, but would ultimately
become important for this portfolio. Dean Acheson’s Economic Subcommittee had
assumed responsibility for the Article VII negotiations of the lend-lease agreement.
According to this article, recipients of lend-lease aid would enter into negotiations with
the United States to erect a global system of free trade. The question before his
Subcommittee was whether the Roosevelt Administration should negotiate with each of
the states that had signed lend-lease master agreements in a multilateral setting or
whether the United States should negotiate with the British first, and then bring in other
627
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states one by one. Acheson wanted to exploit disequilibrium in the balance of
payments between the United States and Great Britain to “persuade” the British to adopt
the American system of free trade. Once this had been accomplished, he believed the
United States should then bring other states into the system one by one. Otherwise
individual states might use the multilateral context to obstruct American aims.629
With regard to general arrangements for the armistice and transition periods, two
additional approaches to achieving consensus were proposed. Taylor believed a fourpower body should be created, which would in turn “blaze the way for immediate
international organization.” In effect, he thought the Great Powers should design an
international organization, which would manage all of the anticipated problems of the
armistice and transition periods. But the rest of the world would have no voice in its
design. The four powers would simply force their solutions on the world. The problem
with this approach, according to Welles, was that it would prejudice other international
groupings, namely the United Nations. Instead, Welles believed the four powers might
design the international organization of the future, but that they should derive their
authority from the United Nations in order to obtain the widest degree of legitimacy.
Berle voiced his agreement, but others were quick to point out shortcomings. On the one
hand, the issue of achieving consensus among too many states would impede action; on
the other hand, nations excluded from the four-power grouping would be angry.630
The United States would never settle on any one of these given paths. For weeks,
they would be the source of constant argument and dispute. With Acheson’s assistance,
Taylor would advocate for a four-power dictate; and with the help of Welles, Berle would
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promote multilateralism. The bilateral approach, though it would later become
important, played a minimal role in the planners’ discussions. Acheson, who was
excluded from the Political Subcommittee, did not push his point of view. But in the end,
an odd combination of all three paths would be used, not because of a conscious decision
on the part of the planners, but because of sheer coincidence and the need to reconcile
competing but equally legitimate points of view. The arguments promoted by the fourpower and multilateral camps possessed such merits that neither side could disavow the
other’s argument: thus an amalgamation of the two emerged. But when bureaucratic flux
permitted Acheson more influence, he employed a bilateral approach to reach four-power
agreement, and then to reach a multilateral consensus as well. In the meantime, pure
multilateralism seemed to hold the upper hand.

Turning “Multilateralism” into a Misnomer

On March 28, 1942, Armstrong launched the Political Subcommittee’s discussion
of the prospective United Nations body with a defense of multilateralism. He worried that
the Anglo-American partnership might become “vulnerable domestically” and “too weak
to impose its decisions.” A select grouping of the four Great Powers “might antagonize
small states and regional blocs.” The multilateral approach made more sense. The United
States has worldwide interests, he argued, and its relations with the other United Nations
are “more cordial” than with the four Great Powers. It also presented tremendous
opportunity. The small states, he thought, might be developed into “a make-weight
against expansionist systems such as Communism.” And finally, multilateralism would
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preempt complaints. Middle-sized powers like Australia already wished to participate
in the decisions of the United Nations High Command. This feeling would only grow.631
No member disputed Armstrong’s argument, but they worried about efficiency.
Cohen “doubted that so large a body could competently make the rapid decisions that
would be necessary.” Carefully constructed machinery would be required. If some sort of
“small executive group did not emerge, the result would be trading blocs of United
Nations with quite injurious results.” Welles agreed. Including the Western Hemisphere
and the Philippines, there would be “thirty-six nations,” he reminded the group. That
would be too many for efficient decision-making. Armstrong concurred, but argued that
without “the fullest possible sense of participation,” “the smaller countries would feel left
out and… become resentful.” As a solution, Welles suggested an Assembly with a
smaller Council responsible for decision-making. But this proposal posed difficulties as
well. Disharmony had too often made it difficult for the Council of the League of Nations
to take speedy decisions, and often decisions were never taken at all.632
At any rate, the group agreed that the Assembly “would have to be given some
form of activity that would make it feel that it was really participating.” At the Paris
Peace Conference, the British had given the Commonwealth countries nothing to do, and
this created divisions in their delegation. By contrast, Wilson had devised a successful
formula for Latin America. Bowman, who attended the Versailles Conference, explained
that Wilson had planned a “systematic program of entertainment… for the Latin
American delegates… to plant in them a sense of recognition.” He then directed those in
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charge of the entertainment to speak to “the Latin American representatives in his
own name.” “The great need,” Bowman concluded, “was to keep a sense of unity
amongst all the nations on our side, and yet to arrange for that rapid action by some small
group that would make the unity able to express itself in directed and forceful action.”633
But how would 36 nations delegate power to an executive group?634 Welles
proposed regional representation. His colleagues shot down this idea. Long-standing
disputes and diverging interests would lead to delays, and the process of choosing a
representative would only exacerbate tensions. The group found a system of rotational
representation equally undesirable. On the one hand, these schemes create inconsistencies
that lengthen the decision-making process. On the other hand, certain countries inevitably
claim status as a semi-permanent representative. The Subcommittee also considered the
possibility of including regional representatives when the interests of a specific country
came before the executive. But this procedure, too, was rejected as too time-consuming.
The executive, it was agreed, needed unity of opinion and coherence over time, and it
would have to be able to make decisions rapidly, particularly in the armistice period.635
Yet the central dilemma remained unresolved. The Executive needed to “satisfy
all the 36 United Nations.” What was required, Welles asserted, was “a sop for the
smaller states: some organization in which they could be represented and made to feel
themselves participants.” Berle therefore recommended the creation of a secretariat and
commissions to address regional and functional problems. Welles, who never ceased
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supporting some form of regional representation, welcomed this idea. The secretariat
and commissions could also handle the relief and resettlement issues. Cohen thought they
might be responsible to the Executive, which would in turn be responsible to an
Assembly. The Assembly would give everyone representation, and the secretariat and
commissions would provide another opportunity for broad participation. But even this
proposal, Welles confessed, did not address the contentious political and military issues.
A secretariat and commissions could not possibly handle these matters.636
The issue at hand was whether it was wise to vest authority in a limited executive
possessing the power to execute decisions, or was it better to have a larger committee
including nations that do not have the force to carry out orders. On this matter, Welles
thought it was best to “avoid a fully dictatorial aspect from the very beginning, and that
provision should be made for the expression of the opinions and desires of others than the
major powers having the force to give and enforce orders.” Everyone agreed.
Immediately after the war, the executive would need absolute powers to manage many of
the military and political problems anticipated, but it would also require a wide degree of
legitimacy to minimize potential opposition. As time passed, the organization would have
to be reequipped to “control difficulties arising in the war of ideas.” Popular movements
in the occupied countries already had the capacity to arouse opposition. The problem
would only worsen as soldiers and military officers returned home. If these groups turned
communist, the group concluded, it would undermine the peace and spell disaster for the
United States.637
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It was therefore essential that the executive include other powers. The State
Department’s Legal Advisor, Green Hayworth Hackworth, thought an executive of seven
members might resolve the problem. In addition to a corps including the United States,
Great Britain, Russia and China, the remaining seats might be allotted to a
Commonwealth country, a West European state, and a Latin American nation.638 Welles
believed Hackworth had gone far to resolve the problem, but broader regional
representation remained his preference. In addition to the Big Four, he believed five
regions should be represented: Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, the Far
East and possibly the Mohammedan peoples.639 To evade potentially divisive and timeconsuming selection procedures, he argued that the Four Powers should simply handpick
representatives from each of the regions. Fierce debate ensued over this procedure, but it
was reluctantly embraced and justified on grounds that certain of the allied governments
in exile had also been handpicked.640 Ironically many of these same governments had
problems with legitimacy.
This whole scheme worried the cautious Myron Taylor. From the outset, he had
been the most forceful proponent of a Four Power dictate, but now he was slowly moving
towards the view of Dean Acheson. Perhaps, he conjectured, we should “develop an
understanding of the future lines of policy and then inaugurate conversations with the
smaller United Nations, a small number at first and then more of them.” He even
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questioned the committee’s timing. He wondered whether it was even possible at this
juncture in the war to determine the kind of organization the United States should
promote. Welles politely reminded the old industrialist that they were merely speaking in
hypothetical terms, though Taylor knew better. He therefore insisted on arrangements
that would give the organization “a palatable flavor.” It should be “clearly, overtly, a
temporary body to handle the immediate problems after the armistice.” If the body had
the “appearance of permanence,” there would be a “serious public reaction.”641
But the New Dealers believed this could be avoided with crafty marketing. Welles
gleefully proposed the title, “Provisional United Nations Authority.” 642 But most
everyone thought the branding power of Roosevelt’s “United Nations” would be
tarnished if it were attached to a body that would act without consulting the alliance.
However Berle did not. The impression of broad international consensus had to be
created and the “United Nations” mantra was essential. Welles concurred. He reminded
the group that the executive would derive its authority from a meeting of the thirty-six
United Nations.643 If this were the case, Bowman interjected, then the United States
might employ “the tactic of having an over-all title reading: ‘United Nations Authority’,
followed by a subtitle which could vary with the many different organizations that might
be evolved.” The Executive could be called “Provisional Armistice Administration.” As
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such, the term “armistice” would reinforce the “provisional” nature of the executive
while also preserving the “symbol” of the United Nations. Welles happily agreed.644
At the end of the meeting, the Chairman summarized the Subcommittee’s
conclusions. A United Nations Authority would be established, composed of
representatives from all of the United Nations. This authority would create an executive
committee, possibly called “Provisional Armistice Administration,” and it would be
composed of representatives of the four powers, with the addition of handpicked
representatives from the five regions mentioned. Commissions or committees would be
created under the Executive with responsibility for on-going and temporary problems
such as relief. From time to time, the Executive would report to the United Nations, but
in the final analysis, the Four Powers of the Executive Committee “would from a
practical viewpoint exercise the power of all the United Nations whether delegated or
not.”645 But there would also be a Secretariat “keeping people active who were without
responsibility.” It would be filled with “social personnel.” These people would keep the
small powers in the know and “make them feel that they are participating.”646
In many ways, this meeting made the institution of relief and reconstruction
programs dependent on the continued development of America’s postwar strategy. By
subsuming these issues under the Executive Committee of a United Nations Authority,
nothing could be officially set up until these two bodies had been established. This plan
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would require the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy’s approval.
Roosevelt would also have to study the proposals and provide his consent. But with
increasing demands on his time, delays were all but inevitable. Of course the planning of
relief, reconstruction and resettlement projects would continue. Berle had jurisdiction
over these areas of policy, all of which were receiving attention from his Reconstruction
Subcommittee. Acheson, too, could continue preparations for the various areas of
economic policy over which he and his Economic Subcommittee had authority. But
whatever programs they designed, it was assumed at this point in our story that they
would be placed under the proposed United Nations organization.
This assumption was only partially correct. Complex bureaucratic systems
operating in a world of infinite variables are rarely amenable to pre-conceived plans. If
the system itself does not undermine or alter a planned policy, then an exogenous shock
often will. In the case of the United Nations, it was a combination of both. For one,
nothing was ever certain in Roosevelt’s bureaucratic system. Policy choices were always
subject to bickering, fighting, and constant bureaucratic maneuvering. These factors,
along with wartime demands, led to intractable problems that created unfortunate delays.
Thus when the political imperative for action suddenly arose, the planners were not
sufficiently prepared to act as they originally planned. The effect, while important, did
not wholly undermine the Political Subcommittee’s proposals. It simply meant that the
plans had to be altered so that the relief agency could be brought into being before the
United Nations organization. As a result, relief became a test pilot for the postwar
organization itself. For this reason, its importance should not be underestimated.
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Exposing the problems of international organization

On April 3, 1942, the work of the Reconstruction Subcommittee came to a
screeching halt. With Berle absent when the meeting began, Acheson decided to create a
little mischief. Instead of permitting a discussion of Harry Hawkins’ latest “Draft Project
for International Relief” – the agenda Berle had set – he permitted a discussion of Myron
Taylor’s latest problems. The multimillionaire businessman had many: but on that day he
was not happy with the way things were going. As Acheson explained, the New Yorker
(who had supported the New Deal) opposed the creation of a separate organization for
relief. He feared an unwieldy multiplication of international organizations in the postwar
era that might burden the American budget and lead to chaos. There should be “one
international organization to handle all international problems.” From the outset it should
consist of no more than four powers, and preferably only three. Acheson, in effect, was
abetting someone else’s war against the plans of Welles and Berle.647
The Assistant Secretary wryly explained that while he was inclined to agree with
Taylor, he thought it perfectly reasonable to call a large meeting first as a constituent
assembly, and then that group could set up a four-power body to make decisions. This
body could be convened occasionally, perhaps once a year to have a debate. But Cohen
claimed that while he also agreed with Taylor, the relief organization would require a
different form of representation given the need for resources from countries not included
in the Big Four, such as Argentina and Canada. Hawkins concurred and Pasvolsky
explained that the United States had faced the same problem when it released the United
647
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Nations Declaration. “Every time new countries were added the problem then arose
again until all countries at war against the Axis had been included.” Countries such as
Canada and the Netherlands, he added, would want to give their views in the
settlement.648
Then Berle arrived and the debate took a turn for the worse. “An approach to the
solution of international problems based on power could not last. Such an approach had
been the basis of the peace conference of Paris. After some years the power crumbled and
the whole structure disintegrated.” No member present dared ask how power crumbles,
but the group knew the system had broken down. Berle tried to explain why.
“International problems” cannot “be solved without general consent.” A rancorous
dispute broke out, and the group referred the question to the Political Committee and the
full Advisory Committee. This proposal suited Berle just fine. He needed Sumner Welles
to win the debate.649
But the following day, Acheson and Taylor trapped the Undersecretary at the
Advisory Committee’s third meeting. Acheson asked Welles if “the United Nations
Authority as envisaged by the political subcommittee would be the ultimate repository of
power,” or if “the executive committee of four powers would be the repository of final
authority?” Welles responded that the “subcommittee’s feeling was unanimous and clear
that the four major powers in the last analysis must make the decisions, but that as far as
possible those four powers should act in accord with the views of all the United
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The problem, according to Taylor, was that an executive committee

presupposed a grant of power to it by others, but in reality, the four powers would seek
no authority from any other source. It would be “improper to call that committee an
executive one.” This designation would result in “serious and harmful dispute.” Welles
demurred: “it was desirable and feasible for the four major powers to attempt to obtain
from the United Nations Authority a delegation of power.” Taylor then put the noose
around his neck: “But not to act as an Executive Committee?” he asked.651
The industrialist had the career diplomat cornered. The Undersecretary wanted the
Big Four to request power from the United Nations, but then to ignore the alliance when
its desires contravened the wishes of the Big Four. Norman Davis of the Red Cross tried
to defend Welles, but Taylor’s argument was lost upon him. Welles simply capitulated:
“The four major powers must exercise… the power of all the United Nations ‘whether
delegated or not.’” He then shut down the debate. But the problem was not resolved and
no one appeared to understand Acheson and Taylor’s discontent. From a marketing
standpoint, they thought it was foolish to assign the committee a misleading name that
might arouse anger. But from a theoretical point of view, they thought it was illogical to
justify the international organization and manifold agencies they envisioned on the need
for legitimacy. Their critique implicitly captured the whole problem of international
organization: when the interests of multiple states coincide, they are quite unnecessary if
650
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the purpose is legitimacy. But when the interests of countries misalign, diplomats and
policymakers often have little choice but to ignore international organizations.652
For Isaiah Bowman, the Soviet Union further complicated the problem. “Russia
was such an uncertain quantity that it was impossible to make up any fixed view.” It was
difficult to predict Russian behavior and power given that nation’s reliance on Great
Britain and the United States. The amount of leverage the United States would have on
the Soviet Union after the war was not clear. If the executive committee gave cause to
worry, the expectation of cooperation on the ground was equally worrisome. His
Territorial Subcommittee was therefore focusing in the first instance on Eastern Europe,
giving particular attention to Poland. He felt the “United States should take a final
position for herself which would be held as… [the] permanent position in regard to the
problems.” When considering the role of the United Nations, the prospect of world
organization, and the enormous tasks of resettlement, he explained that his
Subcommittee’s work became “particularly baffling.” He didn’t know if the United
Nations would be competent enough to handle the tasks it would face.653
But as a practical measure, he proposed a system of surveillance for the entire
continent of Europe. He explained that his group recognized the “grave danger of
confusion after military victory was obtained.” To counter this confusion, he advocated a
set of political commissions that would be deployed with the relief organization to
evaluate political circumstances in occupied countries. These commissions would
determine the location of populations, ascertain relief and rehabilitation needs, assess the
political weaknesses and strengths of various districts of a given region, and decide what
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weight should be assigned to respective groups in those regions. This information
could in turn be employed to “identify the authority in the state” and procedures that
might “be used to create authorities.” To facilitate this process, the commissions would
create analytical reports for the decision-makers, and they would work with the relief
agency and countries on the ground to achieve optimal solutions.654
But it was not purely a matter of controlling events on the ground; the Advisory
Committee also worried about who would control American resources. Following Berle’s
presentation of the relief agency his Subcommittee envisioned, Norman Davis expressed
trepidation over the prospect of putting American “bacon in the hands of others to hand
out.” By his estimates, the United States would be responsible for “at least 80 percent of
the relief and Britain probably responsible for the other 20 percent.” If this were the case,
American policy should “dominate” the organization. Neither a United Nations Council
nor an Executive Committee should be allowed control over these funds. The former
Ambassador to Italy and Assistant Secretary of State, Breckenridge Long agreed. “Relief
would be so large a part of the whole problem of settlement of the world that we ought to
be careful to keep all of it in our own national control.” But in his view, it didn’t matter
where the money came from. “Food could be used for pacification of the disturbed areas
of the world and thereby make its contribution to political settlements.” Long had no
problem with Berle’s proposal “so long as we control the organization.”655
Norman Davis did not dispute the objective of total control, but he did disagree
with Long on one matter. He warned the group that using relief for political purposes had
a “sad history.” He thought food should be distributed “cleanly,” and that “no political or
654
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selfish purpose should be involved.” Yet in the same breath, he also said the United
States should, for “psychological” reasons, “tell the people of the occupied countries that
we are conferring on how we will provide relief for them as soon as possible.” It might be
inferred from this statement that his justification for not using food for political purposes
was based on the damaging propaganda effects it could have, not the inherent ethical
problems it posed. But it is also possible that Davis was indeed an angel in every sense of
the term. With the possible exception of Anne O’Hare McCormick, he appears to have
been the only member of the postwar planning committees that shared this view. But
oddly, this is the only occasion in the minutes of the postwar meetings that anyone ever
objected to the use of food for political purposes.656
Throughout the meetings, most of the planners assumed that it would be
impossible to separate politics from relief. It is for this reason that the issue received so
much attention in the Political Subcommittee. It is for this reason that the planners
decided to create an international organization to manage relief and rehabilitation. And it
is also for this reason that Norman Davis expressed so much concern over who would
actually control the distribution of food and supplies. To be sure, the planners feared that
another power might assume control over American largess and then use it for its own
political or military benefit. But at the same time, the planners understood that if they
were seen to be distributing relief in tandem with the nations of the world, then the
United States would accrue political benefits. Yet for men like Davis, this was not
politics. It was religion. The United States was in the right. Its system and values were
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superior, and they were, above all, universal. The American claim on the world was
moral, and the objective was to save it. As a result, time could not be wasted.
The question was whether the United Nations Authority would be constituted
before the relief agency. If so, then the relief organization might be established at the
same time as the Executive Committee under the UN Authority’s ostensible control. If
not, Berle argued that the Relief Organization should be constituted at once. The four
powers would agree upon a plan, which would then be presented to the United Nations
for their approval. In this case, the process would provide a trial run for the creation of
the United Nations organization.657
The planners agreed that the Reconstruction Subcommittee should continue its
preparations of a detailed project for an international relief organization, but that the
sequencing for the project’s inauguration did not need to be determined immediately. The
United States should preserve its tactical flexibility. Everyone, however, recognized how
context and external factors might force them to construct the relief agency before the
United Nations organization. The war, at this juncture, was going badly for the Allies.
The United States needed a public relations victory. A show of Allied unity might hold
the alliance over until concrete military gains could be realized in the field. The planners
also feared that the British might take the initiative if the Americans delayed too long.
Quite appropriately, Norman Davis made it clear that this would be unacceptable: “Our
aim should be to prevent the British from taking the lead in the organization. We would
provide most of the relief and we should dominate…”658
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE BRITISH RECONSIDER THEIR POSTWAR RELIEF POLICY

The planning for postwar relief entered a new and decisive stage during the late
spring of 1942. Great Britain and the United States made their final preparations for oneon-one negotiations. The impetus for this round of diplomacy, no doubt, came from the
British, who had grown worried over the lengthy delays in Washington. Officials in
London realized that they could not manage the postwar world without the United States,
but they also knew that American participation might mean serious challenges to their
prestige and power in the international system. This reality set off a ferocious debate in
London, pitting the Treasury, which hoped to set serious limits on Britain’s postwar
commitments, against the Board of Trade and Foreign Office, which planned to use the
country’s remaining financial and material assets to maneuver itself into a position of
leadership in the postwar era. For whatever reason, Winston Churchill failed to intervene
in these disputes, a fact that left the Treasury isolated.
To understand this debate and the sources of British concern, one must consider
the background to these events. On September 24, 1941, the British had convened a
meeting of the Allied governments in exile at St. James Palace. The representatives
present created the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements, which, as we
have seen, was tasked with the responsibility of estimating Europe’s postwar relief needs.
However the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with this group, choosing instead to make
a proposal for an international relief organization of its own. This initiative placed the
British in a difficult situation. The Soviet proposal, on the one hand, had to be respected
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given the need for wartime solidarity, but on the other hand, it could not be accepted
because it proposed unanimous voting within the organization’s policy-making body and
it totally excluded the United States, even though the proposal suggested that American
tax dollars would pay for most everything.
As a result, the British made a proposal for a relief organization to the United
States in February of 1942. The immediate objective was to outmaneuver the Russians.
But the British also hoped to elicit American support and cooperation for an international
relief organization more in line with their desires. In addition, the United States
maintained a stranglehold on the world’s material and financial resources. Great Britain,
by contrast, found itself in a perilous financial and material situation. American
participation was therefore essential. Yet due to American failures to respond to this
proposal in a reasonable amount of time, the Allied Governments in Exile were growing
angry that nothing was being done to ensure their postwar needs would be met. They
were threatening, and in some cases, undertaking actions harmful to the war effort. These
delays also meant that the British had still not responded to the Soviet proposal. Both
matters were cause for considerable embarrassment and concern.

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross

The man who bore responsibility for postwar relief in the British government had
spent most of his career at the Treasury. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, known to his friends
and colleagues as ‘Leithers’, entered the civil service in 1909 straight out of Balliol
College, Oxford. Within two years, he held the position of private secretary to Prime
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Minister Herbert Asquith, an experience that gave him valuable insight into public
affairs and started a lifelong friendship with the Asquith family. By early 1914, Leithers
had returned to the Treasury, where he managed the government’s unemployment
program for returning soldiers. Following the war, he moved to Paris to work on the
intractable problem of postwar reparations.659 This experience shaped his attitude towards
relief matters following the Second World War: it would be counterproductive, he
believed, to force war-ravaged countries to pay for relief and rehabilitation supplies if this
policy aroused a spirit of vindictiveness and undermined economic renewal.660
After his return to London, Leith-Ross experienced both setbacks and good
fortune. In 1927, his colleague, Sir Richard Hopkins, obtained the position of controller
of finance, a job that Sir Frederick believed he deserved. Although Leith-Ross managed
to work well with Hopkins, his burdensome workload wore on him. In 1928, he suffered
an internal hemorrhage, which forced him to reduce his duties considerably. But by 1929,
his luck turned. He won the praise of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston
Churchill, following a mission to Egypt, in which he obtained large sums of money for
Britain by settling financial claims Cairo had made against the country. Later in the year,
his stature mounted further. He opposed David Lloyd George’s plan to solve Britain’s
problem of unemployment with a massive program of loan-financed public works. In
doing so, he not only became the architect of the so-called “Treasury view,” he earned
himself a new rival, John Maynard Keynes, the program’s intellectual guardian.661
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This period bestowed Leith-Ross with a prominence that propelled him into
the position of Chief Economic Advisor to the British Government in 1932, but it also
strained his relationship with Hopkins and Keynes, two men who would later obstruct
much of what Leith-Ross hoped to do with regard to postwar relief. In the meantime, Sir
Frederick’s new position afforded him the chance to grace the world’s stage. He
represented Britain on international bodies, served on the preparatory committee for the
World Economic Conference, and conducted negotiations with the United States on war
debts.662 He also undertook a famous mission to China in 1935-36 in which he assisted
the Chinese in their efforts to move from a silver-backed to a managed currency. Though
the mission constituted a technical success, the unfolding strategic context in East Asia
rendered his efforts a failure.663 In 1937, Japan attacked China. By the outbreak of the
war in Europe, the ground was shifting under Sir Frederick’s feet.
One day before the German attack on Poland, Leith-Ross assumed new duties at
the Ministry of Economic Warfare; shortly thereafter John Maynard Keynes literally
moved into the Treasury, which he dominated for the duration of the war.664 This fact
placed him in a position to oppose Sir Frederick down the road. But for the time being,
Leith-Ross played an important role constructing the economic blockade of Europe. More
important for our task, he also worked to prevent raw materials and other supplies from
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falling into the hands of the Nazis. As such, he maintained responsibility for the
Allied governments in exile making purchases of postwar supplies throughout the British
Empire and the Western Hemisphere.665 These efforts, as we have seen, led to the socalled St. James Palace meeting of June 12, 1941, in which the Allies agreed to “mutually
assist each other” to defeat the Germans and Italians, and to establish an “enduring
peace.”666 They also provide a precursor to the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War
Requirements, the creation of which Leith-Ross was primarily responsible.
Sir Frederick did not enjoy his work at the Ministry of Economic Warfare, where
his job, as he put it, was to turn his “ploughshare into swords.”667 Thus when his
Minister, Hugh Dalton, left the Ministry to become President of the Board of Trade, he
followed him.668 Yet he continued his work with the Inter-Allied Committee and assumed
the Chair of the group in early 1942. He also headed a Division in the Board of Trade that
served as the Committee’s Secretariat. From this vantage point, he was well placed to
turn what was initially an effort to win the war into an endeavor to prepare for peace.
This objective accorded more with Sir Frederick’s desires. But his personal ambition and
immense generosity towards Europe would arouse considerable opposition from his
rivals.
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Managing the Unruly Allied-Governments in Exile

Until the spring of 1942, the British had maintained responsibility for the Allied
governments in exile purchasing postwar supplies in various corners of the globe. The
Dutch, one of the few governments with purchasing assets and shipping resources, had
raised the issue of purchases with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross in January 1941. 669 He
welcomed their initiative.670 “The provision of raw materials for the revival of industry
would have to be undertaken by Governments of the occupied countries, working in
conjunction with the producing countries.” At this juncture in the war, this
recommendation seemed wise. The blockade of Europe had severed European markets
from much of the world, and surpluses were accumulating in countries that sold
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agricultural and manufacturing products to Europe. Leith-Ross, however, stressed the
need for coordination with British authorities. He also informed the Dutch some weeks
later that the British would not requisition supplies they acquired unless an emergency
made it unavoidable. Despite his best efforts, the Dutch proceeded to make purchases in
South America and Canada without establishing any degree of coordination with British
purchasing authorities.671
This behavior, in part, convinced the British to alter their policy on purchases. In
conversations with Leith-Ross, officials at the Ministry of War Transport expressed
serious reservations with the Dutch purchases. If they continued, it “might prejudice the
prospects of Allied shipping being used for the relief of Europe as a whole.” Countries
that had stockpiled supplies during the war would tie up shipping resources at the war’s
end when transporting these goods back home. Leith-Ross also heard complaints from
other Allied governments in exile who had few shipping resources and limited means to
make purchases during the war. These governments feared their countrymen might
receive relief too late or none at all. Therefore, at a meeting with the Dutch on July 22,
1941, Leith-Ross emphasized the importance of coordinating “plans for the provisioning
of Europe at the close of the war.” The British, he implied, no longer welcomed
independent Dutch purchases. “Far more effective results were likely to be achieved by
some measure of pooling resources, especially shipping.”672
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The British then proceeded to win agreement for this policy shift among the
Allied governments in exile. The St. James Palace Resolution of September 24, 1941,
which also established the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements,
accomplished this objective. In clause two of this document, the signatories agreed that
“while each of the Allied Government and authorities will be primarily responsible for
making provision for the economic needs of its own peoples, their respective plans
should be co-ordinated in a spirit of Inter-Allied collaboration for the successful
achievement of the common aim.”673 It was also agreed that some machinery would be
created to coordinate purchases. The Dutch consented, but argued that the resolution in
no way prevented them from “carrying out under their own responsibilities the
arrangements made by them for the provisional relief of the Netherlands at the end of
hostilities.”674
Developments during the winter altered the situation dramatically, such that by
March 1942 the Norwegians were also expressing a desire to make independent
purchases. 675 Efforts to construct Allied machinery for purchases came to a virtual
standstill due to Soviet intransigence. As we have seen, the Soviets disliked the LeithRoss organization and sought to thwart its development, thereby forcing the British to
turn to the United States with a full-scale international plan for managing relief. The
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United States, however, elongated the process further as it attempted to determine its
postwar relief policy. As a result, the Allied governments in exile became anxious: on the
one hand, they worried that they might not be prepared for the day of liberation; on the
other hand, they were concerned that they might loose legitimacy with their own people
if they were seen as doing nothing. Norwegian seamen, who had heroically navigated the
Atlantic to bring supplies to Britain, were in an uproar: their government was assisting
the war effort but seemingly doing little in anticipation of Norway’s liberation.676
Yet developments in the war made independent purchases increasingly dangerous.
Following the German assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941, and the Japanese attacks
on the United States and Southeast Asia in December 1941, the demand for agricultural,
industrial, and military supplies exploded. As the Japanese advanced across Southeast
Asia in the first half of 1942, the situation grew dimmer: resources from Borneo to the
Dutch East Indies were lost, and vital shipping and land routes severed at Singapore and
in Burma respectively. In this context, the production of military and non-military goods
soared in the United States. Industrial expansion rose at a faster rate than at any other
period in American history – over 15 percent a year!677 By February 1942, lend-lease aid
on a cumulative basis had increased five-fold over the previous six months, from less
than $500 million to a staggering $2,570 million. In 2009 dollars, this sum equates to

676

On the importance of the Norwegian seamen, see Memorandum of Conversation,
Acheson and Norwegian Ambassador, May 28, 1942, 840.50/545, Box 4798; EP-5,
Chronological Minutes, June 5, 1942, File Chronological Economic Minutes, Box 80,
ACPFP, Notter Papers. On the importance of preparations and legitimacy, see enclosures
attached to Matthews to Hull, May 15, 1942, 840.50/408, Box 4796; see three enclosures
attached to Dispatch No. 3801, Matthews to Hull, June 5, 1942, 840.50/453, Box 4797,
all in RG 59, NARA.
677
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (New York: Random House,
1989), 357-358.

245
$27.5 billion. While aid to Britain mounted over this period, the Soviet Union
received the greatest boost. By mid 1942, Russia was taking in 35 percent of the total, as
much as Britain.678 This extraordinary growth in wartime production turned many of the
surpluses of the previous two years into shortages.679
The British knew that something had to be done to control purchasing. Initially
they reasoned that it would be best not to forbid Allied purchases altogether, but to
manage them through informal arrangements. In March 1942, Leith-Ross, as he had done
with the Dutch in 1941, asked the Norwegian Ministry of Supply to provide a list of the
commodities and quantities that they wished to purchase. The British Ministry of Food
and Supply would then determine if materials over and above actual war needs were
available. If so, Norway would be permitted to make purchases, so long as they closely
coordinated their actions with British authorities to avoid competition in world markets.
Leith-Ross also informed the Norwegians that the British would facilitate the purchases,
but this would be done on the understanding that supplies would be pooled if necessary,
and that there would be no diversion of Norwegian vessels to transport the goods. The
Norwegians readily agreed to these arrangements.680
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However it soon became apparent that this approach was unsustainable. As
supplies became increasingly scarce, the British found themselves in the embarrassing
position of having to obstruct or discourage the Dutch and Norwegians from making
purchases, which aroused resentment.681 The other Allied Governments also became
resentful, either because they did not have the resources to procure their own supplies, or
because they believed Norway and the Netherlands were violating the spirit of the St.
James Palace Resolution. 682 When the Belgians learned that the Dutch and the
Norwegians were making purchases, they informed Leith-Ross that if the buying did not
cease, they would have no choice but to commence procuring postwar supplies as well.683
Thus it became clear that the problem could not be controlled using ad-hoc arrangements,
and that the immediate demand for postwar supplies from the Allied governments in exile
might become so great that it would impair the war effort and endanger Great Britain.
This realization had both direct and indirect impacts on British behavior. In
virtually every department of the British government – Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Ministry of Food and Supply, Ministry of Transport, the Bank of England, the Board of
Trade, the Foreign Office, and the Treasury – policymakers felt that Leith-Ross could not
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manage the problem without the assistance of the United States.
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Yet by early April,

the Americans still had not replied to the British relief proposal of February 1942. The
delay left them fearful of a negative response, especially in view of the fact that the
Americans had proved largely uncooperative in managing the surplus problem in 1940
and 1941. It also weakened Britain’s hand vis-à-vis the exiled Allied governments, and
caused them considerable embarrassment with regard to the Soviets, who had been
waiting patiently for a response to their own relief proposal since January 1942. As a
result, Leith-Ross attempted to use the issue of Dutch and Norwegian purchases to push
the United States into action. As we will see, the ploy worked, but it also inadvertently
triggered a heated review of British relief policy for the postwar period.

The British Reconsider their Postwar Relief Policy

The Treasury no longer believed the government’s policy complied with the
British national interest. Following Churchill’s speech to the House of Commons in
August 1940, in which the Prime Minister promised food aid to all liberated countries,
including Germany and Austria, the British began plans to accumulate supplies for the
liberation of Europe. It was assumed that there would be some form of supply pool to
which Britain would make a sizeable contribution. But by the spring of 1942, it had
become apparent that Britain, like her European allies, would be in dire need after the
war. The Treasury argued that the country would have little to spare in the way of
postwar relief supplies. Hubert Douglas Henderson, John Maynard Keynes and David
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(‘Sigi’) Waley led the charge against Leith-Ross and the Board of Trade, which
remained adamant that Britain should make a contribution.685 These men were not only
worried about the awful supply situation; they feared a balance of payments crisis.686 In
their view, the Prime Minister’s statement had been made in completely different
circumstances, and the assumptions on which it was based were no longer applicable.
Britain’s external deficit became the Treasury’s most alarming concern. By the
end of 1942, it had already reached 2.1 billion pounds, the equivalent of 72.9 billion
pounds in 2008. Even with the introduction of lend-lease assistance in 1940, the rate at
which the deficit grew only accelerated. This development forced the country to take on
liabilities and sell off investments at worrisome rates. Churchill might have called lendlease “the most unsordid act in the history of any nation,” but the Treasury knew better.
The Americans had waited until Britain was bankrupt before providing assistance; they
forbade the use of lend-lease grants to support British export industries that could
compete with American export industries; and they forced Great Britain to sign the
Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942, which the Treasury considered an overt attack on the
system of imperial trade preferences. As a result, the Treasury correctly anticipated the
worst. By the end of the war, the deficit would reach a staggering 10 billion pounds,
despite grants from the United States totaling 5.4 billion pounds. The political leadership,
primarily Churchill, paid little attention to these developments. But Keynes, who
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managed British financial negotiations with the United States in 1941, knew the
Americans would advance their interests at the expense of Great Britain.687
For this reason, the Treasury disagreed with the pitch Leith-Ross made in his
telegram to the British Embassy on April 11, 1942.688 To be sure, they believed it
imperative that Leith-Ross consult the Americans over the problem of Allied purchases,
but they considered it foolish to utilize the occasion to implicitly promote the pooling of
relief supplies.689 A far better approach would have been the continuation of lend-lease
after the war, which would have addressed the Treasury’s primary concern: Britain’s
balance of payments position. With lend-lease aid, Britain could reequip her industry for
export markets without loosing reserves or going bankrupt. The country could then
recover its exchange position through exports. The idea of a pool, however, implied a
British contribution. If the country contributed Sterling, the balance of payments crisis
would worsen; if it offered raw materials stocks, it would deny Britain of one of its only
sources of exchange: raw materials could be exported directly or used as inputs for export
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In effect, the Treasury believed a complete review of British relief

policy in order.
When Leith-Ross learned of the Treasury’s plan to challenge British postwar
relief policy in a letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood, to Hugh
Dalton, the President of the Board of Trade, he tried to convince them to tone the letter
down. He did not think it wise to create controversy that would precipitate intervention
from the War Cabinet before he had received a reply from the United States. Yet he
showed little desire to alter British policy. He believed America and Canada would only
shoulder postwar relief if the British “showed a very willing spirit.” By putting what
Britain had to offer “in the shop window,” he felt the country “could still play a very
considerable part in the whole scheme.” Perhaps, he added, Britain could provide 50
million in sterling and restrict its use to the Empire to offset balance of payments
concerns. He also proposed a variety of commodities that Britain might contribute: wool,
cotton, and cocoa, but also leftover military stocks and goods produced after the war. If
such a contribution were made alongside British shipping, then he felt that Great Britain
might make a “substantial showing.”691
These arguments received a mixed response from the Treasury. Waley displayed
the most sympathetic reaction and tried to tone down the letter.692 Leith-Ross, he wrote
his colleagues, is “quite ready to recognize that our proper contribution to post-war relief
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must be on a limited scale, but he does not think that we ought to take the line that we
shall probably not be able to make any contribution at all.” 693 Richard Hopkins
concurred, but believed it foolish to make commitments before Britain figured out how to
meet its “external difficulties.” What Leith-Ross proposed to contribute would not even
“touch the fringe of the entire problem.” It would probably harm Britain and force the
country to maintain ration controls well into the postwar period, perhaps at levels lower
than those of 1941. 694 Although Henderson and Keynes disagreed little with these
assessments, they preferred that a forceful letter be sent to the Dalton. “This is a major
decision of policy,” Keynes wrote. “May I plead that it should not be fluffed for the sake
of avoiding difference of opinion?” The “whole purpose of the letter” is to “get a
ministerial ruling” changing the government’s policy.695
In the end, Keynes won the argument. The letter Wood sent to Dalton on May 1,
1942 challenged the assumptions underlying British postwar relief policy of 1940 and
implicitly attacked its implications for British negotiation strategy with the United States.
Wood pointed out the extraordinary changes that had taken place since 1939. The war
had become a global affair, surpluses had turned into shortages, and Britain’s supply and
balance of payments positions had eroded considerably. Most important, the United
States had entered the war. The Americans possessed resources “for post-war relief with
which ours bear no comparison.”696 It seemed foolish to pledge commitments before the
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United States had made its position known. Such an approach might unnecessarily
sacrifice scarce resources; perhaps the Americans might prefer an extension of lend-lease.
Premature pledges might also compromise British strategy in other negotiations. It would
be disingenuous to suggest that Britain would be a major donor to postwar relief, while at
the same time pleading for mercy in other financial and economic discussions, most
importantly, the talks over Article VII of the lend-lease master agreement.697 Dalton
would take nearly two weeks to reply.

Managing the Dutch and Norwegians

Meanwhile, the British tried to put a stop to the Allied purchases of postwar
supplies. The Board of Trade proceeded to block English manufacturers from making
delivery on certain goods while the Treasury blocked payment on the goods. This, of
course, sent the Norwegians – who bore the brunt of these actions – into a rage. Alfred
Holter of the Norwegian Ministry of Supply immediately called over to the American
Embassy to complain. With considerable flair, he regurgitated the Norwegian arguments
and painted a picture of tragedy and suffering in his home country. It was necessary for
“psychological reasons” to permit the purchases, which were miniscule in the broader
context. “It would have the most serious adverse affects upon public opinion in Norway
vis-à-vis the Norwegian Government in London should there be any delay at all in
shipping relief supplies to any part of Norway.” Holter’s experiences with the supply
697
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authorities in London had made it readily apparent that it would be utterly foolish to
wait on some projected “Inter-Allied Pool.”698
The Norwegian arguments had little impact at the Embassy: Leith-Ross had
already begun coordinating strategy with the Americans to force a showdown over the
purchases. With the Greeks and Yugoslavs now threatening to procure supplies, action
had to be taken at once to terminate this behavior.699 On May 8, 1942, the British and
Americans met with authorities from the Dutch and Norwegian governments. At this
meeting Leith-Ross spoke on behalf of the British and the Americans. He insisted that
any purchases made by the Allies be coordinated with supply authorities in the United
States and Great Britain. At the same time, he called for a complete suspension of
purchases until a joint supply program could be established. The usual arguments were
exchanged, but at this particular session, tempers flared. After presenting the AngloAmerican position, he told the Norwegians that their behavior was a “great pity.”700
Upon hearing this, the acting Prime Minister of Norway, Trygve Lie, exploded.
Despite the Nazi occupation, he insisted that Norway was a “free country.” As such, he
did not want to come “hat in hand asking permission each time from the Americans or
British for every small purchase contemplated.” Norway, he argued, “had money and
ships,” which meant that they should be treated as “real partners.” He complained that
there was an American and British Shipping Committee, on which the Norwegians had
698
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no representative. His country was “an important contributor to the Allied Shipping
pool.” On a per-capita basis, Norway’s contribution to shipping exceeded all of the other
countries in the alliance.701 He reminded the men sitting there that his country “had a
deep friendship with the United States and Great Britain and were Allies in the full sense
of the word, but they wanted to feel that they were not fighting against a ‘New German
Order’ merely to come into a ‘New Anglo-American Order’ in which they would be told
what to do.” It was an alarming statement.702
The reaction of the Dutch government in exile was quite different. They shared
the Norwegian view on most every point, but they scratched their heads in confusion the
entire meeting. When asked if they had consulted the Americans before making certain
purchases, Dr. Arnold T. Lamping, Head of the Dutch Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Shipping, responded: “I believe they have been consulted.” When told that information
just received from Washington suggested that the Americans had not been informed, Dr.
A.H. Philipse, Head of the Dutch Department of Economic Policy, replied, “But I thought
Mr. [C. Van] Stolk [the Dutch purchasing agent in the United States] had kept in touch
with them.” When Leith-Ross asked the Dutch if they were prepared to suspend their
purchasing, Dr. Lamping finally gave an honest answer: “My Government has been
waiting for a considerable time already and from an propaganda point of view would
701
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soon have to cease feeding our people paper promises.” Leith-Ross then pleaded with
the Dutch to consult the Anglo-American supply authorities and temporarily cease
purchases. Just as Lie had done, they agreed to put the matter before the Dutch
Cabinet.703
Henceforward the two Allied Governments in exile pursued distinct strategies:
while the Norwegians sped up the diplomatic endgame – inadvertently perhaps – the
Dutch, who possessed a combination of discretion, aloofness, and calculated
obliviousness, slowed it down. They simply delayed or played dumb while engaging in
all sorts of chicanery to achieve their objectives. As a result, their purchases of postwar
relief supplies were largely ignored and mostly undetected.704 The Norwegians, however,
played their hand less shrewdly. Within forty-eight hours of having received a formal
follow-up memorandum from the Americans and British, Lie began engaging them in a
petty and wholly unproductive he-said-she-said-I-told-you-so-but-did-we-not-agree sort
of exchange.705 Ultimately Lie won the fight with the British – they finally permitted the
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Norwegians to make purchases with certain stipulations – but this behavior
endangered the alliance and put the Norwegians under the spotlight of the Americans.706
As we will see, this seriously impaired their freedom of action and probably made it
much more difficult for them to achieve their objectives.

Britain’s Internal War and the Response to the American Note

When the American response to the British relief proposal was shared with LeithRoss and Richard Law on May 11, 1942, it presented London with a fundamental
dilemma.707 If Great Britain rejected the American proposal, it might harm the war effort
and undermine the chances that the United States would play a significant role in the
postwar era, which was considered essential for global stability and prosperity by most
everyone. If Great Britain accepted the proposal, it ran the risk of being hustled by the
United States and offending most all of its allies, including the Dominions, Allied
Governments in exile, and possibly the Soviet Union. With the exception of Russia, none
of these governments were guaranteed participation in the preliminary discussions, and
Moscow was certain to protest the dominant role given to the United States in the
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proposed scheme. It left policymakers wondering if Great Britain could preserve its
global influence and imperial prestige in spite of its worsening financial situation and
weakening geo-strategic position. It would take months to resolve these issues.
Naturally the debate reignited the controversy with the Treasury. Leith-Ross
carefully maneuvered within the British bureaucracy to ensure no obstacles arose to his
preference for a positive response to the American proposal, which he considered an
acceptance of his own ideas.708 He urged the President of the Board of Trade to silence
the Treasury, and on May 13, 1942, Dalton responded to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer’s letter of two weeks prior. He cited every imaginable reason why Britain
could not back away from the Prime Minister’s pledge of August 1940. Great Britain had
a humanitarian job to do; it had a debt of honor to pay to Eastern Europe; and a deep
interest in preventing social and political disruption in Europe. But above all, he wrote,
Britain would be more likely to “enlist American sympathy” if “we show a real effort to
help others.”709 Kingsley Wood acknowledged these arguments, but returned to his view
that Britain should enter into no large commitments prematurely. Britain’s balance of
payments is kept in equilibrium due to assistance from the United States and Canada, he
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wrote. If this aid dries up after the war, we may need everything we have to make
ends meet.710
The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who had been privy to this
correspondence, stepped into the ring on May 19, 1942 with a letter to Wood. “America,”
he argued, “is not in the least likely to adopt a reasonably generous attitude towards our
difficulties if we try and make too much of them in a context like this…. It was we who
gave the first undertakings to the Allies in the matter of post-war relief and it would be
fatal if we were now to give an appearance of trying to unload our burden on to the
Americans.”711 Then, in a letter to Churchill, he asked the Prime Minister if it would be
permissible for the matter to be brought up at the next Cabinet meeting.712 A response to
the Americans needed to be sent immediately and everyone agreed that a favorable
response was in order. Churchill, who was not scheduled to be at the Cabinet meeting,
concurred. He was apparently unaware of the deep fissures that had emerged in the
British government over relief policy. In this way, the Foreign Office and the Board of
Trade prepared the way for a smooth sailing through the Cabinet. The Treasury had been
cornered.
On May 21, 1942, the British War Cabinet, in Churchill’s absence, elected to
accept the American proposal, but reserved the right to suggest changes. Eden told the
gathering that Washington was using the relief issue to “establish under the aegis of the
‘United Nations’ the embryo of the international organization of the future.” In his view,
the Americans were “acting on the thesis that the more international machinery that can
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be got into operation with their participation before the end of the war, the greater the
likelihood of American public opinion being ready to continue international cooperation
after the war.” No one wanted to discourage this behavior, even the Treasury. “For the
success of any post-war relief scheme,” Eden argued, “the contribution of the United
States will be all important. For that reason alone we should be well advised to fall in
with the American proposals.”713 Revisions could be sought at a later date, but we should
obtain Dominion approval and inform Ambassador Winant of our desire to dispatch
Leith-Ross to Washington as soon as possible.714
No sooner had the ink dried on the prepared conclusions of this meeting than a
new round of fighting erupted between the Board of Trade and the Treasury. In a
memorandum written for the War Cabinet’s Committee on Reconstruction Problems,
which was partly responsible for determining British postwar relief policy, Hugh Dalton
tried to secure support for his department’s view of the matter. He argued that London
should be prepared to pool postwar supplies and coordinate its efforts with the Allied
Governments through an international organization. Discussions with Canada and the
United States needed to consider what would be necessary to re-provision territories
occupied by Allied forces. He suggested that rationing remain in place after the war, and
that the government consider the possibility of placing a list of British requirements
713
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before the Allies. In a polite overture to the Treasury, he wrote that the precise nature
of the British contribution would have to be determined at a later date.715 Despite his best
efforts, the document fell flat. “The President of the Board of Trade may have become
accustomed to a diet of his own words,” Keynes sarcastically wrote, “but the Cabinet
should be clear what words it is that they are likely to have to eat before endorsing this
paper.”716
In the Treasury’s view, Dalton’s plan lacked precision. It committed Britain to
contribute to a “supply pool,” but failed to explain what that meant. Who would control
this pool? How would decisions affecting the distribution of its supplies be made? These
proposals would “appear to commit us,” Keynes wrote, “to placing in the hands of some
outside body… the whole question of what supplies should be allocated to this country.”
Yet the constitution of that body “is at present unknown to us.”717 Waley wrote that he
could certainly have confidence in the judgment of an Anglo-American organization, but
that it was very difficult for him to have such an attitude if China and the Soviet Union
were included. “It is conceivable,” he added, “that an international organization might
work so slowly and so unfairly that we might regret having placed our destinies in its
hands more than we need.”718 The Chancellor of the Exchequer concurred with these
views.719
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He also agreed that the document failed to make distinctions between
immediate postwar needs and long-term requirements. After the war, the Allies would be
concerned with “acute want” for a period of perhaps three months. If Britain chose to
make extreme commitments, Keynes believed it wise to limit them to the immediate
period with the option of extending them later. This view applied not only to the
provision of food and raw materials, but also to the maintenance of restrictions on
domestic consumption. 720 The Treasury thought postwar rationing necessary to set
Britain’s financial and economic house in order; the Board of Trade believed it would
allow Britain to contribute more to postwar relief. The issue might not have amounted to
much at this point in the story, but the Board also wanted to publicly announce Britain’s
intent to continue rationing after the war, which in turn emboldened the Treasury in its
view that there must be time limits.
However it did not resolve disputes within the Treasury over the prudence of a
public statement in 1942. Several Treasury officials agreed with the Board of Trade: a
public pledge to extend rationing might bolster efforts to persuade the Allies to cease
making postwar purchases and convince the United States of Britain’s sincere
commitment to postwar relief. It would also provide an opportunity to educate the British
people, whose sacrifice would be needed to stabilize Europe and Britain after the war. It
might also exempt the country from having to open up its financial books to some
international body in order to obtain aid – full revelation of Britain’s financial position
would be a disaster for the country’s prestige.721 Waley did not dispute these arguments,
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but believed it unwise to prematurely forfeit Britain’s tactical and strategic flexibility:
even a vague commitment to extend rationing could backfire.722 Keynes agreed. Would
Britain maintain rationing in order to help the Germans? Was it wise to make such
commitments without comparable sacrifice from the Americans? In short, he believed
rationing should be linked to the extension of aid from the United States. 723 The
Chancellor concurred and made this point of view known in a June 2, 1942 memorandum
responding to the President of the Board of Trade.724
Keynes was quickly vindicated in his attitude. When the American Embassy
learned that the President of the Board of Trade and the Foreign Secretary planned to put
a rationing statement before the War Cabinet, Winant quickly informed the State
Department. An analogous statement from Washington would make for excellent
wartime propaganda, he argued.725 Roosevelt agreed to make a statement at his weekly
press conference, but made it known that the United States would not make any
comparable commitment, and it would not announce any extension of lend-lease. Instead
he would praise the British for their “self-sacrifice” and highlight the “depth of United
Nations solidarity.” But he did claim that the “innate generosity of the American people”
would “manifest itself in practical measures to meet the needs of the newly-freed peoples
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of Europe.” Hull thus instructed the Ambassador in London to inform the British of
the President’s decision, and to demand that they make no mention of lend-lease.726
If the British were aware of this decision, it appears to have had no impact on the
Foreign Secretary or the President of the Board of Trade. In a meeting of the War Cabinet
Committee on Reconstruction Problems on June 3, 1942, they regurgitated the whole of
their arguments in every aspect, and Treasury officials refuted them in every possible
way. However the balance of power momentarily resided with those who preferred a
statement, and it was decided that one should be made. But no agreement could be
reached on what the statement should say: what exactly would Britain pledge to ration?
So these men did what men frequently do in bureaucracies when a committee cannot
make a decision: they set up another committee.727 This new committee acted with
unusual speed and energy, and two days later, the “Official Committee on Post-War
Relief Policy,” as the new group was called, agreed on a statement.728 But that was only
because the Treasury arrived unprepared.729 Thus what appeared to be a brilliant victory
for the Board of Trade would turn out to be not so brilliant after all.
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While this feud continued with no apparent end in sight, Leith-Ross
considered a number of questions raised by the American relief proposals. None was
more important to him than the implications of the “Washington scheme,” as he called it,
for his beloved Inter-Allied Committee for Post-war Requirements?730 Leith-Ross never
put it in these terms, but he knew that if his committee became irrelevant on account of
the Americans, then he might also become irrelevant!731 Thus he did everything to not
only guarantee its survival, but to widen its responsibilities as well. Surely it is to his
credit that he concocted such fantastic arguments to persuade people of his views, and
that he used the most circuitous methods to achieve his objectives. As he put it to
Ambassador Winant in late May, these were not his arguments at all: this was the
perspective of South Africa. “In view of the importance of the British Commonwealth of
Nations as a source of post-war supplies, they consider that a special branch of the
proposed organization ought to be established to function in London.”732
He then tried to lead the Americans to believe that this too was their point of
view: “The U.S. note provides that the Inter-Allied Committee in London should be
maintained as an Advisory body.”733 For practical reasons, he added, a branch of the
Executive organization would also be required in London. The First World War had
730
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shown that “the nearer the centre of operations the administration was the more
efficiently it worked.”734 Leith-Ross also underscored the political benefits of devolving
more responsibility to the London organization. The Allied Governments in exile would
certainly protest the composition of the Executive Committee, which, as proposed,
included China, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. If an arm of the
relief agency in London assumed considerable power, and a series of technical
committees were set up there as well, it might mollify the Allies.735
Sir Frederick’s advocacy for the Allies did not end here. He preferred that at least
one or two representatives of the European governments in exile participate in the
preliminary discussions in Washington.736 He believed the Executive Committee should
be widened to include Allied nations. And he insisted that these Governments be made
aware of the American proposals as soon as possible. Otherwise they would learn of them
through leaks.737 As he put it, “there is no object in offending their susceptibilities.”738
Several of these Governments had shipping resources and others held assets in their
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colonies that would be useful after the war. If the United States did not already agree
with this point of view, he believed they could be convinced. In correspondence with his
colleagues, he repeatedly reminded them: “The United States note recognizes that some
of” the Allied Governments “will have claims to be represented.”739 Most everyone
agreed – including the American Ambassador – but no one quite knew how to satisfy
these claims without undermining the efficiency of the entire operation.740
The Soviet Union complicated maters further. Nearly five months had elapsed
since the Russians presented their proposal for an international relief organization. The
British still had not responded. The delay itself was enough to offend the Russians, but to
present them with a counterproposal drawn up by the Americans introduced an
assortment of new problems. It would look as though the British and the Americans were
conniving against the Russians. The Russians might also find the plan offensive. “Too
much power is being placed in the hands of those capitalists,” they might cry. And what
was to be made of the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements and the LeithRoss Bureau housed in the Board of Trade? The Russians abhorred these arrangements,
but the British now needed the Inter-Allied Committee for reasons of prestige, power and

739

“First Comments on United States Note,” May 1942, T 188/254, PRO; the American
views to which he refers are included in paragraph 5, sentence 4 of the memorandum sent
on May 7, 1942: Telegram 1995, The SOS in the United Kingdom (Winant), May 7,
1942, 840.48/5413, FRUS, Vol. 1, 103-105.
740
“Mr. Winant said that he saw no alternative but to put the main responsibility in the
hands of the four Great Powers. One of the main causes of the failure of the League had
been that it put a country like Honduras on the same basis as a Great Power. He had
heard it suggested that the Allied Governments here should be asked to nominate two
representatives, but he had not sent this forward to DC as he did not believe that they
would agree to appoint any two of their number. Moreover, if they were represented in
this way, countries like Brazil and Argentina might also want to come in and the
Executive Committee would become overloaded.” Note of Interview with Mr. Winant,
May 29, 1942, T 188/254, PRO.

267
influence. How could the British prevent the Soviets from helping the United States
sabotage it? How could they keep the Russians from undermining the whole effort? The
British did not ask these questions so bluntly, but this is clearly what was on their minds.
Debate over these matters split along unusual lines. Leith-Ross hoped the Soviets
would enhance the prestige of the Inter-Allied Committee, but he preferred that the
United States do his bidding. He wanted the Americans to first present their proposal to
the Russians, and to tell them of their intention to place it before a meeting of the InterAllied Committee. He also wished that the Americans put pressure on the Soviets to
attend the meeting and support the proposal. Upon hearing of this plan, Winant undercut
the entire effort. On the one hand, he would need to consult his Government, which
would take time. On the other hand, he urged Leith-Ross to go to Washington at once. If
he did not go while matters remained fluid, the British might have less influence.741 The
implications of this advice were not so clear to Leith-Ross, but the Foreign Office quickly
understood them. If the Soviets and Allies were to be informed of the American proposal
before Sir Frederick’s departure, it must happen rapidly. Herein lay the problem: the
Russians “are unlikely to give favorable consideration to the present Relief proposals if
they are hustled for what may well seem to them to be inadequate reasons.”742
In this way, Leith-Ross got little of what he wanted. The Foreign Office would
not permit him to hustle the Russians. It was critical from their perspective that Britain
should maintain strong relations with the Soviet Union, not only to ensure the success of
the relief scheme but to retain their goodwill into the postwar period as well. In line with
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this objective, the Foreign Office thought the Russians should receive all the details in
the American note that were submitted to the British Government. They believed that
Winant should inform the Russians of the American proposal, but they would in no way
press the Americans to place pressure on the Russians to appear at a meeting of the InterAllied Committee.743 Leith-Ross would have to manage that on his own: he would be
permitted to tell the Allies that he was going to Washington.744 But the Foreign Office
was adamant about one thing: it would be dangerous to hustle the United States or the
Soviet Union.
It could only be the other way around. Winant complained incessantly that the
British were taking too long to respond to the American proposal, while he conveniently
forgot that his government took four months to respond to the British proposal. He
pestered Leith-Ross for presenting him with ideas that needed to be discussed in
Washington, not in London. Leith-Ross whined that the Canadians were holding
everything up. 745 Indeed it was not until June 9, 1942 – nearly a month after the
Americans presented their proposal – that Leith-Ross and Richard Law, the
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office, presented the British
response to Winant. His reaction could not have been more revealing. After reading the
document, he asked whether the reference in the last paragraph to Leith-Ross’s going to

743

Baring to Leith-Ross, June 1, 1942; Leith-Ross to Baring, June 2, 1942; Ronald to
Eden, June 8, 1942, all in T 188/254, PRO.
744
Leith-Ross informed the Allies of his upcoming visit to the United States on June 17,
1942 at a hastily called meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War
Requirements: Minutes of meeting held on June 17, 1942, T 160/1404/3, PRO.
745
Leith-Ross to Ronald, June 6, 1942; “Note of Interview with Mr. Winant,” May 29,
1942, both in T 188/254, PRO. By June 9, 1942, even the State Department had grown
perturbed over the delays. See Telegram 2610, The SOS to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Winant), June 9, 1942, 840.50/388-6/8, FRUS, Vol. 1, 110-111.

269
Washington ‘as soon as may be convenient’ referred to Britain’s convenience or
America’s. The two Brits must have struggled to conceal their horror. It would be at “our
mutual convenience,” they replied.746 From this point forward it was clear who was in the
leadership position. The British were going to Washington, not vice-versa.

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross Must Have Instructions

One remaining matter needed resolution. Leith-Ross thought he had been invited
to the United States in his capacity as Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee, not as a
representative of the British Government. The Treasury considered this view ridiculous.
“In his capacity as Chairman,” Hopkins wrote, “he will be able to explain to America
what he takes to be the views and wishes of his colleagues of other nations, but he will
not in his capacity as Chairman express views and opinions other than those which would
be agreeable to H. M. Government from whom he derives his authority.”747 In effect, he
would need specific instructions from the Government. Otherwise, he should not be
allowed to “enter into any commitment, but only to have conversations with a view to
eliciting from the Americans the general line of action and organization they favor.”748
The Foreign Secretary thought this made no sense: Leith-Ross would have to possess the
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As a result, the earsplitting conflicts of the previous weeks erupted

once again around the instructions granted to Leith-Ross.
Four interrelated concerns drove the debate, but they all revolved around one
problem. What contribution could Britain reasonably make to the relief of Europe in the
postwar period? Although the first two concerns fell purely in the domain of public
relations, they had material implications for Britain. The Foreign Minister, President of
the Board of Trade, and the Paymaster General tried to resuscitate the Prime Minister’s
pledge of August 1940 by placing it in the instructions for Leith-Ross: if the Americans
pressed him on the contribution which the United Kingdom was prepared to make, then
he would simply recite Churchill’s speech.750 The Treasury criticized the maneuver as
misleading: at no point since the statement was delivered in August 1940 had there been
any attempt to implement it. The Food Ministry, completely consumed by the events of
the war, had simply ignored it as impracticable.751 When Churchill’s most loyal advisor,
Professor Frederick Lindemann, learned of the statement’s inclusion, he denounced it as
“entirely inexpedient and indeed improper.”752
The Foreign Office dismissed these arguments and explained its logic in realistic
terms that would appeal to the Treasury. Leith-Ross had typically framed the debate in
accordance with his desire to preserve and increase Britain’s influence. The Foreign
749

Hopkins to Waley, Catto and Keynes, June 6, 1942, T 160/1404/3, PRO.
“Memorandum by the SOSFA, the President of the BOT and the Paymaster General,”
War Cabinet, Discussions in DC Washington on Post-War Relief, June 25, 1942, W.P.
(42) 267, FO 371/31501, PRO. Leith-Ross was behind the inclusion of the Churchill
speech: “The Relief Organization – Draft Note for the Cabinet which will constitute Sir
Frederick Leith-Ross’ instructions,” by Hopkins, June 23, 1942, T 160/1404/3, PRO.
751
“Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,” War Cabinet, Discussions in
Washington on Post-War Relief, June 27, 1942, W.P. (42) 273, FO 371/31501, PRO; see
also “Post-War Relief” by Hubert Henderson, June 26, 1942, T 160/1404/3, PRO.
752
Lindemann to Churchill, June 27, 1942, PREM 4/28/11, PRO.
750

271
Office was more forthwith in its acceptance of Britain’s decline. Whether the
statement is included or not is irrelevant: “the Allies have not forgotten its terms.” It was
not a matter of pushing the Prime Minister into a corner on a promise that Britain was
unable to keep. Churchill had already made the statement and was already in the corner.
As Nigel Ronald wrote, “We are pleading ‘frustration of contract,’ and our object is to
offer the best substitute we can.” It is for this reason, he argued, that there needs to be a
declaration about rationing. It would reassure the Allies and make it clear to the United
States that Britain is no longer in a position to provide Europe relief assistance without
making serious sacrifices itself. In the context of Sir Frederick’s negotiations in
Washington, the rationing statement might serve British interests.753
These arguments might have made the statement a non-issue, but conflicts are
rarely settled when one disputant feels that he or she has been hustled. As a result, the
rationing statement became the second source of contention. Officials within the Treasury
remained angry over the outcome of June 5, 1942 ministerial meeting. Hopkins, who had
attended the meeting, sought to defend his actions. “We tried to make [the statement] as
general as possible.”754 But Keynes and Waley were non-buyers. They hung tenaciously
to the view that symbolic gestures for immediate diplomatic gain are foolish if they
involve excessive political risk and have the potential to endanger the national interest.755
Thus on June 18, 1942, the Chancellor of the Exchequer appealed to the Prime Minister.
“I have not been able to agree” with the “recommendation particularly that we should
maintain rationing until the urgent requirements of certain other countries have been met
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However when the Cabinet met on June 29, Churchill was absent

and the Treasury failed to scuttle the plan. It did win one minor concession. It succeeded
in altering the statement to prevent a scenario in which rationing was maintained in order
to benefit Germany. As such, the Prime Minister’s speech of August 1940 and the
rationing statement remained in the instructions prepared for Leith-Ross.757
The third concern, whether raw materials should be included in Britain’s
contribution to postwar relief, evoked a degree of ambivalence from the Treasury. On the
one hand, no official in the Treasury was prepared to refute the argument that raw
materials would be essential to restore industry in Europe, and that Britain’s economic
viability depended on Europe’s.758 On the other hand, they believed their inclusion might
be politically unpopular. They also considered it imprudent to make such commitments
before the United States had explained how far it was prepared to go in contributing raw
materials. The United States had provided Britain few raw materials during the war, and
when it did, severe restrictions were put in place to prevent English export industries
from benefiting.759 It appeared misguided to aid European industry if there was no
guarantee that British industry would receive similar assistance. The Foreign Office
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apparently agreed. At the Cabinet meeting on June 29, the Foreign Secretary argued
that no specific raw material commitments should be made in the context of Leith-Ross’s
negotiations. If the matter arose, he was instructed to refer back to London for guidance.
Thus the Chancellor let the issue rest.760
However, this decision did not resolve the fourth and final concern, whether
Leith-Ross should be permitted to discuss British stocks held abroad as a possible source
of relief supplies in his talks with the State Department. Initially the proposed instructions
only allowed him to discuss supplies physically held in the United Kingdom. But through
all sorts of subterfuge, Leith-Ross had the instructions altered to include everything held
abroad as well, including large Australian wool and Egyptian cotton stocks purchased at
great cost for political reasons during the war.761 The Treasury believed these materials
might be the only foreign exchange assets possessed by the United Kingdom at the end of
the war. Moreover, their location in remote areas of the world made it virtually
impossible to ship them to Europe rapidly enough to be of any use. Thus the Treasury
hung to the belief that they should be retained for financial purposes. This argument
mattered little at the Cabinet meeting on June 29. Despite pleas from the Treasury, the
Ministers refused to limit possible sources of supply to materials held in the United
Kingdom on grounds that the United States would not take Britain seriously.
In the final analysis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer secured only one significant
change to the instructions prepared for Leith-Ross. In his discussions with the Americans,
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Sir Frederick would have to make a clear analytical distinction between physical and
financial contributions to the relief organization. In the least, it would ensure
commitments were not made without considering their financial implications. It was one
thing to contribute supplies for purchase, but quite another to simply give them away. At
best, the distinction might limit Leith-Ross’s authority and send a sharp message to the
Americans. The financial aspects of relief concerned the balance of payments and a host
of other issues relating to Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, which were the
prerogative of the Treasury. Drawing these distinctions in Washington would also
insinuate that Britain would not be able to contribute much in the way of financing relief
if the United States played hardball in the Article VII negotiations.762 Despite this minor
victory, the Treasury remained unhappy with the overall outcome.

Winston Churchill Fails to Intervene

Leith-Ross and his allies in the Foreign Office had obtained most everything they
wanted. The instructions retained the Prime Minister’s speech of August 1940 and
authorized Leith-Ross to share the rationing statement with the Americans. In discussing
Britain’s possible contribution, he was not permitted to make specific promises, but there
was virtually no restriction on what he could promise generally. “In so far as we hold any
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stocks and stores after the war which are not immediately needed for our own
requirements, we shall be prepared to place them at the disposal of the international
Relief Organization either as a donation or against replacement as circumstances permit.”
This included both foodstuffs and raw materials held in Britain and throughout the
Empire.763 The Foreign Office accepted this language on grounds that it contained an optout clause: “We are safeguarded by our original wording which included the phrase
‘which are not immediately needed for our own requirements.’”764 The Treasury believed
that even with such clauses, the nature of the instructions would raise expectations in
ways that were not only misleading, but also politically and economically dangerous.
The debate over Leith-Ross’s instructions contained remarkably little discussion
of the “organizational aspects” of the relief organization and its operations. The Cabinet
did conclude that the Executive Committee should be limited to the four great powers,
but recognized that Canadian acquiescence would be essential to move forward on this
point. Canada would be a major contributor to postwar relief. If any other nations were
permitted membership, it would open the way for similar demands across the board. The
inevitable outcome would be Geneva all over again.765 Aside from this restriction, LeithRoss was to urge that a branch of the organization be established in London with
substantial powers so long as it did not “involve the United Kingdom in undue
responsibility for the provision of relief.” In essence, he was to make broad general
promises that Britain could hardly fulfill, all in order to obtain power and influence for
763
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the United Kingdom. As for other organizational issues, he was given complete
discretion to address “the problem in whatever manner” seemed “to him most likely to
reconcile the divergent interests of the Governments concerned.”766
For a Government led by Winston Churchill, these instructions are not as
remarkable as one might initially think. The Prime Minister, who was best positioned to
have a decisive impact on the debate, appears to have been inattentive to the financial and
economic aspects of the war.767 He did not attend the Cabinet meetings in May and June
1942 when relief was discussed, and he was absent from every meeting of the Cabinet
Committee on Reconstruction throughout the entire war, despite the presence of all his
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senior Ministers.
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He was sufficiently detached from such matters that Keynes

negotiated postwar arrangements with the Americans, the Dominion and European Allied
Governments without ever having obtained the authority of the British Government.769
Thus it is hardly surprising that Leith-Ross thought he should be allowed to negotiate
with the Americans without the Government’s authority either.
The Treasury believed otherwise, especially Keynes. Though Chairman of the
Inter-Allied Committee, Leith-Ross actually worked for the Board of Trade, whose job it
was to protect British trade interests. If he bargained away Britain’s remaining foodstuffs
and raw materials to an international organization, Keynes feared he might damage
Britain’s export industries. This outcome would only exacerbate the country’s impending
balance of payments crisis. 770 As a result, the Treasury had fought vigorously to
circumscribe the powers of Leith-Ross. But with no intervention from the Prime Minister,
failure was all but inevitable: Churchill’s attention remained elsewhere. For ten days in
late June, he summated with Roosevelt in the United States. Britain suffered enormous
shipping losses the entire month, and lost its strategic hold of Tobruk along with 33,000
troops to Erwin Rommel’s armies on June 21, 1942. The Treasury consequently stood
alone to make its case against wide authority for Leith-Ross.
Yet it still remains an odd fact that Churchill failed to intervene in the debate.
Throughout June and into July, his chief advisor, Frederick Lindemann, or Lord
Cherwell, as he was known after 1941, wrote him about the matter no less than five
times. A Professor of physics at Oxford, Cherwell became Churchill’s personal assistant
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at the Admiralty following the Nazi attack on Poland, and continued in this position
after Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940. He is most famous for his role in
planning the aerial bombing of Germany, yet his research in the 1920s won accolades
from scientists such as Albert Einstein and Henri Poincaré. Cherwell was brilliant. His
conservative credentials and ability to simplify complex ideas appealed to Churchill,
whom he advised on matters ranging from economic to military affairs.771
Yet Frederick Lindemann remains one of the more eccentric figures in British
history. A piano-playing vegetarian who loved tennis and airplanes, he relished danger
and displayed an authoritarian streak. He had great difficulty understanding opposing
points of view, was rarely prepared to yield or admit failure, and almost always reacted to
problems in disproportionate ways. An ardent traditionalist who lived his life around
quirky routines and perfunctory habits, he wore the same thing every day, even when he
went flying: the bowler hat and the black Melton coat. If in Churchill’s hand one always
found a cigar, in Lindemann’s there was always a furled umbrella: apparently the sun
never shone on Lord Cherwell. He was the Prime Minister’s closest advisor, and his
personality and brilliance shine through the record.772
On June 12, 1942, Lindemann informed Churchill that Leith-Ross was going to
America to discuss post-war relief. In this context, he accused Leith-Ross of lumbering
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Britain into the wheat discussions that had “caused so much trouble” the previous
year.773 This time “his powers should be very clearly circumscribed, especially as he
tends to a point of view remarkable for its charity towards all and sundry, in which
British interests are apt to be forgotten.”774 Then on June 15, he sent a slightly modified
note to Churchill, reminding him that Leith-Ross should be given “explicit instructions
and limited powers, so that he cannot be committed without reference home.” In “view of
the forth-coming conversations about post-war economic problems,” the scope of his
talks must be restricted.775 And then a day later, he critiqued the whole topic of AngloAmerican postwar economic cooperation, expressing his fear of “unattainable Utopias”
and the “Communist bogy.”776
Lindemann’s dissuasions did not stop here. On July 27, two days before the
Cabinet met, he presented Churchill a line-by-line analysis of the proposed instructions.
While he emphasized the breadth of British resources Leith-Ross was authorized to
commit, he also underscored their possible recipients: “We are to risk our raw materials
being handed over by an international organization, possibly to Germany,” he asserted
incredulously. He then attacked the resuscitation of the Prime Minister’s statement of
August 1940. These promises were “made in totally different circumstances… when the
world was full of surpluses and shipping was still available.” But his most scathing vitriol
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he reserved for the rationing statement, the contents of which Leith-Ross had been
authorized to share with the Americans. What irked him most was the open-ended nature
of the commitment. As written, Britain would be subjecting its “internal affairs to
regulation by an international committee,” and this would “dishearten our people, who
look forward to some alleviation when victory has been won.”777
Even after this incendiary picture, the Prime Minister still made no intervention
on the matter. On July 5, 1942, nearly a week after the War Cabinet had approved the
instructions, Lindemann made one last effort. He listed the three most damning aspects of
Leith-Ross’s instructions – “to publish a promise to maintain rationing at whatever level
it reaches at the end of the war for an indefinite period afterwards; to hand over all stocks
of food and raw material surplus to our urgent necessities to an international committee;
and to resuscitate your old declaration of August 1940, made in quite different
circumstances…” These commitments, which “seem to me grave errors,” the War
Cabinet intends to authorize “Leith-Ross to do in Washington, without any quid pro
quo.”778 But by the time Churchill received this letter, Sir Frederick was in America, his
instructions had been telegraphed to him, and he had shared the rationing statement with
Cordell Hull.779 What would Winston Churchill do now?
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CHAPTER SIX
A DOUBLE DEAL FOR THE WORLD

The behavior of the Allied governments in exile had given London an opportunity
to prod the United States into action. Now the onus was on the Americans not only to
respond to their inquiry regarding independent Allied purchases, but to move the
planning for postwar relief forward. Everyone agreed that the independent buying had to
cease. The disagreement was over how. The bespectacled Leo Pasvolsky suggested the
United States stop the transactions by freezing Norwegian and Dutch funds flowing
through the United States to South America, but Adolf Berle thought it would be “far
better to secure the same result through consent.”780 Sumner Welles agreed.
So on April 20, 1942, Dean Acheson informed Noel Hall of the British Embassy
that the United States had no knowledge of the Dutch and Norwegian agents procuring
materials in the Western Hemisphere. He made it clear that these governments should
“consult with the Anglo-American Supply authorities” and “suspend their activities” until
a “common program” had been developed. The Dutch and Norwegians, he implied,
should be informed of this position. Acheson also promised that an American response to
the British relief inquiry was imminent. “It is the intention of the United States
Government to proceed as rapidly as possible to discussions.”781
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But this would require rapid action and bureaucratic skill to forge consensus
and maneuver proposals through the Roosevelt Administration. The United States had yet
to address many important questions. What role would the Red Cross and voluntary
organizations play in postwar relief? Should a separate organization for the resettlement
issue be instituted? How could the State Department convince the Congress to pay for the
efforts? What sum would be needed? How should the relief organization be structured to
maximize American power and influence? Would the relief agency’s functional scope be
narrow or broadly construed? These questions, as we will see, were all interconnected,
and how the Administration answered them depended on the relative power and talent of
diverse players in Roosevelt’s sprawling bureaucracy.
Two fights shaped the course of events. Would postwar planning remain the
prerogative of the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW)? And
within the State Department, would Dean Acheson or Adolf Berle control the relief and
reconstruction portfolios? These conflicts had dramatic implications for the proposed
relief organization. Dominated by New Dealers, the BEW thought the relief
organization’s responsibilities should include rehabilitation and reconstruction, while
certain individuals in the State Department, to greater or lesser degrees, did not. Although
Acheson personally preferred the conservative approach, he embraced a compromise
position, which in turn facilitated his successful campaign to not only usurp power from
Adolf Berle, but to fend off incursions from BEW as well.
Differences of opinion had less to do with America’s postwar aims: everyone
adhered to the objective of protecting and advancing America’s economic and geostrategic interests. Bureaucratic power notwithstanding, the fighting concerned the

283
strategic position of the United States going into the postwar era. The conservatives
did not want to overexpose the United States before policymakers understood how the
cards would fall vis-à-vis the rest of the world and especially the Soviet Union. The New
Dealers, by contrast, did not want to forfeit opportunities to shape the world in ways that
would serve the interests of the United States. The two groups agreed, however, to
structure the agency so the United States could monopolize control over all relief
activities, but they also concluded that this would only be possible under the guise of
“internationalism.” Franklin Roosevelt agreed.

Dean Acheson and the aspirations of the Board of Economic Warfare

On April 13, 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9128.782 Henry Wallace had
once again convinced the President to broaden the mandate of the Board of Economic
Warfare.783 Previously the Economic Defense Board, this interdepartmental apparatus
had been set up in the summer of 1941 to “coordinate policies, plans and programs… to
protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the
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interest of national defense.”
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After Pearl Harbor the President changed the Board’s

name to reflect its role in fighting the Second World War, an occasion that led Wallace to
seek an aggrandizement of his powers.785 Ultimately Roosevelt abolished the Board in
mid-1943 due to the incessant bureaucratic fighting its leadership caused.786 Doubtless
the order of April 13, 1942 contributed to the problem. It muddied the waters.
Acheson, who apparently preferred that Wallace shoulder the blame for any
delays, informed the British of the situation.787 But he did not tell them of the conflicts
undermining the State Department’s postwar planning process. Indeed that very day
Cordell Hull arrived back in Washington determined to ruin Sumner Welles.788 A shrewd
bureaucratic infighter, Acheson used the conflict to seize control of the entire economics
portfolio, including all matters pertaining to the planning of postwar relief and
reconstruction. To achieve this goal, Acheson exploited Welles to ensure relief planning
was centralized in the State Department, and quietly aligned himself with Hull to see that
Berle would be stripped of his responsibilities.
As this process played out, another little known figure in the American Foreign
Service took the initiative. Born 1901 in Cottage Grove, Oregon, Roy Veatch studied at
Oregon State University and the University of California at Berkeley, where he obtained
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a Ph.D. in economics. After stints at the Institute for Government Research, (later part
of the Brookings Institute), the American University in Beirut, and Princeton University,
he joined the State Department in 1931. He held a variety of positions, working for a
period with Harry Hawkins and Herbert Feis in the Office of the Advisor on International
Economic Affairs. In 1942, he moved to the Board, but returned to the State Department
a year later where he would play a critical role in setting up the relief organization.789
In the spring of 1942, he urged his superiors at the BEW to “take the initiative in
exploring the possibility” of a United Nations conference that would establish an
“International Reconstruction Commission.”790 His proposal would be unremarkable if it
were not for two factors: first, BEW remained involved in the planning well after the
State Department had established firm control of the relief portfolio; and second, Roy
Veatch would shortly return to the State Department to take charge of all relief and
rehabilitation work in the Division of Special Research headed by Pasvolsky, a position
that would afford him the opportunity to work closely with Acheson. Thereafter, he
would become one of the central players in planning and setting up the organization, and
he would also work for the agency. What Roy Veatch wrote to his superiors at BEW in
April 1942 is significant and representational of the mood in Washington at the time.
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Public relations remained his foremost concern. “The United Nations,” he
argued, “need very much to develop a sense of unity and intimate cooperation.” In many
respects, there is a “general feeling” that the Soviet Unions remains “outside the United
Nations.” “India feels isolated and possibly disgruntled.” The British Dominions appear
upset over their relations with London and “would like to feel that they are full partners
in the war effort.” Physically isolated, China needs “closer ties of cooperation and of
increased prestige” to “bolster her morale.” The problem, as Veatch saw it, was that
things did not look good. A perception exists among the enemy and Axis-occupied
countries that the United Nations are nothing more than “a hodge-podge of allies with no
unity of purpose or action.” The Atlantic Charter has failed to catch “the popular
imagination” and has been “looked upon as merely an Anglo-Saxon pronouncement.” A
message of disunity has been impressed upon “the peoples of Europe and Asia repeatedly
during the last few months with almost no counter-news emphasizing United Nations
unity.”791
To address this problem, Veatch proposed a “dramatic meeting of the United
Nations.” “If for nothing else,” he argued, it should serve the “purposes of morale and
propaganda.” But if an agreement could be reached for a relief and reconstruction
program in advance, he believed the conference might address that matter as well. The
Board of Economic Warfare, he added, would be the logical place to center American
participation. It would undertake all the preparatory work with China, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and perhaps a country or two from the British Dominions. Agreement from
the other United Nations would be sought, but they would not be charged with decision-
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making or given any administrative tasks. Instead, representatives of these nations
would simply “lead their own governments and peoples to see the necessity of centralized
expert direction and administration of the total war effort of the United Nations.” While
the Conference agenda might include relief and reconstruction, it would firstly reaffirm
the United Nations Declaration of January 2, 1942.792
If Veatch’s proposals are remarkable for the emphasis they placed on propaganda,
his relief and reconstruction plans are astonishing on account of their scope. Up to this
point in our story, the planners working in the State Department had hardly discussed
what a postwar relief organization would do. They had concerned themselves with other
questions, such as the organization’s relationship with the Inter-Allied Committee in
London, the geographic reach of the agency’s operations, and its decision-making
structure. Now Veatch turned to other matters. His proposals shed light on the comments
of Richard Law, the British Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
following a visit to the United States in the fall of 1942. “It is easy to understand what
critics of the Administration mean when they speak of ‘the lunatic fringe’ at Washington.
For these people are not men of the world. They are children, playing with bricks and
‘making the world over.’”793 Such was the scope of Veatch’s proposal.
An “International Reconstruction Commission” would reconstruct the entire
world. With five departments, it would manage immediate relief needs, undertake
agricultural rehabilitation, and implement all sorts of engineering, infrastructure and
industrial reconstruction projects. It would rebuild the banking, financial and monetary
792
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components of economies, and undertake social rehabilitation programs addressing
everything from education to health care. Veatch recognized the breath of his plan, and
confessed that other international institutions might be needed, including a Commodity
Corporation, Shipping Administration, Health Service, Development Corporation, Labor
Organization, Technical Bureau and Monetary and Financial Authority. Cooperation with
non-governmental organizations would also be essential.794
These proposals were grandiose in most every way, but grandiosity is no
substitute for bureaucratic dexterity. Acheson anticipated “Henry Wallace’s Great
Invasion,” as he called it.795 He convinced Welles of its foolishness. It would only cause a
“duplication of effort and confusion of authority,” he wrote. “I have not been impressed
by either the quality or the quantity of the work” they have done. It would be wise, he
suggested, to take them up on their offer to place their men working in this field at our
disposal.796 When the President reshuffled responsibility for postwar planning on April
13, 1942, Acheson led Hull to believe that his honor had been offended. As he put it in
his memoirs, the Secretary had experienced a “painful, bitter, and humiliating defeat.”797
Under the new rules, the Executive Director of BEW would have the power to delegate to
his assistant. When Hull learned who the assistant was – a “Jew” – he exploded. In this
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way, Acheson unified Welles and Hull around the proposition that the State
Department should maintain primary control over postwar relief and reconstruction.798
But Roosevelt’s revision of the presidential directive in May did not discourage
the BEW. The President privately authorized Wallace to continue working on postwar
planning but to avoid getting “caught by the State Department.” 799 Thus the BEW
machinations continued. Milo Perkins and Louis Bean, the Executive and Assistant
Directors of BEW respectively, connived with a vengeance. Their attendance at State
Department planning meetings became routine opportunities to push over their agency’s
views, defined by Veatch, onto the committee, while the distinguished economist,
Winfield Riefler, worked to influence the process in London. Their impact might have
been greater, but Dean Acheson connived back at them, and eventually sucked the brains
out of their operation by bringing Veatch back to the State Department. But that is beside
the point: what Roosevelt desired was a check against the diplomats, especially Dean
Acheson, whose skill in obtaining bureaucratic power exceeded that of his peers.
By this point Acheson controlled most economic negotiations with the British.
This position, in part, stemmed from his titular status as Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs. But Adolf Berle’s reputation also played a role: officials in London
who respected his intellect disliked his well-known Anglophobia. 800 Perhaps they
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believed Acheson would treat them more kindly. Maybe they just preferred someone
who would hustle them with a smile. Whatever the case, Berle remained in control of
relief planning within the State Department, at least until the first of June. Thus while
Acheson maneuvered to prevent a BEW takeover of postwar planning, Berle continued
preparations in the Reconstruction Subcommittee. The immediate objective was to
respond to the British proposal of February, but outstanding issues needed attention, the
role of the Red Cross and voluntary organizations in postwar relief, and the management
of displaced and stateless persons. Let us address each of these matters in turn.

The Red Cross and Voluntary Groups

On the first question, the Subcommittee concluded that it would be problematic to
put the American Red Cross in charge of postwar relief operations. Experiences after the
last war, Myron Taylor reminded the group, made it clear “that political considerations
could not be excluded from the organization of relief.” Benjamin Cohen concurred with
this assessment: “There was no doubt that major political questions would have to be
considered” and it was inevitable that the Red Cross “would be accused of playing
politics” if it were not “directly responsible to the United Nations.” He consequently
believed that another organization would be needed. Berle, however, thought the Red
York: Free Press, 1987), 180-181. Richard Law has made the best assessment of Berle’s
views on England: “Mr. Adolf Berle, who makes no secret of his distrust of Britain, yet
maintains that the two countries must work together, since they have a common goal…
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Cross could be useful in some countries where it possessed prestige, but the United
States could not continue turning supplies over to the Russian Red Cross, which was “an
agent of the Russian government.”801 Hence a formula was needed to utilize the agency’s
services while avoiding the downsides of total Red Cross leadership.
The problem was to delineate what the Red Cross could do from what it could not
do. Leo Pasvolsky therefore divided the relief portfolio into three functions: procurement
of supplies, transportation to areas in need, and distribution to destitute populations. The
group agreed that the Red Cross would not be appropriate for the first two tasks. George
Edward Allen, the Red Cross representative at the meeting, explained that transportation
remained a political matter; and that his organization did not have the power to secure
supplies. If, for example, it were desirable to persuade American farmers to stop feeding
skim milk to hogs, it would not be in a position to do so. On the distribution side,
however, the Red Cross could help. Allen thus assured the group that his agency would
not undertake actions without the “advice and consent of the State Department” and it
had gone on record “stating that it would act wherever the President might request it to
act.” He also made it clear that the American Red Cross “had never recognized the
International Red Cross as having any supervisory powers.” It would, for all intensive
purposes, be an agent of the American government.802
With this in mind, the Subcommittee devised a formula to employ not only the
expertise of the Red Cross, but other non-governmental entities as well, such as the
801
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American Friends Service Committee. The head of a newly created organization
would “be a politically responsible agent” who would serve as a link between the United
Nations and non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross. The Director would
be responsible for securing supplies, arranging for financing, finding transportation, and
managing controversial political and governmental matters beyond the abilities of other
agencies, groups or individuals. It was specifically stipulated that the actions of other
groups should in no way limit the Director’s authority. The Director, in fact, would have
a staff of his own, and he would have the power to determine where and how to use any
non-governmental entities in the field of operations. While it remained to be determined
what other organizations would be asked to participate, everyone agreed that the
American Red Cross would be one of them.803

Relief Operations converge with the Management of Displaced Persons

The Subcommittee then approached the issue of repatriation and resettlement with
an analysis of the problem. Three groups would require attention. The first included
individuals with a home or country to which they could return. Estimated at 20 million in
Europe and 40 million in China, these people were prisoners of war, civilians who fled
combat zones, individuals evicted to make room for colonists, laborers imported and
forced to work, and persons relocated by the Axis powers in conquered territory. The
second group consisted of individuals with no home or country at all. The size of this
group remained conjectural, but the planners knew that some 50 or 60 thousand Jews
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from Germany had been unsettled at the war’s outbreak, an unknown number of Jews
had been deported to the Government General of Poland, and roughly 100,000 political
refugees from Spain were currently in France. The final group included individuals who
had not been dislocated, but who required resettlement for political reasons. This group’s
size was unknowable.804
The planners assumed three general areas of work would be required to meet the
needs of these people. The affected persons, firstly, would demand food, medical care,
and clothing. In instances where circumstances prevented repatriation or resettlement for
a period of time, these individuals would need housing, but might also require work tools,
agricultural implements, seeds and stock, and even vocational training to prepare them
for a new life in their final destination. Secondly, these individuals would have to be
transported to their home country or place of resettlement. Immediately after the war,
competing demands on limited rail lines would require careful coordination to ensure that
the movement of people did not impair the transport of relief supplies or vice versa.
Railways, roads and other transportation routes would also be in need of repair and
reconstruction. Finally, the planners anticipated the need for a tracing service to help
displaced persons find their families and loved ones: a system of identification,
registration, and possibly advertising would be required.805
The Subcommittee then considered possible means of fulfilling these needs. The
President’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees had been established in 1938 to
provide recommendations to Roosevelt, but this entity had no capacity to undertake any
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of the required tasks. The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, set up at the
July 1938 refugee conference at Evian-les-Bains, France, likewise had little machinery,
though a director and four vice-chairmen had been authorized to negotiate with Germany
and other states to improve the conditions related to the exodus of Jews from the
Reich.806 The League of Nations had machinery, but had ceased functioning after the
German withdrawal from the organization in 1934, and the United States did not want its
efforts stigmatized by the League’s legacy. Thus the Intergovernmental Committee
constituted the only option, and Taylor, who represented the United States on that body,
explained that it would need considerable revamping if it were to undertake the required
tasks.807
Two aspects of the problem perplexed the committee. Distinct from settled
residential populations, displaced persons would require assistance while waiting in
holding areas and during transition to their final destination. This task, it seemed, was
sufficiently distinct from the work of supplying aid to other populations to suggest the
need for a second organization to manage the problems of displaced and stateless
persons. A second aspect of the problem made this option appear even more sensible.
“While relief is essentially an emergency problem which must be tackled even before the
806
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end of the war in recaptured territory, resettlement may not start to be undertaken
until some time after the war is ended and will probably proceed over a period of several
years and possibly even of several decades.” After the First World War, it took five years
to repatriate prisoners of war. An organization to manage these problems seemed
logical.808
Myron Taylor argued that his experiences on the Intergovernmental Committee
suggested otherwise. It was extremely difficult to find homes for refugees and secure
funds to finance resettlement. Virtually no country had been willing to make land
available, with the exception of the Dominican Republic. At the Evian Conference, most
“of the representatives had gone… with the intention of passing some resolutions of
sympathy and then winding up the whole affair.” They feared being called upon to
provide land and were wholly uncooperative. Had nations agreed to provide land, there
was no guarantee that the refugees would have agreed to move: too often they refuse to
resettle in remote agricultural colonies, and forcing them is “barbarous.” It was better to
convince countries to liberalize their immigration laws, but difficult to accomplish in
cases where it appeared that Jews would be the primary beneficiaries. Before setting up
an organization that would pursue extreme measures, Taylor thought it wisest to convince
Jews to return home and take whatever measures possible to make those countries safe.809
At the time, his argument seemed reasonable. No one could predict where
boundaries would lie and how minority populations would be situated within them, and
no one could anticipate how newly constituted governments would treat minorities. Thus
it was impossible to know how many candidates for resettlement would exist after the
808
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war. The number of displaced persons had reached alarming heights, and the group
figured the war would only aggravate the situation. It was better to assume that everyone
had a home to which they could return, and frame the issue as an emergency. Berle
therefore proposed that the relief organization undertake the ‘task of repatriating all
persons with a ‘natural habitat’ to return to.” It would provide facilities to individuals
who might become stateless, but it would not enter into the field of ‘resettlement.’
Everyone accepted this arrangement except for Acheson, who faced reality: what was to
come of the stateless persons if the relief agency could not negotiate on their behalf?810

The American Counterproposal to the British

At this juncture, American plans for postwar relief were sufficiently advanced to
respond to the British proposal of February. The Roosevelt Administration could now say
that it agreed with the international approach proposed by the Russians and British. The
Americans had their own narrow reasons for agreeing on this point, but they also realized
that relief efforts would need to link countries of supply with those in need all over the
globe. The planners had a vague idea of how the agency might work and a pretty clear
conception of the American place in it. A Council would give the member states a voice
at the table; an Executive Committee would make the most important decisions; and an
operational arm would implement the agency’s programs. Entities such as the InterAllied Committee and the Red Cross would play a subservient role, the former as an
advisory committee and the latter as an agent of the Relief Organization.
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The absence of a comprehensive postwar policy constituted the only
remaining problem. But on May 1, 1942, Berle’s Subcommittee decided that relief could
not wait on the development of a larger program. Something had to be done to forestall
competitive purchases by the exiled governments and prevent the British from turning the
Inter-Allied Committee into an operational organization along lines that suited their own
narrow interests. The creation of a larger program would most certainly require the
studied attention of the President and Prime Minister, which would create undesirable
delays. These men needed to focus on the war. The relief organization could expand its
activities at a later date. In the meantime, it would provide a valuable trial run for the
establishment of a more permanent international organization. Thus the State Department
prepared a telegram to be sent to the British, in which they expressed their views and
invited Leith-Ross to Washington to work out a plan in advance of a meeting of the Big
Four.811
To win Roosevelt’s speedy approval, Cordell Hull wrote the President a guarded
letter on May 5, 1942 suggesting that the proposal in no way restricted American power.
The British, he explained, had taken steps to prepare for postwar relief, but hoped
America would assume a position of leadership. The Advisory Committee on Postwar
Foreign Policy was now proposing a United Nations Relief Council with an Executive
Committee consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and
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China. Hull made it clear that the response in no way committed the United States to
compromise its sovereignty, and the plans called for American leadership of the Council,
Executive Committee, and operational arm. 812 The letter shrewdly appealed to the
President’s views on the standing of states in the postwar era: he considered Great Britain
an “old and tired power” that deserved to be in “second place behind the United States,
Russia and China.”813

Dean Acheson Maneuvers and Cordell Hull Sabotages the Planning Apparatus

When the State Department commenced preparations for the visit of Sir Frederick
Leith-Ross in June, it remained unclear who or what agency would serve as the American
focal point for the negotiations. In Roosevelt’s Administration, the President always
reserved the right to change his mind. As late as June 6, 1942, Dean Acheson worried
that the Board of Economic Warfare might overtake responsibility for not only planning,
but for the relief negotiations as well.814 In urging Welles to take the matter up with the
Secretary, he ensured the Undersecretary would also present the matter to the
President. 815 Acheson instinctively understood that Roosevelt was prone to reassign
responsibility within the bureaucracy suddenly, and with little or no advance warning to
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the individuals it would impact. He therefore worked to preempt this undesirable
outcome.
Acheson sensed opportunity on the horizon. While Berle remained Chairman of
the Reconstruction Subcommittee, Acheson took on more responsibility for the relief
portfolio. His own Subcommittee for Economic Policy began discussing relief and he
assumed the task of managing day-to-day interactions with the British on these matters.
Whether he did this on his own volition or with the authority of someone else remains
somewhat of a mystery, but his increased assertiveness coincided with British overtures
pertaining to the Allied purchase of postwar materials in the Western Hemisphere.
Economic defense, to be sure, constituted one of his areas of responsibility, but this in no
way entitled him to duplicate the work of Berle. More likely, the return of Cordell Hull to
Washington explains Acheson’s behavior. With the Secretary now back in town, the
Department of State and the whole postwar planning process came apart. These
developments widened the possibilities for bureaucratic initiative.
On May 2, 1942, Hull took control of the Advisory Committee for Postwar
Foreign Policy, but after the meeting he would never assemble the group again.816
Henceforward there was no central coordinating body for postwar planning, with the
possible exception of the Division of Special Research headed by Pasvolsky. But Hull, as
we will see, undercut this operation as well. Consequently coordination was largely done
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on an ad-hoc basis and far fewer persons had access to the planning process as a
whole. This, in turn, undermined the Department’s ability to fashion a coherent postwar
foreign policy strategy, and it almost guaranteed that the United States would stumble
into the postwar period ill-prepared to meet the challenges it faced. Why did Hull do this?
According to the official record, meetings of the Advisory Committee were no longer
called to ensure “secrecy on policy recommendations… pending their final review by the
Secretary and the President,” and to avoid “the rapid reaching of decisions, which might
involve fatal gambles.”817 But unofficially Hull wanted Welles out of the equation.
Yet it was inconceivable that he would be able to manage everything on his own.
Hull was a sick and exhausted man. Even in his prime, he never possessed the talents of
Sumner Welles. An adroit administrator with a knack for grasping complex ideas quickly,
Welles maneuvered swiftly and efficiently. Hull, by contrast, was slow, deliberate and
laborious. He would have to rely on others to a far greater extent than Welles. Assistant
Secretary Berle was not an option. By righteously anointing himself mediator between
the Secretary and Undersecretary, he aroused Hull’s suspicions. Leo Pasvolsky remained
a possibility, and his importance would grow. He had served the Secretary well as Special
Assistant, but failed to prevent Welles from modifying the postwar planning structure to
enhance his own power.818 The final option was Dean Acheson. Whether by chance or
raw intelligence, Acheson avoided the conflict between Hull and Welles, and took great
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care to ingratiate himself with the Secretary while not offending the Undersecretary.
Thus his power in the Department grew immensely, and it would not wane until 1944.

The Reconstruction Subcommittee considers Resources and Finance

But when the Americans learned on May 15, 1942, that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross
would come to the United States, Berle appeared in control of relief policy.819 His
midnight obsession had not changed. The relief organization needed to be put into
operation as soon as possible, not so much to guarantee preparation for the day of
liberation, but to preempt the British.820 Otherwise London might commence operations
independently of Washington, placing “the United Nations organization in a secondary
role of a resolution-passing and policy-ratifying body.” With the Allied Governments in
exile now making independent purchases, Berle believed the British had a strong motive
to press ahead. 821 So visceral was his worry that he convinced the Reconstruction
Subcommittee to suggest the President write the British Prime Minister urging him to
postpone relief operations. This came to nothing, but it highlights one fact: Berle
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underestimated the importance of American participation in Great Britain’s plans.
Finance and resources were too important.822
Yet the Reconstruction Subcommittee had given these matters scant attention.
The lone conservative in the group, Myron Taylor, had repeatedly used these issues to
urge restraint upon the Subcommittee. If political aspirations exceeded the country’s
financial capabilities, he argued, the results would be disappointing. His warnings fell
upon deaf ears. But with Roosevelt’s acceptance of the general plan and the impending
visit of Leith-Ross, finance could no longer be ignored. Everyone knew that an
appropriation from the Congress would be required. The question was whether the matter
should be raised before, during or after the UN Conference. If it took place too early, it
might create the impression that a plan had been decided upon before consultations with
the United Nations Governments had taken place. If it occurred too late, hopes might be
raised without any assurance of Congressional approval. To balance these forces, the
planners decided that the appropriation should be put before the Congress during the
United Nations Conference. In this way, the public relations affects of the Conference
could be brought to bear on the Congress.823
The group faced another dilemma. “Would it be desirable to give Congress some
idea of the magnitude of funds which might be required later for procurement?” Without
any indication of future costs, the Subcommittee worried that the Congress might be
unwilling to embark on a large undertaking. Yet they also believed it would be
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impossible to make an overall estimate of relief needs at the present time, and if an
accurate approximation could be made, it might discourage the Congress. As a result, the
group could only agree to solicit an appropriation to cover the salary of the Director and
his staff. In the meantime, it was determined that an estimation of the director’s
requirements should be made. Then a survey of available supplies for relief should be
ascertained so that precise cash requirements might be calculated. The State Department
would also prepare legislation to be submitted to Congress that would permit the use of
raw materials accumulated but no longer needed for the war effort.824
With the hope of consolidating and centralizing the control of all resources for
postwar relief, the State Department also began estimating the assets and potential
contribution of private relief agencies. Thanks to the Neutrality Act of 1937, which
required these groups to report monthly on their activities, the American government had
amassed considerable data on their activities by September 1939. But with the outbreak
of war, the number of agencies exploded, placing demands on limited resources required
for defense and domestic relief. Roosevelt set up a Committee on War Relief Agencies to
investigate and monitor the situation. By the spring of 1942, an estimated 700 agencies
based in the United States had undertaken relief activities and some 300 remained in
operation. Varying in size and scope, these agencies had amassed $66.5 million by the
spring of 1942, $39 million of which had been sent abroad. The planners intended that
the American government control these agencies so that their efforts at home and abroad
did not overlap or come into conflict with the proposed relief organization.825
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Dean Acheson moves American preparations forward

For three weeks, postwar relief preparations hung in abeyance. The documentary
record leaves no clear explanation as to why. But on June 5, 1942, Dean Acheson took
the initiative. With no apparent authority, his Economic Subcommittee resumed the
conversation over relief. Berle was in Canada. 826 The tides had changed, but they
appeared to be shifting in London as well. Myron Taylor asked Acheson whether he had
been disturbed by the rumors that Leith-Ross had lost the confidence of his government.
No high-level diplomat desires to negotiate with someone who has no authority. Acheson
sought to understand the rumors. It was perhaps an overstatement to “say that Leith-Ross
was out of favor.” Previously he had been a person of “outstanding importance,” but now
he was “playing a secondary role.” This, he added, “might be due in part to the nature of
the task entrusted to him, but it might be that he would not be the person to continue in
charge of work on relief at a later stage.” Yet Acheson assumed that Leith-Ross would
represent Britain if a meeting of the Four Powers were called to negotiate a relief
agreement to be presented to the United Nations.827
In preparation for such discussions, Acheson argued that the powers of the
proposed relief organization needed to be defined. As suggested to the British, the
organization would consist of a Council, an Executive Committee, and an operational
June 19, 1942, File E Minutes 1-46, Box 80, ACPFP, Notter Papers, both in RG 59,
NARA.
826
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arm led by a Director of Relief. The functions and powers of each of these bodies
needed to be determined. Everyone agreed that the Council should have very limited
powers if any at all. Otherwise the entire organization would get bogged down in
interminable debate. The Council’s membership would include the United Nations and it
would meet no more than twice a year. From time to time, it might make decisions, but it
would really do little more than comment on the organization’s progress. The Council
would nominate the Director of Relief and formally set up the executive authority, but
this would be well choreographed among the Great Powers, primarily the United States,
to ensure the desired outcome. To appease its members, council members would be
permitted to sit on a series of “advisory committees.” The New Dealer Benjamin Cohen
likened the arrangement to the stockholders of a corporation. Acheson, however, was far
more eloquent. The Council’s primary function would be to “kick off, and let off
steam.”828
The Executive Committee aroused ambivalence. Its function, Acheson facetiously
commented, would be precisely what its name suggested, an “executive.” Yet when the
committee members considered the implications of such an arrangement, they became
weary of the idea. Presumably the United States would contribute roughly seventy
percent of the agency’s budget. If the Executive Committee had control over how the
organization’s funds would be spent and where its supplies might go, it was conceivable
that the other Great Powers might pursue objectives using American resources that
conflicted with desires of the United States. It seemed far more intelligent to place real
executive responsibility in the hands of the organization’s operational arm, even if
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nominal responsibility rested with the Executive Committee. In this way, the Director
of Relief, certain to be an American, could prevent undesirable outcomes. He would draw
up budgets and operational plans. The Executive Committee would merely approve or
disapprove of them.829
The United States had every intention of retaining as much power for itself as
possible. The organization would be international only in appearance. At the operational
level, the Americans intended to run the show. Through the Director of Relief they would
set the agenda, engage relevant authorities in areas of operation, and control the
presentation of the organization to the world and Council. For this reason, the Director
“would be a person of unusual importance.”830 He would be involved in three interrelated
functions: the collection of information on needs and available supplies, the construction
of mechanisms to assemble the required materials, and the design of methods to distribute
them in accordance with American objectives. While it was believed that no harm could
be done in giving the organization a free hand to collect information, the Subcommittee
reasoned that extreme caution would be needed when it came to assembling and
distributing supplies. These crucial tasks converged with the national interests and
sovereign prerogatives of states all over the world.831
By what authority could the organization step into a country with a relief
program? Everyone agreed that the consent and cooperation of relevant military
authorities would be essential in areas they occupied. The problem concerned countries
with a legitimate national government. If they refused to cooperate, then it was
829
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inconceivable that the organization could be effective. The only solution was to
obtain the cooperation and consent of the particular government in question. It must
therefore have the right to negotiate with the agency. If that government refused to
cooperate, it would receive no assistance. The Americans, however, did not believe all
governments should be entitled to a veto over relief operations in their respective
territories. In some instances, the recognized government of a given territory might be
unable to exercise its authority. In other cases, such as Austria and Germany, the
government would not deserve such rights. For this reason, the Americans believed the
Director should “have the obligation to consult rather than the obligation to obtain prior
consent.”832
The great difficulty, Acheson suggested, was to bring an organization into being
that adequately met all of these requirements. How could this be done? Harry Hawkins,
possibly the most experienced “multilateral” negotiator in the American government,
proposed that a series of resolutions be put before a meeting of the United Nations.833 The
first resolution would outline and formally set up the organization. The second resolution
would authorize the participating countries to contribute to the organization. Acheson
welcomed this idea but wondered whether they should take the form of a “corporate
charter” or a “covenant” like that of the League of Nations. He preferred the latter model,
but thought it unwise to spell out all of the powers. “We might follow this general outline
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until we get into trouble,” he suggested. Would it be intelligent to state that the
Director would be an American, he asked? Whatever the case, “it would be necessary in
our own requirements to distinguish how the organization would work from how it would
look on paper. We might wish to reassure our public and Congress on various things.”
Acheson did not want the extent of America’s powers to be apparent.834
No one disputed his logic, but Leo Pasvolsky thought it dangerous to leave the
question of contributions open. It would be insufficient to simply authorize member
states to make contributions. Real commitments were essential. Otherwise the United
States might be left to foot the entire bill. The international approach to relief had been
chosen in part as a means to tap the resources of the entire globe. If the American people
believed they would have to carry the burden alone, they might reject the plan altogether.
Here history was important. The United States had provided relief to Europe after the
First World War, funded the Dawes plan, and felt utterly cheated by the “imperialist”
Germans and Russians. Thus it was reasonable that the postwar planners would want
control commensurate with their contribution.
But it was also believed that if other countries sacrificed their resources, then the
United States was more likely to make a significant commitment. Thus some formula
would have to be arranged with the Council so that every nation contributed within its
means. Other countries would have the ability to make considerable contributions.
England and the Dominions would have resources; Argentina, Brazil and Chile could
provide supplies; and several European countries with shipping facilities and colonial
resources might contribute as well. The secret was to win commitments and use the
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Executive Committee to hammer out the details. Once the supplies had been obtained,
they would then be “turned over to the Director of Relief,” who would have the
responsibility of ensuring “equitable distribution.”835
The following day Acheson’s bureaucratic maneuvering continued. He informed
Welles that Berle’s Subcommittee on Reconstruction had reached a consensus on the
steps necessary to bring the relief organization into being.836 But in truth, it had been his
Economic Subcommittee making the decisions. With Leith-Ross scheduled to arrive on
June 22, authority for relief negotiations needed to be centralized in the State
Department. 837 Acheson sought approval to send London a telegram reassuring the
Norwegians and other exiled governments that action was being taken. It conveyed the
nature of the discussions to the British so that Leith-Ross arrived with the power to
negotiate. Implicitly, Acheson also sought authority to prepare a draft agreement that
would bring the organization into existence. It would include statements establishing the
organization, explaining its purpose, and defining its membership. It would describe the
executive authority, delineate the organization’s powers, and provide for contributions.
Notably, it would provide an outline of the agency to ensure countries that they could
play a role and that their nationals would be utilized in the administration of relief.838
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When the Subcommittee on Reconstruction met again on June 12, 1942, it
was clear that Adolf Berle had lost control. Acheson politely pushed him aside, and asked
Harry Hawkins to present the draft agreement prepared in light of the results of the
Economic Subcommittee’s June 5 meeting. The text written and read aloud by Hawkins
would become the so-called “Acheson draft agreement.”839 Henceforward Berle was a
participant in his own committee’s discussions. He had shaped the American
government’s attitude towards relief decisively, and he would continue influencing the
debate, but he would do nothing to disrupt Acheson’s ascendancy. An academic and
intellectual by nature, Berle emphasized the power of ideas without giving adequate
attention to the precarious position he occupied in the American bureaucracy.840
His decline had little immediate significance for American relief planning.
Acheson and Berle agreed that the construction of an international relief organization
would require a sizeable appropriation from the American Congress. The question, as
always, had been how much would be needed. The line between relief and reconstruction
constituted the problem. Hundreds of millions of dollars would be needed for relief, but
billions would be required for reconstruction. Harry Dexter White of the Treasury
believed it would be much easier to obtain funds from Congress if the project were
nominally confined to relief. But by defining relief broadly enough to include many
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things commonly thought of as reconstruction, they might increase the chances of
obtaining a large appropriation. Relief, in fact, would depend on the reconstruction of
hospitals and the renovation of transportation systems. If the Germans retreated using
scorched-earth practices, this conception of relief would be all the more apropos.
Acheson explained that it might even be necessary to rebuild houses, sanitation facilities
and other infrastructure essential for the administration of relief services.841
This strategy for dealing with Congress presented additional possibilities. The
Board of Economic Warfare had been advocating for an organization with broad
functions for weeks, but Acheson had ignored the idea. Now, with an apparent rift in the
committee, Louis Bean tried to present the idea again. If the relief organization’s scope
were not explicitly defined in the agreement but the Council were given the power to
determine the agency’s functions, then it might be possible to expand into other fields at a
later date. Berle sympathized with Bean. The relief agency, he argued, could be used as
an “entering wedge” into other fields. Implicitly he believed that if an initial
appropriation were secured, then additional funds for other functions could be obtained
later.842 To capture this idea, Bean thought the word “rehabilitation” could be substituted
for “reconstruction” in the text of the agreement. But White feared that words like
“reconstruction” or “rehabilitation” might set off alarm bells in Congress, though he
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agreed the relief agency might expand at a later date. The secret was to conjure up the
idea of an “emergency” to get an appropriation out of the Congress.843
These proposals brought the conflict between the two Assistant Secretaries into
the open. Unlike Berle, Acheson disliked direct confrontation and tried to outmaneuver
his opponent through subtle acts of legerdemain. He inquired whether the name “United
Nations War Relief Administration” would be an appropriate title for the organization.
But Berle refused to take the bait. This construction, he argued, indicated a time limit and
suggested the relief of soldiers, sailors and their families. Instead, he preferred the title
“United Nations Relief Administration.” Acheson let the matter rest and moved to more
overt attempts to block the inveterate New Dealer. He proposed the omission of the word
“reconstruction” and other phrases that might imply a wide mandate, such as
“improvement of standards of living and health.” He also argued that the organization’s
objectives should be explicitly defined to include the estimation of needs, procurement of
supplies, and construction of distribution facilities. When Berle objected on grounds that
these statements would make it more difficult for the organization to expand into other
fields, Acheson simply changed the subject and appears to have rewritten the text after
the fact to accord with his point of view.844
Moving forward the Subcommittee worked to ensure the draft left the United
States with as much control and power as possible while avoiding appearances that might
trouble Congress or offend other countries. The group deleted a provision allowing for
majority votes in the Council on grounds that it might be “interpreted as placing the
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American Treasury at the mercy of the majority of countries.” As Berle argued, the
Pan-American Council used majority voting despite the absence of any such provision in
the Charter. But in practice, the United States permitted no vote on a question unless the
minority was insignificant and the majority shared the American view. On grounds that it
would send the wrong message, the group also removed a provision stipulating that the
President of the Council and Executive Committee should be an American. The group
decided no harm could be done if small countries were permitted the right to preside over
the Council. Like the League of Nations, the Council’s decisions would carry no weight
unless the President was a representative of a Great Power. As for the President of the
Executive Committee, the group reserved that position for the Director of Relief, who,
thanks to a gentleman’s agreement among the Big Four, would be an American.845
The organization’s design allowed the United States to obtain the cooperation of
the United Nations while preserving the American tradition of unilateralism.846 In the
event of non-cooperation, recalcitrance, or outright obstructionism, the Americans had no
intention of permitting the relief organization to impede their freedom of action. The
Council would maintain nominal power over policy, but the Executive Committee would
carry out that function when the Council was not in session. The draft agreement
stipulated that the Council would meet once a year, but that the Executive Committee
might call a special session if necessary. As Pasvolsky explained, “a routine meeting
attracts less attention and can obtain results without unnecessary splash.” As a stopgap
845
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against the possibility of an unruly Executive Committee, executive authority would
always be vested in the Director of Relief, who would be a puppet of the U.S.
government. To appease the Council, it would have the annual responsibility of choosing
three countries to sit on the Executive Committee with the Big Four. To give the small
countries a sense of importance, they would participate in permanent committees to
advise the administration. Their nationals could also work for the organization.847
The draft Acheson revised and pushed through the Subcommittee for
Reconstruction on June 15, 1942, evoked the United Nations Declaration and the Atlantic
Charter.848 Like these two documents, it conjured up images of hope and highlighted the
promise of American leadership in the postwar era. “Victory shall bring relief as well as
freedom from oppression and cruelty.” The draft promised food, clothing and shelter to
“any area liberated by the United Nations.” It vowed to rehabilitate agriculture, resume
basic services and restart essential industries. It bound its signatories to the task of
preventing pestilence, nursing people back to good health, and repatriating exiles and
prisoners of war. And it pledged to restore “the essential foundations upon which a
liberated world may build anew.”849 But it did all of this under the pretense that the
organization would be a United Nations effort and that American motives were purely
humanitarian and apolitical, when the postwar planners – Acheson above all – were as
847
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concerned with increasing American power and advancing the country’s economic
and geo-strategic interests as any nation of Old Europe.

A New Deal for the World?

Is it appropriate to call the organization that resulted from this draft a plank in
what has been referred to by several historians as a New Deal for the world?850 The
rational for such arguments is nuanced, complex, and different depending on the scholar.
But they share certain features. They implicitly suggest that postwar planners in
Washington, either inadvertently or explicitly, acceded to the principle of cooperation
among nations for the promotion of the common good, what is frequently called
“internationalism.”851 To achieve this end, the United States set up a world order based
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on multilateral institutions modeled after Roosevelt’s New Deal, which constructed a
system of domestic agencies and programs to confront the political instability and
economic havoc wrought by the Great Depression. The agency that resulted from
Acheson’s draft certainly sought to address the political and economic problems left in
the wake of the Second World War, but the multilateralism it suggested – the relief
planners never actually used this word – was more guise than a genuine effort to forge the
cooperative arrangements associated with this term. The Americans planned to run the
show.
Yet this does not necessarily mean that references to the New Deal by scholars
working on the postwar international system are wholly misplaced. Rather it suggests that
the relationship between multilateralism and the New Dealers is not clearly
understood.852 If a kind of New Deal multilateralism exists – and that is debatable – it
begins with the Good Neighbor Policy, Roosevelt’s attempt to secure more friendly
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relations with Latin America.
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By renouncing military intervention, constructing a

series of overlapping trade agreements, promoting cultural exchange, and instituting a
variety of multilateral formulas for addressing disputes, the Roosevelt Administration
sought to reduce anti-Americanism throughout the region in order to increase its clout
and preserve its power. Doubtless this policy was a direct result of the Great Depression,
which humbled and weakened the United States, making it more sympathetic to Latin
America. It was also a subtle effort to confront revolution and the fascist threat in the
Hemisphere.
Yet this approach to the region, as Frederick Pike and others have argued, was not
what it seemed. “While paying lip service to equality,” it “realistically accorded de facto
primacy to the mighty.” 854 Though Roosevelt avoided intervention in most Latin
American conflicts, he continued his predecessor’s interventionist policy in Nicaragua
and undertook his own in Cuba. When these methods backfired, Roosevelt turned to
“cultural diplomacy.”855 One might call it propaganda, or, if you like the euphemism,

853

The scholarship on the Good Neighbor Policy is extensive, but the best place to begin
is: Frederick Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos
(Austin: University of Texas, 1995). See also Irwin Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy:
United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1979). On the debatable nature of New Deal multilateralism, it has been
established that the Roosevelt Administration, at least during the 1930s, was one of the
most isolationist of American history.
854
Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy, 223.
855
Both Pike and Gellman discuss cultural diplomacy, but the most recent iteration
comes from Antonio Pedro Tota, The Seduction of Brazil: The Americanization of Brazil
During World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009). Tota’s primary
contribution is in the area of government’s ability to create popular culture. This, of
course, is an international extension of the cultural aspects of the New Deal. Roosevelt’s
Administration paid cultural icons such as Woody Guthrie and Leadbelly to produce
recordings promoting the government’s efforts. Perhaps the greatest masterpiece of
American folk music, The Columbia River Collection of Guthrie, was a product of these
efforts. Yet this was actually not as American as may seem. The Nazi regime pioneered

318
public relations. Whatever the case, the purpose was the preservation of American
hegemony in the Hemisphere. As for the multilateral trading regime, it was constructed
using bilateral negotiations, a procedure that prevented any individual state from allying
with another to obtain leverage in negotiations with the heavy-handed Americans. The
dispute mechanisms and cooperative measures instituted in Latin America usually left the
United States with a litany of procedural tricks they could employ to achieve their
objectives. The sum of these efforts might have meant nothing on a global scale, but
scholars have repeatedly argued that this approach, which we might call New Deal
multilateralism, was the basis for America’s postwar plans.856
Linking multilateralism to the New Dealers and agencies and programs they
constructed in the United States presents additional problems. Like the proposed relief
organization, many New Deal agencies and programs were authoritarian and even
arbitrary in their design and implementation, an attribute that runs counter to the spirit of
multilateralism.857 This fact was the result of power politics, but also the necessity of
meeting crisis situations with speed. At the same time, the creation and administration of
and perfected these techniques. The most alarming example is Leni Riefenstahl’s
Triumph of the Will. The Nazis, in fact, undertook extensive propaganda efforts in Latin
America, which left the Americans with little choice but to do the same.
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many of these agencies involved negotiations with relevant stakeholders. But this was
required to rectify competing interests among the powerful. It was neither a procedure
administration officials preferred, nor one that involved the weak, even if they ultimately
benefited. Roosevelt’s administrative system generated competing policy ideas, which
forced New Dealers to negotiate in a multilateral fashion, but the ultimate arbiter in these
debates was a single hegemonic force, the President.858 His decisions rarely deviated
from a realistic reading of the power dynamics at play. When a conflict found resolution
before it reached the Presidential level, it was usually the logical outcome of a
bureaucratic concentration of power or the consequence of raw trickery. At the most
basic level, the mentality of the New Dealer stood in conflict with multilateralism. No
administration in American history has fought itself so much. To be sure, this fact is a
result of Roosevelt’s administrative style, but it is also a consequence of the people he
chose to lead his bureaucracy. Righteous and arrogant, they loved power almost as much
as he did.
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The Roosevelt’s Administration’s proclivity for producing competing policy proposals
has received considerable attention ever since Arthur Schlesinger Jr. first made this point.
Generally this has been framed as a positive outcome of Roosevelt’s administrative style,
which is undisputable if one seeks options. Borgwardt, however, goes further by arguing
that the New Dealers openly embraced these arrangements. As she writes, “New Dealers
tended to embrace chaos as a creative force.” But in terms of power, this point is
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officials beseeching him to clearly define lines of authority. This would be a moot point
here, but Borgwardt also suggests that Roosevelt’s Administrative style was a source of
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systems.” In general terms, this may be true, but in practical terms, the New Dealers
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voice was more a necessity than an intellectual desire. See Borgwardt, New Deal, 72-74.
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While the pursuit of power may create turmoil in political and economic
systems, its execution does not necessarily lead to the same outcome. If it is used
cautiously, it can provide stability. Roosevelt implicitly understood this fact. Scholars
have also recognized the merits of this argument. While there is some debate on the
point, the stability of any multilateral system, whether economic or political, depends on
the willingness of a single leading power, or a concert of Great Powers, to intervene in
times of upheaval. In effect, stable multilateral systems are necessarily imperial or
hegemonic. Otherwise they fall apart.859 Problems tend to arise when there is not a
sufficient concentration of power to exact a solution in times of crisis. The European
Union constitutes a case in the present. Problems also arise when the existence of
multiple great powers with competing visions makes cooperation impossible. It is for this
reason that the American postwar planners were so obsessed with American power and
challenges to it, which begets a question: Should we call the American postwar planners
imperialists?
In principle, imperialism may appear to be profoundly different from
internationalism, but the step from one to the other is not as drastic as it may seem.860
Internationalism seeks to achieve many of the same ends as imperialism: order, stability,
and predictability, but above all, the preservation of one or more of the Great Powers. By
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giving all states an opportunity to participate, affording them the chance to voice their
views and concerns, and seeking their cooperation through consent as opposed to brute
force, internationalism also attempts to take the sting out of the inevitable and necessary
execution of power. Imperialists can do these things as well, but often they do not. The
big distinction is to be found elsewhere. Internationalists rely on grand masquerades like
the United Nations to achieve legitimacy and conceal the underlying mechanics of power
from the awakened masses. Spectacle is often required to achieve stability. But often
shows have unintended consequences that lead to dangerous outcomes.
This might read as an indictment of the planners, but hard facts make it apparent
that their choices remained far more restricted than one might assume. Policymakers
feared a relapse into depression once the war ended, which would reignite the fires that
precipitated the war in the first place. American economic health, they believed,
depended on the economic revival of the rest of the world, especially Europe. Once
wartime demands plummeted, American manufacturers would require export markets for
their products and returning soldiers would want jobs. Otherwise policymakers predicted
low growth and high unemployment, a sure recipe for instability in a society that has
always had high aspirations for itself. “The financing of reconstruction,” as Berle aptly
put it, was “closely connected with the internal problem of maintaining employment.”861
But to arrive at the point where reconstruction could take place, the United States had to
keep the world alive, and it had to give people a reason to live. Consequently the planners
had little choice but to embark on some program to relieve and rehabilitate societies
afflicted by the war. But they had to do it in a way that would convince the Congress and
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the American people of its merits. The beauty of it all is that what served American
economic interests could also serve the interests of the world.
The planners also worried about Soviet objectives for Central and Western
Europe. It is no coincidence that, when the draft agreement for the relief organization was
under final consideration in the State Department, Acheson’s Economic Subcommittee
was also making plans for an economic federation in Eastern Europe that might evolve
into a full-fledged political union.862 To the degree possible, the United States hoped to
keep the Soviet economic and political system out of Central and Western Europe. A
federation or union in Eastern Europe could supply inputs to industry in the West and
work as a bulwark against Soviet power. The Americans believed the relief organization
might facilitate the construction of this system. Both Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union would need American assistance after the war, a fact that would give the United
States leverage. The international approach would give Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union a voice at the table, which might translate into goodwill and cooperation. The plan,
however, suffered one major flaw. After the war the Red Army would occupy Eastern
Europe, which was divided against itself and overtly hostile towards the Soviet Union.863
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This topic constitutes a dissertation unto itself. The following documents detail some
of the more important discussions of a federation or union for Eastern Europe: P Minutes
11, May 16, 1942; P Minutes 12, May 23, 1942, both in File Political Subcommittee
Minutes (Chron.) 1-20 (Part II); P Minutes 13, May 30, 1942, File Political
Subcommittee Minutes (Chron.) 1-20 (Part I), all P Minutes in Box 55; E Document 17,
“Some Economic Aspects of a Possible Unification of Eastern European Countries,” June
25, 1942, File E Documents 1-25; E Minutes 19, July 24, 1942; E Minutes 20, July 31,
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The idea for a federation came from the East Europeans. Jan Masaryk, the most
visionary of the East European leaders, dreamed of a nation state consisting of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece, under an arrangement open to adherence by
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Despite these unfavorable circumstances, the United States had little choice
but to try. In moral, economic and geo-strategic terms, the Americans could not abandon
Eastern Europe without an attempt to help the region, or some effort at cooperation with
the Soviet Union. In the short run, it would have done irreparable harm to the Grand
Alliance fighting valiantly to defeat the Axis powers. In the long run, it would have
damaged the moral clout of the United States and tainted its claims to global leadership.
Yet it also made little sense to needlessly pour funds into a region without a strategy for
stabilizing it or some assurance that the money would be reasonably well spent. An
American or Anglo-American relief organization was not possible. The Russians had first
proposed the creation of an international relief organization and they made it clear that
they would never accept another Hoover relief mission like the one sent to the Ukraine in

Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. In effect, he wanted to construct an altered version of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Acheson to Hull, Welles, and Atherton, November 5,
1941, 840.50/272-1/2, Box 4796, RG 59, NARA. The East Europeans, above all, worried
that the United States and Great Britain would abandon them. In July 1942, the Poles
conveyed information obtained by Polish agents on Soviet postwar plans to American
officials. According to Polish sources, the Russians were gleeful that the Nazis had
ousted virtually all Anglo-American political and economic influence in Europe. They
hoped to prevent the return of any “principal capitalist power” to the continent and were
appealing to the Free French in order to achieve their objectives. The Poles, no doubt,
hoped to lure the Americans into Eastern Europe. See Biddle to Hull, July 31, 1942,
840.50/539, Box 4797, RG 59, NARA. The Czechs, however, were so worried about
fighting among East Europeans that they turned to the United States for help. Ladislav
Feierabend, the Czech Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Polish-Czechoslovak
Economic Commission approached Leo Pasvolsky in July 1943 to express his desires for
an East European Union. What interested him most, was not the form the federation
would take, but whether the United States would be willing to exert pressure on any
country or countries that refused to cooperate or join. See Memorandum of Conversation,
“Economic Unification of Eastern Europe,” Feierabend and Pasvolsky, July 3, 1943,
840.50/2172, Box 4811, RG 59, NARA.
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A unilateral or bilateral effort might also have led to charges of imperialism.

The only possibility was to construct an international organization that sustained
America’s independence of action, preserved the country’s strategic flexibility, and
provided it options or a way out in the event of disaster or unintended consequences.
It is for these reasons that Acheson’s draft agreement looks more like a highstakes masquerade than the mythical New Deal agency of the popular imagination.
Surely it is a tribute to Roosevelt’s genius that he adopted expressions such as the “New
Deal” and the “United Nations,” which have retained their glamour among so many for
so long. But behind the euphoria and myths that have sustained the allure of these words
and the sentiments they excite, one too often finds a history that disappoints. For better or
worse, the Roosevelt Administration believed it would have to deceive the world in order
to save it, and it would have to mislead the American people to make this possible. The
planners knew, as Herbert Hoover would soon preach, that an international organization
could not administer relief. 865 A fast-operating authoritarian structure is needed;
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specific example, see Gary Dean Best, Herbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years,
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otherwise people just wilt away and die while men in dark suits grandstand and
debate.866 They also knew that opponents to excessive spending would obstruct their
efforts if the message to Congress were not carefully managed. It would fall to Dean
Acheson to see the effort through.

The Torch Passes, but Roosevelt remains Master of his Administration

Adolf Berle surrendered the relief portfolio to his archrival in July 1942.867 More
than anyone, Berle defined the broad lines of America’s postwar relief policy, and he
worked relentlessly to guard against British guile. A member of Roosevelt’s original
Brain Trust, he was always more suited for constructing policy than the process of
navigating it through political systems and diplomatic discussions. Surely it is an irony to
say that Berle loved his country more than himself. But he risked his influence and career
to bring peace to the State Department. In doing so, he created an opportunity for
Acheson. It is not clear whether he bowed out under pressure from Hull, or whether he
was wise enough to have known that his rival was more suitable for negotiating with the
British and Soviets. Berle’s approach was always too crass, too blunt and too honest for
the diplomatic art, which requires the deceitfulness of a world-class poker player. It
certainly made no sense to sit him at the negotiating table with the British. He hated them
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and they knew it. Acheson, by contrast, had the reputation of an Anglophile, even
though he shared many of Berle’s ideas towards the British.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs also displayed the
necessary dexterity for maneuvering within the bureaucratic labyrinth of the Roosevelt
Administration. At this point, the Board of Economic Warfare constituted Acheson’s
only serious obstacle. The Lend-Lease Administration, under the leadership of Edward
Stettinius, would make an attempt to obtain some responsibility for postwar relief, but its
efforts would come too late and to little avail.868 Acheson concentrated on BEW. To
appease the agency, he acceded to Bean’s suggestion that “rehabilitation” be included
among the proposed relief organization’s responsibilities, despite the inevitable problems
this language would cause. More intelligently, he promoted Paul Appleby, one of Henry
Wallace’s old lieutenants at the Department of Agriculture, as the best choice to fill the
position of the relief organization’s first Director-General.869 He personally proposed
Appleby to Welles, and he appears to have utilized a fellow Yale graduate, Oscar Cox of
the Lend-Lease Administration, to suggest Appleby to Harry Hopkins.870 This was no
lighthearted decision. Appleby, the Assistant Secretary for Agriculture, had the talents to
868

See “Memorandum to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins” from Edward Stettinius, June 24, 1942,
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do the job and was considered by many to be the most brilliant administrator in the
entire government bureaucracy.871
But even this was not enough to subdue the power-hungry Vice President. No less
than twenty-four hours after the Reconstruction Subcommittee approved Acheson’s draft,
Wallace informed the President of the plan. Outraged, he demanded a meeting with
Roosevelt and Hull.872 Unlike Churchill, who ignored repeated warnings from one of his
most important advisors, Roosevelt immediately asserted his authority. “I know nothing
about this,” he wrote the Secretary of State. “Will you speak to me about it?”873 The
meeting that took place with Wallace and Hull some days later did nothing to alter the
course of events, but it did confirm three things. Roosevelt remained master of his
administration; he blessed the general approach that emerged from the postwar planning
committees; and the State Department – read Acheson – now had authority to move
swiftly ahead.874
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It is not clear to me when the meeting took place as it was cancelled on several
occasions, but my notes suggest it was July 7, 1942, well after the arrival of Leith-Ross.
Further research at the Roosevelt Library will be required to confirm the precise date.
Whatever the case, Roosevelt received a copy of the Acheson draft. Had he disagreed
with its content, it is unlikely that he would have permitted Hull and Acheson to move
forward.

328
CHAPTER SEVEN
SIR FREDERICK LEITH-ROSS GOES TO WASHINGTON

During the late summer and the fall of 1941, the possibility of a visit to
Washington by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross had been contemplated on both sides of the
Atlantic.875 The British and Americans wanted to discuss the coordination of efforts to
accumulate surpluses for postwar relief. But in a letter of July 22, 1941 to Leith-Ross,
Dean Acheson inadvertently sabotaged the visit by trying to link surpluses and postwar
relief to negotiations on America’s plans to erect a global free trading regime after the
war.876 This he did before the Atlantic Charter and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement
had been signed. With Article VII of the Master Agreement under consideration during
the fall of 1941, Leith-Ross rebuffed the invitation on grounds that Britain needed to
consider the issues Acheson had raised in his letter of July 1941.877 Fierce disputes had
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erupted in the British Government over American efforts to smash the system of
preferences that governed trade in the British Empire.878
The visit might have taken place after the Master Agreement was signed on
February 23, 1942. But by this point, the Soviet Union and Allied Governments had
muddied the waters. The Russian proposal of January 1942 for an international relief
organization widened the scope of the discussions. The British had shared the Soviet note
with American authorities along with views of their own. It took the State Department
more than two months to formulate its reaction. While internal deliberations took place,
the problem of surpluses turned into one of shortages for many commodities and
products. At roughly the same time, the Norwegians joined the Dutch in making
purchases for the postwar relief of their country, which threatened to exacerbate these
problems. In turn, this development increased the necessity to construct an international
relief organization, which would centralize the procurement of supplies, as rapidly as
possible. On May 11, 1942, the U.S. Government urged Leith-Ross to visit Washington
immediately.879
He would not arrive until June 27, 1942. In the meantime, the British War Cabinet
accepted the general lines of the American plan shared with them in early May. The
ministers also began the process of crafting Sir Frederick’s instructions, but these
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discussions would not be completed until after his arrival. Leith-Ross also took steps
to reassure the European allies and bring the problem of independent purchases under
control. In Washington, the Americans took similar steps while finalizing the proposal
they would discuss with Leith-Ross. In preparation for their talks, Acheson assembled an
interdepartmental committee to discuss their proposals with Leith-Ross. The group
included representatives from the State Department, Treasury, Department of
Agriculture, the Red Cross and the Board of Economic Warfare. This committee met
with Leith-Ross on six occasions during July and August. This chapter examines these
events up through Sir Frederick’s five-day sojourn to Ottawa in late July 1942.

Norway and the Problem of Allied Purchases

Before Sir Frederick Leith-Ross arrived in the United States, the conflict with
Norway over postwar purchases escalated. As we have seen, the British and Americans
demanded that Norway and the Netherlands coordinate their procurement with supply
authorities in London and Washington. They also asked these nations to suspend all
purchasing until a joint procurement program could be established among the Allies. The
Anglo-American authorities wanted to ensure that materials in short supply would be
available for the war effort, and they hoped to prevent competitive bidding that might
drive prices upward. The British worried that other allies might commence purchasing if
these activities persisted, and countries with few or no resources would become angry if
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the richer allies bought up limited supplies.

331
Despite these arguments, the Anglo-

American efforts failed. In the case of Norway, two factors are to blame.
First, Norway only agreed to cease purchasing for a few weeks while the AngloAmerican authorities established a joint purchasing program. But nothing had been done.
According to Trygve Lie, his country had already “waited for more than six months since
the Inter-Allied meeting” of September 1941 “before taking any separate action.”881 Now
circumstances had elevated the stakes. The Germans had begun a propaganda campaign
to persuade Norway’s seamen assisting the war effort to return home. The Great Powers,
according to this propaganda, were exploiting the smaller allies, and would cast them
aside when peace came. The Norwegian Government believed it imperative to avoid any
impressions of this sort. If the seamen realized the British Government was preventing
Norway from buying the necessities of which their wives and families were deprived, it
might undermine the war effort. It was essential that the Norwegian government “assure
them truthfully and categorically that the moment Norway is free of the Hun,” they will
“be able to pour into the country supplies of everything that is now lacking.”882
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Second, Norway made its willingness to suspend purchases dependent on
Britain’s readiness to approve licenses for orders placed in the United Kingdom.883 The
Board of Trade had refused to issue export licenses, thus preventing British
manufacturers from completing a number of orders. The Board cited limited raw
materials, labor, and manufacturing capacity, but also Norway’s failure to notify British
supply authorities of their purchasing plans. Leith-Ross took this concern to the Board,
which agreed to approve all orders placed before March 17, 1942 with the exception of
several contracts for boiler suits and overalls. The Norwegians, furthermore, would have
to agree to turn over these supplies at cost if required for the war effort, and they would
refrain from placing future orders without the Board of Trade’s consent. As for those
orders placed after March 17, the Board blocked them.884 This decision and the failure to
promptly establish a joint procurement program infuriated the Norwegians.
As a result, they refused to cease purchasing. Dean Acheson had told them that
procurement machinery would be established in a matter of “weeks rather than
months.”885 But the Norwegians concluded that his promise was empty.886 Furthermore,
they resented British attempts to obstruct their purchasing in the United Kingdom. Export
licenses, they argued, had been permitted for goods to be sold to Holland, Spain,
Portugal, Turkey, Switzerland and other countries in North and South America. They also
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maintained that on a per-capita basis Norway’s trading relationship with Great Britain
had been more important than with any other country in the world, and the British
position imperiled the prospects of continuing this relationship after the war.887 More
importantly, Norway had considerable Sterling reserves that could only be spent in the
British Empire. If the purchases were not allowed to go through, Lie wrote on June 16,
1942, it “would be a very hard blow” for Norway.888
This conflict might have been less bitter, if Leith-Ross had not lambasted the
Norwegians for violating the spirit of the St. James Palace Resolution. In return, they
attacked British insensitivity towards the plight of their countrymen and complained of
being excluded from Anglo-American discussions impinging on their interests. Sir
Frederick retorted that Norway had been inconsiderate of the broader alliance and had
backtracked on its pledge to suspend purchases and consult with British supply
authorities about their procurement activities. The Norwegian denied having promised
either.889 When the fitful dispute led Leith-Ross to meet Lie in June, the Norwegian
Foreign Minister attributed his country’s recalcitrance to political divisions within the
Cabinet, but claimed a resolution could be found if Britain would only approve the
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contracts made after March 17, 1942. Leith-Ross pointed his finger at the Board of
Trade and the problem appeared irresoluble.890
Thus he turned to Washington. First, Sir Frederick asked the Americans to
approve a “note from the Chairman” to the Inter-Allied committee, which he would
present during a meeting before his departure. It would insist that countries making
purchases consult with allied supply authorities and suspend these activities until the
establishment of a common program. In this way, he could win support for their “efforts
to restrain the Norwegian and Dutch activities.” Second, Leith-Ross suggested Great
Britain and the United States would have to permit the purchases if delays prevented the
immediate construction of common machinery. So long as the Allies consulted with the
relevant Anglo-American authorities, agreed to make their supplies available at cost if
needed for the war, and permitted the relief organization to requisition them if they might
be used to greater effect outside the owning country, then he thought the purchases could
be allowed.891
The Americans thought purchases should only be permitted as a last resort, but
agreed to the note, which Leith-Ross shared with the Inter-Allied Committee on June 17,
1942.892 As anticipated, most of the represented nations spoke out against independent
purchases, including Belgium, France, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia. The Dutch and
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Norwegians maintained their position, restating their arguments with the usual vigor,
but the meeting left them temporarily isolated. The Norwegians, however, fought back,
asking Leith-Ross whether the European allies would be invited to partake in the
Washington discussions at any point. Sir Frederick, who had opened the meeting with a
vague explanation of his trip to the United States, could not and did not answer the
question.893 Thus his plan to refute the idea that London and Washington disregarded
their concerns backfired. 894 He promised to keep their views before the American
Government nonetheless.895

Allaying the Fears of the Soviet Union

Prior to Sir Frederick’s departure, another matter of importance sat on the British
diplomatic table. Six months had passed since the Soviet Union delivered their relief
proposal of January 13, 1942. But at the request of the United States, which needed time
to consider the Soviet ideas and formulate its own, the Foreign Office had refrained from
formally responding to the Russians. If the Americans had moved more rapidly, this
request might have amounted to nothing, but, as we have seen, it took the Roosevelt
Administration months to get its act together. Naturally the delays aroused suspicions in
Moscow, and left Great Britain in an embarrassing position.
For both countries, the context made the matter worrisome. Churchill’s hostility
towards the Soviet regime was well known, and the Stalinists had long considered the
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British Empire a “mortal enemy of Communism.” Even the Nazi attack on the Soviet
Union in June 1941 could not remove this mutual animosity. It might be possible to
conveniently forget when faced with a common enemy, but the past could not be erased.
The Soviets had concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with the Nazi regime in 1939. They
had occupied large portions of Eastern Europe and launched an unprovoked attack on
Finland. As a result, the British refusal to open a second front in Europe at the moment of
Russia’s greatest peril left Stalin to suspect ill will. So long as the Wehrmacht remained
outside Moscow, British counterarguments mattered little. Yet the two enemies needed
one another, and British diplomats saw no reason to let postwar relief turn a difficult
relationship into an unmanageable one.896
Their worries mounted when the Soviet Ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky,
raised the issue with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, on June 26, 1942. He wanted
to know whether the Soviet Union might shortly receive a reply to its memorandum of
six months prior.897 Perhaps he felt as though Russia was being ignored. Sir Frederick
had neglected to tell Maisky of his impending visit to Washington. He remained furious
over the Russian refusal to participate in the Inter-Allied Committee, which they
considered “a sham and camouflage” for a “purely British Committee.”898 Eden hoped to
ease the situation with a reply to the note of January 13, but the Americans had still said
nothing of their own proposals to the Russians. The Foreign Office therefore instructed
Leith-Ross to do everything possible to expedite this communication.899
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The Americans also worried about Soviet suspicions. Like the British, they
had exhibited contempt for the Soviet regime dating back to the Russian Revolution, and
had expressed outrage at the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact. Moscow harbored
resentment towards Washington as well. But following the attack on Pearl Harbor and
German declaration of war on the United States, the two powers found themselves in
alliance with one another. Wartime imperatives made cooperation essential and the
Americans hoped this would persist into the postwar world. Suspicions had to be
repressed. Thus on July 1, 1942, Cordell Hull and Dean Acheson met with the Soviet
Ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinov, and explained the purpose of Sir
Frederick’s visit and the process they envisioned for the future, but they provided no
details of their proposals.900
Why did the United States fail to include the Russians in the Leith-Ross
discussions? Stalin, to be sure, had never protested Moscow’s exclusion from the AngloAmerican war councils. As Adam Ulam tells us, he feared they might demand
reciprocation, which would have given the “Anglo-Saxons” influence on Russian war
strategy and access to information on Soviet force capabilities. These dynamics, however,
had little bearing in the case of relief. Russia made the first proposal for an international
relief organization. But the Americans, it seems, planned to shackle Britain before
integrating the Russians into the negotiations, and they wished to avoid the Soviet tactics
that frustrated Leith-Ross’s efforts to set up the Inter-Allied Committee. Everyone also
expected the Russians to delay the process. Stalin distrusted his diplomats and kept them

900

“Memorandum of Conversation,” Hull and Litvinov, July 1, 1942; “Memorandum of
Conversation,” Acheson, Litvinov and Shih, July 1, 1942, both in File #2 Post War – ER
and EP May PART 3, Box 5, WRPR, Acheson Papers, RG 59, NARA.

338
on a short-leash, which forced them to obtain instructions from Moscow on almost
every point.901
The Americans still felt obliged to keep the Russians at ease.902 “We have been
much impressed” with your proposals and “the thought” which has gone into them,
Acheson told Litvinov on July 1, 1942. Hull assured him that the United States had “no
definite plans.” Everything was “purely tentative.” Acheson further explained that the
State Department had been “attempting to formulate proposals” along lines suggested by
Russia, but “lacked the knowledge of the actual experience which had been gained from
the work of the Committee in London.” Thus the State Department had invited Sir
Frederick to Washington to ascertain and assess all of the relevant facts. Officials hoped
“to test” their ideas on him. Once they grasped the situation, proposals would be
formulated “for discussion with the British, Russian and Chinese Governments.” But any
ideas reduced to paper, Hull promised, would be shared with Russia when available.903
While these efforts reassured Litvinov, London’s predicament persisted. On July
6, 1942, the Foreign Office informed Leith-Ross of a plan to hand Maisky a response two
days hence unless advised otherwise.904 But Hull insisted that the British defer action
until he had spoken with the President.905 Meanwhile, Maisky approached Eden again on
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July 7, 1942. The Foreign Secretary promised a response soon, and blamed the delays
on Washington. “The informal talks now taking place between Sir Frederick Leith-Ross
and American representatives in Washington were started on American initiative, and it
would be the United States that would have to make the major contribution to relief.” He
suggested Maisky speak with the American Ambassador in London, John Winant. But
Maisky had already done so; he had received the barest of outlines.906

Dean Acheson Corners the Norwegians

In the meantime, Acheson cornered the Norwegians. For weeks, Sir Frederick had
kept him informed of the independent purchases, and had made no attempt to conceal his
contempt for Norway’s behavior. “I just heard that the Norwegians have placed an order
for coffee in Brazil, again working through devious, and apparently unnecessary,
intermediaries,” he wrote. “Needless to say, the information did not come to me from the
Norwegians!”907 The tactic paid off. On June 22, 1942, Acheson ordered the Chief Cable
Censor to suspend delivery of telegrams between banks in New York and various banks
and firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay regarding credits totaling five
million dollars on behalf of the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission for the purchase
of supplies. This action forced a showdown. For ten consecutive days, he requested that
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the Norwegian Ambassador, Wilhelm Morgenstierne, and the Minister of Supply,
Arne Sunde, provide detailed information on the purchases, but they ignored the
requests.908
By the end of June, Norway’s procurement program in the Western Hemisphere
had come to a standstill: they had little choice but to face the Americans. On July 1, 1942,
Acheson asked Moregenstierne to suspend his country’s purchasing in the region until a
joint solution for postwar relief had been devised. He demanded all information on future
procurement and the purchase orders that were the subject of the stopped cable traffic “in
order that appropriate arrangements may be made with the censorship authorities.”
Otherwise, he implied, the United States would block the transmission of their cables.
Finally, he insisted that Norway make any postwar supplies already purchased available
for the war effort if they were suddenly needed. The Ambassador agreed, provided that
the suspension would be lifted after one month if a joint purchasing program had not
been established. Acheson accepted this stipulation, and instructed the cable censor to
transmit the cables held up at the end of June.909 In this way, the Assistant Secretary
temporarily resolved the problem.
In April 1942, Leo Pasvolsky had suggested the State Department stop the
purchases through its control of foreign funds in the hemisphere, but Adolf Berle
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objected, arguing that it “would be far better to secure the same result through
consent.”910 Acheson clearly thought otherwise.
The British expressed shock at the heavy-handed approach of the United States,
but welcomed it. “Mr. Acheson’s way seems to be even shorter than that of Sir F. LeithRoss! But, if anybody is to hit them on the head,” Gladwyn Jebb wrote his colleagues at
the Foreign Office, “I think it is preferable that the Americans should do so rather than
we.”911 At a meeting called to discuss the matter on July 8, 1942, representatives of the
Foreign Office and the British-run Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau cautioned the
Board of Trade, which wanted to block all Norwegian orders placed in Great Britain after
March 17. It would be a grave mistake to “exasperate” the Dutch and Norwegians, they
argued. England needed Norwegian shipping to win the war, and would require their
cooperation on a host of other issues in the postwar period.912 Apparently Acheson did
not feel this way, yet he also knew the dynamics of power were stacked in America’s
favor.
The Foreign Office similarly rejected the argument that the Dutch and Norwegian
purchases violated the St. James Palace Resolution of September 1941. This document
stipulated that the Allied governments maintained primary responsibility for “for making
provision for the economic needs of its own peoples,” they argued. The Dutch, in fact,
had made their willingness to sign the resolution contingent on the “understanding that
910
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nothing therein” would “be deemed to preclude them from carrying out under their
own responsibility the arrangements made by them for provisional relief of the
Netherlands at the end of hostilities.” Eden had also agreed to this stipulation.913 But the
United States had been a mere observer at these events: thus their hands remained free.
While Britain’s declining power left it at the mercy of rump governments, which it
needed to show strength, America’s ascendancy permitted it far more freedom of action.

Great Britain Develops Its Response to Norway

Acheson’s initiative did not resolve the problem of purchases in the United
Kingdom. Due to raw material shortages, a strained labor force, and limited
manufacturing capacity, the Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply considered the orders
undesirable.914 Even if British industry were able to fulfill them, it would be wiser to
limit production to war-related products and domestic consumption.915 Orders placed
after March 17 should be vetoed on supply grounds, and British manufacturers forbidden
to enter into new contracts. But the Foreign Office and Allied Post-War Requirements
Bureau thought this approach extreme. It implied “no further orders could be placed” and
would only anger the Allies.916 They proposed a case-by-case review of orders. If some
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were rejected, it could be done on supply and political grounds: it was not in the
“general allied interest” to permit orders with the relief issue under discussion in
Washington.917
Only after two weeks of wrangling did a compromise emerge. The Foreign Office
believed there would be “grave political objections to an outright cancellation of all
outstanding contracts placed after March 17th,” but the Board refused to review orders on
a case-by-case basis, and rejected other proposals that would have permitted limited
purchases.918 Ultimately they reached an agreement allowing orders already in production
to be completed, but other orders would be stopped.919 The Ministry of Supply and Office
of the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau concurred.920 The Treasury thought the
proposal “very drastic, but agree[d] that it should be made.”921 On August 6, 1942, Nigel
Ronald of the Foreign Office presented the new policy to the Norwegians. “The main
trouble,” he told them, “had been found to be the shortage, not so much of raw materials,
as of labor and manufacturing capacity.”922 A prepared memorandum also stated that it
was not in the “general interest of the Allies that independent purchases should continue”
while the relief organization was under discussion at Washington.923
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The Norwegians accepted the policy, but wanted to know when Leith-Ross
would return from Washington and tell the Allies what he had been doing there. After
some “disingenuous fencing,” as Ronald described the conversation, he told them that the
Americans “would be reluctant to come out in favor of any general plan for post-war
relief until after the [November, 1942] elections.” It was essential not to embarrass the
Americans. “Anything which could be twisted into implying that they proposed to saddle
the American taxpayer with the whole burden of post-war relief could hardly improve the
chances of our friends at an election.” The Norwegians concurred, but disliked the idea of
a three-month delay. Thus Ronald encouraged them to consult with the Belgians and
Dutch to see if it made sense of broach the matter with the American Government. The
one-month moratorium on purchasing imposed upon Norway by the Americans had
expired, and he redirected their dissatisfaction to Washington.924

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross Attempts to Decentralize the American Relief Proposal

When Sir Frederick arrived in the American capital, he quickly learned of the
limits on what he could accomplish. “Responsible authorities,” Cordell Hull politely told
him, “realized that the United States would necessarily have to bear a large part of the
burden” for postwar relief. As a result, the relief organization would have to be
constituted in a manner that suited American interests, and did “not to excite ill-disposed
critics in Congress” inclined to “attack the Administration on the ground that it was
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This fact,

Acheson told Leith-Ross, meant that the “method of dealing with the relief problem and
the timing of any announcement concerning it were of considerable importance and
should be cleared with the President.”926 These circumstances left Leith-Ross in a weak
position from the outset. Yet he in no way abrogated his responsibilities. He attempted to
influence the structure of the relief organization and the general course of events in a
manner commensurate with British interests and his own preferences.
On July 2, 1942, Sir Frederick presented the interdepartmental committee a
proposal to devolve power in the relief organization to London and strategic outposts in
the British Empire. As he saw it, the draft Acheson shared with him the previous day
centralized too much power in “the Director General’s office and his operational
organization.” This setup, he argued, would pose political and practical difficulties. To
appease the Allied governments and maximize efficiency, he preferred that separate
organizations be established in London, Cairo and New Delhi, which would manage
relief operations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East respectively. Regional
directors would oversee operations in each of these areas “within limits prescribed by the
Director General and approved by the Executive Committee.” He proposed the creation
of regional committees to advise the organizations and cooperate with local governments.
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He also suggested that the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements serve
this function in London.927
The Americans disliked Sir Frederick’s proposal. For months, they had made it
clear in internal discussions that they would permit no arrangement that legitimized the
British Empire, or compromised America’s control of the relief organization.928 As such,
they rebutted the proposals on grounds that they would impair efficiency. Field offices
would be essential, but they would have to “be under definite control of the central
organization.” “The Director General would have plenty of troubles with the Council and
the Executive Committee,” the Undersecretary of Agriculture, Paul Appleby argued, “and
his subordinates in the field should be protected from similar difficulties as far as
possible.” Permitting regional committees direct access to the agency’s operational arm
would undermine its effectiveness. As Milo Perkins put it, “Committees could not
administer.” They debate, dispute and make decisions slowly. Harry Hawkins believed
the Inter-Allied Committee might be maintained, but it should advise the Council, not the
agency’s operational divisions. 929 Even with this concession, America’s aims were
evident: the United States intended to dominate the relief organization.
Leith-Ross couched his rebuttal in political terms, but failed to adequately address
the practical concerns of the Americans. “The Allied Governments would not be satisfied
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with the existing London committee if it were merely an advisory body,” he told the
interdepartmental committee. “The members of the London committee were most
dissatisfied with its lack of progress and… they would not be pleased by a proposal for a
United Nations organization unless it gave them a very real responsibility in the general
direction of policy.” If the Americans failed to meet their desires, the Allies might refuse
to cooperate. “Many of these governments had funds and could operate independently.” It
made sense to provide a direct link between the committees and the regional directors,
who might preside at their meetings and provide them with a Secretariat. He thought their
voice would not extend to the details of operations, but his American interlocutors
remained unconvinced: these proposals would open the way for obstructionism.930
The Americans justified their ideas with reference to their system of government.
According to Milo Perkins, the “Council would lay down lines and limits of policy,” but
the “Director General should be free to carry out those policies without hindrance. It
would work like the Congress and Presidency. But it remained important that the Director
General retain as much freedom as possible.931 Appleby agreed. He told Leith-Ross that
the “Department of Agriculture would be helpless if it had to consult state legislatures at
every turn.”932 This view hardly implied that committees should not be erected, or that
U.S. officials opposed decentralization altogether. It simply meant that the committees
should relate to the Council in a manner akin to committees in the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives, and that the Director General alone should control operations without
interference. On these points, the Americans remained adamant. “The pattern set in this
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organization would have far-reaching implications,” Perkins asserted. If successful, it
will win “popular acceptance of some form of international government.”933

America’s Relative Power gives it the Upper Hand

The relative superiority of the United States in material and financial assets
emboldened the Americans in their conversations with Leith-Ross. On July 3, 1942, the
interdepartmental committee focused on resources. Leith-Ross had told the Americans
that certain Allies had the financial means to operate alone, but Acheson wanted to know
if they would help others. “I do not wish to give an over-optimistic impression,” LeithRoss replied. “The attitude of the Governments in London was rather reasonable,” but he
did not think it wise to “have them expend the greater part of their resources on relief
when there would be pressing needs for reconstruction.” Although the Dutch and
Norwegians had resources, the Belgians, French and others would need assistance and
“were accordingly interested in the wider scheme.”934 Taken with the proposals he made
the previous day, the situation was abundantly clear: these Allies would want influence
incommensurate with what they could reasonably contribute to the organization.
Sir Frederick’s answers also made Britain’s decline apparent. When Acheson
asked him if Britain intended to make a contribution in the form of goods or funds, LeithRoss followed his instructions: “Great Britain was prepared to cooperate in a joint world
effort, primarily in terms of goods.” Harry Dexter White, the Treasury’s Chief Advisor

933

“Memorandum of Conversations,” First Meeting, July 2, 1942, FO 371/31504, PRO.
“Memorandum of Conversation,” Interdepartmental Group and Leith-Ross, Second
Meeting, July 3, 1942, FO 371/31504, PRO.
934

349
on Foreign Affairs, immediately deciphered the response: “Contributions in goods
would only involve questions of foreign exchange when they reduced the country’s
capacity to export or the demand for its goods or when they necessitated additional
imports.”935 In effect, Britain’s weak balance of payments position restricted what the
British government could contribute to physical goods. But if donating these goods had
any bearing on the ability to export or import requirements, then a material contribution
might also be harmful to Britain’s balance of payments situation.
With these facts on the table, Acheson struck. Would Britain participate as “a
supplying or a processing nation?” he asked. Leith-Ross replied carefully. London would
assist “to the fullest extent of its ability.” The country had already agreed to contribute to
the wheat pool. It might have cotton, wool, and possibly cocoa; army stores, motor
transport and uniforms might also be useful. But it could make no detailed commitment
until its financial position became clear and the general postwar arrangements clarified.
His mandate, the Americans knew, did not include the Article VII negotiations of the
Lend-Lease agreement, and regardless, Leith-Ross explained, Britain would most
certainly “need very extensive imports.”936 London, in effect, stood at the mercy of
Washington. But to remove doubts of his country’s intentions, Leith-Ross shared with
Acheson the statement Britain planned to make announcing postwar rationing.937
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London Finalizes Sir Frederick’s Instructions

When Leith-Ross left London, the War Cabinet had not debated his instructions.
The matter aroused fierce competition between the Treasury, on the one hand, and the
Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, on the other. The Treasury did not want LeithRoss to pledge Britain’s remaining assets, which Keynes and others believed could be
used to revitalize the country’s export industries, a necessity in view of the country’s
weakening balance of payments position. By contrast, the Foreign Office and Board of
Trade hoped to utilize these assets to gain influence in the proposed organization. The
matter obtained heightened importance due to America’s plans to use the relief
organization as a model for the future United Nations organization. Yet the Treasury
considered this approach misguided. It made little sense to pledge Britain’s remaining
material assets at the outset of negotiations. Instead, they hoped concessions would only
be made once it became clear that Britain would receive assistance in return.
As we have seen, Winston Churchill’s chief advisor, Lord Cherwell, shared this
point of view, yet his efforts to convince the Prime Minister to intervene before LeithRoss departed failed. He wrote Churchill a series of scathing letters, attacking the
instructions prepared for Leith-Ross from every possible angle. He criticized the use of
the Prime Minister’s speech of August 1940 promising relief to Europe after liberation.
He lambasted efforts to commit Britain’s remaining resources to an international
authority. And he expressed complete opposition to the proposal that Britain should
previous day. See Telegram No. 4117, Relief No. 3, FO to DC, July 2, 1942,
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publicly announce plans to continue rationing after the war. These instructions did not
serve the interest of the United Kingdom, he argued. Rather, they entailed the submission
of Britain’s internal affairs to an international organization that might turn the country’s
raw materials over to Germany. Yet Churchill’s absence from the country, preoccupation
with setbacks in the war effort, and general inattention to financial matters, decreased the
urgency of Cherwell’s concerns.
As a result, the Treasury suffered a defeat at the Cabinet meeting on June 29,
1942. The Prime Minister’s statement of August 1940 remained in the instructions, and
Leith-Ross received authorization to share with the Americans a draft statement of
Britain’s plan to maintain rationing after the war, which he did on July 3, 1942. The
Treasury managed to secure agreement in the Cabinet that no specific commitments
would be made with regard to raw materials without further ministerial approval. Yet
they failed to win support for language in the instructions that would have prevented
Leith-Ross from making general promises, and they were unable to exclude stocks
Britain held abroad from the pool of supplies that might constitute a part of Britain’s
contribution. With no support from the Prime Minister, they agreed to sign off on the
instructions once the Cabinet agreed to draw a distinction between the financial and
material aspects of the question. Leith-Ross received his revised instructions on July 3,
1942; the same day he shared the rationing statement with the Americans.938
However on July 5, 1942, the Prime Minister’s personal secretary, Sir Thomas
Rowan, finally captured Churchill’s attention. He reminded him of Lord Cherwell’s most
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recent note, and explained that the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s position accorded
fully with Cherwell’s views, but that his arguments had been rejected at a meeting of the
Cabinet on June 29, 1942. “If Sir Frederick Leith-Ross’ instructions are to be further
revised,” Rowan wrote, “action must be taken as soon as possible.”939 Upon reading this
letter, Churchill wrote the following note to the Cabinet:
“We ought not to be precipitate in agreeing to melt down English means to living
and standard of life to the average level of all the countries that have been unable
to defend their soil and independence. Such an act of supreme self-sacrifice might
be done consciously by the will of the people after the war, but we ought not to tie
ourselves down now to such obligations. We have no authority from Parliament to
inflict such privations on the masses of the British people on the morrow of a
victory in which their tenacity will have saved the world.”940
The Prime Minister insisted that the issue of Sir Frederick’s instructions come before the
Cabinet again, and he requested that Rowan prepare him a brief on postwar relief.941
Even after learning that Leith-Ross had already shared the rationing statement in
Washington, he remained adamant that relief remain on the Cabinet’s agenda.942
How the Prime Minister’s note of June 5, 1942 would impact the instructions sent
to Leith-Ross remained unclear. Treasury officials assumed the note referred to the
rationing statement, but Richard Hopkins believed it applied to other components of the
instructions as well, particularly the promise to commit stocks and stores not needed for
939
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Britain’s immediate requirements. The language used in the instructions, Hopkins
argued, actually provided Britain a “get-away” from a burdensome contribution.
According to the instructions, Britain could demand “payment or replacement as
circumstances permit.” However, he believed that resorting to this language to justify
these courses of action would be criticized as “tricky.” Hopkins thought Churchill’s note
might provide an avenue to dump the circuitous language in favor of something more
blunt but less likely to create resentment.943
The discussion took place on July 9, 1942. Churchill told the War Cabinet that
both the Parliament and nation should know before the British Government made “such a
far reaching commitment.” Eden immediately countered this interpretation: “We only say
that there should be a system of rationing after the war.” But an incredulous Kingsley
Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, suggested that Eden also wanted to commit
British stocks to the relief organization. The Foreign Minister disputed this claim, but
then reminded the Prime Minister that he had already committed Britain to contribute
stocks with his statement of August 1940. Thereupon the Minister of Production, Oliver
Lyttelton, reframed the issue in Churchill’s defense. Would Britain obtain more
assistance by providing its stocks to the relief organization than if it were to sell them in
hopes of improving its exchange position? Absent an answer it seemed foolish to make
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commitments. Eden, however, thought Britain would not be able to meet its food
demands by selling its goods. Shortages would be too dire.944
Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labor and National Service, initiated the move
against Churchill, arguing that the promise of postwar rationing did not imply a specific
level. Churchill replied: “We can’t tie our people up in this suffering bureaucratic
machinery.” Then Lord Halifax intervened: “Would our people hesitate to accept
rationing… if there are starving people in the countries” in the countries we have fought
to liberate? The Secretary for Dominion Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, Clement
Attlee accused Churchill of wanting an “unregulated scramble” after the war. “We will
maintain a system of rationing to control the position,” he insisted. But Churchill was
unmoved. Ironically as we will soon see, he contended “Canada could supply us if we
needed it.” Bevin mocked this idea as having failed after the last war when two to three
million people were unemployed. But Churchill remained defiant: “At the end of this war
I will submit to no inequality with the United States.”945
Hugh Dalton, President of the Board of Trade, implied that Churchill’s note had
nothing to do with the United States, but was an effort to keep British standards of living
above countries that had been unable to defend their territory. The Lord Privy Seal,
Stafford Cripps, turned this objective against Churchill. If Great Britain failed to pledge
postwar rationing, it had very little else to contribute, and might, in the eyes of
Washington, appear little different than the “other ‘distressed’ countries.” Lyttelton, who
sided with Churchill on the issue of pledging stocks, now attacked the Prime Minister for
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his refusal to promise rationing. Stocks of clothing in Europe, he argued, were so low
that if Britain failed to maintain rationing for at least two years, prices would skyrocket,
preventing the poor from even buying a shirt. Bevin readily concurred, and Halifax
suggested the American people would contribute through higher taxation even if they
failed to maintain rationing. They will provide “most of the food,” he argued. But
Churchill was unmovable: “If we contribute, let our people do so as a generous gift.”946
Eden, inadvertently perhaps, opened the way for a temporary solution. “The
whole thing is governed as part of a common plan,” he asserted. “We are not committed
unless we like” the final program. Cripps reminded him that they were obliged due to the
Prime Minister’s statement of 1940, and that Wood now believed they should do nothing.
Churchill, upon hearing this claim, immediately disavowed his earlier statement.
Britain’s “position has deteriorated now,” he grumbled. Cripps cleverly sought to exploit
even this statement: in order for the country to backtrack on the 1940 pledge, it was best
to “make some contribution now,” he argued. Clearly eager to settle the debate, Wood
insisted that they “avoid [a] public declaration at this stage, until we have seen the
common plan.” Bevin reluctantly agreed, whereupon Wood suggested that Leith-Ross
enter into no commitment, permit no publication of a rationing statement, and make it
clear that London would make up its mind once it had seen the entire plan.947
Churchill jumped on the suggestion. Britain should not commit to the
maintenance of rationing unless the Washington agreed to an equal level. He ordered
Wood to prepare a new telegram to Leith-Ross outlining the points articulated.948 Eden
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said nothing, but then disputed the meeting’s prepared conclusions and the revised
instructions for Leith-Ross.949 In his view, the instructions did not accurately convey the
decisions reached by the Cabinet. The Foreign Office prepared another draft telegram,
which Wood rejected as unacceptable. While Eden’s draft indicated that Britain would
make the rationing statement provided a satisfactory relief scheme emerged from the
discussions in Washington, Wood’s draft deferred the decision for later.950 The Foreign
Office, however, had no allies in its interpretation, which Dalton and the Paymaster
General rejected. Thus when Wood wrote Churchill about the matter on July 11, 1942,
Eden quickly agreed to a version in line with the Treasury’s view.951 Most likely, he
sought to limit the damage of Churchill’s intervention. The rationing statement had
already been shared in Washington.

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross Fails to Decentralize the Agency

It had absolutely no impact. The Americans not only rebuffed Sir Frederick’s
plans to decentralize the agency, they did everything possible to strengthen the Director
949
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General’s powers. The draft of June 19, 1942 defined the Director General’s
relationships with the Council and Executive Committee ambiguously, but revisions
following Sir Frederick’s proposals gave the Director General “full powers and
responsibility for carrying out relief and rehabilitation operations.” He only had to
operate “within the limits of available resources and broad policies determined by the
Council and [Executive] Committee.”952 The earlier draft forced the Director General to
consult the Committee when choosing his staff, but the Americans deleted the
provision.953 As Milo Perkins argued, “Administration requires a man with clear-cut
authority, money, and the right to hire and fire.”954 The Americans similarly placed the
Director in charge of the agency’s relationship with military authorities and voluntary
societies. Leith-Ross accepted the latter revision, but failed to secure a modification
providing the regional committees operational influence.955
The draft that emerged after Sir Frederick’s discussions gave the committees far
less influence than they had in the version of June 19, 1942. The earlier version provided
that standing committees, which included both regional and technical committees, would
“advise and participate in the making of plans and the formulation of policy.” These
committees would “report to the Director General, the Executive Committee or the
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But Leith-Ross inadvertently reduced their influence by shining light on

the arrangements. His persistence aroused American fears and forced them into a position
of obstinacy. Consequently, the July 10, 1942 draft stipulated that the regional and
technical committees would only have powers to advise the Council. Leith-Ross
nonetheless managed to secure agreement that the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War
Requirements would constitute the European Committee, but in obtaining legitimacy for
the London group, he all but guaranteed that it would have little real power.957 The
Americans, who remained determined to dominate the organization, would have it no
other way.
No matter how hard Leith-Ross tried, the Americans shot down his proposals. He
suggested that functional committees be duplicated at the regional level.958 He proposed
that the United States and Canada be placed on the committees in return for more power
at the regional level.959 He asked that the location of regional organizations be specified
in the agreement.960 He tried to break down the specific functions of the organization,
proposing that certain powers be given to the regions while others remain in Washington.
And he recommended that the regional committees be given the power to make “suballocations within allocations made by the Council.” 961 All were rejected. Acheson
reacted to Leith-Ross with bewilderment: “I had not considered that the regional
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committees would have any administrative functions.” Sir Frederick was undoubtedly
disappointed, but he knew why. “The main question was whether Congress would agree
to finance an international organization and this would depend on the form of
presentation and the degree of control which the United States would have in the
management.”962
In his telegrams, Sir Frederick emphasized America’s readiness to recognize
regional committees and the existing Inter-Allied Committee; but he conveniently
neglected to report the presence of such committees in the draft presented to him upon his
arrival. At Cordell Hull’s request, he never shared the June 19, 1942 version with
London. 963 It was, he told the Foreign Office, nothing more than an agenda. The
relationship between the regional committees and the operational organization “will
cause some difficulty,” he wrote,” but he left the Foreign Office to believe the situation
remained fluid, when the Americans had given him every impression that they would
never accept strengthened regional committees.964 Apart from cosmetic and legalistic
changes, they had summarily rejected most of his proposals and questioned his
motivations. Does not your position at least “derive in part from” the mere “existence of
the London committee?” Paul Appleby audaciously asked him. Of course not, Leith-Ross
replied.965
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The Executive Committee and Sir Frederick’s Successes

Sir Frederick’s efforts succeeded elsewhere, though not in ways that accorded
with his preferences. On July 2, 1942, he received instructions from London insisting that
the Executive Committee be limited to China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the
United States. Leith-Ross disliked the position, but the Foreign Office considered it
essential to avoid “the experience at Geneva.” If “there is to be any hope of attaining the
necessary degree of unanimity and of discharging business expeditiously,” then the
committee must be limited to four. The British also believed the organization would
establish a precedent. “Any defects allowed to appear in the first will inevitably be
reproduced in the others.”966 When explaining the position on July 3, 1942, Leith-Ross
suggested countries excluded from the Executive Committee might receive invitations to
participate in its meetings when questions affecting their interests arose. Full
representation on regional committees with powers to discuss plans might also win their
acceptance of the four-power scheme.967
The Americans reacted ambivalently. Initially they agreed with the four-power
setup, but the June 19, 1942 draft provided for seven members, four permanent
representatives from China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, and
three additional members to be chosen annually by the Council.968 The record does not
explain why the Americans shifted their views just before Leith-Ross arrived, but the
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interdepartmental meetings suggest the Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare
bear responsibility. Harry Dexter White told the group that it “might be worth sacrificing
some efficiency to obtain wider support.” If the smaller powers were excluded from the
committee, it might lead them to disrespect the organization. Perkins agreed, but was
inclined to support a different formula. He thought it would be easier to exclude smaller
powers if membership were based on specified criteria, such as the quantity of relief a
nation could contribute. White agreed. He and Perkins thought it would be more
acceptable in domestic political circles and make it easier to secure an appropriation for
relief from the Congress.969
Until Leith-Ross intervened, differences of opinion left the group divided. Several
officials disliked the idea of basing membership on a nation’s potential contribution, as it
would deny China and the Soviet Union a seat on the committee. “If the organization
were to be democratic in the widest sense,” Appleby argued, then “China should be
included on racial grounds.” If the United States hoped to secure Soviet cooperation in
the postwar era, then Moscow should receive a seat as well. Thus a number of members
agreed with the Foreign Office: the group should consist of only the four great powers.
Yet other members of the group, particularly White and Perkins, thought it would be
equally counterproductive to deny smaller nations membership if the objective was to
obtain wide legitimacy for the organization. These differences of opinion forced the
group to defer decision on the matter.970 But on July 9, 1942, Leith-Ross received further
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instructions urging him to secure the four-power setup while officials remained
divided.971
He succeeded, but still disliked the arrangements. The Americans favoring the
four-power setup exploited the British position and won the point. They also accepted Sir
Frederick’s recommendation that the committee be renamed the Policy Committee.972
Acheson and others believed the title misleading: executive powers would reside with the
Director General. Yet the new title highlighted the irrelevance of the Council, which,
according to the draft, would be the organization’s “policy-making body,” but would
meet only once a year. When it was not in session, the four powers would make policy.
Leith-Ross therefore proposed that the Council meet at least four times a year. But the
Americans would only accept biannual meetings.973 To ensure favorable outcomes at
Council sessions, Acheson suggested that Director General appoint and provide a staff
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Leith-Ross worried that this setup

would elicit outrage among the Allies.
The exiled governments in London remained at the forefront of his concerns.
They had not been permitted to partake in his round-table talks in Washington; there were
no plans to invite any of them to participate in future four-power discussions; and the
Dutch and the Norwegians, who well knew what was occurring, had made their contempt
for this approach apparent. 975 Now these Allies had been excluded from possible
membership on the Policy Committee, and the Americans had sabotaged all hope that the
Allies would have any power over relief operations via the regional committees. It looked
as though Washington also had plans to dominate the Council through ulterior means.
Harold Caustin, Secretary of the Inter-Allied Committee, believed these
arrangements would not survive. While assisting Leith-Ross, he witnessed the
discussions first hand. In a letter to Dudley Ward at the Ministry of Economic Warfare,
he reported the successful developments, but predicted fierce opposition from the Allies,
especially the Europeans. The population of the Europe numbered over four hundred
million people, he wrote, and it seemed unlikely that they could be excluded from the
Policy Committee indefinitely. He thought the Americans would reverse course again.
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Those who only reluctantly accepted the four-power setup thought it would have to
be changed after the war.976

The United States Decides to Delay the Process

But it would take time. Due to setbacks in the war, the American officials thought
it inopportune to call a United Nations conference to discuss postwar relief. The Red
Army remained in retreat on the Eastern Front; in North Africa, Egypt stood exposed due
to Erwin Rommel’s successes in Libya; and in the Far East, the Japanese had not only
captured Bataan and Burma, they seemed poised to assault Australia. With Congressional
elections scheduled for November, it seemed ill advised to make an announcement on
postwar relief lest they risk their plans by making them the subject of campaign attacks.
Cordell Hull and Henry Wallace agreed that the President would have to make the final
decision, but both men preferred postponement.977 The success of America’s postwar
relief plans would depend on Congressional support, and it seemed foolish to run such
risks at this stage in the war, even if it stood to anger the Allies and protract the problems
of independent purchases.
This reasoning worried Sir Frederick. He feared the Americans might “pigeon
hole the draft and defer any meeting of the United Nations.” But the Americans thought
the four great powers might secretly set up a political council with a planning committee
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to examine the subject. Alternatively the four powers might set up an interim
organization to provide for relief. Leith-Ross rejected this proposal. As he wrote the
Foreign Office, it reflected “the tendency here to attach exaggerated importance to
fluctuations of local sentiment and to neglect the importance of keeping the Allies in
good heart.” If a United Nations conference could not be convened in the near future, he
believed the draft should be shared with the allies so they could consider it and provide
their views. It would reassure them and keep “centrifugal tendencies” under control. The
possibility of leakages, however, led him to promote a meeting of the United Nations
despite the war situation.978
Sir Frederick’s colleagues back in London recognized the “political dynamite” in
the “American Relief Plan.” It would be “dangerous” to underestimate this fact, one
Foreign Office official wrote. It was “the League of Nations new style.”979 “A campaign
in Congress against the Relief Administration – the first international organization in
which the United States has been asked to participate – might have deplorable results.”980
Congress had already begun complaining that “the lend-lease agreements are a
surreptitious and unconstitutional way of getting the United States entangled abroad.”981
“Americans must be the best judge of feeling in their own country and Congress.”982 In
any case, it would take time for the American departments to reach agreement on the
draft, and several more weeks for the Chinese and Russians to consider it. London would
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also have to ascertain the views of the Dominions. By the time this had taken place,
the elections might have already passed.983
Yet everyone understood the importance of massaging the allies and being
prepared. The Treasury, however, thought it might serve Britain’s interest if the agency
were not prepared to follow the Allied armies across Europe. In this case, the military
would provide relief and presumably they could utilize the existing lend-lease
machinery.984 But Treasury officials still agreed that the Allies needed to be informed. As
an alternative to Sir Frederick’s proposal, Waley thought the Allies might be issued a
short statement of progress if the threat of leakages made it impossible to share the draft
immediately.985 Officials at the Foreign Office considered it weak not to voice Britain’s
preferences, and thought Waley’s suggestion inconsiderate of the Allies.986 Thus LeithRoss received instructions to present his proposal to the Americans, but was told not to
press them if they felt it wise to defer the conference or delay communicating the draft to
the allies.987
Well-established patterns made American acquiescence to this procedure
unlikely. On July 11, 1942, Acheson sent the draft agreement in its most recent form to
Hull.988 Three days later, with the Secretary’s consent, he transmitted it to the Russians
and Chinese.989 These maneuvers, as we will see, had internal bureaucratic implications,
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but vis-à-vis Leith-Ross they revealed Acheson’s preference for the four-power
approach. The transmission also upstaged the British, who were given no opportunity to
consider the proposal in advance. Yet they had faithfully refrained from replying to the
Soviet note of January 1942 at the request of the United States. The British had also
permitted the Americans to review and revise the contents of their reply to the Russian
memorandum. But the State Department delayed.990 Not until the Americans had shared
the draft with the Chinese and Russians, did the British finally convey a formal reply to
Maisky. It said little that the State Department had not already revealed.991

Anglo-American Tensions and the Retraction of the Rationing Statement

The War Cabinet received a copy of the agreement the very day it instructed
Leith-Ross to retract Britain’s postwar rationing pledge. 992 On July 16, 1942, Sir
Frederick informed Acheson: “It is felt that public opinion in the United Kingdom can be
got to accept such a declaration only as part of a common plan for international
organization of post-war relief.” He told the Assistant Secretary that the British
Government would not be able to “reach a final decision on the point until such a plan
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has taken definite form.”
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By linking the rationing statement to the creation of a

relief organization, he left Acheson with the impression that the British were unhappy
with the progress of his negotiations in Washington. Yet officials in London were
unaware of the events that had taken place. While Leith-Ross had informed the Foreign
Office of the general direction of his discussions, he had not revealed the extent to which
the Americans had blocked his proposals.
These circumstances embarrassed Britain. Roosevelt had already been informed
of the pledge to continue rationing. Although he refused to commit his country to postwar
rationing, he agreed to issue a statement praising the British for their selfless behavior.
Acheson conveyed this decision to Leith-Ross on July 17, 1942, and he refused to accept
the retraction. “I would suggest that your Government advise us when it thinks the time
ripe for such a declaration and we will then immediately ascertain the President’s views
as to its timeliness.” Acheson’s letter may read as an optimistic prediction for the future:
namely, that the British and Americans would reach agreement on postwar relief. Yet it
may suggest the United States expected Britain to make the rationing statement if it
hoped to receive American assistance or maintain influence.994 The ambivalence troubled
Sir Frederick and he requested guidance from his government.995

993

Leith-Ross to Acheson, July 16, 1942, File #2 Post War – ER and EP May 7 PART 3,
Box 5, WRPR, Acheson Papers, RG 59, NARA.
994
Acheson to Leith-Ross, July 1, 1942, Acheson Papers, NARA.
995
See Telegram Relief No. 17, 18, 19, all DC to FO, all July 18, 1942, all in
T160/1404/4, PRO.

369
London’s Reaction to the Draft Agreement of July 10, 1942

British officials had long worried that the United States would use aid as leverage
to crack the preferential trading system of their empire. The Americans had forced them
to sign a Master Lend-Lease Agreement, Article VII of which pledged Britain to
negotiate for an open postwar trading regime. In early 1942, Britain had pressed the
Americans to begin these discussions, but bureaucratic infighting in Washington meant
that little had been done.996 Now London suspected the Americans also planned to use
relief as a tool to force Europe to accept their economic plans. While British officials
hoped to keep the two matters separate, they tried to use the relief portfolio to provoke
the Americans into starting the economic discussions. But pessimism reigned. Nigel
Ronald of the Foreign Office argued that Britain should prepare for failure. AngloAmerican cooperation in the postwar period was not guaranteed, and he even
contemplated “secret discussions with the Dominions and European Allies” to erect a
“non-American system” after the war.997
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The Treasury lambasted this idea. Britain “should show no signs of any doubt
that there will be full co-operation with the U.S.A.,” wrote Lionel Fraser, the Treasury’s
liaison with the exiled allies. “We think it would be unwise and [possibly] disastrous to
have secret discussions with the Dominions and European Allies on what you call a ‘nonAmerican system.’” 998 Such “conversations would… inevitably get round to the
Americans, [and] they could only appear, even in the eyes of the Dominions and the
Allies, as an attempt to build ourselves up at the expense of the Americans.”999 Keynes
was prepared to let his “mind play on the nature of the solution if America returns to
isolationism,” but thought Britain should wait until it knew “more what the American
principles are.” If Washington turned to heavy-handed tactics, it would be best “to try to
persuade the Americans not to interpret their principles too dogmatically” and “not to try
to put across anything by coercion which could not be obtained by peaceful persuasion.”
As he put it, “There is a difference between sweetening the peaceful persuasion with
benefits and coercion by a threat to withdraw all favors to come.”1000
Keynes believed the agreement of July 10, 1942 far more coercive than
convincing. Two days after receiving the draft, he distributed a bold critique of it to his
colleagues. Article VI of the agreement, he noted, pledged each member government to
contribute “its fullest possible support within the limits of its available resources and
subject to requirements of its constitutional procedure.” Because the Americans would
provide most of the agency’s resources, the U.S. Congress would determine whether the
agency could operate or not. Keynes argued that the draft failed to settle major areas of

998

Fraser to Ronald, July 4, 1942, FO 371/31501, PRO.
Keynes to Ronald, July 8, 1942, FO 371/31501, PRO.
1000
Keynes to Playfair, Waley, Hopkins and Henderson, July 3, 1942, T 247/90, PRO.
999

371
policy, such as the Director General’s relations with the allied militaries, supply and
shipping authorities, and governments in areas where the agency would operate. If these
matters devolved to the Policy Committee “without further instructions and narrower
terms of reference,” it seemed unrealistic to assume that the agency would “be allowed to
rule Europe” while the American Congress held the power to “withhold all manner of
foodstuffs and supplies.”1001 The result must be American domination or stalemate.
Keynes’ colleagues at the Treasury shared his view that the agreement was “an
empty show.”1002 For practical matters, the Council would “hardly count.”1003 It was little
more than a “debating society.”1004 If it only met twice a year, it would not be in a
position to settle issues of policy. Which countries would receive relief? How would
supplies be allocated? Would they to be made as gifts or supplied on credit? These and
other issues would fall to the Policy Committee.1005 But if the four powers disagreed, then
the Director General “would be the real motive power.” With deputies in various parts of
the world, he “would control not merely the getting together and transport of supplies and
the means of paying for them but also their actual distribution among and in the
distressed countries.” For practical purposes, “he would be ruling Europe.” His powers,
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Sir Richard Hopkins wrote, were “far in advance of those of Mr. [Herbert] Hoover…
the relief administrator at the end of the last war.”1006
How should the British government approach these proposals? If it forced a
debate, it might divide the alliance. It would be better to wait, one Treasury memo
argued, to see if the Americans might change the proposal on their own for practical
reasons. But if they did not, the agreement would at least encourage populations in the
occupied territories.1007 David Waley disputed the wait-and-see approach. Perhaps “we
ought to react somewhat more strongly against the idea of the post-war world being run
by an American dictator acting in the name of an international debating society with a
committee of four as the executive…” Keynes agreed.1008 “It would be impossible to run
relief by an Executive Committee of the four great powers in Washington.” Strong
machinery would be needed in Europe. Britain should “pour cold water on the American
ideas and play for time.”1009
The Foreign Office disagreed. At the outset, its officials ignored the policy issues
and focused on the organization’s structure.1010 Sir Frederick had left them in the dark.
They preferred to telegraph a series of follow-up questions to Washington with proposals
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to strengthen the regional committees.
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If the organization’s chief benefactors

served on the committees, they thought the Americans might accept their proposals,
namely, that the regional committees should assume some of the executive powers as
well as the right to hear complaints and recommend changes to the administration. If
disagreement prevented a unified set of suggestions from a committee, or the Director
General’s representatives in the region rejected their proposals, then the Policy
Committee in Washington would arbitrate the dispute.1012 But conflicts with the Treasury
and other intervening factors prevented the British from pursuing this course of
action.1013

The New Dealers Strike Back With Plans to Expand the Scope of the Organization

By mid-July, another matter had aroused concerns at the Treasury and Foreign
Office. The agreement telegraphed to London on July 14, 1942 left most officials
believing the organization would only address immediate relief needs and basic
rehabilitation, not long-term issues such as finance and reconstruction. 1014 Officials,
nonetheless, wondered where “rehabilitation” ended and “reconstruction” began. Several
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civil servants wanted “rehabilitation” defined to include nothing more than restarting
the most essential services and industries. But others believed it impossible to draft clear
distinctions between the two. 1015 It was also becoming apparent among officials in
London that the Board of Economic Warfare hoped to expand the functions of the
Council in ways that would impinge upon postwar financial issues and long-term
reconstruction. Officials in the Foreign Office and the Treasury opposed the idea that an
international body might determine the general direction of discussions on these issues,
which they hoped to confine to the United States and Great Britain via the Article VII
negotiations.
The New Dealers had long advocated a UN Council that would oversee a number
of functional agencies. The relief agency, they hoped, would constitute the first of these
organizations, but might be followed by others focused on everything from food and
agriculture to finance and reconstruction. In part, Acheson and Hull had outmaneuvered
the chief proponents of this view within the State Department, Adolf Berle and Sumner
Welles. But in July, these men struck back. Berle complained to Welles and Pasvolsky
that the economics subcommittees had achieved no concrete results and argued that they
be restructured.1016 He then managed to wrestle many of the long-term economic issues
from Acheson, including planning for Eastern Europe. His subcommittee began to
discuss the region’s reconstruction and making plans for capital infusions into the area
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for large-scale transportation and hydroelectric projects, all, of course, under the
assumption that diverse agencies of the United Nations would assist in these efforts.1017
Outside the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare had never
abandoned its hopes of a United Nations organization with broad powers to work in a
wide array of fields. Dating back to Roy Veatch’s proposals up through Louis Bean’s
more recent critique of the Acheson draft, BEW supported a single organization that
would manage everything from relief to social, educational and even intellectual
rehabilitation. 1018 Due to Acheson’s dexterity, they had never achieved sufficient
influence to win acceptance of their agenda. But they refused to concede, and used the
discussions with Leith-Ross to make another effort. On July 10, 1942, at the fourth
meeting of the interdepartmental committee, they made their first move. Milo Perkins
suggested the Council study the problems of economic reconstruction. He hoped to
create a window through which the United States could later expand the organization’s
operations. Leith-Ross rejected the proposal, arguing that reconstruction should be left to
other machinery.1019
On July 15, 1942, the proposal came under fire at a meeting of the
interdepartmental group. Harry Dexter White argued that reconstruction was necessary,
but that it could not be undertaken by the relief organization. He believed the preamble of
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the July 10 draft defined the agency’s functions too broadly and wanted references
to the resumption of production deleted entirely. “Relief,” he argued, “could properly…
embrace the building of hospitals, sanitary facilities and possibly… essential transport
links, but not factories.” Norman Davis of the Red Cross agreed. “The American people
were always sympathetic to relief needs, but… an undertaking to rebuild Europe might
jeopardize the whole program.” White concurred. “If the Administration tried to go too
far Congress would react against it.” Acheson emphasized the importance of restoring
agriculture and other basic economic functions. The problem, simply put, was that the
distinction between “rehabilitation” and “reconstruction” remained difficult if not
impossible to define.1020
The debate worried Leith-Ross immensely, not because members of the group
wanted to exclude “reconstruction” from the organization’s functions, but because so
many of them displayed an apparent disregard for the importance of raw materials in
revitalizing war-torn economies. The following day, he expressed his concerns in a letter
to Acheson, who had carefully navigated the debate to maintain his influence. “I was
surprised,” Sir Frederick wrote, “that so many of the members of your group seemed to
think that relief could be limited to foodstuffs.” He reminded the Assistant Secretary that
the St. James Palace resolution provided that “raw materials and other articles of prime
necessity” would be made available. He also included a report by the British Director of
Relief after the First World War, which explained how the absence of raw materials
rendered relief irrelevant. “Without wool and cotton for the factories,” Jan Masaryk told
the British Director, “it was impossible to put his people to work…” All across Europe
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instances of this nature left the continent demoralized and under the constant threat of
anarchy.1021
Important, to be sure, but the American economy constituted the Board of
Economic Warfare’s main concern. On July 18, 1942, Milo Perkins and Winfield Riefler,
the Board’s Director and Chief Economist, respectively, presented their case to Acheson
and Leith-Ross. The cessation of government spending after the war, Perkins argued,
would result in unused labor and productive capacity disruptive for the entire American
economy, even if a rapid turnover to peacetime production took place. To avert this
possibility, he believed reconstruction projects in war-torn countries would provide an
outlet. He agreed that projects could not be presented to Congress at the present time, but
that plans should be prepared and brought forward at the moment when government
expenditures slackened. Perkins made it clear that he had “no interest” in a simple twelve
or 24-month relief program as such: “it was necessary and would be done.” “But only if it
was so planned as to lead on to active reconstruction on bold and imaginative lines would
he regard it as an adequate response to the situation.”1022
How to accomplish this aim without angering Congress or the Treasury remained
the central question. Riefler agreed that the executive functions of the organization
should be limited to relief. In this way, neither Congress nor the Treasury would have
1021
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cause for complaint. But the proposed Council, he thought, should be empowered to
“look further ahead, and to undertake the preparation of plans, not only for relief but also
for reconstruction.” If another UN Council were set up to address these concerns, Riefler
feared there would be undesirable delays, unnecessary overlap, and divided responsibility
between the two councils. He believed funds would be forthcoming when the economic
implications became apparent. 1023 In line with this thinking, he proposed substitute
language for Article I of the agreement, which would have allowed the Council to plan
broadly and to use other agencies for tasks related or unrelated to relief.1024
When Leith-Ross informed the Foreign Office that interdepartmental disputes
over the scope and role of the Council had emerged,1025 the Treasury insisted that finance
and reconstruction be excluded from the Council’s prerogatives.1026 But the telegraph
with instructions to this effect arrived after Sir Frederick’s meeting with Acheson,
Perkins and Riefler.1027 Leith-Ross conveyed the proposed changes to Article I of the
agreement to London.1028 But the arrival of this news coincided with Sir Frederick’s
telegram explaining the American reaction to the War Cabinet’s decision to retract their
pledge to issue a statement on postwar rationing.1029 These two factors, along with
dissatisfaction with the draft agreement – it failed to resolve most of the major policy
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issues and it left America in a position of dominance – aroused serious concern in
London.

Fear and the Recall of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross

When on July 18, 1942, officials in London received news of the American
reaction to Britain’s decision to retract the proposed statement on postwar rationing, the
matter escalated up the chain of command. Churchill worried that Roosevelt might still
make a press statement citing British plans for postwar rationing. But the Foreign
Secretary informed him otherwise, and urged the Prime Minister not to write Roosevelt
on the matter.1030 Doubtless Eden hoped Churchill would change his mind and publicly
commit Britain to postwar rationing after hearing his colleagues regurgitate their
arguments before the War Cabinet once again on July 21, 1942. But the Prime Minister
refused to budge. With the American elections on the horizon, he and others believed the
relief negotiations would go slowly: there was no reason to feel embarrassed and
certainly no need to revise Sir Frederick’s instructions again.1031
But the issue would not disappear. The following day, the Foreign Office learned
from the British Embassy in Washington that Cordell Hull intended to make an important
broadcast on postwar policy later in the week. 1032 Churchill immediately requested
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assurances from the Foreign Secretary that nothing would be said of postwar
rationing. Eden assured him not.1033
Yet harsh criticism continued to poor into the Prime Minister’s office. Everyone
of relevance in Whitehall and the Embassy in Washington believed Britain should
publicly commit itself to maintain rationing, including the Ambassador, Viscount
Halifax. 1034 It had become a matter for public relations. “I do not think American
spokesmen should be left much longer in almost sole possession of the field of idealistic
utterances about the future of the world,” one cable wrote. “We should not in any way
pour cold water on high hopes and sentiments expressed in speeches here but on the
contrary show we are not by any means behind hand as is shown by our record for a great
many years past and in the heat of the present war.”1035
With Churchill refusing to alter his stance, officials began to worry that Britain
might “be getting at cross purposes with the Americans.”1036 On July 24, 1942, the
Foreign Office had instructed Leith-Ross to reject as premature any interpretation of the
agreement or language in it suggesting the Relief Council would “be the right body to
supervise long-term aspects of post-war recovery.”1037 They also told him that the British
position on the rationing statement stood firm: decision on it would only be made once
the British Government had considered the United States relief plan as a whole.1038
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But to fully understand the agreement, American intentions, and “what exactly
[had] been happening” in the Washington, officials at the Foreign Office, Treasury, and
Board of Trade thought Leith-Ross should come home for consultations.1039 They had not
resolved their disputes over how to respond to the draft. They also feared that the Council
might obtain wider powers than desirable, and that the Americans planned to use the
Director General as an agent to rule over Europe. These and other factors led to the recall
of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross on July 28, 1942.1040
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CHAPTER EIGHT
WHEN THE NEW AND THE OLD WORLDS COLLIDE

On July 28, 1942, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross emerged from the home of the British
High Commissioner in Canada. Ottawa must have been a welcome respite from the
suffocating humidity and sizzling heat of Washington in July. With its charming canal
and majestic Parliament overlooking the Ottawa River, the Canadian capital is both
quaint and grand. But in the 1940s, as one historian tells us, the city also maintained a
“frontier and ramshackle flavor.”1041 Leith-Ross did not fare well here. He rubbed most
of its officials the wrong way. According to the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie
King, he was like “those Englishmen who antagonize by their mere appearance and
manner.” He called it the “tranquil consciousness of effortless superiority.”1042 Over the
course of five days, the Canadians, who were resentful of the wartime treatment they
received from London, trampled all over Sir Frederick, who was dealt a weak hand by his
government. His exchanges in Ottawa would interject a new dynamic into the relief
negotiations that would fundamentally alter the trajectory of our story.
Here we will dissect Sir Frederick’s visit to Canada, but also his discussions upon
returning to Washington at the first of August. With one exception – the postponement of
his recall to London – virtually nothing went Sir Frederick’s way. Officials at the State
Department hustled him at every turn. They put forward measures to resolve the problem
of independent purchases without bothering to consult with him or any of his colleagues
1041
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in London. They renewed their assault on his efforts to decentralize the agency, and
they widened the scope of the organization’s mandate irrespective of Britain’s concerns.
The situation forced Leith-Ross and his colleagues to rethink Britain’s strategy. He even
turned to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, Maxim Litvinov, in hopes of finding
support. His hopes were dashed. Nothing perturbed him more than the American refusal
to approve a strong statement explaining his discussions to the European allies and
reassuring them that something meaningful was being done. He would return to London
beaten and disappointed, but still prepared to accept what the Americans had given him.
Why did Sir Frederick Leith-Ross fail to achieve so much of what he had hoped
for? What explains the outcome of his talks in Ottawa and Washington, but also his
willingness to accept it? The answers, to be sure, are complex and varied. But a number
of factors clearly played a role. Bureaucratic conflicts in both London and Washington
complicated the ability to reach agreement on all sides, thus making the adherence to
rigid agendas impossible. Widening power asymmetries between the old and the new
world, however, turned Britain’s position into one of dependence, and made
brinkmanship virtually impossible. Time constraints prevented the use of dilatory tactics,
and conflicts between wartime demands and future desires increased the dangers of
taking risks. The American habit and preference for unilateral action, moreover, often
made it difficult to know what State Department officials were doing. Even more
frustrating, a divergence between Sir Frederick’s views and British policy eclipsed his
freedom of action. As a result, Leith-Ross departed Washington with dashed hopes and a
little to show for his efforts.
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Global War and the Transatlantic Triangle

Throughout the twentieth century, English-speaking Canadians began to shy away
from the British. Political power in Ottawa increasingly required the support of French
Canadians, most of whom not only opposed participation in Britain’s wars; they disliked
English rule altogether. During the First World, the problem erupted into a full-fledged
crisis. Between January and May 1917, Canada suffered nearly 57,000 war casualties,
which forced the Government in Ottawa to initiate conscription. Protests broke out in
Montreal and Quebec City, forcing authorities in the latter to call the federal government
for assistance. Battalions sent from Toronto charged mobs and returned fire on violent
protesters, leaving four dead and many more wounded. The government suspended
habeas corpus to inject order into the province.1043 But the damage was done: the age-old
fissure between English and French Canadians had erupted once again.
Mackenzie King had vigorously tried to avoid war. But unlike Robert Borden,
who had been Prime Minister during the First World War, he possessed a degree of
freedom: the 1931 Statute of Westminster had granted Canada foreign policy
independence.1044 Yet English speakers remained devoutly pro-British, a fact that came
into conflict with Quebec’s tempered admiration for the fascist states. For this reason,
King became a shameless supporter of Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, as
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Following the Nazi invasion of Poland, the old British

sympathies surfaced. With promises of no conscription and appeals to the fact that France
was at the center of the struggle, King managed to bring Quebec into the war. His
commitment, however, remained halfhearted not only in terms of resources pledged and
provided, but even in terms of his desire to see the war pursued. During the winter of
1939-40, Mackenzie King lobbied for peace, but to no avail.1046
The collapse of France the following summer altered events and Canadian support
for the war increased. Britain would take advantage of Canada’s renewed commitment. It
would accept Canadian troops, material, and financial aid. Yet Great Britain gave Canada
no place on the Supreme War Council, which had been restricted to France and Great
Britain. 1047 The British subsumed Canada’s limited navy into their own, set up a
recruiting scheme for the Royal Air Force in Canada disguised as the British
Commonwealth Air Training Program, and then duped Ottawa into paying for most of it.
To be sure, the resulting Canadian contributions went far in wining the Second World
War – Canada provided an astonishing $3,043,000,000 in assistance to Britain by 1945
and it contributed over a million troops: 42,000 never came home.1048 Regardless, the
arrangements for Canadian participation in the war’s strategic direction left Ottawa with
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influence incommensurate with the country’s overall contribution. Between 1940 and
1942, Canada made no formal complaint.
The reasons for this behavior are apparent. Much of Canada’s contribution came
late in the war and no policymaker could envision the future. Canada, moreover, had not
grown accustomed to its newfound independence. Mild and conservative, the Canadian
temperament remained that of a British colony despite its freedom and potential might.
Certain Canadian diplomats – notably the Canadian Official at London House, Lester
Pearson, and the Minister to France, Lt. Col. G.P. Vanier – suggested the idea of making
complaints to the British during the winter and spring of 1940, but these proposals were
not pursued.1049 With the disasters that befell France and England in the summer of that
year, the Canadians apparently had no such urge. Yet with France occupied and the
Luftwaffe coming up the Thames River, this was perhaps the best time to make such
demands. The United States had not yet entered the war. But Canada was neither Japan
nor was it Russia; it was reluctant to do anything that might undermine Allied unity in the
face of grave threats to the British Empire. But this would change.
Like the United States, the Great Depression had devastated Canada: the outbreak
of war had been a welcome boon for Canadian agriculture, manufacturing and unabashed
profit-seekers. Unemployment dropped and profits reappeared on company balance
sheets across the country.1050 Yet this economic renewal came under constant threat.
Britain’s financial malaise forced Canada to raise taxes and run deficits to finance the war
effort and aid to London. Many inputs to Canadian industry came from American
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sources, which weakened Canada’s balance of balance of payments position vis-à-vis
the United States. The passage of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1942 led Canadian
policymakers to worry that Britain might divert orders from Canada to the United States,
thereby hurting Canada’s economic recovery. Mackenzie King, obviously alert to the
problem, set out for the United States with a proposal in his satchel. At Roosevelt’s estate
in New York on April 20, 1941, the two men released the so-called Hyde Park
Declaration, in which the United States and Canada not only agreed to coordinate
production programs, but also to a procedure permitting the procurement of materials in
the United States using lend-lease for outputs produced in Canada for Britain.1051
The resolution of Canada’s economic troubles did not resolve the country’s
defense worries. With their navy now working to aid Britain, the country’s coastline
remained defenseless. The resulting vulnerability worried civil servants in Washington
and Ottawa. Thus on August 16, 1941, Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt met
again and released the so-called Ogdensburg Declaration, which created a Permanent
Joint Board on Defense. Neither Winston Churchill nor the Foreign Office welcomed this
development. But the British, who were overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe’s assault on their
country, had failed to show any sensitivity to Canada’s economic and military security.
They simply took their Dominions for granted.1052 The Canadians, at least for a period,
took it on the cheek, even while their own men were slaughtered during the Japanese
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As a result, fear and expediency pushed them decisively

into the American economic and military spheres of influence.1054
The importance of these developments was not lost upon the American President.
Roosevelt privately acknowledged Canada’s power and potential, but appears to have
believed the country lacked the will, fortitude, and audacity to assert itself. 1055 On
January 2, 1942, one day after the signing of the United Nations Declaration, he
explained to his Cabinet that it was “significant that Canada did not want to be included
in the same group with the four big powers and wished to be listed with India and the
other Dominions.”1056 This comment might suggest Roosevelt’s concern that Canada still
considered itself a British Dominion, but more likely, it reveals his recognition that
Ottawa did not perceive itself as an equal with the other Great Powers, which it did not.
For reasons that will become apparent, Canada’s reticence and reluctance might have
undermined its long-term ability to advance its interests. The capacity to achieve one’s
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aims in international politics is driven as much by self-image and external perceptions
as by reality.1057
It is hardly surprising that Mackenzie King received no invitation to the Arcadia
Conference held in Washington during the winter of 1941-42. At this meeting, Great
Britain and the United States established the Combined Chiefs of Staff. But Canada
learned of this development in the newspapers. Here it is worth noting the astonishment
of one eminent Canadian historian: “It is an extraordinary fact that, although it is evident
that it was expected that Canada’s forces should be put at the disposal of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, and the lives of her soldiers, sailors, and airmen hazarded in accordance
with their decisions, the Canadian government never received so much as an official
notification that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been set up.” If Winston Churchill
bears responsibility for this lack of notification, as C.P. Stacey asserts, Mackenzie King
must shoulder the blame for failing to set a different tone in London and Washington.
The Australians and New Zealanders complained incessantly and were consequently
welcomed into the Pacific War Council.1058
If this were not enough, Great Britain and the United States also failed to notify
Canada of their intention to establish a series of Boards to coordinate and allocate
shipping, munitions, and raw materials among the Allies until after the decisions had
1057
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On the British side, this failure of policy

rests with Churchill, who assumed that he was entitled to represent the Dominions while
providing them little or no information. The Americans possessed no formal
responsibility for conveying such information to the Canadians, but their failure to do so
ran counter to the collaborative spirit that had emerged between the countries over the
previous two years. In addition to the Hyde Park and Ogdensburg Declarations, an
elaborate series of formal and informal arrangements had emerged to synchronize
production, prevent unnecessary duplication, and maximize industrial output for the
war.1060 Even if Canada’s military and economic contribution did not warrant inclusion in
these Anglo-American efforts at this point in the war, surely they provided reason to at
least consult Ottawa.

The Hurdles for Canadian Action

These developments might have aroused Canada to action, but the first
conscription crisis of the Second World War occupied the government’s attention. When
it became apparent that the country did not have enough volunteers for five overseas
divisions, individuals began to call for conscription. The liberal government came under
assault from conservatives, and King faced pressure from several of his own ministers to
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reverse course. The debate resulted in a plebiscite that split the country along ethnic
lines. The English overwhelmingly supported conscription, while the French did not.
Although the measure did not lead to an immediate draft, it ignited mild protests in
Montreal and precipitated a rapid decline in support for the war in Quebec.1061 With these
matters at the forefront of Mackenzie King’s attention, foreign policy had to be put on the
back burner. King had named himself Secretary of State for External Affairs when he
assumed the Premiership in 1935, and had always refused to relinquish control of the
portfolio. This fact had unfortunate consequences for his foreign policy.1062
It explains why Canada recognized the importance of postwar relief for the
country’s interests so late. For years King refused to permit the Canadian High
Commissioner in Britain, Vincent Massey, to even attend informal meetings of the
Commonwealth countries. He disliked and distrusted him. He wanted power in his own
hands. As a result, Massey spent most of his time socializing with the English upper class
and promoting Canadian culture. When the war broke out, the situation improved, but
King maintained his hostility towards Massey; thus the High Commissioner’s influence
increased very little.1063 In early 1941, King exacerbated the problem by recalling the
country’s ablest official in London, Lester Pearson, back to Ottawa to assist him and the
new Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson.1064 As a result, the
Canadians played a marginal role in the debate over relief in London. It is hardly
1061

Wade, The French Canadians, 947-953. Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada
1900-1945, 324-325.
1062
Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United
Nations (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), pp. 4-5.
1063
Claude Bissell, The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey in Office (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 119; Eayrs, In Defense of Canada, 29.
1064
Lester Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson, Vol.
1, 1897-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972), pp. 181-201.

392
surprising that, when the High Commissioners met to discuss the proposed meeting of
the allied governments in exile to discuss postwar relief in July 1941, Massey was
absent.1065 He also failed to attend any of the meetings of the Inter-Allied Committee for
Post-War Requirements. Instead, low-level officials represented Canada, while Australia,
New Zealand and South Africa sent their High Commissioners.1066
With Vincent Massey constrained by King’s dominance, and Ottawa consumed
by the first conscription crisis of the Second World War, the only place where anyone
took an immediate interest in the country’s position vis-à-vis the Allied war machinery
was in Washington D.C. Humphrey Hume Wrong, the First Secretary at the Embassy,
and a member of the diplomatic corps since 1938, fired the first shot. In a letter to the
Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, Wrong articulated what
has been called the functional principle: “Each member of the grand alliance should have
a voice in the conduct of the war proportionate to its contribution to the general war
effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be
greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly
concerned.”1067 By Wrong’s estimation, Canada ranked third after the United Kingdom
and the United States in the supply of war materials; in terms of “trained fighting men,”
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As such, it would be “justified” for the Canadian

government to put a complaint before the American and/or British governments.
Wrong then set out to explore options to resolve the problem. His friend and
competitor, Lester Pearson, who had expressed concerns over Canada’s marginal status
early in the war, also made a proposal. In a meeting with Britain’s representative on the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, Sir John Dill, Wrong presented a proposal for a British
Commonwealth mission to London that would have partially ameliorated his concerns
over the Anglo-American war machinery. The British accepted the plan, but revised it to
ensure that London maintained ultimate control. Wrong believed Ottawa would reject the
revised scheme and decided to pursue other alternatives with authorities in
Washington. 1069 In the meantime, Pearson put forward a proposal to resolve the
problems,1070 but Wrong opposed it on grounds that “the plan would not be acceptable to
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As a result, the two diplomats were unable to

produce and agree on a solution that would resolve the problem. Anglo-American
planning continued apace, with very little input from Canada.
This fact worried Wrong. On February 3, 1942, in a letter to Pearson, he
complained of a lack of leadership coming from Ottawa. He lamented that Canada had
lost its chance. “With the entry of the United States into the war we are not as well placed
to influence the conduct of the war as we were when the United States was neutral… If
we had sought earlier to undertake more extensive political responsibilities, it would be
easier now to maintain our status. We have tended, however, to be satisfied with the form
rather than the substance.” Yet in the same stroke of his pen, Wrong also argued that it
was useless to be resentful and querulous. “We must not now endanger our direct
contribution by indulging in recriminations and charges that we have been left out.”
Apparently, he believed the British and Americans would just as well do without
Canada’s contribution than to listen to peevish complaints. The purpose of his letter, as
he put it, was “to blow off some steam.” Wrong was hard pressed to know what to do.1072
The Canadian War Cabinet could do no better: disputes between the Minister of
Defense, James Ralston, and the Minister of Munitions and Supply, C.D. Howe, resulted
in delays and no action. Ralston wanted the Government to express a protest, but Howe
argued that Canada should simply refuse to pool the country’s war resources with the
Anglo-American authorities, and let initiative come from the United States. The Prime
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Minister agreed. At their meeting on February 4, 1942, he acknowledged “the
practical necessity of limiting representation upon combined bodies for the efficient
conduct of the war” and told his colleagues that he would not “seek to complicate the
situation by unreasonable requests.” Yet he complained that “Canada had been in the war
for more than two years and Canadians would expect that their interests would not be
ignored in any of these fields.” Still, he lamented: “The present position was
unsatisfactory but there was, at present, no useful initiative that Canada could take.” By
February 12, 1942, the Cabinet agreed that a telegram should be sent to the Americans
and British, but no note was ever sent.1073 King’s diary suggests his attention remained on
the conscription crisis.1074
Meanwhile, developments at the Canadian Embassy in Washington created
another hurdle to action. As one historian put it, Hume Wrong “did not possess that
extraordinary capacity for self-effacement.” His acidulous wit and high regard for himself
had irritated the Canadian Minister to the United States, Leighton McCarthy. The
relationship deteriorated and Wrong reached out to Pearson for assistance. Pearson, in
turn, urged Norman Robertson, to engineer a reorganization of the Canadian mission in
Washington, in which the Minister would be recalled. But McCarthy outmaneuvered the
two men with a letter sent to King, who decided to deploy Pearson to Washington and
bring Wrong back to Ottawa.1075 King had already offended the two men the previous
year when he chose Robertson to replace O.D. Skelton as Undersecretary. Now, he
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forced both of them to relocate. This bureaucratic shuffle might have amounted to
nothing, but it occurred at an inopportune moment; it also angered the man King would
need to implement his foreign policy in Washington, Lester Pearson. These facts, as we
will see, would have extraordinary consequences for the negotiations over the postwar
relief organization, and they would alter Lester Pearson’s life.
But at this juncture, they made it more difficult for Canada to devise a policy and
strategy to achieve its aims. Efforts to obtain membership on the Raw Materials Board
and the Munitions Assignment Board failed. The Americans blocked Ottawa’s ambitions
and the Canadians had neither the nerve nor the strategy necessary for brinkmanship.1076
Despite this setback, Britain remained aware of Canada’s potential contribution to relief
and consulted Ottawa over the proposed organization. In a May 23, 1942 letter to
Mackenzie King, Massey explained that Great Britain had finally received the American
views on postwar relief and wished to obtain Canada’s concurrence before accepting
them.1077 But before the Canadians could properly consider the proposal, London began
putting pressure on Ottawa to respond at once.1078 The decision-making apparatus in
Ottawa remained so confused that King’s team simply accepted the American views and

1076

This matter is covered in most standard accounts of Canada and the war, but see
Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. 2, 327.
1077
Telegram 1388, HC in London to SOS for External Affairs, May 23, 1942,
DEA/2295-G-40, Document 661, DCER, Vol. 9, 768-769.
1078
The Canadian War Cabinet met on May 28, 1942, but failed to address the issue. I
examined these minutes in Ottawa, but portions of them can be seen in: “Extract from
Minutes of Cabinet War Committee,” May 28, 1942, PCO, Document 1026, DCER, Vol.
9, 1243-1244. By May 29, 1942, New Zealand and South African had responded to the
American views: Telegram 1429, HC to SOSEA, May 29, 1942. By June 2, 1942,
Australia had also accepted the American views: Telegram 1457, HC to SOSEA, June 2,
1942. By June 6, 1942 the British had become anxious and another message was sent:
Telegram 1505, HC to SOSEA, June 6, 1942, all in File W-22-1, 1942-43, Vol. 44, RG2,
LAC.

397
noted that the “proposed organization does not provide for Canadian representation
on [the] Executive Committee.” This matter would have to be raised later, but should be
expressed to the British authorities.1079 Speed had overwhelmed Ottawa.
In sum, a conglomeration of factors had impaired Canada’s ability to impact
events in ways that accorded with its interests. King’s determination to maintain
complete control over foreign policy had prevented his own diplomats from serving him
at the very moment when he needed them most, during the conscription crisis of 1942.
Massey remained aloof and provided King little guidance from London. The men most
suited to devise a strategy, Wrong and Pearson, received no guidance from King, while
Robertson remained on a short-leash. Making matters worse, Wrong and Pearson were
uprooted and shuffled around. Pearson moved from London to Ottawa and then to
Washington in less than 18 months. He arrived in the American capital with little
knowledge of the inter-workings of the place. Wrong, who knew Washington as well as
anyone, was brought home to Ottawa. The effect was a lack of influence. As Lester
Pearson put it years later when discussing Canada’s relationship with the United States
and Britain: “[Our] difficulty was more often to avoid being squeezed out, rather than
squeezed between.”1080

1079

Telegram 1105, SOSEA to HC, June 6, 1942, DEA/2295-G-40, Document 662,
DCER, Vol. 9, 769. See also Cabinet War Committee, Meeting No. 168, June 4, 1942, C4874, Vol. 5675, RG2, LAC.
1080
Pearson, Memoirs, Vol. 1, 212.

398
The Turning Point in Canadian Diplomacy

June 1942 marked a turning point in Canadian diplomacy. The dust from the
conscription crisis had settled, but with French-Canadian support for the war declining,
King now faced a new problem. What would happen if the Canadian public learned of his
government’s poor position in the decision-making structures of the Allied war
machinery? What would happen if the Canadian Parliament concluded that the United
States and Great Britain were taking Canada’s contributions to the war effort for granted?
It might threaten the stability of his Government, and it might even further weaken the
population’s support for the war. These possibilities aroused King to action. The
country’s independence had to be protected and its sovereignty asserted. King and his
Ministers therefore decided to utilize the proposed relief organization to take a stand. In
their view, if Canada failed to achieve proper representation on the relief organization, it
would undermine the country’s standing well into the postwar era. Like the British, the
Canadians realized that Washington considered the organization a pattern for the future.
However the British remained adamant that the Executive Committee should
include only the Four Great Powers. The Foreign Office had taken note of Ottawa’s
reservations to the American proposal, but they were not sure if the Canadians were
“staking out a claim for membership [on] the Committee.”1081 To buy time, they would
try to persuade Massey not to press Canadian claims too much, thereby providing
sufficient time to convince the Americans to embrace a four-power Executive
Committee. If the Americans agreed, the power dynamics would be squarely set against
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the Canadians, and the United States could be blamed for the outcome. According to
Richard Law, Britain’s main interest was “not so much to prevent Canada from sticking
to her reservations as to prevent Leith-Ross from encouraging the American’s to enlarge
the Executive Committee.” Yet he had to be kept “on the rails without administering a
snub to Canada.”1082 As a major supplier of foodstuffs, Ottawa could not be offended.
On July 2, 1942, the Foreign Office had informed Leith-Ross that the British
Government adhered to the four-power formula. “In light of the experience at Geneva,”
where too many members on the League of Nations Council hampered efficient decisionmaking, “they felt there was “an overwhelming prima facie case in favor of limitation of
the directing body to the four principal powers…”1083 According to the Foreign Office, a
small executive remained essential “if there [was] to be any hope of attaining the
necessary degree of unanimity and of discharging business expeditiously.” The Foreign
Office also believed the “relief executive [would] be [a] pattern for other analogous
organs to be set up… under the aegis of the United Nations.” And they worried that “any
defects… in the first [international organization for the postwar period would] “inevitably
be reproduced in the others.” For this reason, the British opposed increasing the size of
the Executive Committee to include the Dominions.1084
To meet the concerns of Canada and Australia, the British proposed that these
nations be permitted to participate in meetings of the Executive Committee on an ad hoc
basis when discussing commodities that they might supply. These countries would also
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be appointed full members of any local branches of the Executive where their
interests are of concern. Leith-Ross would have to manage Canada with extreme care if
Ottawa was to be persuaded not to pursue “what appears to be her present intention to
press for full membership on the Executive.” Leith-Ross was instructed to reserve
Britain’s position on the matter while advocating a four-power directorate.1085
But it soon became clear that Ottawa intended to play hardball. By contrast with
the other Dominion Delegations in Washington, the Canadians displayed a focused
interest in the Leith-Ross conversations.1086 Lester Pearson requested that Canada be kept
informed, and he extended an invitation for Leith-Ross to visit Ottawa. He also explained
Ottawa’s unsympathetic attitude to British arguments designed to keep Canada off the
Executive Committee. While he appreciated the problems Canadian membership would
create with other countries, he told Leith-Ross that Canada had a “special claim to
representation.”1087 His complaint received further force in late July. Under instructions
from the Canadian War Cabinet, Massey delivered a letter to the British stating Canada’s
concerns over the establishment of the Combined Food Board and the Combined
Production and Resources Board, which the United States and Great Britain had
announced in June 1942 without consulting Canada.1088 Massey’s letter made it clear that
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Canada preferred tripartite arrangements. Provision “should be made for full
Canadian membership” on these Boards.1089
Yet Massey’s letter also linked Canada’s demands to the country’s wartime
contribution. Since 1939, Canada’s exports of farm products to Great Britain had more
than doubled. In 1942, the export of food products to Britain would constitute 25 to 30
percent of overall Canadian production, compared with a mere six to eight percent from
the United States. Now Canada supplied one-third of Britain’s “total food imports,
including virtually all wheat and flour, three-quarters bacon, one half canned salmon, one
quarter cheese, one sixth eggs” and much more. Massey complained that Britain had
diverted orders from Canada to the United States utilizing lend-lease without properly
notifying Ottawa, which made it difficult to plan production well in advance.
Coordination between Canada and the United States had also been inadequate. Ottawa
had made no protest over the war machinery set up earlier in the year, but this time
Canada’s demands could not be met by reducing the country’s participation to the
inclusion of Canadian experts on technical subcommittees. Next to the United States,
Canada was the most important contributor of foodstuffs to the common pool of the
United Nations.1090
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Britain’s Strategic Foibles Vis-à-vis Ottawa

The British attitude towards Canada’s assertiveness was ambivalent. The Ministry
of Food disliked the idea of providing Ottawa full membership on the Food Board. The
Combined machinery had only just begun to work: additional members might not only
impair the Board’s operations, it would lead to similar demands from other countries.1091
By contrast, Gladwyn Jebb, head of the economic and reconstruction office in the
Foreign Office, preferred that Britain satisfy demands with respect to the Combined Food
Board to make it easier for Ottawa “to agree not to be represented on any central
executive committee for the Relief Organization.” Because the Food Board was an
“Anglo-American body,” Canadian membership would not “give rise to great jealousies
on the part of other states.” But Jebb believed the relief organization constituted “a
different kettle of fish.” If Canada obtained membership on the executive committee, it
would “give rise to acute political difficulties” with respect to other states and would
undermine the agency’s efficiency.1092
These different views led to an incoherent strategy for managing the Canadian
demands. While the Foreign Office hoped to link the two issues, the Ministry of Food
controlled discussions of the Combined Food Board, and sent R.H. Brand of the British
Food Mission in the United States to Ottawa for discussions at the very moment when
Leith-Ross visited the city. Instead of negotiating from a point of view that would allow
Britain to meet Ottawa’s demands for membership on the Food Board in return for
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Canadian acquiescence to a four-power directorate of the relief agency, he did
everything possible to encourage Canada to accept anything but full membership on the
Board. He downplayed the Board’s importance; proposed other means of linking the
Canadian food agencies to authorities in Washington; and offered them the right to sit in
on discussions of the Board when their interests were concerned. But with efficiency at
the forefront of his mind, he not only neglected the issue of Canadian prestige, he
offended their honor and thwarted his own efforts: the Food Board was not a North
American entity; it was a global affair, and as such, Canada’s interests were less than
they assumed.1093
This tactless approach denied Britain its most promising option and left LeithRoss with little flexibility. According to his instructions, he had no ministerial authority
to deviate from the Government’s line. Ottawa would have to accept a four-power
directorate with provisions permitting Canada membership on regional and functional
subcommittees, and the right to attend meetings of the executive committee on an ad-hoc
basis when matters of interest to them arose. He was also instructed to join Brand in his
discussions of the Food Board with Canadian officials, but given no authority to digress
from the Ministry of Food’s position. As a result, Leith-Ross had no cookies to offer
Canada apart from proposals of which they were already aware. If the Canadians reacted
strongly against anything short of full membership, he was asked to report the matter
fully to London.1094 As we will see, this approach placed Great Britain in a precarious
diplomatic position. By permitting the Ministry of Food’s short-term concerns to override
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long-term strategic considerations, Great Britain not only reduced its ability to
appease Ottawa, it endangered its relationship with Canada.
Yet the problem posed risks for Canada. According to Leith-Ross, “only by a
deliberate policy of making gifts could the Canadian economy be kept working at full
capacity.”1095 Wartime production had lifted the nation out of the depression, and to
prevent degeneration after the war, the Canada would require outlets for its surplus
production capacity. Relief constituted an option. However the need for export outlets
remained linked to the country’s foreign exchange position vis-à-vis the United States
and Great Britain. The Hyde Park Agreement had resolved the problem with the United
States, but this would not apply after the war. To rectify the imbalances with Britain,
Canada had made a one billion dollar gift to London in 1942, but this gesture, too, posed
problems.
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The resulting budgetary constraints left the Government exposed

politically. This situation would worsen if the Canadian people learned of the country’s
marginal status in the allied wartime machinery. These dynamics left officials in Ottawa
in a tricky position: they had to seek political satisfaction without risking economic
stability.
Thus the Canadians approached their discussions with Leith-Ross carefully. On
Monday, July 27, 1942, they gently warned him that a four-power directorate of the relief
organization might lead to isolationism in certain countries, which would force the Great
Powers or countries in need to pay cash for relief supplies from nations such as Canada.
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A day later, the Canadians made it clear that this possibility ran counter to the
interests of everyone involved. Norman Robertson and the Governor of the Bank of
Canada, Graham Towers, argued that it would endanger Great Britain’s foreign exchange
position with Canada. Robertson told Leith-Ross that he “did not see how Canada would
renew the billion dollar gift” to Britain. Towers maintained that Canada “could not decide
what contribution she could make for relief until the general exchange position with the
U.S. and the U.K. could be more clearly seen.” Leith-Ross, in turn, highlighted the
implications of relief for the Canadian economy. No official disputed this claim.1097
However one Canadian official argued that this aspect of the question could not
be considered in isolation of other problems. Douglas Alexander Skelton, the son of the
former Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, O.D. Skelton, crystallized the whole
dilemma in language that was both brutally realistic yet inoffensive. An economist and
former Rhodes Scholar, Skelton had become Chief of the Research Department at the
Bank of Canada at 29 years of age.1098 The problem, in his view, was not economics –
that could be solved – the problem was politics. Gifts of surpluses would certainly be the
most effective method,” he argued, but “it would be far from easy to get this accepted by
the public – or by the political interests.” For this reason, he thought the Relief Council
“unsatisfactory.” It “did not provide Canada with representation corresponding to its
potential assistance to relief.” If the “Relief Council was to be the pattern or the germ of
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other and larger post-war organization,” he concluded, then it “would be very
necessary for Canada to have more adequate representation.”1099
On Wednesday, July 29, 1942, the discussions took a turn for the worse. The
British position on Canada’s demands for full membership on the Combined Food Board
proved decisive. At a meeting of the Canadian War Cabinet, Norman Robertson read a
memorandum Brand prepared for the group, and the Ministers rejected the British
proposal outright.1100 Apparently the document angered everyone. Even King evinced
shock at the force of his Minister’s opposition.1101 Experiences with the other Combined
Boards had shown that representation must be provided for at the top level, not on
insignificant subcommittees. According to Robertson, Brand’s proposal aroused such
resentment that it negatively influenced the Cabinet’s opinion of the proposed relief
organization. Neither arrangement provided Canada representation commensurate with
the contribution everyone expected the country to make. As he put it, the Cabinet
believed “a spirit of dictatorship inspired” both schemes.1102 These sentiments awoke a
furry that spilled over into Sir Frederick’s subsequent meetings with Canadian officials,
first with Clifford Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, and then with Norman Robertson.
Up to this point, the conversations with Leith-Ross had been subtle, measured,
and polite, but Clifford Clark employed an abrupt, angry and threatening tone. He
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attacked the Combined Food Board vigorously. The United States and Great Britain
had set up the “Board with complete disregard for Canada.” If the Canadian people
became aware of what was taking place, he insisted there would be “a complete
outburst.” Support for the war in Quebec had dropped precipitously.1103 The “attitude of
the French Canadians” made it “all the more necessary” that Canada obtain proper
representation on the Combined Food Board as well as the relief organization. “If it got
about that Canada was being dragged at the heel of an Anglo-American dictatorship,
Canadian public opinion might lose interest in the war.” Canada might also refrain “from
active participation in relief work.” “It was a fact,” Clark explained, “that an isolationist
tendency already existed in Canada and this could only be held in check by giving
Canada both a position and responsibilities commensurate with its resources and its
potential contribution.”1104
Clark warned of unfortunate consequences if the four-power Executive
Committee stood as proposed. “Canada might not be one of the Great Powers,” he
asserted, “but her position could be distinguished from that of the other United Nations.
No other of these Nations had contributed so much… in the way of food, munitions and
shipping.” Canada had been the only member of the United Nations to refuse lend-lease
assistance. But now the Great Powers were ignoring Canada’s “special position.” Of the
four powers to be included on the Executive Committee, three of them would be in dire
need of the very assistance they expected Canada to provide. If these proposals were
pursued, Clark warned, Ottawa would face “great difficulties” renewing “the billion

1103

Wade, French Canadians, 952-953, 956.
“Memorandum of Conversation, William Clifford Clark, Norman Robertson and
Leith-Ross, July 30, 1942, T188/252, PRO.
1104

408
dollar gift” to Britain, and would have to purchase British industrial assets in Canada
to keep London’s exchange position in balance. “Canada was not satisfied that the Four
Powers had shown sufficient altruism to guide the destinies of the world,” he argued.
“They had shown themselves in the past both selfish and meddling.”1105
Sir Frederick’s subsequent meetings with Norman Robertson and Mackenzie
King were anticlimactic. The Undersecretary and Prime Minister simply reiterated
Clark’s views, though with less panache. Political concerns would trump economic
concerns no matter how detrimental it might be for Canada’s own economic interests: the
country could only go as far as Parliament and public opinion would permit it. Canada
should be given representation on the relief organization commensurate with its potential
contribution. When Leith-Ross proposed that Canada be permitted membership on
Subcommittees, Robertson argued that this formula had been tried elsewhere but
failed.1106 When he proposed inviting Canada into meetings of the Executive Committee
only on matters of interest to them, King confirmed what Clark had already said:
“Canada would not be satisfied with being admitted by the back door while the Great
Powers occupied the four-poster bed.”1107 The British Treasury official’s meetings in
Ottawa ended in fiasco. As the British High Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm
MacDonald put it, “Nothing that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross could say would modify the
Prime Minister’s view.”1108
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Though Sir Frederick remained far more sympathetic to Canada’s position
than it appeared, King made it clear that Britain would pay a hefty price if it failed to
support Ottawa’s demands. In addition to the cessation of wartime gifts to Britain, he
threatened to play the United States and Great Britain off one another to Canada’s
advantage. “Opinion in some of the Dominions,” he told Leith-Ross, “was tending to be
alienated from the United Kingdom.” As a result, these countries were looking to the
United States for assistance. In fact, he claimed, there “was not the opposition to
[Canada’s claims to better representation on the Post-War Relief Organization] in
Washington that they made out.” Britain was the problem. Australia and New Zealand
would certainly accept Canadian membership on the Executive Committee even if they
were excluded.1109 Leith-Ross knew these assessments were true.
Before departing Ottawa on July 30, 1942, he visited the American Ambassador,
Jay Pierrepont Moffat. With no freedom to make proposals of his own, he privately
revealed the cleavage of opinion in the British government over the composition of the
Executive Committee. He explained the problems Canada presented, and conveyed the
views of Anthony Eden, who feared a return to Geneva if too many countries ended up
on the Executive Committee. Yet personally he had “doubts as to whether the European
nations would consent to giving Russia a quarter voice in their fate, or to giving Russia
and China a half voice.” This view, he said, accorded with Ottawa’s. Canada had been
adamant that the Great Powers could not expect others to “make their full contribution
unless they are brought into the picture as principles.” Ottawa, he argued, would most
certainly make a big contribution if their views were met. It was in their interests to do
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so. Otherwise their surpluses and industrial capacity would be of no economic benefit
to the country. Sir Frederick knew the contents of his conversation would end up on Dean
Acheson’s desk, and that is precisely what happened.1110

Acheson and Leith-Ross Maneuver to Postpone the Recall

But the immediate concern was Sir Frederick’s recall. Leith-Ross and Acheson
disapproved of this decision. The Assistant Secretary worried that Sir Frederick’s
departure would cause the whole project to get irretrievably bogged down in
interdepartmental disputes. He told Leith-Ross that he “attached the utmost importance”
to his remaining in Washington until they had thrashed out a proposal. Leith-Ross
disliked the idea of having to face the Allied governments in exile empty-handed. If he
returned with no agreement or progress to show for his time in Washington, they would
most certainly recommence with independent purchases. At the end of July, the
temporary suspension of purchases expired, and he believed it would be most difficult to
prevent disintegration within the wartime alliance. He had hoped that an agreement could
be reached among the four great powers before he returned, which could in turn be shared
with the Allies along with future plans to call a conference of the United Nations to
discuss the proposal.1111
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Officials at the Treasury, Foreign Office, and Board of Trade acknowledged
these concerns, but insisted that Leith-Ross return home. Their reasons were many. They
did not know if Britain possessed sufficient leeway to press for further decentralization.
The most recent language drafted to meet the concerns of the Board of Economic
Warfare remained unsatisfactory: only after the Article VII negotiations had progressed
could Great Britain discuss wider postwar economic issues. Concerns also remained over
whether broad political and strategic questions could be delegated to the organization.
Was the proposed machinery little more than a “façade under which the DirectorGeneral” would operate in close collaboration with the American and British
governments? How would the agency interact with allied supply machinery? How would
the demands of Canada and the smaller powers be met? These and other issues required
the presence of Leith-Ross in London. Without personal conversations, they could not
provide proper instructions or express the views of the British government.1112
With pressure on Leith-Ross to return immediately, an ingenious stratagem was
employed to buy time, yet its architect remains a mystery. On August 10, 1942, Sir
Frederick informed the Foreign Office that Acheson had called a meeting of the
interdepartmental meeting for the following day to reach agreement on a draft to be
presented to the President. After receiving Roosevelt’s approval, the State Department
intended to share the draft with the British, Chinese and Soviet governments. Acheson,
Leith-Ross wrote, had asked him to remain in Washington to “see the President with him
about” the relief proposal. “If I go back for consultation” now, Sir Frederick explained,
this “procedure might still be followed in my absence.” The questions raised by the
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British Government could be settled with amendments if necessary at the next
stage.1113 Acheson may have designed this ploy: Leith-Ross, as we will see, provided him
a tool with which to forge a compromise among the disputing departments. But LeithRoss might also have been responsible. He wanted concrete results to show the Allies.
But we will probably never have an answer: Leith-Ross never saw the President of the
United States.1114
Whatever the case, the Treasury and Foreign Office took the bait. On August 12,
1942, he received permission from White Hall to remain in Washington until he had met
with Roosevelt, but he was asked to make it clear that Britain would probably raise
additional points on the draft. The instructions also urged Leith-Ross to convince
Roosevelt not to circulate the draft agreement to the Chinese and Russians until Britain
had had the time to study the document.1115 As we will see, this request was never met.
Likewise, the British Treasury considered Sir Frederick’s meeting with “the high
authority” a chance to advocate for British concerns. A subsequent set of instructions
urged Leith-Ross to tell the President that “general questions of post-war economic
reconstruction should be dealt with in the Article VII conversations,” which, according to
the telegram, should remain “outside the scope of the relief administration.”1116
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Finding a Procedure to Permit Allied Purchases

News of Sir Frederick’s discussions in Washington created a series of new
difficulties for the British back home. Even with the one-month moratorium on Allied
purchases, the problem had unexpectedly generated a number of complications that
threatened Britain’s weakening balance-of-payments position. The British had always
reserved the right to requisition supplies at cost if they were needed for the war effort and
could not be purchased on the market. Yet they failed to analyze the complexity and
financial implications of any such procedure. When the Ministry of Supply determined
that leather and hemp could not be found on the market, they initiated procedures to
requisition stocks, which the Dutch and Norwegians had purchased in South America
using dollars.1117 However Britain’s weak dollar position led the Treasury and the Bank
of England to propose that the materials be taken over on a barter basis. Britain would
pledge to replace the leather and hemp, but if unable to do so within a specified time
period, they would pay for the leather and hemp using dollars.1118
The procedure appeared simple, but presented technical and financial difficulties.
If at a later date, Britain procured the replacement leather and hemp using Sterling to
preserve their dollars, the Bank of England would have to undertake a complex reverse
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transaction to meet payment agreement arrangements with South American countries.
Not only were such procedures time-consuming, Britain would have to inform the
countries to prevent problems when the materials were exported. Notification would
awaken them to Britain’s financial weaknesses and leave England vulnerable to price
exploitation.1119 In any case, it was probable that Britain would pay higher prices when it
entered the market to procure replacement materials: the days of surpluses had come to
an end.1120 In view of Britain’s contribution to the war effort, it seemed unjust that the
invaded countries would be able to relieve their populations at a cheaper price, and that
their unilateral actions would exacerbate England’s finances no matter how London
acquired the supplies it needed.
The United States constituted another obstacle. If Britain knew that a postwar
purchasing program would soon be established – preferably a supply pool to avert
exchange difficulties altogether – it would simply requisition the supplies using dollars or
a reverse transaction.1121 But absent a program, Britain faced the danger that either of
these undesirable alternatives would become a precedent for innumerable requisitions in
the future.1122 The news of Leith-Ross’s discussions left them dismayed. As one British
official wrote, they “were going less well than we hoped.”1123 Even had the Americans
shown a greater desire to integrate Sir Frederick’s suggestions into the relief proposal,
bureaucratic infighting within the American government probably would have made it
1119
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impossible. But that was irrelevant: the United States had money and resources. As
we will see, cooperation between the two countries on planning for relief and purchasing
had become increasingly asymmetric, with the British rarely taking action without
informing Washington, and the Americans almost always acting unilaterally.
The question of Belgium adds a new dimension to these difficulties. While the
Dutch and Norwegians repeatedly acted independently, the Belgians tried to cooperate. In
early June, they informed officials in London that they hoped to purchase 200,000 tons of
wheat in Canada, and promised to execute the transaction through Anglo-American
supply authorities.1124 The proposal was difficult to refuse. Wheat was not in short
supply; the Dutch had purchased a similar quantity; and everyone knew it would be
harmful to obstruct purchases by an Ally attempting to cooperate.1125 But if the Belgians
chose to demand delivery amidst the rush to replenish supplies in Europe after the war, it
might lead to shipping shortages. And if they announced the purchases to accrue
propaganda benefits, as they intended to do, other Allies might demand similar treatment,
thereby precipitating shortages and forcing Britain to requisition wheat.
The Ministry of Supply conceived a solution, but the slow progress of the relief
negotiations in Washington left them hesitant to propose it. Instead of permitting an
outright purchase of wheat, they suggested buying wheat futures, which would be
converted to actual wheat or flour out of British stockpiles held in Canada at call. In this
way, the British would maintain control over the wheat and could coordinate competing
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Technically this procedure posed no difficulties, but as a

matter of policy, the British questioned the advisability of this procedure with no
assurance of a joint purchasing program or American acquiescence. 1127 When the
Belgians began to apply pressure, Leith-Ross presented the case to Acheson, who turned
urgency into fluff.1128 “There is plenty of wheat available,” he wrote, and it “would be
wise to encourage a country that is prepared to work through the Joint Supply Board.”1129
The Americans called the shots and the British had little choice but to let them do it.
British officials immediately maneuvered to guard their flank. Sir Frederick told
the Belgians that any announcement must make a clear distinction between wheat and
other supplies.1130 In London, his colleagues figured that the purchase of wheat futures
could not be too harmful. A wheat pool had been established in 1941, which negated
complaints from impecunious Allies who were incapable of entering the wheat market.
While the Dutch had already purchased considerable wheat, British officials thought the
Norwegians might be appeased if they were allowed to buy wheat futures too. So long as
the facility were not extended to other commodities, the British thought all of the Allies
should be permitted to use it.1131 On August 1, 1942, the Foreign Office sought the
approval of the State Department, which agreed.1132 While this decision went far to
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mollify the Norwegians, it hardly resolved Great Britain’s problems.
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On August 2,

1942, the one-month moratorium on all other purchases, which Acheson had imposed
upon the Netherlands and Norway, expired.1134
Without notifying the British, the Americans began designing proposals for the
coordination of postwar purchases. Only when Leith-Ross inquired regarding the wheat
futures did he learn of this activity.1135 The British now became concerned that the United
States would unilaterally dump their proposals on the Allies without even bothering to
consult them.1136 When the British sent a telegraph to Washington attempting to prevent
this possibility, they learned that this was precisely what the Americans intended to
do.1137 Acheson had planned to place the proposals before the Norwegian Ambassador to
the United States on August 10, 1942 and the other Allies shortly thereafter. Only
reluctantly did he agree to postpone delivery for 48 hours. If officials in London had
suggestions, Leith-Ross wrote, they needed to “send them immediately.” By the time this
message arrived in London along with an outline of the American proposal, the British
were left with a mere 24 hours to express their views.1138
The purchasing regime ignored the British Empire. It would apply exclusively to
the Western Hemisphere and be centralized in Washington. The Norwegians, and
possibly other Allied Governments, would be asked to notify the State Department of any
proposed purchases, listing the quantity, grades desired, delivery dates, price limits and
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the source of supply. American officials would then, in conjunction with the British
Embassy, consult the Food or Raw Materials Board to determine whether the items could
be procured and the procedure to be utilized.1139
Commodities would be placed in one of three categories, which would dictate
whether and how they could be procured. First, it would be forbidden to purchase
materials in short supply deemed vital for the war effort. Second, the purchase of items
not necessarily scarce, but that the Americans or British were buying or planning to
purchase, would have to be coordinated with and executed according to procedures set by
Washington. And finally, commodities in ample supply could be purchased freely. But to
participate, countries would have to provide a list of all items already purchased or under
contract, including the grade, quantities, and deliver dates.1140
The British reaction to the proposal speaks for itself. Officials worried, firstly,
that the United States would provide the Allies lists of commodities in ample supply,
which they could purchase freely. With the supply situation of commodities likely to
change rapidly, they thought it wise to withhold any such list. But more importantly, they
did not want to sell stocks of commodities they held in long supply, which were
considered a potential source of reserve currency. They also sought to protect themselves
against having to make requisitions. Secondly, they thought the Combined Shipping
Board should be given the opportunity to express its views on the purchases: the British
knew the shipping authorities would be more likely to block purchases. And finally, they
thought the interim procedure should be broadened to include purchases anywhere, not
only those in the Western Hemisphere. This suggestion served to avoid the appearance
1139
1140
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that Britain was not permitting purchases; to force the Americans to cooperate more
closely with London; and to secure control and influence over purchasing in the Western
Hemisphere.1141
These proposals annoyed the Americans. They had no plans to share lists of
commodities with the Allies and rejected the idea of giving the Combined Shipping
Board veto powers over purchases. The Norwegians, who provided considerable
shipping, would never accept this procedure, they argued, and it seemed unreasonable to
reject purchases on prospective shipping difficulties. While they agreed to include
purchases outside the Western Hemisphere, they only grudgingly accepted the British
formula requiring the Allies to notify British supply authorities of their purchases. Yet
they refused to include this procedure in the note to be conveyed to the Allied
Ambassadors, choosing to tell them “orally that it will probably be found convenient that
purchases in the Western Hemisphere are notified to the State Department and purchases
in the British Empire to London departments concerned.” The British begged the
Americans to hold the note to allow for time to study the proposals.1142
But they refused. On August 14, 1942, Hull shared the note with the
Norwegians,1143 a day before the British received it.1144 While British officials judged it
“sensible and satisfactory,” the Americans had neither consulted nor shared the procedure
with any of the Dominions, most importantly Canada. With Ottawa threatening to reduce
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aid to Britain if Canada were not allowed membership on the Combined Boards and
the Executive Committee of the relief organization, this failure threatened to exacerbate
tensions between the two countries. The Americans also refused to limit how much the
Allies could purchase, which increased Britain’s exposure to requisition procedures and
left them unwilling to sell stockpiles held in the British Empire. For Allies holding
Sterling reserves, this decision took “away in substance” what the American note
promised. The Americans also failed to extend the purchasing facilities to other Allies
until much later. The Belgians received the note at the end of September. The delays left
the Allies feeling they were not being treated equitably and Britain in the crosshairs of
their scorn.1145
By early winter, the purchasing procedures were in place.1146 The Americans
agreed that the note should be shared with the Dominions.1147 But apparently Acheson
and Hull obstructed British efforts to win further concessions on other aspects of the
American procedure. Sumner Welles intervened on London’s behalf: to prevent future
shipping problems, he secured an agreement permitting the allies to purchase no more
than a six-month supply. He also pledged to keep the British Embassy informed of all
purchase requests made with the State Department. No application would be forwarded to
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the Combined Boards, he explained, until Britain had been properly informed.
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In

this way, the British would be able to relay whatever information they obtained to Ottawa
when Canadian resources came in question. The British also prepared a parallel note on
purchases, which they transmitted to all of the Allies at once.1149 Yet they failed to avoid
the embarrassment of refusing to sell stocks in the British Empire while still suggesting
they were open for business.
Ironically, the Dutch submitted the first request to utilize the new facilities.1150
While the subject of Anglo-American concern, they escaped the wrath levied against the
Norwegians and continued their purchases. Apparently they ordered little in the Great
Britain. When they came under the scrutiny of the Anglo-American supply authorities,
they scratched their heads and procrastinated. The Dutch now wanted to try out the new
procedure before accepting it, and they refrained from responding to the American memo
until it became clear that the London agreed to the procedure as well. Within two days of
receiving the British note on purchases, the Dutch formally agreed to cooperate – two
months after the Americans delivered their memorandum and well after they had
completed most of their purchasing.1151 In time, all of the Allies would step into line. The
problem of independent procurement vanished.
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Relief and its Relationship to Reconstruction

So long as Sir Frederick endeavored to limit the proposed agency’s prerogatives
to relief, the British Treasury agreed that he could remain in Washington until an
agreement had been reached among the American departments.1152 But two weeks earlier,
he told Acheson that London might accept a “half-way” house between the Board of
Economic Warfare’s position and that of the American Treasury, which shared the views
of the British Treasury, but for different reasons.1153 While they agreed that aid from the
relief agency should come in the form of gifts, the American Treasury was not prepared
to commit to pay for reconstruction prematurely. Instead, they hoped to use gifts and
loans as carrots to win approval for America’s postwar economic plans. Like the British
Treasury, they did not want long-term reconstructions to become interminably bogged
down in an international organization, and they knew that their functional expertise
increased the likelihood that they would dominate the negotiations. Relief and
reconstruction should therefore remain separate.1154
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To bring the Treasury’s view in line with that of the Board of Economic
Warfare, Acheson prepared an alternative to the proposal provided by BEW on July 18,
1942.1155 His revision of Article I watered down their proposal, which gave the relief
organization powers to “implement the objectives of the United Nations as expressed in
the Atlantic Charter and United Nations declarations.”1156 This language would have
given the organization sweeping powers touching on almost every aspect of the postwar
order from security to economic affairs. Acheson rejected this version. While retaining
powers included in the original draft, namely, to “acquire, hold and convey property” and
“to enter into contracts and undertake obligations,” his new proposal gave the agency the
right to “designate or create agencies and to review the activities of agencies so created.”
It then enumerated the specific functions in a second paragraph, consisting of three parts:
one devoted to activities in recipient countries, one to the procurement of supplies, and
one to future planning for the United Nations.1157
The first section granted the agency the power to “plan, coordinate, administer or
arrange for the administration” of relief supplies, but it also stipulated what the
organization could provide and the circumstances under which it could get involved in
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reconstruction. The text permitted the agency the power to distribute “food, clothing,
and other basic necessities,” and to provide for “housing facilities, and medical and other
essential services.”1158 The construction of homes and the provision of essential services
implied a degree of reconstruction. But to the disappointment of Leith-Ross, it made no
provision for industrial reconstruction, though it implicitly permitted the agency to begin
rebuilding industries that might provide relief supplies.1159 As Acheson explained, the
agency could reconstruct firms in Poland’s lumber industry if it provided material for
housing, but it could not support companies seeking to export.1160 Here Sir Frederick
failed to obtain for the agency any additional powers over industrial reconstruction, but
managed to get fuel and transportation included in the list of supplies and services the
agency could provide.1161
To Sir Frederick’s dismay, the second section provided the organization very little
control over procurement. Apart from its right to acquire materials, it would be allowed
to “formulate and recommend measures for… the coordination of purchasing, the
chartering of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation
1158
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But these arrangements disregarded the issue of independent

purchases during the war, and failed to stipulate machinery to coordinate the purchase
and allocation of supplies after the war. The agency would have to seek authority from its
members to play a role here.1163 For British supply authorities, who wanted to know the
organization’s relationship with Anglo-American supply machinery, and whether these
arrangements would persist after the war, this issue had been front and center.1164 LeithRoss and others thought more international machinery would be required, but the
Americans had no intention of surrendering control over their resources. As such, Sir
Frederick believed the agency would not be able “to take effective action.”1165
Sir Frederick also came up short with respect to the controversial third section,
which Acheson prepared to appease the Board of Economic Warfare while not offending
the Treasury. It gave the agency the power “to formulate and recommend for individual
or joint action… measures with respect to related matters” arising out of the experience
of “planning and performing the work of relief and rehabilitation.” While the nebulous
phrase “related matters” was used instead of “long-term reconstruction” to avoid
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provoking Congress, the section also stipulated that any proposals would have to be
approved “by unanimous vote of the Policy Committee.”1166 In this way, Washington
could block undesirable proposals. Even with the veto procedures, Leith-Ross thought the
proposal went too far, as did his colleagues in London.1167 It would be embarrassing to
obstruct the desires of other great powers, particularly the United States, they thought.1168
Sir Frederick tried to secure changes, but here again he failed.1169
Yet he still believed Britain should accept these provisions. While everyone
recognized that Article VII negotiations had to begin before the wider aspects of
reconstruction could be taken up, public opinion in the United States remained more
disposed to provide relief than to understand complex problems such as remedying
exchange difficulties. The purpose of the final section of the Article I, Leith-Ross
explained, was to provide interim measures should action not be taken elsewhere. And if
actions were taken, he maintained that measures would be required to coordinate them
with relief efforts.1170 Keynes, in fact, had been discussing the sell of relief supplies in
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liberated territories to mop up excess liquidity.
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Presumably efforts of this nature

would have to be synchronized with plans for long-term reconstruction. But if Britain
opposed using the relief agency for such purposes, the draft provided an opportunity to
veto such proposals.1172
Leith-Ross highlighted the dangers of placing relief and reconstruction in separate
watertight compartments. After the last war, the failure to consider relief and industrial
production as a single problem led to the depreciation of exchanges, which in turn,
precipitated revolutionary conditions in Europe. It would be foolish, he argued, to
encourage the Americans to consider these two facets of the postwar world separately.1173
It would play into the hands of elements in Washington prepared to provide relief at no
cost to starving people, but who wanted cash or at least repayment for anything else.1174
The Board of Economic Warfare, Sir Frederick explained, stood opposed to this view.
Despite their injudicious methods, individuals like Milo Perkins and Winfield Riefler
would be Britain’s greatest allies when it comes to Article VII. It would be wise to
encourage them, Sir Frederick argued, by agreeing to the formula provided in Article I.
Britain should capitalize on American goodwill and leave open its extension to
reconstruction.1175
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Setbacks on Decentralization and the Emergence of a new British Strategy

If Leith-Ross considered the New Dealers potential allies in the Article VII
negotiations, they did not help him in his efforts to decentralize the relief agency’s
operations. At the very moment when Leith-Ross thought the issue had been settled
among the Americans, Riefler and Appleby launched a further attack on the regional
committees. Riefler so disliked them that he preferred their deletion altogether. Appleby
worried that the drafting of Article III of the agreement suggested a degree of freedom for
the regional committees not granted to the technical committees.1176 While the agreement
stipulated how members of the technical committees would be chosen – the Policy
Committee would nominate them for approval by the Council – it said nothing of this sort
with respect to the regional committees. Of course Leith-Ross preferred this distinction:
the members of the Inter-Allied Committee, which would become the European regional
committee, had been chosen. 1177 This drafting implied independence and legitimacy.
Hostile to this idea, the Americans proposed a new Article III. Instead of
providing two paragraphs, one each for the technical and regional committees, it grouped
them together under the rubric “standing committees” of the Council. It described no
procedure for choosing their members, except that they would come from the Council,
unless an individual with competence in a given functional area were needed. Leith-Ross,
who thought appointments should reside with governments, protested. But Acheson
thwarted him. The draft, he explained at the final meeting of the Interdepartmental
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Committee on August 11, 1942, provided that the committees would be made up of
“members of the Council, or their alternates, representing the member governments
directly concerned.” Although the new draft still stated that the Inter-Allied Committee
would become the regional committee for Europe, it not only made it clear that its powers
would be advisory; it established its subservience to the Council.1178
These changes would be unacceptable to the Allied Governments, Leith-Ross
argued, but he realized the futility of his efforts.1179 He came to believe the Allies would
protest, and that decentralization would “more likely to be achieved through the pressure
of events and the need for prompt action than by discussions now.” He advised his
government to wage no protest at the moment. Why waste ammunition when others will
surely wage the battle on Britain’s behalf? If necessary, the United Kingdom could
always submit amendments later.1180 Indeed his colleagues in London were arriving at
similar conclusions, though several of them remained unconvinced that the proposal was
anything other than a “façade to screen the Director General.”1181 Leith-Ross tried to
allay fears by arguing that the arrangement drew upon American constitutional practice.
“It has not been easy to get agreement on the maintenance of the Inter-Allied Committee
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in London,” he asserted.
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It would be wise to show restraint. But the shrewdest

officials, notably John Maynard Keynes, remained unconvinced.1183
The wait-and-see approach may have seemed practical, but it revealed a degree of
wishful thinking. From the start, the Russians had emphasized the importance of drawing
a fine line between the policy-making functions of the organization and the operational
side, and the Americans never passed up an opportunity to inform them that the Soviet
proposals influenced their ideas on this matter. The Russians also hated the Inter-Allied
Committee and remained determined to sabotage it. Maisky informed Keynes of this in
early July.1184 As a result, it seemed unlikely that the Soviet Union would support any
scheme that increased the executive powers of the regional committees. Unless the
Chinese embraced the British view – an unlikely event in view of China’s dependence on
the United States for wartime material – London had little chance of achieving its
objective. Even if the Allies protested, changes remained doubtful if the Americans,
Chinese and Russians all opposed decentralization. Leith-Ross, who was well aware of
the Soviet position, remained unconvinced.1185
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The Russian Views Begins to Emerge

The Russian view of the early draft agreements remains difficult to ascertain
without access to Soviet documents, but their thinking can be deduced with some
precision by assessing their behavior and conversations with American and British
officials. Until August 1942, the Russians had had few discussions with the Americans
about postwar relief. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States,
admitted he was unfamiliar with the topic. Ivan Maisky, their Ambassador to Great
Britain, played the central role for Russia. He doggedly implemented his Government’s
refusal to have any relationship with the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War
Requirements, and managed the diplomacy surrounding the January 1942 Soviet proposal
for an international relief organization. If this document constituted an obstructionist
ploy, then it makes little sense to assign it much significance when determining
Moscow’s attitude toward the American plan. The first hints of Russia’s position
emerged in July during interviews Maisky conducted with Anthony Eden and John
Maynard Keynes.
The session with Keynes revealed more than the meeting with Eden. Maisky
informed the Foreign Secretary that he supported the four-power Policy Committee. He
also voiced opposition to establishing the organization in Washington. 1186 But with
Keynes, he argued that it would be “a mistake to unite planning and policy with the
operating body.”1187 This procedure had not been followed with the Soviet State Planning
Committee, or Gosplan, as he put it, and it had been a “great mistake.” The task of
1186
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allocating supplies between different applicants and that of organizing purchase,
transport, and distribution would require different skills and contacts. The former, as
Keynes described the Ambassador’s view, involved “high politics.” “It does not much
matter who is the engine-driver for the supplies, if their destination has been settled
elsewhere.” Maisky consequently displayed an open mind towards the question of who
would distribute relief in a given country. It might be the occupying army, the incoming
government, or the relief agency, depending on circumstances and opportunity.1188
When describing the Ambassador’s position, Keynes left the interpretation of it
open to the reader. “You will see the inwardness of it without my having to say any
more.” If the Soviet Government embraced the position of Maisky, he insinuated, then its
greatest concern was readily apparent. Moscow would want resources directed to areas of
primary interests to the Soviet Union, and on the receiving end it would insist upon no
interference from the individuals responsible for the allocation of supplies. The problem,
as Keynes analyzed it, was that this view ran counter to the position of the Director
General, which “seems to presuppose something else.”1189 His colleague at the Treasury,
Richard Hopkins, identified the same problem. “There is obviously a question of high
politics lurking in this matter. One of the questions at any rate is whether Russia… will
fall for this. I should have expected that Russia would wish to be administrator of relief in
Eastern European countries.” 1190 But Leith-Ross believed it would be impossible to
divorce allocation and delivery completely. Supplying countries, particularly the United

1188

Keynes to Ronald, July 8, 1942, FO 371/31501, PRO.
Ibid.
1190
R.V.N.H. [Hopkins], “Telegram Relief 11 and 12,” July 16, 1942, T160/1404/4,
PRO.
1189

433
States, would not provide their resources without a voice in regard to their
distribution.1191
When Maisky received a copy of the relief plan on July 23, 1942, his opinion
hardened.1192 Yet much of his critique revolved around facts not explicitly stated in the
draft proposal. As he told Eden on August 12, 1942, he was “far from convinced that the
headquarters of the proposed organization should be in Washington, still less that the
Director-General should necessarily be an American.” No article of the agreement made
any mention of such arrangements. But taken with what was stated, the plan frightened
Maisky. The Director-General would be an individual of “enormous importance,” he
forewarned, and he would have the “right to appoint his own staff.” “This,” he cautioned,
“might mean that the majority of the staff might well be American, too.” If the DirectorGeneral then had responsibility for both the planning and execution of relief schemes, the
United States could dominate the organization. Eden, who admitted his unfamiliarity with
the relief proposal, asked Gladwyn Jebb to address Maisky’s concerns.1193
Jebb’s reply did little to comfort the Russian. When he alluded to Washington’s
preeminence in resources, a fact that made it difficult to resist “an American claim to
preside over the machinery for relief distribution,” Maisky countered that it would be
“equally logical to maintain that those which had the greatest sacrifices in the Allied
cause should be those which had the greatest say in relief policy and administration.” Yet
his anxiety betrayed his awareness of brute realities: past sacrifice in no way guarantees
future influence. Jebb claimed that the proposed organization did not but should have

1191

Telegram No. 3701, Relief No. 13, DC to FO, July 14, 1942, FO 371/31501, PRO.
Ronald to Maisky, July 23, 1942, FO 371/31501, PRO.
1193
Eden to Kerr, August 12, 1942, T160/1404/5, PRO.
1192

434
regional directors and councils with “full and recognized powers both of policy and
execution.” Maisky welcomed this proposal as a step in the right direction, but said it
failed to address his main concern. “It might well be that the Americans would hold that
because they commanded the resources they should therefore in the last resort dictate
policy.” “That argument,” he asserted, “should be vigorously resisted.”1194
Eden tried to convince Maisky of the important role the United States would have
to play. He expressed his fear that the American people might fail to shoulder their
responsibilities as they had done after the last war. Anything that convinced them not to
“run out of the peace” was good. Maisky seemed to accept the idea that the Americans
would necessarily have a major say in what funds were apportioned and how they would
be allocated between the various areas of relief. But cynicism and ideology consumed
him. It would be foolish, he asserted, not to assume that the Roosevelt Administration
would be replaced by “some ill-disposed Republican regime.” “The idea that Wall Street
would get control of the Relief Organization filled him with dismay.” If the agency were
constituted along American lines, “it would provide a very potent weapon for American
imperialists, who might attempt to put a pistol to the head of the various smaller nations
and say that unless they agreed to the American policies they would get no relief.”1195
There is no indication that Maisky expressed the views of his Government, but
there is plenty of reason to believe he shared his opinions with Moscow, which became
the Russian policy. On August 20, 1942, Litvinov requested a meeting with Acheson. As
the Assistant Secretary was preparing to depart for vacation, Adolf Berle fielded a “string
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of questions” from the Russian Government. Moscow viewed the relief proposal with
brute realism. As such, Litvinov made not one single inquiry about the Council or the
Policy Committee. He wanted to know, first and foremost, where the organization would
be situated, and the location from which the Director General would operate. Who would
appoint this individual, he asked, and from what nation would he come? The Americans
had never informed the Russians of their plan to seat the agency in Washington, nor had
they made it clear that an American would serve as Director General. Maisky must have
learned these facts from Keynes. While Berle confirmed these plans for Litvinov, he
imputed them to British desires.1196 Acheson, however, curiously attributed the idea of an
American Director General to both Great Britain and the Soviet Union.1197
The Russians were looking for areas where they could drive a wedge between
London and Washington. Litvinov wanted to know whether the relief proposal
incorporated British suggestions. Berle and Acheson wisely evaded the question, but
made it clear that the draft of August 13, 1942 was “American.” With this non-specific
reply, Litvinov struggled to identify disputes that could be exploited to Russia’s
advantage. At this juncture, there appeared to be no divisions over the composition of the
Policy Committee, and Litvinov, as we have seen, didn’t even raise the question. With
one exception, the Soviet Union’s belief that the policy and operational aspects of the
relief problem should be distinct from one another squared well with the American view.
The regional committees, Berle confirmed, would only be advisory. The Director General
would preside over the Policy Committee, but would not vote in its decisions. It was
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nonetheless conceivable that members of the Director General’s staff might come
from the Council, though Acheson admitted that no thought had even been given to this
idea.1198
The Russians wanted to maximize their influence, minimize threats to their
interests, and obtain as many resources as possible. Circumventing and surveying the
Director General were means to these ends. After learning that the Director General
would not be permitted a vote on the Policy Council, which would have given him more
power to influence where and how resources would be dispensed, Litvinov inquired
whether there would be Deputy Director Generals? As we will see, his Government
hoped to place Russians at the highest levels of the organization. The Ambassador also
asked how the members of the various committees would be chosen. Here, too, his
Government wanted to ensconce in key places individuals friendly to the Soviet Union.
Most revealing, Litvinov wanted to know who would determine the sums that might be
required of local governments. But he left the United States out of the equation. Would it
be the regional committees or the local governments, he asked? Berle replied that it was
difficult “to see how any government would give any committee a blank check on its
treasury.” “Presumptively, negotiations with the local government were indicated.”
Acheson agreed.1199
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Preparing for the Next Stage

After months of maneuvering, Acheson laid out procedures for the endgame. The
draft agreement, he told Leith-Ross, would be put before the departments involved in the
discussions for final approval. Once their acquiescence had been obtained, he would send
the document to Roosevelt, seeking his agreement to formally share it with the British,
Chinese and Russians. Your presence at that meeting, he told Sir Frederick, would
“probably be desirable.” However, formal discussions among the four great powers
would not place: if disagreements arose, they would have to be resolved informally to
avoid publicity. Once this process had played out, the United States would communicate
the draft to the United Nations, with the intention of calling a conference sometime after
the November 1942 elections. In the meantime, various other aspects of planning would
continue, but he told Leith-Ross that discussions on coordinating these activities with
London should be avoided for the moment to prevent additional roadblocks to achieving
a consensus in the American government.1200
Events unfolded much as Acheson planned, but not without delays. On August
11, 1942, the interdepartmental committee met for the last time. The group made several
legalistic changes to the draft, the most important of which permitted the Free French to
sign the agreement. Harry Dexter White also convinced the committee to add provisions
requiring the Director General to make periodic reports “with a view to securing merited
and valuable publicity.” But he made it clear that the Treasury could not sign off on the
draft until the Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, had reviewed it. Leith-Ross maintained that
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his “personal approval of the draft” in no way precluded his government “from
raising questions of detail.” The status of the regional committees worried him
immensely. The “European Allied governments would not like the present form.” His
“mental reservations” aside, he would not “press his objections.” At this juncture, the
New Dealers constituted the greatest threat. The Vice President wanted the draft
considered at the next meeting of the Board of Economic Warfare. Acheson demurred. I
“hope it will not be necessary to delay presentation of the draft to the President to that
extent.”1201
Two days later, Milo Perkins informed Acheson that the Board of Economic
Warfare would consider the draft on August 18, 1942. The Assistant Secretary was
invited, but the message was unambiguous: they would consider the draft with or without
him.1202 Thus at 10 AM on that day, Acheson defended the relief agreement before a
meeting of the Board in Henry Wallace’s office on Capital Hill. Miraculously, the New
Dealers presented no opposition. But because the jury included departments excluded
from the interdepartmental committee, Acheson faced opposition. The Under Secretary of
War, Robert Patterson, objected to Article IV of the draft on grounds that the
“relationship of responsibility of the armed forces and the Director General following
reoccupation” lacked clarity. Those present jumped on the bandwagon and Wallace asked
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Acheson to change the draft to meet their concerns.
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The new version of Article IV

stipulated that “while hostilities or other military necessities exist in any area,” the “relief
administration and its director general shall not undertake activities therein without the
consent of the Military Commander in that area.”1204
This change was inevitable. Three days prior to Acheson’s meeting with the
BEW, Leith-Ross had received a telegram from the Foreign Office stating that British
military authorities had problems with Article IV as well. They were planning to
undertake emergency relief operations and the relationship between the relief
organization and the occupying militaries required clarification. Leith-Ross was therefore
instructed to clear up the matter “at once.” 1205 The American War Department’s
intervention evoked applause in London, especially among officials at the Treasury, who
assumed that relief distributed by the British military would qualify for lend-lease. For
this reason, numerous officials in London hoped that the occupying militaries would
maintain responsibility for relief as long as possible.1206 According to Acheson, the
American War Department agreed with this idea, but he thought it somewhat unrealistic.
The soldiers on the ground carrying out this work, he insinuated, would want to come
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home. He also evinced concern that the American military, unlike their British
counterparts, had done nothing to begin preparing for emergency relief operations.1207
In August, another relationship of critical importance remained unresolved. For
weeks, officials in the British Ministries of Food, Supply and War Transport had been
criticizing the draft agreement for its failure to address the problems of procurement and
supply allocation. According to one complaint, U.S. authorities were not “giving enough
weight to the need for making full use of existing agencies.”1208 British authorities
worried that the relief organization might undermine the Combined Boards, which had
been established to centralize procurement and coordinate resource allocations with
Allied war strategy. Article IV of the draft agreement empowered the Director General to
create an emergency organization to purchase and assemble supplies. “It would be more
than unfortunate,” one official wrote, “if the Director-General did in fact create” a rival
“organization, particularly while hostilities were still continuing in some parts of the
world.” If this occurred, the agency might become a competitor in a field where
authorities had been working to eliminate competition and prevent uncoordinated
purchasing.1209
These officials wanted the organization’s relationship with the existing supply
agencies defined precisely. In their view, the agency should be a client of the Combined
Boards just as the Ministries of Food, Supply and War Transport, which were required to
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submit their requirements and proposed purchases for approval by the Boards.
Otherwise the agency would compete for the same supplies and shipping resources
without any coordination. In constructing an emergency procurement organization, the
Director General would duplicate existing machinery and make demands on scarce
personnel. If the matter were not “settled at the present stage,” British officials worried
that the Americans might use the relief agreement to unilaterally assume responsibility
for the procurement and allocation of supplies.1210 Officials may also have feared these
arrangements would invite other Allies into the decision-making process. Either outcome
would dilute Britain’s influence. These concerns, in fact, influenced the decision to recall
Leith-Ross for consultations before possible four-power talks.1211
Sir Frederick’s reaction to these worries must not have been reassuring. While the
Americans agreed that the relief agency would have to be “linked up” with the Combined
Boards, Acheson thought it ill advised to hold up the draft to resolve the problem.1212
Leith-Ross concurred, but in missives to various British officials he rejected the idea that
current supply arrangements could persist after the war. If the Combined Boards
remained a bilateral affair, the Allies would regard them as instruments of “AngloAmerican imperialism rather than of international cooperation.” Membership on the
Boards would have to be widened. The “United Kingdom and perhaps also the United
States” would “have to submit their own supplies and shipping programs to the control of
this International Organization.” If Sir Frederick’s belief that such arrangements would
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be accepted illustrates a certain disconnect with reality, his contention that “it should
not be difficult for us to get our way” exhibits an equal degree of wishful thinking. His
colleagues had refused to submit any programs to the Inter-Allied Committee, and the
Americans had obstructed most if not all of his ideas for the relief organization.1213
By the third week of August, Acheson had secured agreement to the draft from all
of the departments involved. The Treasury and the Department of Agriculture consented
to its terms. Oscar Cox of the Lend-Lease Administration convinced his boss, Edward
Stettinius, to accept the draft, but he thought Roosevelt should not announce it until it had
the authority to execute it: doubtless he hoped the Lend-Lease Act might provide a means
to this end.1214 Most importantly, the New Dealers had accepted the agreement. If the
Board of Economic Warfare erected barriers from the beginning, the meeting of August
18, 1942 in the Vice President’s office proved a boon. Not only did it permit Acheson an
opportunity to secure support from the Army and Navy, he could now legitimately argue
to the President that all of the relevant departments in his Administration were on board,
including the Departments of Justice and Commerce as well as the Bureau of the Budget
and the War Production Board.1215 In view of the rancorous warfare that so often beset
Roosevelt’s Administration, this work constitutes a significant achievement.
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Acheson was pleased. “With the drafting of the memoranda on the subject of
the United Nations Relief Authority completed,” he explained to Appleby, “I am
planning to turn to the question of making interim arrangements now for doing whatever
is necessary on the administrative side to carry out our plans for action in this field.”1216
He had laid the groundwork. On August 7, 1942, he presented the draft to the economics
subcommittee. The group accepted the plan and laid out a framework to study
requirements and available supplies. As suggested by one of Acheson’s assistants, H.
Julian Waldeigh, five committees were established to focus on food, agricultural
rehabilitation, clothing, health, and essential services and industries. Relevant agencies
and departments of the government were assigned to the each group. The committee
postponed the creation of groups to study the controversial topics of personnel and
finance.1217 The established structure nonetheless provided Leith-Ross points with which
to formalize coordination with the Inter-Allied Committee, which he arranged during his
final days in Washington.1218
He also sought cooperation in creating a coffee pool for postwar relief. As he
wrote Herbert Feis in early July, a number of South American countries were “sterilizing
substantial quantities of ‘sacrifice’ coffee for which there [was] no market.” These
supplies, along with those in the United States, could be pooled using arrangements
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Any effort along these lines, Leith-Ross

told Acheson and other officials, would assure the Allies that actions were being taken,
provide opportunities for propaganda, and ensure markets for coffee-producing countries
after the war. Acheson agreed that his colleagues should discuss the matter with the
Leith-Ross. In turn, they decided to enter into discussions with Brazil, the only South
American country with significant coffee surpluses. Brazil declared war on the Axis
Powers at the end of August. Washington was eager to reward their fellow combatant.1220
But this initiative could hardly be viewed as anything more than a token effort to color
Sir Frederick’s discussions with success. For starving populations, coffee provides no
calories.
While these discussions unfolded, Adolf Berle’s subcommittee continued its
preparations for Eastern Europe. For good reason, much has been made of American
efforts to use the Western Hemisphere as an exemplar for the postwar world, but at this
juncture, the planners hoped that Eastern Europe might serve as a model as well,
particularly the region’s relationship with the United Nations organizations. Berle’s
subcommittee hoped the relief organization would restore nutrition standards to prewar
levels, and that subsequent UN reconstruction efforts would augment them by at least ten
percent. Everyone agreed that this objective would require an increase in agricultural
production, and that this objective would allow for exports to provide the exchange
currency needed to import consumer goods from Western Europe and the United States.
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The Department of Agriculture was therefore asked to study and propose
development projects for the region. The capital needed to fund such endeavors would
come from a United Nations Bank, perhaps along the lines of the Treasury proposals of
Harry Dexter White.1221
While ambition propelled the United States, the gravity of Sir Frederick’s sessions
in Ottawa forced British officials into a slow retreat on the composition of the Policy
Committee. “If the U.S. would be ready to agree to a Canadian Member, it seems a pity
that we should raise objections,” wrote one Treasury official.1222 The possibility that the
billion-dollar gift might not be renewed worried everyone. Reporting on a meeting with
Clifford Clark, Sir Frederick Phillips of the Treasury claimed that the attitude of the
Canadian government towards the renewal of the billion-dollar gift was colored “by
strong resentment… at [the] exclusion of Canada from [the] Combined Boards and… the
Relief Council.”1223 The Dominions Office suggested that Leith-Ross disassociate Britain
from the American agreement in a conversation with the Canadian delegation to
Washington.1224 The Foreign Office agreed and Sir Frederick informed Pearson that the
American draft in no way prejudiced London’s views on the Policy Committee.1225
For many officials, especially in the British Treasury, obtaining representation for
the exiled governments was unimportant. “I doubt very much whether it is worth getting
ourselves mixed up by granting representation to the various rump Governments of the
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invaded countries now,” one Treasury official wrote. “When the time comes we may
find we have a quite different lot to deal with.” In the short run, resources and finance
remained far more important. In the long run, something else could possibly be arranged.
“The essentials of Post War Relief seem to me to be to get a good contribution out of the
United States, to keep the scheme short – say one or two years, and to have ready a
practical organization for obtaining and forwarding food to Europe. The precise degree of
representation of European interests on the Government body is an ornamental
consideration.” Keynes wholeheartedly agreed with this assessment.1226
But this opinion was neither the case with Canada nor with any of the other
dominions. From the Treasury’s point of view, the matter turned on resources and
finance: Ottawa, in particular, had to be managed carefully. The Dominions Secretary,
Clement Attlee, saw the issue in a much broader context. He worried about any policy
that might lead to the disintegration of the British Commonwealth. Britain’s position on
the four-power committee, he argued in a letter to Eden, would “have to be considered
not in relation to Canada only, but to Australia… and to New Zealand and the Union [of
South Africa].” For this reason, he thought it would be premature to commit Britain “to a
policy which in effect would lend our full weight to the exclusion of the Dominions from
the Committee.”1227 Weeks earlier, the British had received a letter from the Australian
High Commissioner to London, Stanley Bruce, in which he evinced increased interest in
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the issue on the part of his government. Though Australia had made no claim to
membership on the four-power committee at this juncture, the situation would change.1228

What shall we tell the Allies?

Leith-Ross worried about the Allied governments in exile. They had been
excluded from the Washington discussions, and the draft agreement that emerged looked
as though it would offend them. It denied the Europeans membership on the Policy
Committee and permitted few outlets for them to influence the organization. Sir
Frederick therefore believed they might attempt to derail the agreement. A harsh reaction,
he feared, could also hurt wartime and postwar cooperation. The possibility of
disintegration also threatened the Inter-Allied Committee. But quite possibly, Leith-Ross
reasoned, Allied objections to America’s postwar relief plans might lead the Americans
to change the draft to accord with Britain’s desires. For this reason, Leith-Ross hoped to
share the draft agreement with the Allies sooner rather than later. But the Americans
refused and Sir Frederick needed to know what he could tell the Allies. He wanted
maximum freedom.
On August 20, 1942, Leith-Ross put the ball in Acheson’s hands. What could he
tell the Allies, he asked the Assistant Secretary? “They would expect me to make some
report,” and they would probably have a “good idea of what was in the wind.” Tell them
that you have covered the whole ground with the American administration, Acheson
replied, but explain that the administration did not think the time was opportune to set up
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a relief organization. Leith-Ross protested: this would not be “at all appropriate.” It
would confirm “their view that nothing was being done and would strengthen forces in
favor of independent action.” Instead, they should be informed that the Americans were
“very much interested in the preparation of plans for an international relief organization,
that they were working out a tentative scheme which would be put before the Allied
Governments as soon as possible for their consideration with a view to a Conference
being held later in the year.” Acheson disagreed. Hull did not want to commit the United
States to a conference until it became clear that the war had turned in the Allies favor.1229
Two days later, Leith-Ross pleaded with the Secretary of State. “The people in the
European countries now in German subjugation would be disheartened in carrying on the
struggle unless they could get assurances that Great Britain, the United States and other
countries would be prepared to furnish relief.”1230 But Hull refused to bend. The risks of
agitating opponents of the Administration remained too high. They would argue that the
Roosevelt Administration sought to “squander American resources on postwar relief”
instead of exerting “all their energies to the winning of the war first.” Hull did not want a
repeat of 1918. Woodrow Wilson had made promises that public opinion would not
support. Leith-Ross recounted his arguments and argued. “If the first step was considered
so difficult to get across to public opinion, what would be the position when we came to
the practical question of commitments?” The Secretary replied that it did not matter. The
Allies had two choices. They could accept America’s stance and cooperate during the
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war, or they could choose “Nazi domination.” They could embrace America’s
postwar plans, or “accept anarchy.”1231 In short, they had no choice but to go along.
With the Americans in control and Hull refusing to go on record in support of a
relief conference, what could Sir Frederick do? He argued that leaks were already taking
place. Acheson replied that this “could not be helped.”1232 Leith-Ross warned that the
organization might not be ready in time. Hull acknowledge this possibility, but
considered it wiser to run this risk than to endanger the entire endeavor through
premature announcements.1233 The underlying message, Sir Frederick wrote home to
London, was “that relief policy should be decided by the Secretary of State and by no one
else.” Hull, in fact, dictated what Leith-Ross could tell the Allies: he should report that he
had undertook informal discussions in Washington; the U.S. Administration was
interested in postwar relief; they were assembling the relevant factors and formulating
plans to be communicated to the Allies at the appropriate time; but the timing of action
would depend on the war situation and there should be no publicity at the present
time.1234
Sir Frederick watched in dismay as he saw the fault lines of the Roosevelt
Administration surface before his very eyes. Acheson presented Hull the latest draft with
the amendment from the War Department. It now had the approval of all the relevant
individuals and bureaucracies, he explained, including the New Dealers and the Vice
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President. As such, it was ready for the President’s consideration, but Henry Wallace
wanted to attend the meeting with Roosevelt. The Secretary disliked the Vice President
and could not conceal his irritation.1235 For Leith-Ross, this evoked worry. “Support for
the plan from the New Dealers accentuates [Hull’s] apprehensions,” he wrote the Foreign
Office. The Secretary did not propose a date for his meeting with the President and he
“did not propose to take me along… as originally intended.” He didn’t even appear to
support the present draft.1236 Acheson tried to reassure Leith-Ross. Hull’s behavior, he
explained, should be attributed to caution rather than opposition to the agreement.1237
Acheson was not lying, but his advice to Leith-Ross kept him away from the
White House. He told him to go on a vacation. After all, he had planned one for himself.
Do not cancel your trip to Denver, he counseled the British Treasury Official. The
Secretary needs time to think about things and it is best not to pressure him.1238 But as
soon as Sir Frederick boarded his plane, Hull requested an appointment with Roosevelt.
Set for August 28, 1942, the meeting ironically would not take place until Sir Frederick
was back in Washington. 1239 But with Acheson now out of town, Leith-Ross was
unaware of what was taking place. On September 2, 1942, Hull and Wallace met the
President. Roosevelt accepted the draft agreement, and agreed that it should be formally
communicated to China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Under the influence of Hull
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and Wallace, who were in agreement for once, the President insisted that the plan
should not be announced at the present time. It would simply serve as the basis for future
discussions. He also authorized a statement for Leith-Ross to deliver to the Allies.1240
Leith-Ross protested the authorized text.1241 Before his departure for Denver, he
had translated Hull’s proposals into a positive statement.1242 But the State Department
sent an alternative proposal with Hull to the White House, which, according to LeithRoss, read as though the United States had gone back on the proposals of May 11. “Little
progress had been made,” he complained to Ray Atherton, head of the European Division
at the State Department and one of Hull’s closest advisors. These issues were “very vital
in Europe… and it would be very disheartening to the people of Europe… if some
definite announced plan for relief could not be reported.”1243 He then penned a letter to
Acheson. “The last thing that His Majesty’s Government wished to do was to cause any
embarrassment to the Administration; and if this statement represented the furthest that
the Administration felt able to go vis-à-vis the Allied Governments, I should have to
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make the best of it. But it seem to me that some of the phrases would be a cold
douche to the Allied Governments.”1244
One State Department official shared Sir Frederick’s view. When Harry Hawkins
read the text, he expressed doubts. “This telegram strikes me as leaning so far on the
cautious side as almost to throw cold water on the whole idea,” he wrote. “Such vague
phrases as the one to the effect that many of the factors relevant to the post-war situation
cannot be foreseen,” and “that formal negotiations might result in unnecessary
controversy over detail, is the kind of language which diplomats often use gently to inter
a proposal.” To restrict the Administration’s activity to “the immediate war effort,” he
argued, gives the impression that the American government is either unwilling or
incapable of foreseeing and preparing for future problems, which is “contrary to fact.”
Language of this sort, he added, would put up road blocks to taking up any “post-war
question as long as the war is on.” As such, it “tends to confirm and strengthen the
occasional superficial criticism which it is intended to meet” – that the United States was
doing nothing.1245
Why did the State Department propose the statement as opposed to the more
positive but rather innocuous language of Leith-Ross, and why did the most powerful
men in the American government, including Franklin Roosevelt, accept it? The answer
remains difficult to ascertain, but the record leaves possibilities. The Americans, to be
sure, had legitimate reasons for wanting to avoid publicity and delay formal action on
postwar relief. Woodrow Wilson’s failures after the First World War weighed heavily in
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their calculations. Hull had made it clear that he did not want matters to get out in
front of public opinion. With Congressional elections looming and the war effort going
badly, this approach seemed wise. Yet the statement might have achieved the same
objectives without sending counterproductive impressions to the Allies. It might have left
Leith-Ross in a better position vis-à-vis the exiled governments. It could have suggested
more definitely that concrete actions had been taking place and would continue to occur.
Perhaps the Americans wanted to send a clear message to Leith-Ross. In late July,
the British held firm against Acheson’s reaction to their decision to retract the rationing
statement.1246 Leith-Ross refrained from sharing London’s stiff reply with the Americans.
But with Hull apparently wavering, he reminded the Americans on September 1, 1942
that Britain’s decision to maintain rationing would depend on the relief agreement.1247
Spiteful though it may seem, the Americans, particularly Roosevelt, who had welcomed
the statement and agreed to support it before the press, may have wanted to suggest that
they could be equally obstinate and that they had no intention of caving into pressures
from the British. In short, they would make the decisions on timing. Sir Frederick
certainly left his meeting with Cordell Hull under this impression. Yet if the Americans
hoped to send such a message, it seems bizarre that they would utilize language that
reflected so poorly on them and that might cause disintegration, particularly after they
had spent so much time working to discourage independent Allied purchases.
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Maybe the Americans simply hoped to undermine the Inter-Allied Committee
for Post-War Requirements. With officials in London urging Leith-Ross to move ahead
in setting up the Committee, he requested Acheson’s permission to establish
subcommittees for nutrition, medical services and inland transport. Virtually no work had
been done to consider how supplies would reach target populations, while nutrition
experts and public health officials worried that Britain would not have assembled the
requisite supplies to combat malnutrition and heed off pandemic once the liberation of
Europe began.1248 But if the Americans intended to prevent these efforts, as they had
successfully done in June, their approach backfired.1249 Once Atherton informed LeithRoss of the approved statement, Sir Frederick moved ahead aggressively.1250 He made it
clear that his efforts to develop the Inter-Allied Committee were a direct result of “the
probable delay in setting up any United Nations Organization.”1251 Acheson had no
choice but to allow Leith-Ross to proceed, but in subsequent meetings with Sir
Frederick’s aid, Harold Caustin, the Americans ensured that they would be regularly
informed of everything that was taking place in London.1252
American behavior encouraged Leith-Ross to reach out to the Soviet Union as
well. Throughout his stay in Washington, he had only once met with the Soviet
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Ambassador yet on September 1, 1942, after it had become apparent that the
Americans had no intention of addressing his concerns, he reached out to Maxim
Litvinov. 1253 Despite his obvious antipathy for the Russians, he duly noted the
Ambassador’s offer. “‘After all,’ Mr. Litvinov explained with a lecherous smile and a
pawky wave of his hand, ‘we are now Allies and we must act together. It may be that my
Government would not wish to raise objections to the American draft but would be
willing to support your Government if they wished to suggest some modifications.’”
Leith-Ross described his concerns: the relationship between relief and reconstruction, the
constitution of the Policy Committee, and the powers of the regional committees.1254
The Americans may have hoped to undercut possible leaks through their
statement, and they definitely wanted to keep Leith-Ross, who was prone to be
independent, on a short leash. With the effort riding on Congressional support, worry
over the Inter-Allied Committee or the Soviet Union was secondary. The Americans
knew well that no country would have much choice but to cooperate with Washington
after the war. Hull made this clear to Leith-Ross on September 2, 1942. Even Litvinov
had come to accept the central tenants of the American plan – those that Maisky so
despised – that it would be centered in Washington and run by an American. However
lecherous he may have appeared to Sir Frederick, he was not seeking British support for
Soviet modifications; he was offering Soviet support in the event that Britain desired
changes.1255 In view of the resources that would be needed to liberate and rebuild Europe,
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no country on the continent – including the Soviet Union – was yet prepared to anger
the United States.
Sir Frederick made one last effort to amend the statement. On September 4, 1942,
just before his departure, he wrote Acheson with proposals to change the authorized
statement. While he sought discretion to warm the water, he inserted adulterated versions
of the very commitments the Americans hoped to publicly avoid. Instead of saying
nothing of a future conference, he insinuated that one would take place: the United States
“does not consider that the time has yet arrived for initiating formal intergovernmental
negotiations for the settlement of a detailed plan.” Instead of leaving the Allies with the
impression that nothing was being done, his language indicated that while negotiations
were taking place, it would provoke “misunderstanding and controversy” if they were
announced. Additionally he expressed disagreement with the idea that the United States
would face “little difficulty in achieving unanimous agreement… for action based on…
previous studies of a plan.” Rather, he hoped to conclude the statement with reassurances
that the situation would change in a few months to “permit positive action.”1256
Thanks to Harry Hawkins, the statement underwent revisions before it was
delivered to the Allies. The alterations, however, did not reflect many of Sir Frederick’s
suggestions. They were the product of Hawkins’ criticisms and desire to project the best
possible image of the United States. The final draft deleted the vague phrases, adverse
language, and misleading statements suggesting the Roosevelt Administration could not
manage the war effort and postwar planning simultaneously. It established quite clearly
that actions were being taken while carefully avoiding any firm commitments. Most
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importantly, it gave the impression of a confident and mature nation riding in the
leadership position. Ironically the result left Leith-Ross with less leverage vis-à-vis the
Allies than he might have had were the first draft of the statement used.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION OF THE FOUR POWERS

Roosevelt hoped that four great powers – China, Great Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union – would cooperate in the postwar period to prevent aggression and
solve the problems of global politics. In diplomatic discussions, he called these nations
the “Four Policemen.” In public, they were touted as the “Big Four.” Yet this term was
misleading. A combination of overextension, strategic miscalculation, and financial
malaise had seriously damaged the British Empire;1257 China was divided, overrun by an
enemy, and weak militarily and economically. There were only two great powers in this
group: the United States and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt, however, planned to exploit
the weaknesses of China and Great Britain to corner the Soviet Union. In this way, each
of these countries would learn to cooperate with the United States.
China and Britain received special treatment during the war. In part, wartime
circumstances and America’s postwar aims made this behavior necessary. For reasons
already made apparent, the State Department took Britain into its confidence earlier than
the other powers. But throughout Sir Frederick’s discussions in Washington, Acheson
and Hull also kept the Chinese informed whenever they shared information with the
Soviets. These nations would have the chance to study and comment on the American
relief proposal before any other nation. Here we examine their reactions to the draft
agreement, placing special attention on their strategic orientation going into the four
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power discussions. Where necessary, we also consider the historical context. We
conclude with an assessment of American strategy for these negotiations.

Leith-Ross presents the Draft Agreement to the British Government

On September 18, 1942, the War Cabinet’s Official Committee for Post-War
Commodity Policy and Relief considered whether the “draft was a workable basis for
action and whether it could be recommended” to the British Government. According to
Leith-Ross, officials in Washington had intentionally left the agreement vague, preferring
to develop machinery as events unfolded, and he thought it unwise to engage in timeconsuming and potentially harmful attempts to define every aspect of the agreement. The
regional committees constituted a case in point. Under the influence of their constitution,
the Americans remained determined to keep the executive and policy-making functions
divided. As a result, they made the Director General an all-powerful position, and refused
to give the regional committees anything beyond mere advisory powers. But Britain’s
preferences, he explained, would be met: the pressure of events would force the
Americans to devolve executive functions to the regional committees.1258
Other members of the group feared the draft’s imprecision. Keynes expressed
reservations over the relationship between the Policy Committee and the Council. What
happens, he asked, if the Policy Committee cannot agree on whether ex-enemy countries
should receive aid? Would this matter then go before the Council, as the draft implies?
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Leith-Ross replied that the Americans believed there must be a Council “to
preserve the United Nations approach to the problem.” The burden of relief would fall
largely on the United States, but they did not want this fact “apparent in the draft.”
Cordell Hull insisted that every country must play its part. Sir Frederick also asserted the
importance of avoiding the impression among many of the Allies that the “Axis
dictatorship” was going to be substituted with a “dictatorship of the Great Powers.” If the
Great Powers were agreed, he added, they would “always be able to dominate the
Council.” And if the Soviets made agreement impossible by insisting on unanimous
voting in the Policy Committee or the Council, the Director General could act
unilaterally. These possibilities “strengthened the case for giving as much power as
possible to the Director General.” In essence, the scheme was pretense and the
imprecision helpful.1259
While Keynes agreed with Sir Frederick’s assessments to a degree, these
arrangements worried him, especially on matters of high politics, such as the treatment of
enemy countries, whether relief recipients would pay or not, and the order of priority in
which countries would receive relief. “It seems to me unwise to take such issues, even if
only in point of form away from the Great Powers and give it to a monkey-house of 28
nations with no provision for voting or methods of procedure,” he wrote days later.1260
Keynes disagreed with the American view that they could run the show via the Director
General. It would be impossible for this individual to maintain control over local issues
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Keynes also worried about efforts to pool relief

supplies, which he contemptuously labeled “international communism.”1262
Yet he was prepared to go along. “The real question,” he wrote, “is whether one
regards the plan as embodying a workable proposal, which we can expect to put into
actual operation hereafter, or whether it is merely a way of getting the Americans
committed to the first step with the intention of hammering out something rather different
in the course of time and experience.” If the latter approach dominated British thinking,
then “the object should be, not to make it more precise, but, if anything, less precise.”1263
Although he preferred an arrangement whereby contentious political issues went before a
Supreme Council of the Great Powers, he accepted Sir Frederick’s argument that it would
be destructive, subject to certain reservations, not to accept the broad lines of the draft as
a working basis. He still thought Britain should reduce the status of the Council, and
attempt to clarify the role of and strengthen the regional committees.1264
Leith-Ross wanted to appease the European allies without angering Washington.
“In all probability the Council can hardly be more than a consultative body,” he wrote,
“but it is probably wiser to let this develop from the force of circumstances than to
provoke criticism from the smaller powers by limiting its nominal authority.” So long as
the great powers are united, they would direct “all broad lines of policy” in any case. But
if not, he maintained that Britain could always influence the Director General through
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personnel it secured on his staff, or through bilateral relations with Washington. To
mollify the allies, he thought Britain should make a further attempt to strengthen the
committees, but without applying too much pressure. The Americans were “somewhat
suspicious of our promoting” the Inter-Allied Committee, he wrote. If it appeared such
proposals might create tensions, the inevitable devolution of powers to the regional
committees would still provide Britain sources of influence.1265
Sir Frederick believed other outstanding concerns would be resolved. American
and British military officials agreed that Allied forces would manage relief while
hostilities continued and for a short period afterwards, but would then hand over
responsibility to the relief organization. Though military authorities in each country
disagreed over how long this period would last, he thought the issue would not present
major problems. He was largely correct. Furthermore, if the Combined Boards possessed
suitable machinery, Leith-Ross believed the relief organization would utilize it, but he
urged caution: the “Joint Boards were merely a façade under which the U.S. decided what
could be provided” to Britain. Representatives from the Ministry of War Transport
disputed this generalization and thought the Combined Shipping Board thought it should
remain in place. The Committee thus decided that Leith-Ross should discuss the issue
with the Ministries of Food, Supply and War Transport.1266
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Should Canada be Permitted a Seat on the Policy Committee?

Before the War Cabinet discussed relief on November 3, 1942, two major
conflicts erupted: one concerned substance; the other revolved around procedure. The
Official Committee had instructed Leith-Ross to prepare a report for the ministers
discussing any misgivings he had with the draft, and a procedure to follow after the State
Department officially shared the draft with London. Leith-Ross conveyed his concerns
over the marginal status of the regional committees; everyone agreed with his
assessments. But his recommendation that the Policy Committee be widened to include
Canada aroused fierce debate. While most of the concerned ministries agreed with LeithRoss, the Foreign Office remained staunchly opposed. Similar dynamics surrounded the
debate over procedure. The Foreign Office believed the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May
1942 required Britain to consult Moscow before sharing its views with Washington, but
everyone else disagreed. In conflicts, Churchill provided the decisive voice.
Vis-à-vis Ottawa, Britain had two objectives: to obtain as much financial and
material assistance as possible, and, to keep Canada integrated in the British
Commonwealth and out of the American sphere of influence.1267 Ottawa’s aims did not
come into blatant conflict with Britain’s, but they were by no means perfectly
harmonious. By providing assistance to London, Ottawa achieved its aim of economic
growth. This objective, however, depended on continued support among the Canadian
population for the war effort, which in turn, meant that Canada had to assert its
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independence from Britain. If the Canadian public determined that its Government
had little influence in the overall direction of the war, then it might become critical of the
war itself. Officials in Ottawa therefore believed Canada should have a place in Allied
Councils commensurate with its contribution to the war effort. As a result, the Canadians
used their leverage with Britain to place pressure on the Americans while making
simultaneous appeals in Washington.
Yet this tactic in no way guaranteed success. Many British officials were either
blind to the changing power dynamics in the transatlantic triangle, or preferred to look
out for their narrow interests, which meant that they often refused to bow to Canada’s
wishes.1268 For those who recognized these shifts, their efforts to help Ottawa were
undermined by the tremendous leverage the United States maintained over Canada. As
Britain’s financial and military situation deteriorated, Canada had turned to Washington
to meet many of its defense requirements. Canada also needed American cooperation to
preserve its trade relations with Great Britain, especially after the passage of Lend-Lease
Act, which gave Britain all the incentives in the world to procure its food and
manufacturing goods in the United States as opposed to in Canada. Altogether, this meant
that the United States had the ultimate voice in whatever arrangements that might
emerge. Canada and Great Britain were dependent on the United States economically and
militarily. Often the United States simply engaged Ottawa bilaterally, knocking Britain
out the equation altogether.
As we have seen, the Canadians protested their exclusion from the Munitions
Assignment Board (MAB), the Combined Food Board (CFB), and the Combined
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Production and Resources Board (CPRB) in the spring and summer of 1942. But
when the Americans agreed to permit Canada partial representation on the MAB, the
Canadians would accept nothing short of full membership. The Americans worried that if
they satisfied Canada’s desires entirely, other countries would make similar demands.
They also believed Canada overstated its contribution to the production of munitions,
much of which was paid for by the United States.1269 As a result, the process of allocating
Canadian munitions remained in the hands of an informal Anglo-Canadian committee in
Ottawa, though the Americans would ultimately join this body as a full member. In form,
however, Britain represented Canada on the MAB.1270
The debate over the Combined Food Board unfolded along similar lines, but in
this case, Britain blocked Canada’s aspirations, not the United States. Many officials in
London disagreed with this decision, but the British supply agencies, particularly the
Ministry of Food, refused to acquiesce.1271 If London granted a seat to Ottawa on the
CFB, they argued, then the other Dominions would make similar demands; their
inclusion would make the Board’s work more difficult. In hopes of appeasing the
Canadians, they proposed the creation of a North American Food Committee that would
parallel the London Food Committee, which included all of the Dominions. In this way,
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Canada could protect its interests in London and Washington. These arrangements
differed with those of the Munitions Board in only one aspect: the link between Ottawa
and Washington on food issues would be immediately formalized. But the effect of both
arrangements remained the same: like the Hyde Park and Ogdensburg Declarations of
1941, the United States established deeper ties with Canada at the expense of Britain.
Neither of these formulae allayed the fears of the Canadians, but they accepted
them in exchange for full membership on the Combined Production and Resources
Board, which the United States and Great Britain reluctantly permitted. On September
16, 1942, British and Canadian authorities finalized these arrangements in Ottawa.1272
British officials with little knowledge of the discussions or Canada’s internal politics
welcomed this development. The Treasury, which had hoped to remove “the causes of
Canadian irritation,” thought it would “make the point about Canada’s representation on
the Relief Policy Council less explosive.”1273 With talks of a financial agreement on the
horizon, it remained important to keep the “political atmosphere in Canada… sweet.”1274
The Foreign Office interpreted the matter somewhat differently. “Canada is at the
moment reasonably satisfied by her newly gained membership of the Combined
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Production and Resources Board.” We should “let sleeping dogs lie” and push for the
four-power Policy Committee, one official argued.1275
But these assessments were mistaken. For most Canadian officials, the rejection
of the offer for partial membership on the Munitions Board was a mistake, but stiff
opposition from C.D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, posed an insurmountable
hurdle. Howe did not want civilian control over military procurement transferred to
military hands, which would have occurred under the MAB agreement.1276 The Food
Board constituted another mishap. The British had purposely understated the Board’s
mandate to suggest it was of little interest to Canada, but the written terms of reference
indicated otherwise. 1277 Similarly, membership on the Combined Production and
Resources Board fell short of meeting Canada’s expectations. While the other Boards had
power over allocations, the CPRB concerned planning. Canada, moreover, had the right
to appoint someone to the Board, but not an “Executive Secretary” to match those already
appointed by the United States and Great Britain.1278 With Canadian prestige on the line,
these arrangements meant little, and for British officials aware of the situation, they did
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not portend well for the impending debate over the relief organization’s Policy
Committee.1279
If the Great Powers admitted Canada, the remaining Dominions would make
similar demands; the Europeans would insist that they receive a seat; and the United
States would support Brazilian membership to counter the possibility of Anglo-Canadian
cooperation. If the committee became too large, disagreement and inefficiency would
undermine its effectiveness as with the League of Nations. 1280 The Foreign Office
remained the most vigorous proponent of this view.1281 On the other side of the equation,
the Dominions Office, supported to varying degrees by the Treasury and Board of Trade,
believed Canada had a formidable claim to membership on the Committee. In contrast to
China and the Soviet Union, Canada could make a major contribution to postwar relief.
China, in fact, would be “the principal beggar.”1282 Apart from the United States and
possibly Great Britain, this fact distinguished it from all other members of the United
Nations.1283 But equally if not more important, Canada might significantly reduce or even
terminate its wartime financial assistance to Britain.1284
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On October 7, 1942, the matter went before the Official Committee. The
British High Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald, presented the case for
Ottawa. The Canadian Government, he informed the group, did not contest the idea that
the organization “should be ‘streamlined’ as far as possible, and that the policy making
body should be confined to a small number of powers,” but it believed that “if the four
great powers tried to run the post-war world, they would not be successful.” This
approach “would arouse the hostility of the other powers,” resulting in a “lack of
cooperation.” In Canada, the French Canadians disliked the British and hated the Soviets.
The political and intellectual class also feared four-power domination. Politics would
dictate whether Canada contributed to the effort, MacDonald suggested, not economics.
The recent compromise regarding the Joint Boards had not appeased Ottawa. But most
importantly the British attitude towards the Policy Committee was prejudicing Canada’s
willingness to continue providing financial support to Britain.1285
MacDonald thought Britain should revert to the State Department’s original
proposal for a Policy Committee consisting of seven powers, but he believed the LeithRoss report insufficient. “If the Canadians saw the terms of the recommendations they
would be bitterly disappointed.” The objective, he explained, was to have a positive
influence on Britain’s financial negotiations with Canada. He considered it imprudent to
support Canada’s aspirations only if the other powers agreed to widen the committee’s
membership, which is what Leith-Ross proposed. The Canadians, he reminded the group,
knew American reversion to the four-power setup had been in deference to Britain. If the
1285
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objective was to restore the goodwill and secure a financial support from Ottawa, it
made no sense to create a situation in which the United States could argue that the British
had only been willing to support Canadian representation due to American pressure.
Instead, MacDonald thought the Official Committee should recommend an enlargement
of the Policy Committee in positive terms.1286
Rather than attack MacDonald’s ideas on their merit, Nigel Ronald of the Foreign
Office tried to delay decision using a technicality. If Canada’s claim was based on “her
views on the general framework of the post-war political settlement, then no progress was
possible in the [Official] Committee.” These issues fell outside the mandate of the
Committee. Sir Frederick and Lord Keynes rebutted the career diplomat. Leith-Ross
asserted the Committee’s “duty” to make a recommendation on the size of the Policy
Committee; Keynes maintained that Canada’s argument in no way prejudiced other
postwar bodies. He also endorsed MacDonald’s view that the language of Sir Frederick’s
report to the Ministers should be strengthened. When Ronald replied that this decision
might arouse the hostility of other contributing nations, Leith-Ross drew distinctions
between the potential size of Canada’s contribution and that of other countries. In this
way, the matter was momentarily settled and MacDonald received instructions to provide
substitute language for the memorandum. Defeated in this setting, Ronald reserved the
views of the Foreign Office.1287
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Over the next few days, Gladwyn Jebb sharpened the Foreign Office’s
position. He suggested the favored alternative to a four-power setup, a Policy Committee
consisting of seven nations including Canada, Brazil, and a European state, presented
insurmountable problems. With the Soviet Union likely to insist on unanimous voting,
the committee would become ineffective. Divisions would emerge over the European
country most deserving of the seventh seat. France, the obvious choice, remained divided.
Donor countries excluded would insist on further extensions, possibly leading to a nineor ten-power body. These demands would raise impossible questions as to what
constitutes a “major donor.” An enlarged committee would also prejudice the four-power
concept for future organizations. Matters of high policy, Jebb argued, should reside with
the four powers. With Welles, Hull and Roosevelt favoring the four-power concept, it
seemed unlikely that they would accept anything else. It also remained unclear whether
the Soviet Union would accept an enlarged committee.1288

Should Great Britain consult with the Soviet Union?

In part, the latter question provoked a second major conflict. From the outset,
there had been confusion over what procedure the British should employ moving
forward, and whether the State Department would formally convey the agreement to
China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.1289 If so, it was assumed, that the four powers
would respond in writing. If they agreed to the broad lines of the draft, it would be shared

1288

See “Minute” by Jebb, October 7, 1942; “Draft Minute to Richard Law and Anthony
Eden,” October 9, 1942; “Minute” by Jebb, October 21, 1942, all in FO 371/31504, PRO.
1289
Telegram 4729, DC to FO, September 19, 1942, T160/1404/5, PRO.

472
with all the United Nations in anticipation of a conference. But the Americans, who
wanted to avoid publicity at all cost, had made it quite clear that there would be no
meeting of the four powers. 1290 No one, however, knew what would be done if
disagreements erupted. For this reason, the British decided to limit their criticisms to
avoid delays, or the possibility that the draft might be “thrown back into the melting
pot.”1291 Once the War Cabinet had considered the plan, they would seek the approval of
the Dominions, and “inform” the Soviets before conveying those views to the State
Department.1292
The dispute concerned whether Britain should “inform” or “consult” the Russians.
According to the Foreign Office, the British Government had an “obligation” to parley
with Moscow: the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942 stipulated that the two countries
would collaborate closely “for the organization of security and economic prosperity in
Europe.” 1293 With the Russians indicating a preference for a four-power Policy
Committee, the Foreign Office clearly hoped the Soviet position would harden during
any exchange. In turn, Soviet intransigence would force Britain to support the four-power
plan. If Sir Frederick and his supporters hoped to avoid controversy, and if they wanted
to get something started for relief now, leaving the details “to be hammered out
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afterwards,” then it hardly made sense to take a position that would open a rift with
the Soviet Union, which might take weeks, possibly months to close.1294
The Foreign Office believed Britain’s relations with Moscow might deteriorate.
They blamed Leith-Ross. “The plain fact of the matter,” Jebb wrote on October 7, 1942,
“is that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross does not like the Russians…”1295 Leith-Ross had invited
Maisky to send a representative to a meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee in late
September, but hardly gave him a week’s notice. He neither shared relevant documents
with him, nor consulted with him on anything for months, despite Russia’s role in
proposing the international relief organization in the first place. If these failures were not
enough to anger Maisky, Sir Frederick’s brief to him did: “The tenor of your letter is to
the effect that discussions have already taken place… and conclusions arrived at” without
even consulting the powers that set up the Inter-Allied Committee.1296 Upon reviewing
the correspondence, the Foreign Office became angry, called the exchange
“unsatisfactory,” and insisted Sir Frederick apologize, and meet with the Russian
Ambassador.1297
Sir Frederick’s certainly disliked the Russians, but he also feared the Americans.
The State Department had begun aggressive preparations for postwar relief. These
actions, while decreasing dependence on the Inter-Allied Committee, would, in Leith-
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Ross’s view, increase America’s ability to act unilaterally. It was therefore necessary
to develop a system of technical committees in London as rapidly as possible. This fact,
he told Maisky on September 30, 1942, explained the short-notice of his letter and
suggestion that Russia chair the medical subcommittee. Maisky accepted the explanation,
but tore into the American draft agreement. Leith-Ross implored him to be realistic.
Relief could not be undertaken without the United States. If Britain or Russia raised too
many objections, Washington might revert to unilateralism, providing Britain and Russia
fewer opportunities to influence the distribution of postwar relief. Maisky agreed, but
refused to back away from the principle that “blood was more important than
wheat…”1298
Despite Maisky’s ire, officials still opposed the idea that Britain had a legal
obligation to consult Moscow before sharing its views with Washington. The most
vociferous opponent was Keynes. When Ronald read a minute on the matter prepared by
the Foreign Office, Keynes suggested they hire a new legal advisor. A distinction, he
argued, must be made between preliminary and final views. 1299 In talks with the
American Ambassador, John Winant, he learned the President of the United States had
not even endorsed the plan. With the November elections just around the corner,
Roosevelt had no intention of supporting the plan just yet, even in diplomatic channels.
He merely authorized the State Department to communicate it to the other powers for
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Thus Keynes believed it unwise to establish a precedent that might

anger the Americans. He preferred that Britain remain flexible, or refrain from making its
views known until the Soviets and Allies had expressed theirs.1301
On November 3, 1942, these issues came before the War Cabinet. By this point,
the specter of loosing financial aid from Canada had forged a consensus on the Policy
Committee. British officials believed they needed to support the seven-power setup to
restore goodwill in Ottawa. If the Soviets blocked this formula – a likely scenario
according to the Foreign Office – then Britain could blame Moscow, while arguing that it
had done everything possible to support Canada.1302 Here the preferences of the Foreign
Office would be satisfied, and the financial concerns of the Treasury and Dominions
Office would also be met. The strategy was nothing short of tacit approval of a fourpower setup. But to hedge against the unlikely possibility of a seven-power committee,
the Foreign Office insisted its membership never be allowed to exceed seven, and that
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general postwar political arrangements always remain in the hands of the Big
Four.1303 With Lord Cherwell in support of this plan, Churchill readily acquiesced.1304
As noted elsewhere, Cherwell, or the Prof, as his colleagues called him, was the
Prime Minister’s most trusted advisor. “Churchill,” as Lord Ismay wrote in his memoirs,
“used to say that the Prof’s brain was a beautiful piece of mechanism, and the Prof did
not dissent from that judgment… In his appointment as Personal Assistant to the Prime
Minister no field of activity was closed to him.” Relief and the postwar world were not
exceptions to this rule. Cherwell would have had it no other way. As Ismay writes, “he
was as obstinate as a mule, and unwilling to admit that there was any problem under the
sun which he was not qualified to solve. He would write a memorandum on high strategy
one day, and a thesis on egg production the next.” His influence on Churchill was
tremendous, and “contribution to Hitler’s downfall… considerable.”1305
But here the approach he and Churchill embraced failed to address the inevitable
political fallout if the seven-power formula were rejected. Tensions were already high. At
the meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee on October 1, 1942, the allies struggled to
conceal their outrage over being excluded from the talks in Washington, and expressed
disgust over the apparent lack of progress. The Dutch representative called the statement
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delivered by Leith-Ross on behalf of the American Government “worse than
useless.”1306 With such sentiments bound to grow, the War Cabinet concluded that it
should stress the importance of regional committees in their reply to the Americans.1307
These committees would improve the organization’s effectiveness and meet Allied
demands for influence. Leith-Ross also endeavored to make the Inter-Allied Committee
indispensable to relief operations, and the War Cabinet insisted that existing agencies of
the United Nations be maintained.1308
The matter of consultations with the Soviet Union was not easily resolved. For
weeks, the Foreign Office had disputed the language used in Sir Frederick’s
recommendations, but the concerned officials ultimately agreed to use the word
“consultation” while also making a direct reference to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of
Alliance.1309 This, however, did not sit well with the cantankerous Lord Cherwell. As he
saw it, this requirement implied that Britain “must exchange views with Stalin before we
are allowed to talk with Roosevelt.” If this became a precedent, it would “impair relations
with Washington.” “Any semblance of aligning ourselves with the Soviets against the
U.S. would be bound to cause irritation and ill-feeling and no legal pedantry should be
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allowed to force us into such a position.”
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Churchill concurred and insisted that all

reference to the Treaty be deleted from the recommendations.1311 He agreed nonetheless
to share their views with Moscow with the stipulation that they should only be permitted
a fortnight to reply.1312
The Soviet Union received the short end of the stick. Britain intended to place
blame for the four-power Policy Committee on Moscow, despite England’s complicity in
these designs. The explicit preference of Roosevelt, Welles and Hull, the four-power
concept, or the idea that that postwar world should be run by the “Four Policemen,” had
originated in Washington.1313 When wayward officials such as Dean Acheson realized the
outrage this formula would evoke, they began promoting a seven-power formula for
postwar relief. Britain – citing the need for speed and efficiency – convinced Acheson
and other officials to return to the four-power design. While Britain’s machinations
remained secret, it is inconceivable that London’s insistence that Russia provide
comments within two weeks would not raise eyebrows in Moscow. On the heels of Sir
Frederick’s peremptory letter to Maisky, to say nothing of the six months it took Britain
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to reply to the January 1942 Soviet relief proposal, this restriction could only
reinforce Moscow’s deepest suspicions.

The Impediment to Action in Washington is Removed

On November 3, 1942, the Congressional elections took place in the United
States. The Democrats lost 45 seats in the House of Representatives, but managed to hold
on to the majority by a mere one percent. While the Republicans picked up nine seats in
the Senate, the Democrats, with a sixty-seat majority, still maintained decisive control of
the upper house.1314 The results were now on the table; the State Department assumed the
initiative.1315 The prospects “for satisfactory action were at the moment better than they
had been at any time in Washington,” Dean Acheson informed the British Embassy. “The
internal disputes appear to have composed themselves and there is a serious desire to get
on with the job.” While encouraging them not to disagree, he requested Britain’s
reactions to the draft agreement as soon as possible.1316 His office made similar requests

1314

See Wikipiedia: the Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “United States House of Representatives
Elections, 1942,” and “United States Senate Elections, 1942,”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_1942
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate_elections,_1942 (accessed
September 20, 2012).
1315
The critical decision to move forward aggressively was taken in a meeting of Cordell
Hull and Henry Wallace on November 4, 1942. See “United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Program,” No Date, File #2 Post War – ER & EP May 7 PART 2, Box 5,
WRPR, Acheson Papers, RG 59, NARA. At roughly the same time, the Americans began
applying pressure on the British. See Telegram Relief No. 57, DC to FO, November 10,
1942, T188/256, PRO.
1316
Quote is in Telegram Relief No. 58, DC to FO, November 13, 1942, T188/256, PRO.

1317

with both the Chinese and Soviet Embassies.

480
If the British worried that the time

limit they intended to impose on the Soviet Union might offend Moscow, they need not
worry now.1318 The Americans wanted a response at once!1319
For Britain, these exhortations created new problems. Before they could share
their views with Moscow, they had to consult the Dominions and India. Here they
anticipated no difficulties. But the Australian High Commissioner to Great Britain,
Stanley Bruce, had misled the British Government into believing Canberra would accept
an enlarged Policy Committee that included Canada but not Australia. 1320 Similar
perceptions existed with regard to New Zealand. But when it became apparent that
neither country would reach a decision rapidly, the Dominions Office decided to ignore
them.1321 The War Cabinet had decided that their interests would be served through
membership on a regional committee for the Far East, which they had proposed in their
prepared response to the draft.1322 Thus on November 17, 1942, Eden shared Britain’s
views with Maisky despite problems with Australia.1323 Not until December 15, 1942 did
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Britain receive a reluctant letter of acceptance from Bruce.
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The Soviet reply came

the following day. 1325 By this time, the British had shared their views with the
Americans, albeit informally.1326
The indirect implications of this decision are revealing. An impatient Acheson
went to work securing support for a seven-power Policy Committee, and it appeared that
the Americans would bow to Britain’s preferences on the issue. 1327 The American
planners, as we have seen, could have cared less whether the committee consisted of four
or seven members. But equally revealing, Acheson requested Britain’s permission to
broach the seven-power setup with Litvinov.1328 This proposal understandably worried
the British, who had felt it “impolitic to refuse” a request from Maisky to allow Moscow
more time to review Britain’s response to the draft before London communicated it to
Washington. Naturally the British asked that Acheson refrain. But if he should still speak
with Litvinov, they insisted that he blame the seven-power setup on Canada! They did
not want the Russians to think London and Washington were collaborating at Moscow’s
expense.1329 Apparently the Americans agreed: Acheson did not speak with Litvinov.
While this affair sheds light on the double-dealing essential in all international
diplomacy, it also reveals the degree to which the British were prepared to risk their
rapport with Moscow to maintain exceptional relations with Washington. The Americans,
who preferred unilateralism, rarely returned the favor. Nothing underlines this fact more
1324
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than the bombshell Roosevelt dropped on November 23, 1942. Out of nowhere, the
White House announced that Governor Herbert Lehman of New York State would resign
his office in December to take up the position of relief administrator.1330 While the
British welcomed this appointment as evidence that Washington would play its part in
postwar relief, they did not understand its implications until later. At a meeting of the
Pacific War Council on December 9, 1942, Roosevelt “irrelevantly referred to the recent
appointment of Governor Lehman as Director of Relief and Rehabilitation for the United
Nations.” It was odd, the British Ambassador thought, that he should not have consulted
London.1331
Roosevelt also failed to consult Hull or Acheson. Lehman would be responsible
for setting up the State Department’s Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation
Operations (OFRRO). If the relief negotiations were successful, this bureau would
become the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Lehman
would then become the organization’s first Director General. Acheson was furious. He
had long promoted Paul Appleby, who he believed would be an excellent “servant” of the
State Department.1332 Acheson was also in the midst of the process of bringing the relief
organization into being. It helped little that such a decision would be made without at
least informing the diplomats so they could prepare and consult with the other powers.
Equally important, he would have to work with whoever served in the position. At
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minimum, he thought the President should have informed the State Department
before making the announcement.1333 It only worsened morale and left Appleby with an
unclear mandate. He returned to Department of Agriculture in January 1943.1334
But with Roosevelt, politics determined everything. Shortly after the November 3,
1942 elections, Herbert Hoover began publicly promoting himself as the best man to run
European relief after the war. As a result, Roosevelt took renewed interest in the topic
and began expressing irritation that so little had been done to prepare for the day of
liberation. Yet he was in large part responsible for the lack of progress. Unrelated to these
developments, the Democrats had lost the New York Governorship to Thomas Dewey in
November. Convinced that the damage could be undone if the party captured the New
York Senate seat in 1944, Roosevelt tapped Lieutenant Governor, Charles Poletti, as his
prospective nominee. But Poletti refused unless he could run as a former Governor,
which meant that Lehman would have to resign just before the end of his term. Roosevelt
decided that Lehman should be Director General of the relief organization.1335 He had
prestige, experience running large organizations, and a long record of providing relief to
Jewish refugees. Lehman was a very rich Jewish New Yorker, married to a Guggenheim.
But above all, he was an old friend of Roosevelt’s.1336
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By late 1942, the puzzle was coming together. Whatever irritation the
appointment caused, it was a welcome development to have the President motivated. It
threatened Acheson’s territory, but he accepted it, and the British quickly invited Lehman
to London, apparently believing they could co-opt him. Hull delayed the visit. 1337
Competition between Great Britain and the United States would persist, but the fear of
failure forced them to cooperate. Acheson believed there could be no “greater disaster”
for the “United Nations than to have our forces, the British forces, or any other armies of
the United Nations forces occupy an area and then find themselves unable to feed that
area.” A famine that led to the deaths of “hundreds of thousands, or millions of people,”
he told colleagues, would be “one of the greatest blows to our conduct of the war, to say
nothing of the prestige of the United States throughout the world.”1338 Britain shared
these views. Thus Leith-Ross expressed deep satisfaction when Britain formally
conveyed its reaction to the draft agreement to Washington on Christmas Eve, 1942.1339

Sino-American Relations During the War and Prospects for the Future

For Chiang Kai-shek, the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was
a godsend.1340 It guaranteed that at least one great power would make war on Tokyo. But
it also promised increased aid. Washington had no desire to see China fall out of the war.
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Roughly two-fifths of all available Japanese forces remained tied down in the
country. Of 50 Army divisions, 34 were in China if Manchuria is included.1341 To assist
the Chinese, the United States had already provided the Nationalists $170 million in loans
and credits well before it entered the conflict. On February 9, 1942, it served up an
additional credit of $500 million.1342 Much of this aid was hoarded and misused.1343
The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 made further assistance possible, but the
delivery of supplies presented extraordinary challenges. Isolated from Chinese seaports,
which had been captured by the Japanese, territories occupied by the Nationalists were
only accessible via the tortuous Burma Road. Yet on April 29, 1942, the Japanese
stopped passage along this route, and by the end of May, they had taken all of Burma.
Tragically, most of the lend-lease aid for China delivered to this date had been invested
into improving this route.1344 Now the United States could only fly supplies over the
Himalayas, which imposed severe limitations on what could be brought to Chungking.
The reaction of the Americans and Chinese to these developments would color
Chiang’s attitude towards the relief proposals. A rancorous dispute broke out over what
to do about China’s supply problem. General Joseph Stillwell, the ranking American
1341
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military official in the China-Burma-India theatre, hoped to use Chinese troops to
reopen the Burma Road, but he also wanted to reform the Chinese army. This course
would permit sufficient supplies into the country and pave the way for a renewed ground
offensive against the Japanese. By contrast, Colonel Claire Chennault hoped to use
airpower to attack the Japanese. With supplies flown over the Himalayas, he believed air
power alone could strike a blow to Japan.
Despite the obvious problem with Chennault’s strategy – air bases with
inadequate ground defenses would be vulnerable to Japanese attack – Chiang preferred
the latter option. He feared the potential loss of Chinese troops in a Burma campaign,
which, he correctly assumed, would be needed to fight the communists at a later date.
Stillwell’s proposals to reform the military, moreover, would have undermined his
leadership.1345 Patronage paid to various warlords who commanded many of the Chinese
army’s divisions kept Chiang in control. Naturally, the Generalissimo pulled out all stops
to undermine Stillwell and his allies.1346
For Chiang Kai-shek, the stakes were high. Stillwell not only threatened Chiang’s
leadership, he also jeopardized the Nationalist party’s access to supplies. The American
General informed Washington of rampant corruption, incompetence, and extravagance
among the Nationalist leadership. He suggested the United States should be wary of
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He

and other officials, including British diplomats, even suggested the United States increase
its cooperation with the Communists.1348 Outraged, Chiang used Chennault and other
contacts in Washington to undermine Stillwell, discredit his assessments, and label him
the problem. He also sent his wife to the United States to garner public support for his
leadership. These efforts, it should be remembered, were taking place at the very moment
Acheson requested China’s reaction to the relief proposal, and they continued throughout
the four-power discussions. Chiang had no interest in kicking up dust over the proposed
relief organization. He could not, as one scholar writes, appear “totally negative and
disruptive.”1349 He wanted that characterization pinned on Stillwell.
Similarly, Roosevelt had no interest in angering Chiang. If China pulled out of the
war, a card Chiang discreetly revealed from time to time, or if his regime collapsed, a
scenario many American officials feared, it would not only undermine America’s
wartime strategy in Asia, it would undercut Roosevelt’s postwar plans as well.1350 In his
view, the Versailles settlement had failed to concentrate power in the hands of a few
select nations capable of providing global stability. To rectify this shortcoming, he
believed the postwar international structure required more than a United Nations
organization; a condominium of the Great Powers, or the Four Policemen, as he referred
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to it, was needed to lead that organization, preserve the peace, and maintain global
stability. Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union should constitute the first
three legs of this structure, but China, he thought, should assume the fourth.1351 While he
acknowledged China’s weaknesses, and agreed that this country would have to go
through a period of reform and transition, he stood convinced that China’s geography and
population would make this nation a Great Power regardless of its problems.1352
The United States should not obstruct this process, he thought; rather, it should
win China’s friendship by facilitating its rise. Roosevelt believed this approach would
serve American interests. In disputes with the other Great Powers, China would side with
the United States. It would provide a counterweight to Soviet power; offer a means of
containing Japan; and work to stabilize the entire region.1353 Like the United States,
China stood adamantly opposed to the colonial empires in Asia. As such, Roosevelt
believed China should play a role in a trusteeship scheme for former colonies in Asia
where a transition to self-government appeared necessary: Burma, Indochina, Korea,
Malaya, and possibly Siam. 1354 With China and other countries involved in these
trusteeships, Roosevelt could convince the American people to participate, which would
1351

Roosevelt’s postwar plans are discussed in many places. But see Dallek, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, 342, 389-391; Kimball, The Juggler, 83-106; Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 175,
308. One scholar explains that America’s idea of China as a stabilizing force in East Asia
dates back to 1899. See Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of SinoAmerican Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 142.
1352
On Roosevelt’s attitude towards China, see Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 390-391;
Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 307-08, 420.
1353
On these points, see Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 390-391, but also John Lewis
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security
Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 10-11.
1354
The issue of trusteeships is discussed more thoroughly in William Roger Louis,
Imperialism at Bay: the United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). But it is also touched upon in most of the works
listed in this section.

489
in turn give him cover for the maintenance of American naval and air bases in the
region. If China could reform and resolve its own problems with revolutionary
nationalism, it might also serve as a model for other countries in the region.1355 The
United States could work with China, and thereby shape the country in ways beneficial to
American interests. Access to the great Chinese market had always been a dream of the
American capitalists.1356
While Chiang could not and did not know the full extent of Roosevelt’s plans, he
certainly agreed with the general approach. The Chinese had never concealed their
opposition to the presence of colonial empires in Asia. The Atlantic Charter, particularly
the promise of self-government and economic opportunity, had struck a chord. When it
appeared that a parallel Pacific Charter would not be announced, they quickly asserted
the Atlantic Charter’s global reach.1357 Diplomatic reports coming out of Chungking
indicated China’s hope of increasing its regional influence, especially in areas hosting
large Chinese populations, such as Malaya and Siam, but also territories at one time
under the suzerainty of Imperial China, such as Korea and Indochina.1358 Though debate
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raged over the country’s future, factions existed who supported American aims: a
commitment to reform and internal reconstruction, as well as a free, open and
decentralized economic system. 1359 Whatever Chiang might have thought of these
debates, he certainly embraced the invitation to join the Great Powers in managing world
affairs. The relief organization was the first effort to apply the four-power principle to the
postwar era, and the Generalissimo wasn’t about to rock the boat.

The Determinant Factors in the Chinese Position Towards Postwar Relief

Chiang Kai-shek also needed aid. The prospect of an organization that might
deliver food and supplies to China must have been a welcome development. As one
scholar tells us, Chiang’s troops were starving. Nothing did more to impair their ability to
fight.1360 A seat on the Policy Committee would afford Chiang the opportunity to steer
aid to China, an outstanding prospect so long as it was kept out of the hands of the
communists. If inadequate supplies, poorly trained troops, and incompetent leadership
made it difficult for him to launch an offensive against the Japanese, a fact that angered
the Americans and British, the communist menace made him all the more reluctant to risk
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his troops in battle. For all of the heroic accolades bestowed upon Chiang and his
military in the American press during the Second World War, the truth is that the Chinese
army would not engage the Japanese, and Roosevelt, who wanted to appease the
Kuomintang leader, refused to make aid contingent on China’s willingness to fight.1361
Chiang therefore tied up his best troops blockading territories the communists controlled,
until he had the requisite strength to attack them. Aid from any organization could only
bolster his efforts. With few exceptions, China had little reason to dispute the relief
proposals.
The regional committees that so aroused the passions of Leith-Ross played no role
in China’s assessments. The draft agreement granted these entities little power, and with
no comparable Inter-Allied Committee in Asia to fret about, China had no reason to
worry of such matters. But in London, the dramatic setbacks Britain experienced in the
Far East, first with the loss of Malaya in January 1942, then Singapore in February, and
finally Burma in April, they were eager to restore their prestige in the region. It was
important to demonstrate that Britain could not only retake its lost territories, but that it
could also care for the local populations. With this aim in mind, the Colonial Office
emphasized the importance of a Regional Committee for the Far East, and even proposed
the creation of an Inter-Allied Committee for the region, which might include France and
the Netherlands.1362 Until this point, the main concern in creating a committee for the Far
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East had been to appease the Australians and New Zealanders, who took offense at
their exclusion from the Policy Committee. But in late 1942 it became a means to restore
European prestige in the region, particularly that of the British Empire. Though China
had no way of knowing this, it serves to highlight their reluctance during the negotiations.
Yet it might still seem bizarre that China would raise no complaint over the
preeminent place the United States reserved for itself in the relief organization. Chiang,
for example, had always been reluctant to place his troops under American command.1363
Why would he give an American Director General of Relief the freedom to operate with
such wide powers in China? Of course the Chinese would raise a minor objection to this
arrangement, but they also made it clear that they would not insist on changes.
Further considerations make this behavior somewhat understandable. Membership
on the Policy Committee explains it in part. But China had also been remarkably
successful at “sucking folks in and deceiving them,” as Harry Hopkins put it.1364 They
had not only bamboozled influential individuals throughout the American government,
they succeeded in assembling an army of journalists, philanthropists, and businessmen
prepared to support their causes. 1365 Why would China provoke controversy over
American power in the relief organization when it possessed the ability to exploit it for
the relief of their territories in Asia. See “Memorandum by the Burma Office,” October
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Chinese benefit? Why would Chiang challenge the Roosevelt Administration when
the United States remained the sole power capable of offering significant assistance to the
Chinese Nationalists in their inevitable struggle with the communists?
The alternatives presented problems. It made little sense to collaborate with Great
Britain against the United States when London’s central objective in Asia remained the
preservation of the British Empire, a goal that came into conflict with China’s aims.
Churchill, moreover, had little respect for China and refuted the idea that it was or could
be a Great Power. The Chungking Government, he told Anthony Eden in October 1942,
was a “faggot vote on the side of the United States.”1366 As for the Soviet Union, Chiang
had little leverage in Moscow, and his devious schemes to drag the Soviets into the war
with Japan must have irritated Stalin, whose armies remained bogged down on the
Eastern front. That the Chinese faired so poorly against the Japanese, and refused to go
on the offensive, surely served to heighten Stalin’s contempt. For his part, Chiang always
feared the possibility that Moscow might provide aid to the Chinese communists, and the
United States remained the best counterpoise to this contingency.1367 The wisest course
was to stir up no unnecessary trouble and stick with the Americans.
Similarly, the Americans did not want to strain their relations with China. Just as
they informed the Soviets of Leith-Ross’s visit to Washington, they also called in the
Chinese Ambassador, Hu Shi, on July 1, 1942 to explain their intentions. Hu’s meetings
with Hull and Acheson are notable for two reasons. First, the Ambassador was terribly
uninformed. He knew nothing of the Inter-Allied Committee in London, had not given
the question of postwar relief any thought, and apparently had no guidance from his
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Government on how to handle the issue. Second, he revealed not the slightest
hesitation in expressing what he knew his Government’s primary concern would be.
Whereas the British and Soviets fretted over the organization’s structure, Hu wanted to
know what information the Americans needed so his Government could receive relief.
Apparently unconcerned with the scheme itself, he asked Acheson whether he should
obtain “material on the extent of the Chinese needs for relief.” The Assistant Secretary
shrewdly deflected the question.1368
But the reaction must have raised concerns. No sooner had Acheson shared the
July 14, 1942 draft proposal with the Chinese than the State Department asked the
American Ambassador in Chungking, Clarence Gauss, to find out everything he could
about trends on postwar thinking in China.1369 He learned that roughly forty Chinese
officials were debating postwar issues in an organization established by the Kuomintang
before the American entry into the war. Its leader, Wang Chung-hui, remained a powerful
figure in the Nationalist party. A former Foreign Minister, he served as the Secretary
General of the Supreme National Defense Council chaired by Chiang Kai-shek. Though
real power in the Nationalist Government resided with the Military Affairs Commission,
also chaired by Chiang, the Defense Council directed the Government. In meetings with
Ambassador Gauss, Wang elucidated the reach of the postwar planning organization’s
work, which covered three primary topics: postwar international organization; relations
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with Japan and other countries in the Far East, and economic adjustments, which was
subdivided into external economic relations and internal reconstruction.1370
From newspapers and meetings with elites and government officials in an outside
of this organization, Embassy officials learned the Chinese had ambitious plans, and
hoped for American assistance. According to various officials, China’s primary concern
would be internal reconstruction. China would request financial aid, raw materials,
industrial equipment, technical know-how, and help expanding the country’s
transportation system and rebuilding its agricultural heartland. They desired the extension
of lend-lease assistance into the postwar period, and believed access to the American
market would provide a means of servicing their debt and retiring the principle of
whatever loans and credits they received. But what they wanted most, and this they
remained reluctant to say bluntly, was aid with no strings attached.1371
American officials also learned that certain Chinese officials hoped to “play
power politics after the war.”1372 These individuals wanted assistance building up the
country’s national defense industries with increased steal production, armaments
manufacturers, and the extension of the country’s rail, highway and air communications
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These officials placed special emphasis on the

independence of former colonial territories and expressed their desire to assert influence
in borer regions and territories with large Chinese populations. They hoped to recover all
territories lost to the Japanese since 1894, but the evidence also suggests that they wanted
the Americans to help them regain leverage over Indochina to gain access to and control
over the South China Seas.1374 In the north, they similarly wanted the United States to
help them secure an agreement with the Soviet Union to resolve border disputes and keep
Moscow away from the Chinese communists.1375 For officials with this agenda, internal
reconstruction, while complementing their geopolitical aims, remained a secondary
concern.
Yet most Nationalist officials, including Chiang Kai-shek, evinced a high degree
of caution in how they presented their ideas. They played to American preferences. It was
agreed, for example, that China should embrace Cordell Hull’s ideas on trade: low tariffs,
abandonment of nationalistic trade policies, and impartial access to raw and essential
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Statements made by officials expressing a preference for centralized

control of the economy were balanced with assertions on the need for economic freedom
and private enterprise. 1377 On geopolitical matters, the Nationalists were equally
judicious. They repeatedly denied the notion that China aspired “to the dominant position
sought by Japan.” Chiang certainly feared this impression. In a speech to the People’s
Political Council, a body of 200 representatives from diverse Chinese parties set up
purportedly to help Chiang design wartime policy, the Generalissimo asserted that,
“although China is the oldest and largest nation in Asia ‘it is not for us to talk boastfully
of her right to a position of ‘leadership’ and China shall rather regard it as her
responsibility to treat peoples of Asia as equals’, toward whom China has responsibility
but not rights.”1378
Despite such statements, the British remained hostile to the idea of China as a
Great Power. It constituted an error of judgment, one British official stationed in
Chungking suggested, to continue along the path of “paying unwarranted tribute to the
economic and political capabilities of the Chinese.” These attributes do not exist. He
nonetheless agreed that the economic rehabilitation of China would be of tremendous
benefit to not only the Chinese but also the entire world if the task were accomplished.
But he worried that the Chinese regime “was becoming increasingly autocratic.” Any aid
provided, he argued, should be used as leverage to exact reforms. It should only be
granted with strict conditions, and should not be limited to areas controlled by the
Nationalists. Most importantly, he stressed the importance of Anglo-American
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cooperation in China. The Chinese had a long history of playing the Great Powers off
one another.1379
Chinese Nationalist views on postwar international organization accorded with
those of the Americans. They believed the organization should pursue disarmament and
include an impartial body for arbitrating disputes, but that it should be backed up by an
international police force. They reveled at the idea that China should be one of the four
policemen. Yet they expressed disdain for unanimous voting, which, they believed,
weakened the League of Nations, and left it unable to do anything meaningful when the
Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, and then the whole of China in 1937. Also like the
Americans, the Chinese believed these enforcement functions should reside in a body
separate from those managing political, economic and social affairs. Postwar relief, it can
be inferred, constituted one such example. Like Sumner Welles, the Nationalists also
agreed that while there should be no delay in setting up the organization, a “cooling off”
period should precede the conclusion of definitive peace treaties. Ironically the
Nationalists knew things would “heat up” in China when the war came to an end.1380
It remains unclear who reviewed the draft agreement in Chungking, but it
probably went before China’s planning organization. 1381 Perhaps this group made
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recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek and the Supreme National Defense Council,
which authorized the Foreign Minister, T.V. Soong, to speak with Ambassador Gauss
about the issue. As the Chinese responded more rapidly than the British and Russians, it
remains doubtful that they consulted any other power on the matter at this point.1382
When Acheson began pressuring the Chinese to provide their reactions in early
November, Soong informed Gauss that debate over the issue of unanimous voting had
created delays. Yet he was unaware of the particulars. It soon became apparent, however,
that the Chinese feared the organization might become hamstrung in the same manner as
the League of Nations.1383 Apart from this information, the Americans knew nothing of
what the Chinese really thought at this juncture.
On November 24, 1942, T.V. Soong conveyed China’s views to the United States.
The Kuomintang accepted all ten articles of the agreement with two suggestions. First,
they preferred that the Director General’s plan of field operations be subject to the
approval of the country concerned. If differences of opinion emerged, then the Policy
Committee should resolve the dispute. This proposal was designed to protect their
sovereignty. Second, they suggested that amendments to the agreement be permitted with
a simple majority vote.1384 This proposal, the Americans learned, was an attempt to
prevent the weaknesses of the League of Nations. With these suggestions on the table,
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Soong made it known that his Government was “not prepared to insist on them.”

The Chinese had no reason to stir up trouble, nor any reason to think they would receive
little or no aid. Without informing the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare
had recently sent experts to Chungking to discuss China’s postwar reconstruction.1386 The
New Dealers, like the Nationalists, had big plans for the country.

Relief and the Soviet Conundrum

The Soviet Union was a brutal regime. While it overtly slaughtered millions of its
own people, and then sentenced millions more to harsh labor in what Solzhenitsyn called
the Gulag Archipelago, its policies inadvertently if not explicitly led to the deaths of
millions more, not only at home, but abroad as well.1387 Much of this carnage was
purportedly done to achieve internal and external security, but it was also part of an
ideological campaign to bring about communism, or the final stage of history, in which
class and state cease to exist. It also provided Joseph Stalin a pretext to remove threats to
his authority and centralize power in his hands.1388 Whatever one might think of the
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relative worth or causal importance of these aims, the means employed to achieve
them were often ruthless. Famine constituted one such tool, which makes Moscow’s
relief policy deserving of investigation.1389
Equally important, the Soviet commitment to postwar relief does not appear to
accord with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the socio-political underpinnings of the Soviet
Union. To sharpen the problem, let us note that American policymakers considered relief
necessary to prevent revolutionary instability, but often justified it in public with
references to the country’s Christian tradition. 1390 They believed that by preventing
revolution they were doing God’s work. This reasoning and justification contradict
Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is premised not on eschatology, 1391 but on a
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materialistic and teleological view of history that is both predictive and determinant.
As such, it foretells and promotes working-class revolutions that overthrow bourgeois
establishments in favor of so-called “dictatorships of the proletariat.” In turn, this
ideology both predicts and encourages the imposition of “socialism” on countries by
these new regimes, with the goal of reaching “communism.”1392 If Stalin held these
beliefs and espoused such aims, why would his regime support an agenda designed to
prevent revolution?
Moreover, why would Stalin agree to collaborate with London and Washington to
construct a relief agency? He had refused to participate in all of the Allied War Councils,
preferring envoy diplomacy to manage the alliance. Maxim Litvinov had repeatedly
argued for the institutionalization of inter-allied cooperation, but his superiors in Moscow
ignored him.1393 One historian explains: “Having themselves helped Germany against the
Western Powers earlier in the war, the Russians now often assumed that the British and
later the Americans were deliberately following a somewhat similar policy.”1394 Soviet
officials also remained wedded to the idea that Great Britain and the United States
occupied the vanguard of capitalistic-imperialism, and were enemies of the proletariat.
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Nothing aroused Ivan Maisky’s fears more than the thought that Wall Street might
somehow take control of the relief organization.1395 Stalin’s worries were elsewhere, but
his spirit the same: “Churchill is the kind who, if you don’t watch him, will slip a kopeck
out of your pocket… Roosevelt… dips in his hand only for bigger coins.”1396

The Great Russian Famine of 1921

Marxist-Leninism might have never emerged on the international stage were it not
for the First World War, which precipitated the 1917 Russian Revolutions that brought
the Bolsheviks of Vladimir Lenin to power. These events and the resulting Civil War also
set the stage for a catastrophic famine. The policies of the old Tsarist regime, massive
dislocations of people, and the requisition of food by the Bolsheviks led to significant
reductions in the acreage of land cultivated annually. Then, a severe drought destroyed
the harvest of 1920. By March 1921, Lenin’s Bolsheviks had secured control of most of
the country, but the food situation looked grim.1397 “If there is a harvest,” he predicted,
“the government will be saved.” But if not, he believed it would perish.1398 By the early
summer of 1921, a second drought made Lenin’s direst predictions increasingly probable.
With few alternatives, the Bolsheviks sought outside help.
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During the first week of July 1921, two appeals went out from Moscow.
Lenin, who had hitherto attacked the Russian Orthodox Church, permitted Saint Tikhon,
the Patriarch of Moscow, to request assistance. In letters to the Archbishops of York and
Canterbury, Tikhon urged the world to aid Russia. Less shocking perhaps, but more
dramatic, he also let the great Russian author, Maxim Gorky, issue an entreaty. While
Tikhon appealed to the Christian beneficence, Gorky urged the world to save Russian
civilization: “Gloomy days have come to the country of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Mendeleev,
Pavlov, Mussorgsky [and] Glinka,” he wrote. “I ask all honest European and American
people for prompt aid to the Russian people. Give bread and medicine.”1399
Thus in one stroke, Lenin turned Bolshevism upside down. A regime that strove
to supplant the old order with communism would turn to Russia’s deepest traditions to
save itself. In so doing, Lenin established a principle: when Bolshevism is strong,
Marxism is on the march; but when it is weak, it beckons the old order. Stalin learned
well. During the purges of 1937-38, he had 100,000 priests, monks and nuns shot,1400 but
with the June 22, 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, he reopened the churches and
made an appeal to “Russian” patriotism.1401 Herein one fact is clear: strategically the
Bolsheviks were always willing to take contradictory steps when their survival was on
the line.
This they did even if it was embarrassing. Lenin realized the workers of the world
were in no position to assist Russia; he would have to turn to the capitalistic countries he
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detested. Far more frightening, the individual most capable of assisting Russia was
Herbert Hoover. While Hoover obtained global fame for his relief efforts during and after
the First World War, he achieved notoriety in Russia when his private relief organization,
the American Relief Administration (ARA), provided food to the White Armies battling
the Bolsheviks in 1919. Hoover hated Bolshevism as much as Lenin abhorred capitalism.
He considered the fight against this movement a great humanitarian cause. Its brutality
and ideological commitment to world revolution appalled him. He thought it godless and
synonymous with anarchy. It not only benefited from chaos and disorder, it openly
promoted such conditions to achieve power. But its central cause, Hoover often argued,
was hunger, which led him to believe it could be defeated with food.1402
On July 23, 1921, Hoover replied to Gorky’s appeal. Without the release of all
U.S. citizens held in Soviet prisons, the American people would not be willing to aid
Russia. The authorities in Moscow, he insisted, should appeal directly to the ARA. But to
receive assistance, its American personnel must have complete “liberty to come and go
and move about Russia.” Governmental interference would not be permitted. Moscow
would have to provide “free transportation, storage and handling of imported supplies
with priority over other traffic.” Required buildings, equipment, and fuel must also be
supplied free of charge. Hoover stipulated that all children and sick individuals receiving
ARA assistance be provided the same rations “as are given to the rest of the population.”
Finally, he insisted the government refrain from interfering with the liberty of ARA
members. In return, he pledged to help all children and invalids without regard to race,
creed or social status food. He promised that ARA representatives would engage in no

1402

Patenaude, The Big Show in Bololand, 27, 32, 34-35.

506
political activities. These conditions, he concluded, were the same as those in place in
the 23 other countries where the ARA was operating.1403
The latter pledge seems misleading in view of Hoover’s attitude towards
Bolshevism. To be sure, he had every intention of using food as a weapon in the Soviet
Union. But he did not plan to deploy it in the crude manner suspected by the Soviet
authorities and his enemies at home. As one scholar explains, “His plan was to
accomplish political ends in Russia not under the guise of famine relief… but rather by
means of it.” If the people of Russia could recover their physical strength, the prerequisite
for which was food, then they would rise up and overthrow their Bolshevik repressors.
The important step, Hoover reasoned, was to get them sustenance. Moreover, if the
Russian people witnessed the energy and efficiency of the ARA, it would discredit the
inefficient Soviet regime. In this way, the mere presence of the ARA might work as a
catalyst to provoke an uprising.1404
Hoover provided Lenin an opportunity. In 1921, Soviet Russia remained a pariah.
Few countries had recognized the Bolsheviks. But with Hoover then serving as U.S.
Secretary of Commerce, Lenin believed he could portray negotiations with the American
Relief Administration (ARA) as quasi recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States,
though the ARA by this point was no longer an arm of the U.S. Government. It was also
important to reach an agreement with Hoover that would bring relief aid into the country,
and save the regime. But with Hoover actively promoting the idea that relief aid would
destroy Bolshevism, Lenin had to take care not to expose his government to subversive
1403
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activities and sabotage. He would therefore seek limits on what Hoover’s men could
do, and where they could operate. He would also try to control and survey their
operations.1405
Shortly after Lenin released the American prisoners, the negotiations began in the
Latvian capital of Riga. Walter Lyman Brown, Chief of the ARA mission to Poland,
represented Hoover. Maxim Litvinov, then serving as the Soviet Ambassador at large,
negotiated for Lenin. At their opening meeting on August 10, 1921, conflict erupted over
Hoover’s conditions. Litvinov wanted ARA operations limited to the Volga region, and
no more than 100 American personnel in Russia at a time. Arguing that they constituted a
counterrevolutionary threat and unnecessary duplication of existing Russian machinery,
he voiced adamant opposition to the use of independent food committees, which Hoover
had insisted upon. Brown objected on all three counts. Hoover had no intention of
interfering in political activities, he told Litvinov. He simply wanted to promote self-help.
Replying in his customary lisp, Litvinov argued that nonpartisan food aid remained
impossible in Russia. As he famously put it, “Food iz a veppon.” He knew this from
experience: the Bolsheviks had a habit of withholding food from their enemies.1406
While the scholarship on the Soviet famine of 1921 has often praised Hoover for
his efforts, there are grounds for criticism.1407 Throughout April, May, and June of 1921,
one of his ARA lieutenants, Tom Gregory, let the press know how he and Hoover
withheld assistance to Hungary in the summer of 1919, thereby precipitating the collapse
1405
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of Bela Kun’s communist regime in Budapest. This example alone suggests that if
Hoover hoped to rid the world of Bolshevism, it might have been wiser to follow the
Hungarian model. And by failing to silence Gregory, he needlessly overexposed himself.
His statements aroused suspicions in Moscow, and encouraged Lenin to play tough.
“Delicate measures are needed,” he told the Politburo. “Hoover and Brown are insolent
liars…. We must establish superstrict conditions: for the slightest interference in internal
matters – expulsion and arrest.” Thus the onus to display magnanimity fell to Hoover, not
Lenin.1408
Litvinov exploited this imbalance with aplomb. In an attempt to prepare the way
for a collapse of the negotiations, he told the press that suspicion and a lack of confidence
existed on both sides of the negotiating table. He implied that Hoover needed to show
goodwill. With Brown, he maintained a hard line, well aware that failure would provoke
a storm of controversy: it was in Hoover’s interest to made a deal. He simultaneously
turned to other relief organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to suggest that the ARA was not the only organization capable of meeting Russia’s
needs. Thereupon Hoover’s position softened, and Litvinov backed away from his
fiercest demands. The local committees would be allowed if Soviet officials could serve
on them. Additional compromises were reached on extraterritoriality, the selection of
personnel, where the organization could operate, and who would bear the costs. The final
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agreement left Hoover in a strong position, but Lenin secured a more favorable deal
than any other country receiving ARA assistance.1409

The Relevance of the Relief Negotiations of 1921 for those of 1943

How do these events help us understand the relief negotiations of 1943? For one,
they reveal the dexterity of Maxim Litvinov, who maneuvered Hoover into a corner and
seized every chance to bolster the legitimacy of the Bolshevik regime. They make it clear
that the Soviet authorities were willing to compromise when their own rule was at stake,
but that their suspicions could not be erased. They would try to limit American control
over the relief operations, obtain positions for their agents within the organization, and
then use the security apparatus to keep the agency under surveillance. Similar factors
would play a role in 1943. The war’s outcome remained uncertain during the four-power
discussions in Washington. Not until after the Battle of Kursk in August 1943 did a
Soviet victory appear certain. Stalin also knew he would need aid after the war. Thus
wartime solidarity and the need for postwar assistance drove him to cooperate on the
relief organization.
But these comparisons present problems. In 1921, reaching an agreement that
would permit an existing agency to operate in the Soviet Union remained the primary
concern. The affair involved one country, and the discussions took place between a
government and a non-state actor, over the conditions by which that agency would enter
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into the sovereign territory of a state. But in 1943, the question concerned the
arrangements to set up an agency that would undertake postwar relief, but that was
assumed to be a model for future international organization with implications for the
entire postwar world order. The discussions took place between states, and included no
non-state actors. Participation in the four-power negotiations implied not only legitimacy,
but also great power status. The territorial prerogative of the proposed organization,
moreover, was not restricted to one state. It potentially included countries on every
continent, either as recipients or donors.
Would the Great Powers seek to build a postwar international system based on
spheres of influence, or would they each adhere rigidly to their ideological preferences
and thereby precipitate a global conflict? With China’s future uncertain and Britain in
decline, the attitude of the Soviet Union and the United States remains most important
here. In both countries the tension between ideological aims and the desire for a stable
postwar system created dilemmas.
While the Roosevelt Administration preferred and prepared for a liberalcapitalistic order based on democratic principles, free and open markets, and laws and
institutions that would resolve disputes and restrain aggressive behavior, it also
recognized the potential obstacles to these plans posed by Soviet power. As the Red
Army converged on Germany, they acknowledged the importance of Moscow’s
acquiescence to American designs, especially in areas under Soviet occupation.
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Roosevelt accepted the idea that Eastern Europe might fall into a Soviet sphere of
influence. Yet neither he nor his administration ever renounced its global aspirations.1410
American thought developed along two distinct but not necessarily incompatible
continuums. The United States would seek cooperation with the Soviet Union to win the
war and create a stable peace. It would invite Moscow to participate in its postwar
arrangements, offering aid and a position of leadership in the prospective international
organization. Within this framework, however, the United States would also build in
checks against potential Soviet aggression and obstruction. The idea of the four
policemen constitutes a case in point. As much as this proposal was a forum for
cooperation, an implicit recognition of spheres of influence, and a way to keep the peace,
it was also a means to balance against Soviet power and advance American objectives.
When disagreements left Washington at odds with Moscow, the support of China and
Britain would make it more difficult for the Soviets to oppose American aims, and leave
them isolated should they do so.1411
The relief agency and future international organization would provide another tool
to keep Moscow in check. By providing relief and other forms of assistance to countries
behind Red Army lines, it would win allies for the United States and provide a public
relations tool for Washington against Soviet subversion and propaganda.
On balance, the strategic disposition of the United States in early 1943 was far
more offensive than defensive. In the event of cooperation with the Soviet Union, the
concept was almost purely offensive, though it would rely on consent and the hope that
1410
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Moscow’s postwar requirements and evaluation of her interests would lead her to
accept U.S. proposals. Yet the Americans knew the Soviet Union would probably achieve
its prewar levels of production within three years of the war’s end.1412 This fact, in turn,
increased the specter of non-cooperation, if not immediately after the war possibly within
several years. The strategic concept in this case was much more defensive. But it still
called for offensive action. If the Soviets became immediately hostile, the United States
might still be able to use the relief agency to influence the regimes that came to power in
Eastern Europe. If the Soviets became hostile later, the Americans could then use
alliances in Eastern Europe and the UN organization in public relations campaigns
against Moscow.

Soviet Postwar Strategy

For many years, Soviet strategy for the postwar era has been clouded in mystery.
While it has long been known that the Soviet Union sought to secure its borders as they
stood just before the launch of Operation Barbarossa,1413 and it has been confirmed that
Roosevelt, at least by late 1943, remained prepared to accept this formula,1414 the policies
Stalin pursued for territories beyond these borders has been a topic of constant debate,
especially in the scholarship on the origins of the Cold War.
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The controversy has centered on whether the Soviet Union’s decision to
impose communist dictatorships over the countries of Eastern Europe was the result of its
geopolitical and ideological ambitions, or whether it was a direct response to American
behavior, particularly in the domain of economics. Despite heated argument, scholars on
both sides of the debate have generally agreed that Stalin preferred regimes on its borders
that would maintain friendly relations with Moscow.1415 It can therefore be assumed that
Moscow would take measures to prevent the constitution of hostile governments in
Eastern Europe, but also in areas along its southern and far eastern borders.
Following the battles at Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943, the Soviet postwar
planning process accelerated, coincidentally at the very moment when the relief
negotiations were underway. By 1944, the Soviet Ambassadors responsible for these
negotiations, Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov, had returned to Moscow. Maisky
assumed leadership of the Foreign Ministry’s new commission on reparations. Litvinov
chaired a commission on peace treaties and the postwar order. Andrei Gromyko, who
Stalin appointed second in command in Washington, assumed the Ambassadorship upon
Litvinov’s departure. He would manage the relief portfolio for Moscow henceforward.1416
Thanks to the Russian historian Vladimir Pechatnov, who has made several planning
documents prepared by these men available, we can make reasonable guesses as to what
the Soviets were thinking during the relief negotiations.1417
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These document are not without problems. They were analytical pieces that
included recommendations for Stalin and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav
Molotov, not official policy statements. Written after the relief negotiations took place,
they may exhibit ideas formulated under different circumstances. One letter Gromyko
penned to Molotov, for example, was written just after Great Britain and the United
States launched the cross-channel invasion. This context, Pechatnov explains, may have
led Gromyko to write more optimistically than he would have done earlier or later in the
war. But several of the memoranda prepared by Maisky and Litvinov warrant attention.
With Molotov eager to control foreign policy, he denied these men access to diplomatic
exchanges, a fact that required them to rely on previous experience, newspaper reports,
and word-of-mouth. While this fact heightens their importance for the relief negotiations
of 1943, they may not reflect the opinions of Molotov and Stalin.1418
However, the work of Eduard Mark allows us to partly resolve these problems.
With published and unpublished documents from Great Britain, the United States, the
Soviet Union and other countries, he examines the Kremlin’s direction of Europe’s
communist parties, which shifted critically in 1943. He concludes that while the Soviet
Union did not abandon its revolutionary ideology, Stalin altered its application to
preserve Moscow’s working relationship with London and Washington during and after
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the war. His strategy, as we will see, displayed offensive and defensive
characteristics.1419 But most importantly, it accords with many of the ideas Maisky,
Litvinov and Gromyko articulated later. It also corresponds with circumstantial evidence
available to scholars for decades.
For Moscow, the maintenance of strong relations with London and Washington
remained of paramount importance.1420 In early 1943, Russia had every reason to work
with its Anglo-American partners to defeat Germany and Japan. The Soviet Union might
have defeated Germany without an Allied invasion of Western Europe, but authorities in
Moscow knew that an Anglo-American assault in the West would reduce demands on the
Red Army and decrease the human and material costs to Russia. For similar reasons,
Moscow hoped Great Britain and the United States would defeat and demilitarize Japan,
preferably without Soviet assistance.1421 After the war, the Soviet Union would require
assistance from the West as it faced the task of reconstruction at home and in areas it
planned to incorporate into its sphere of influence. Moscow certainly planned to rely on
its own resources and reparations from Germany and Berlin’s wartime allies, but it also
considered Anglo-American aid the “third main pillar of reconstruction” assistance.1422
In terms of postwar security, strong relations with London and Washington
remained essential. In May of 1941, Stalin had expressed approval of Roosevelt’s four
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policemen. “One cannot doubt that without the creation of an association of the armed
forces of England, the USA [and] the USSR able to forestall aggression,” he wrote
Molotov, “it will not be possible to preserve peace in the future.”1423 He assumed Great
Britain and the United States would not permit the existence of fascist regimes, and could
help prevent their emergence.1424 Chinese participation in Roosevelt’s scheme remained a
sore point for the Russians, who believed Washington sought to turn the country into an
American protectorate.1425 Yet even here, they had no interest in provoking conflict. It
remained far wiser to play along, monitor the situation, and wait for an opportunity to
assert Soviet influence in China.1426 Too many other concerns weighed on their minds:
the construction of friendly regimes in Europe,1427 limiting Turkish influence in the
Balkans and at the straits,1428 increased influence in Iran and the Middle East, and the
assumption of control over the Kuriles and Sakhalin in the Far East.1429
Angering the British and the Americans would only create roadblocks. If the
Soviet Union aimed to be the only great land power in Europe, an arrangement Litvinov
and Maisky preferred, then they would have to win the trust of London and Washington.
Moscow might play the two countries off one another to achieve its aims, but this would
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have to be done carefully. Otherwise the United States might rearm Germany and
Japan, and erect blocs in Europe and Asia hostile to the Soviet Union. Authorities in
Moscow did not believe the United States had territorial or military ambitions in any of
the areas along their borders, though they feared American financial, economic and
technological prowess, and the potential threats these assets might pose if conservative
forces assumed power in Washington.1430 Russian officials also displayed a degree of
sensitivity to public opinion in the United States, which they knew placed constraints on
whatever policy the Americans embraced.1431 Simply put, the evidence makes it clear that
the Soviet Union did not want to provoke the wrath of the United States.
Stalin therefore reordered his priorities vis-à-vis the communist parties of Europe.
He had already adjusted his strategy to meet the challenges posed by fascism. Following
the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the Comintern – the international communist
organization founded in 1919 – returned to the Popular Front strategy first articulated in
1935, when the communist parties of the world chose to join with any and every political
party opposed to fascism. This approach made sense until the Soviet Union became allies
with the United States. The Comintern’s pre-1935 history of aggressively pursuing
communist revolutions stigmatized the organization in Washington, and Stalin considered
its existence harmful for the war effort. By May 1943, he had dissolved the body.
Yet its activities intensified! Instead of using revolution to impose communist
regimes on Europe, Stalin now hoped to establish in liberated territories national fronts
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consisting of multiple parties that included the communists. Within this framework,
the communists would endeavor to render local opposition ineffective, create support for
their programs, and minimize Western objections to the slow creation of communist
regimes controlled from Moscow all over Europe. In this way, the Russians hoped to
facilitate incremental communist revolutions while simultaneously sustaining cooperation
with the West.1432
The lingering debate over the origins of the Cold War drives one to ask whether
this strategy constitutes a reaction to America’s postwar plans. This interpretation is
conceivable, but inconclusive. The extent to which State Department planners illegally
shared information with Russian agents remains unclear, but the evidence suggests that
certain officials were guilty of this charge.1433 But the dominating position Washington
reserved for itself in the relief plan could only arouse suspicions. Stalin’s instructions to
the Comintern coincided with Acheson’s decision to share the draft agreement with
Litvinov.1434 The proposal, however, was not necessarily a cause for an offensive Soviet
strategy, even if that might have been one of its results. Rather, the draft was a reason for
considerable caution, demands for revisions, and extensive negotiations to achieve more
favorable terms. That is precisely what occurred.
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It is nonetheless instructive to compare the Soviet and American strategies,
which were inexact foils of one another. While Washington hoped to operate behind Red
Army lines to construct liberal-capitalistic regimes, Moscow hoped to use communist
parties to slowly create communist system in Europe. The United States, however, made
no secret of its plans, and had every intention of seeking Moscow’s cooperation in
exacting them. Yet the Americans also planned to use international organization and
relief aid as tools to achieve their aims even if the Soviets opposed them. With assistance
and propaganda appeals to the people of Eastern Europe, Washington hoped to secure
allies that would counterbalance Moscow if it became hostile to its objectives. Similarly,
the Soviet Union planned to use communist parties to win broad support among Europe’s
populations, but had no plans to convince Washington of the merits of its preferences.
For the Soviet Union, cooperation on relief was not so much a means to obtain a
stable postwar international system, but rather a necessary precondition to advance and
protect its interests. The appearance in the West that Moscow might have or would
abandon its extremist ideology after the war was pretense. Revolution stood at the center
of the Soviet strategy. Stalin simply decided to pursue “quiet revolutions,” or “revolution
by degrees,” as Mark describes it, to conceal his objectives and wreak the immediate and
medium-term benefits of collaboration with the United States.1435 The decision to engage
London and Washington on relief, an endeavor designed to bring about stability, and that
was at its core humanitarian, did not mark a break from the past. It was pure Realpolitik.
As such, the Soviet Union entered the relief organization with obvious aims: to
reduce American influence in the relief organization while maximizing that of the Soviet
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Union; to secure assistance for itself, preserve its geopolitical position, and guard
against any ulterior motives the Americans might have had. To achieve these objectives,
Moscow remained prepared to divide the British and Americans against one another, and
to exploit opportunities the Chinese might create. It is through this prism that Moscow’s
approach to the postwar relief organization must be assessed. Though this approach is
entirely compatible with what one would expect of Great Power politics, it ultimately
served ideological purposes: the construction of communist regimes all over Europe.

The Russian Reaction to the Draft Agreement

The Russian reaction to the American draft agreement emerged piecemeal. While
Maisky and Litvinov considered aspects of the draft between August and December
1942, it remains unclear who studied it in Moscow. Most likely, this responsibility fell to
the Narkomindel, or People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which sent follow-up
questions to Maisky and Litvinov. Molotov clearly played a role.1436 Presumably Stalin
made the final decision. With the ousting of Litvinov as Foreign Minister in 1939, the
Soviet Dictator took hold of the reigns of foreign policy. But Molotov, it seems, remained
his primary conduit with the bureaucracy and the Ambassadors.1437
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On December 16, 1942, the Soviets delivered a formal reply to the British
expressing their opinion of the draft.1438 Two weeks later, Litvinov shared a slightly
different memorandum with Dean Acheson. 1439 Using these documents and the
discussions the Russian Ambassadors had with their interlocutors, we can construct a
reasonably clear idea of Moscow’s thinking. Analytically, they assessed the draft on two
levels: operations and policy-making. Broadly, they considered it “altogether too
American.”1440
As with the Hoover Mission of 1921, Moscow placed great emphasis on the
source of the relief organization’s authority and the conditions under which it would be
allowed to undertake operations in a given territory. They worried that the agency would
enter into a territory uninvited, or that it might make aid contingent on it being able to
control the distribution exclusively. While Maisky led the Americans and British to
believe the Russians feared another Hoover Mission, it soon became apparent that their
concerns extended well beyond Soviet territory.1441 “Clearly no such attitude would ever
be taken up towards a great power,” Eden wrote, “but [the] Soviet Government did not
desire that it could be adopted to a small power either.” They believed the draft created a
“political instrument” susceptible to American domination due to Washington’s
resources.1442 Thus Moscow argued that the agency should operate with “the consent of
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the government of the state receiving relief,” and should “admit of ways” by which
that government could “take upon itself the whole responsibility for fulfilling these
measures on its territory.”1443
The issue was never Russian territory. Neither London nor Washington believed
any authority other than the Soviet Government would undertake relief there.1444 The
question concerned all of the other areas where the agency would operate. As Acheson
explained, the drafters had given the organization wide authority for those areas where
there was no clear government,1445 or, as Eden put it, where anarchic conditions existed
and relief was needed rapidly.1446 But the Soviets worried that former enemy countries
might have the power to negotiate with the relief organization and deliver supplies.1447 In
these areas, the Americans conceded that the “‘appropriate authority’ might be the
commanders of the reoccupying forces.”1448 For the Russians, this meant that the Red
Army would undertake relief in areas it occupied, unless Moscow had sway, presumably
through communist parties, over a recognized government.
With regard to policy-making, Great Britain presented Russia its greatest obstacle.
Fearful that Moscow might make it more difficult to enlarge the Policy Committee,
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Leith-Ross told Maisky that this body would never address any point of “high
policy,” but would remain focused on technical questions affecting the administration of
relief. Jebb quickly corrected this view in an internal memorandum. “The extent to which
Germany or Italy should be supplied with foodstuffs in relation to Allied countries is one
which is all too likely to give rise to furious debate on a high level.” A “question of pure
politics,” this matter would go before the Policy Committee.1449
Jebb believed complete paralysis would result if the committee were enlarged.
What if the Norwegians insisted that the Finns receive aid, he wrote, while other
countries demanded assistance for Belgium or Poland? These suggestions alone would
“evoke the utmost suspicion” in Moscow. The Russians, he declared, might well urge
that the sufferings of their population who had at least resisted the Germans vigorously
should be preferred to the sufferings of [people such as] the Danes who did not resist.”1450
Though unaware of his views, Moscow took the same line as Jebb. The Policy
Committee should be limited to four powers.1451 While they argued that jealousies and
dispute would arise when trying to select the additional members,1452 they certainly knew
that an enlarged committee would decrease the weight of their vote. They also appear to
have assumed that those countries with the greatest claim for membership on the
committee, specifically Brazil and Canada, would side with London and Washington in
disputes over high policy.
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On the issue of voting, the Russians argued that all decisions of the Policy
Committee should be taken unanimously.1453 In this way, they could veto any proposals
with which they disagreed and guard against the possibility that the Americans might
agree to expand the size of the committee. The proposal also served to pressure the
British into accepting a four-power committee. In conversations with the British, Maisky
suggested that if the Allies insisted on expanding the Policy Committee, they would hold
firm on their demand for unanimity.1454
This tactic placed the balance of power in the hands of the Jebb and Ronald, who
still preferred the four-power formula despite the Cabinet’s decision of November 3,
1942.1455 It put Leith-Ross on the defensive. Writing Ronald on December 18, 1942, Sir
Frederick agreed that “the choice of the additional members” would “likely create
difficulties,” but he did “not think an increase from four to seven would complicate the
Committee’s work.” He worried of the Soviet demand for unanimous voting.1456 Several
days latter, Maisky provided him a way out. If the Policy Committee were limited to four,
he suggested Moscow might drop the demand.1457
The Soviet position on voting worried Acheson as well. Like the British, he
believed unanimity would permit insignificant issues to become unnecessarily bogged
down in diplomatic channels.1458 Instead, he preferred this procedure for a few select
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matters. The final draft, in fact, called for unanimous voting on all amendments to the
agreement and resolutions to expand the scope of the organization’s operations.1459 But
for the moment, he told Litvinov something quite different. “As a practical matter,” he
thought unanimity “was probably essential,” yet he “doubted the wisdom of requiring it
in the draft.”1460 In this way, he sought to ameliorate Moscow’s fears and open the way
for an agreement.
Britain, it seemed, would have to pay the cost of a concession on voting from
Moscow. As we will soon see, American officials remained far more flexible on the size
and composition of the Policy Committee than Britain, even if Roosevelt hung
tenaciously to the four-power concept. But for Britain, a decision to support the smaller
committee could have serious financial repercussions. London would have to accept
Russia’s view that Canada’s claims for membership on the Policy Committee would have
to be met through alternative means.1461 The situation worried Eden. Writing the British
Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax on January 1, 1943, he explained that he had
“hoped for a less negative attitude [from Moscow], more especially in respect of
unanimity rule and numbers on Policy Committee.”1462
If unanimous voting were abandoned, the Soviets would need another tool to stall
the organization should circumstances require it. It is hardly surprising that they would
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They preferred that he should have as little

influence on policy as possible. Because the draft provided that the Director General
would serve as the Chairman of the Policy Committee, they first insisted that he have no
voting rights.1464 The Americans had never intended that he would, and made no mention
of the issue in their formal correspondence with Moscow.1465 Apparently Acheson had
put the matter to rest in Washington before the end of 1942.
More significant, the Russians insisted that the Policy Committee have the power
to periodically affirm or reject the Director General’s leadership. If any member of the
committee disapproved of the Director’s performance, it should have the right to call a
vote of confidence. If he failed to receive unanimous affirmation by the four powers, then
he should be replaced. 1466 In this way, Moscow could periodically obstruct the
organization by calling his leadership into question. This proposal, of course, raised
serious doubts in Washington. While the British believed a term limit might appease the
Soviets,1467 Acheson rejected this idea altogether. It would make “continuity of planning
and policy difficult,” he told Litvinov.1468
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Maisky had another idea. He argued that China, Britain, and the Soviet Union
should each be allowed to appoint a Deputy who would serve on the Director General’s
staff and share his duties. “This arrangement,” he claimed, “would be necessary to avoid
political suspicions.” But Leith-Ross believed the proposal “likely to raise more difficulty
than any of his other points.” 1469 The Americans did not “wish the staff of the
Administration to be exclusively American,” he told Maisky, but had also insisted that
the Director General have the exclusive power to hire and fire. They would “raise strong
objection to the other Governments appointing Deputy Directors as political
commissars,”1470 or “political watch-dogs,” as he described the idea to Acheson,1471
“without regard to their qualifications or their acceptability to the Director General.” 1472
Moscow refrained from making the suggestion in their official reply to the American
proposal, but reserved its right to put forward additional proposals in the future.1473
Like the British, the Soviets believed the powers of the regional committees
should be increased, but did not explain in their reply to the Americans how this should
be done.1474 Maisky, however, told the British that the committees might play a role in
determining the allocation of supplies. If a dispute arose in a given country, they might
also work to resolve it locally with little or no intervention from the top. Leith-Ross
welcomed these ideas, but pointed out that American officials “attached great importance
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to the proper coordination of the whole machinery and wanted to be sure that the
regional committees would not claim for themselves independent powers.” Any
proposals from the regional committee would have to go to the Policy Committee, he
explained. For obvious reasons, Maisky believed this formula could work.1475
Two remaining issues worried Moscow. With noticeable embarrassment, Maisky
had informed Leith-Ross that his country “would probably wish to stipulate that they
could not participate in any organization for the relief of territories occupied by a country
with which they were not at war.”1476 Doubtless this reservation concerned the Far East.
In early 1943, the Soviet leadership remained sufficiently fearful of war with Japan that it
wouldn’t even contemplate discussions of their providing relief to areas the Japanese
occupied, especially China. With Moscow urging the Americans and British to open a
second front in Europe, this stipulation made Maisky fretful. Apparently he worried that
London and Washington might link the second front to a Soviet pledge to assist China
with postwar relief. As this possibility threatened to provoke Japan into attacking the
Soviet Union, it impinged upon Russia’s supreme national interests. Consequently,
Moscow duly conveyed this stipulation to the State Department.1477
The second issue concerned the return of prisoners and exiles. Here the Soviets
worried that the relief organization would repatriate Russian citizens without Moscow’s
consent. As Maisky explained to Leith-Ross, “there were a great many White Russians
who were exiled from the Soviet territories and the Soviet Government could not agree
that these exiled should be repatriated without Russian consent.” Sir Frederick dismissed
1475

“Note of Conversation with Maisky,” by Leith-Ross, November 20, 1942, T188/256,
PRO.
1476
Ibid.
1477
“Memorandum by the Soviet Union,” December 29, 1942, Acheson Papers, NARA.

529
this possibility as inconceivable. The White Russians would not be repatriated
without Moscow’s consent.1478 Though the Soviet Government made no mention of this
concern to the Americans,1479 it highlights their suspicions. Hoover had gladly assisted
the White Armies fighting the Bolsheviks after the last war. Why wouldn’t the Americans
send White Russians back into the country after this war to incite insurrections?

American Strategy for the Four-Power Talks

The Roosevelt Administration never planned to call a formal meeting of the Big
Four. State Department officials simply hoped Britain, China and the Soviet Union would
accept their relief proposal with few or no alterations. Then, they planned to circulate it to
all of the United Nations, and associated powers. Here again they hoped the world would
simply accept the agreement. But this proved to be wishful thinking. The weakest of
Roosevelt’s four great powers, the Chinese, did as they were told. They put forward two
suggestions, but made it clear that they would not press the matter. With London and
Moscow, however, it was not so easy. Not only did these countries desire changes to the
agreement, they disagreed with one another key points. This created a problem. How
could the four powers resolve their differences? To minimize British influence, the
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Americans had initially hoped to resolve differences with the Chinese and Russians
after Sir Frederick’s departure.1480 But the circumstances made this approach less ideal.
It became apparent that some informal meeting of the four powers would have to
take place. Yet the recall of Leith-Ross meant these negotiations could not occur
immediately. It was also apparent that Moscow would need time to assess the
agreement.1481 Thus in late 1942, no one knew the date of the meeting, and it wasn’t even
clear where the talks would take place. Maisky, who wanted to play a role in postwar
relief,1482 wanted them held in London. Leith-Ross disliked the idea: “the United States
would be the financer and supplier of relief.” An arrangement made in Washington, he
told Maisky, was “much more likely to go down with Congress.”1483 He also knew
Britain would have to oppose the Russians on the four-power plan and unanimity, and
preferred the Americans “undertake the onus of getting over these difficulties with
Russia.” Although the suggestion was put to Lord Halifax, he was told not to push it if he
believed it might cause offense.1484 Nothing ever came of it. On January 8, 1943, the
Americans issued an invitation for the three Ambassadors to meet three days later in
Washington.1485
They had devised their strategy. On January 5, 1943, Acheson convened a group
of eight State Department officials to determine the American position for the talks. With
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the exception of Herbert Lehman – the only participant with close relations to the
President – and Laurence Duggan – who was a close associate of Sumner Welles – most
of these officials owed their prominence in the Department to Cordell Hull. The Secretary
had recruited Leo Pasvolsky and Harry Hawkins. James Clement Dunn, then the
Department’s Advisor on Political Relations, had ingratiated himself with Hull and won
repeated appointments.1486 His Assistant, Alger Hiss, had also penetrated the Secretary’s
circle, primarily through strong relations with Pasvolsky.1487 Ray Atherton, whom Hull
appointed Chief of the European Division following the Nazi invasion of Western
Europe, became one of the Secretary’s most trusted advisors.1488 Similarly, Hull had
recalled George Atcheson from China following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
in 1937. Atcheson advised Hull and served as Assistant Chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs until his redeployment to Chungking in late 1943.1489
The presence of these men at the January 5, 1943 meeting symbolized the revival
of Hull and the ascendancy of Acheson at the State Department. At no point during the
Roosevelt years did Acheson possess more power than in early 1943. He maintained the
full confidence of Hull, and had exploited the Secretary’s hatred of Welles to reduce
Berle’s influence. Lehman might have preserved their significance, but appears to have
been ill equipped for the infighting that distinguished Roosevelt’s Administration.
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Roosevelt was mostly unaware of Acheson’s approach to the negotiations. Nominally
Hull remained in charge, but for much of this period he was away from the Department
due to illness.1490 Acheson therefore sat at the helm of the wheel. With the assistance of
Roy Veatch, who had been lured away from the Board of Economic Warfare, he
dominated the entire process.
This fact is important. It not only signified Acheson’s central role in the making
of American foreign policy at this juncture in the Second World War; it meant that relief
would remain at the center of the country’s postwar strategy. Welles, as we will see,
would later complain of the impression that relief dominated all aspects of policy, and
that Acheson was using relief to assume complete control of the State Department.1491 It
serves as a testament to the Assistant Secretary’s skill that he was so successful in this
regard, but of his immaturity that he thought such an approach was sustainable. Shortly
after Welles’ departure from Government, Roosevelt would reshuffle the chairs on the
ship deck, thereby cornering Acheson once again.
The men assembled on January 5, 1943 first discussed the Policy Committee.
With the British now proposing to increase its membership to seven, the Americans
focused on the countries that would fill the additional seats. Britain had suggested
Canada, Brazil, and one European country. If Canada provided supplies to the
organization, it would have benefits in view of domestic pressure to spread the burdens of
relief and reconstruction across the international community. But if Canada were given a
seat on the Policy Committee, it would outrage Anglophobes in Congress, who would
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charge that London had two votes. While everyone agreed this might create problems,
no one considered it true. A potential supplier, they thought Ottawa would side with
Washington in disputes with Britain. They also drew similar conclusions with regard to
Brazil. In fact, the Americans believed the promise of membership on the committee
might entice Brazil to sign the United Nations Declaration, which it had refused to do so
despite having entered the war in August 1942.1492
But the difficulty of choosing the seventh member led the group to reject the
seven-power formula. Here they agreed with Litvinov. The process of selecting a
European country would create “great jealousies.” Both Poland and the Netherlands
would demand membership, and neither would be satisfied unless it was included.
Instead of producing “wholehearted cooperation,” it would only create “international
friction.” Litvinov also knew it would make it more difficult for Moscow to achieve its
aims. This might have been a good thing, but the Americans deemed Russian cooperation
too important. Yet they concluded that Acheson “should not take a rigid attitude from
which” he “could not later withdraw” if the four-power setup became untenable, or if
Moscow appeared willing to accept a six-power committee that included Brazil and
Canada. Whatever the case, the Americans considered the seven-power setup the “least
desirable position.” It would only lead to fighting in Europe, and this they wanted to
prevent.1493
The group next considered two Russian proposals to restrict the Director
General’s freedom of action. First, the Soviets believed the organization should only be
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permitted to operate in territories where it had obtained the consent of the government
in that area, and they argued that it should make it possible for the recipient government
to undertake the whole responsibility for the administration of relief in its territory. The
Americans knew these proposals would curb their influence and create problems in
enemy countries and areas where “several governments might be claiming authority.” But
if Acheson assured Litvinov that Moscow would be exclusively responsible for the
distribution of relief within its territory, they thought he might drop the demand. Oddly,
they do not seem to have considered that the Russians were more worried about other
countries.1494 They also ignored a similar Chinese suggestion that recipient countries have
the chance to approve or disapprove of the Director General’s operational plans. More
striking, they refused to draw distinctions between enemy states and members of the
United Nations.1495
The second proposal also worried the Americans. In addition to mandatory
reporting requirements, the Russians believed the Director General should face periodic
review by the Policy Committee, which would either confirm his powers, or recommend
to the Council a new person for the position. The problem was not the recommendation
itself, but the call for unanimous voting on the Policy Committee. Under this procedure,
the Director General would need unanimous approval to remain in the job. If he were
ousted, policy coherence might result. This proposal would also weaken the Director
General, and thereby undermine American influence over the organization. Instead, they
thought the Policy Committee should have the power to remove the Director General at
any time by unanimous vote. If this proposal proved unacceptable to Moscow, the group
1494
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thought Acheson should propose a two-year term limit. If Moscow still refused, he
should propose that the committee have the power to remove the Director General only if
action were taken within thirty days of the date on which he submitted his annual
report.1496
Whether Washington should accept unanimity on all decisions taken by the Policy
Committee remained a difficult question. For the Russians, the procedure would allow
them to single-handedly remove the Director General when desirable; for the Americans
it would allow them to prevent the Director’s dismissal without their consent. This fact
required a balancing act. While Washington hoped to prevent obstructionist ploys by any
of the Great Powers, it had to avoid impressions that it planned to operate unilaterally in
the event of disagreements. But as a practical matter, they knew the organization could
not function without “the Great Powers acting together.” Thus the Americans considered
unanimity essential “on all questions of importance.” This view Acheson would share
with Litvinov, but he and his colleagues thought the Russians should not insist on its
inclusion in the agreement. Such a procedure would “delay action on a large number of
matters about which the Great Powers would not have strongly held views, but as to
which a particular representative might have preconceptions.”1497
The Americans turned next to the issue of regional committees. Like the British,
the Soviets thought these committees should not only be given advisory functions but
also extended powers. The lack of specific proposals from Moscow on how this could be
achieved made the American determination necessarily abstract. With the same force of
reasoning with which they had rebutted pleas from Leith-Ross, they concluded that the
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regional committees should remain “purely advisory” and should not become part of
the executive branch of the Administration. In one aspect, however, the Americans
revealed flexibility. If the Director General chose to assign the committees administrative
functions, then they would acquiesce. In this way, they could control the matter.
Otherwise they concluded that any actions designed to strengthen the committees would
be a “great mistake.” It would “tend to paralyze action if the Director General’s executive
powers were subjected to the control of regional committees.”1498
The final point of consideration presented no problem for the Americans. The
Soviet Union wished to “reserve the right during the war to abstain from participating in
the solution of problems arising in connection with [the] relief of countries with which
the Soviet Union [was] not at war.” The Americans knew that Moscow preferred to take
no actions that might be interpreted as a deviation from their policy of strict neutrality
vis-à-vis Japan. With Moscow still engaged in a death struggle with Nazi Germany, they
also realized that they could not and should not force the Russians into positions that
might jeopardize their military position in Europe. Any such behavior would damage
relations with Moscow and hurt America’s wartime interests. These same arguments had
led them to accept a similar reservation during talks over the United Nations Declaration.
By this point, the Americans must also have feared exacerbating tensions over repeated
delays in opening a second front in Europe, which Stalin had insisted upon for
months.1499
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CHAPTER TEN
THE FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS

In early January 1943, the relief discussion entered their most torturous phase.
Over the next five months, representatives of China, Great Britain, the United States and
the Soviet Union would meet in Washington on six occasions to revise and finalize the
draft agreement so that it could be submitted to the United Nations for consideration. The
Americans and Russians would have preferred that the four powers determine the
contours of the relief organization without interference from other members of the United
Nations, but Great Britain considered it essential that Canada’s concerns receive
immediate attention. Because the Canadians threatened to withhold further wartime
assistance to Britain if they were not given a place in the relief organization
commensurate with their potential contribution, London embraced a policy that forced
Washington to consider Canada’s complaints. As a result, Great Britain and the United
States engaged Ottawa in a series of informal bilateral exchanges that took place between
the various meetings of the four. These exchanges added considerable complexity to this
stage of the negotiations.
Throughout this process, two issues dominated the discussions. First, disputes
emerged at the outset over the size and composition of the Policy Committee. Those who
disliked the four-power formula worried that it would excite rage and possibly noncooperation from states capable of contributing to postwar relief. This debate precipitated
a time-consuming duel between Great Britain and the United States, the resolution of
which involved painstaking discussions with Canada. Second, the four powers disagreed
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over the organization’s right to operate in a given territory. Would it be permitted to
administer programs in an area without the consent of the recognized authority in that
territory, and would it have any obligations towards that authority? While this issue
raised theoretical questions on sovereignty, it was really a contest between the Americans
and Soviets over who would dominate postwar Europe. For the most part, remaining
disputes over voting procedures, the Regional Committees, a proposed Supplies
Committee, and the introduction of Deputy Director Generals emanated from these
broader concerns.

The Four Wise Men, Their Accomplices, and the Canadian

Of the principals who partook in the four-power negotiations, Dean Acheson was
the least experienced in world affairs. Prior to joining the State Department, he had
worked a total of one year at the Treasury. But the experience he had outside of
Government made its mark on the negotiations. Acheson was, as Jean Monnet, the
Frenchman and father of the European Union, later observed, “of that uniquely American
profession.”1500 He was a lawyer. He served in private practice for most of his early
career, but shortly after graduating from the Harvard Law School, he clerked for Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis.1501
Acheson was not only happy to use his legal skills; he was talented at it. To avoid
the two-third majority vote required of treaties in the Senate, he and experts in the State
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Department concluded that the results of the relief negotiations could be classified as
an executive agreement. A matter we will examine in the final chapter, they drew on a
past precedent, but had to be careful lest they anger the relief organization’s main funding
source: the Congress.1502 Like other American laws, the agreement would thus have to
give impressions quite different from what was intended or secretly arranged. Acheson
was well equipped for this task. He helped devise the legal and financial principles that
led to the passage of the Destroyers for Bases Deal of 1940 as well as the Lend-Lease Act
of 1941. Roosevelt was so impressed with his skill and support that he brought him back
into Government as Assistant Secretary of State.1503
Acheson was not the only lawyer among the wise men. The Chinese Ambassador
to the United States, Wei Tao-ming obtained a doctorate in law from the University of
Paris in 1926. A short and handsome man, he returned to China to pursue a legal career,
but joined the Kuomintang and at the astonishing age of 29 became President of the
Judicial Yuan, the equivalent of a Minister of Justice. From here he served as Mayor of
Nanking, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, and as a member of the Supreme
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Council for National Defense during the early war years. Before deployment to
Washington, he also served as Ambassador to France.1504
Western sources leave us with little further information about this man, but two
relevant facts should be noted. Wei maintained important relationships with French
officials, which in turn meant that the Chinese Embassy would share the entire record of
the four-power negotiations with the Frenchman, Jean Monnet. Second, his legal training
was in the Western civil law tradition, which influenced his country’s legal system.
Chinese law also drew upon moral norms of Confucianism and principles of Chinese
Legalism. Altogether, this meant that the system had fewer laws, but that they were clear
and less susceptible to judicial change.1505 By contrast with Acheson, who strove for just
enough confusion to keep everyone happy, Wei remained far more comfortable with
agreements that were unambiguous.
The British Ambassador, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, or Lord Halifax, was
an Oxford educated aristocrat possessing that sense of entitlement peculiar to his class.
As he told Winston Churchill, he “expected to be treated like a gentleman.”1506 Of course
he looked and acted like one. Tall and slender, he had an atrophied left arm, but it never
kept him from his hunting, shooting, and horseback riding excursions.1507 By the time he
arrived in Washington in 1941, he had served in an impressive array of posts, most
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notably as Viceroy of India and Foreign Secretary under both Neville Chamberlain
and Winston Churchill. Though scorned by contemporaries for his support of
appeasement, recent scholarship, especially work by conservative historians, has
vindicated him for his abrupt abandonment of this policy.1508
Halifax was prone to conciliation, a fact that led him, in Acheson’s words, “to
avoid obstinacy by circuitous restatement of the same position so that it kept reappearing
as a new one.”1509 He endeavored to establish new principles and ideas without saying
anything new at all. By contrast with many of his peers, trickery and deception were not
his forte: his devout religiosity made him too honest for diplomacy, and prone to
accommodation. Yet compromise played no role when he was out with his hunting dogs.
He showed no mercy for game in the sites of his gun. Churchill christened him the “Holy
Fox.”1510
The Soviet Ambassador, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, was the oldest and most
experienced of them all. An old Bolshevik revolutionary, he learned to propagandize,
escape prisons, rob banks, and smuggle arms early in life. In exile, he mastered the ways
of the West, an ability that helped him as a man in power. He proved a shrewd negotiator
and diplomatist, talents that explain in part why he was at the center of Soviet foreign
policy for three decades, most importantly as Ambassador at large under Lenin and the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs under Stalin. Scholars in the West have spilt
gallons of ink trying to argue that had he not been dismissed late in his career, the Cold
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War might or might not have been averted. But the picture of Roosevelt he proudly
displayed on his desk serves more as testament to his savvy than any easy-minded
approach to the West. He was just as tough, cynical, stubborn and suspicious as his
cohorts, which is why Stalin, who considered his ability and knowledge indispensable,
kept him around for so long. Litvinov, in fact, was one of a very few Jewish Bolsheviks
from the pre-1917 era to survive the Stalinist purges.1511
If Maxim Maximovich was misleadingly courteous and talkative, his short and
plump figure made him seem warm and even affectionate. He was known to “waddle in
and out” of Washington’s wartime social functions with his British wife attached to his
arm.1512 Acheson humorously described him as “roly-poly.”1513
Several assistants of the wise men played important roles. The Director of Relief
in the State Department’s Division of Special Research, Roy Veatch, aided Acheson.
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Halifax relied mostly on Noel Hall, the Minister in charge of economic warfare
activities, but occasionally on Guy Thorold, the First Secretary of the Embassy. For
China, the newly appointed Minister, Liu Chieh, backstopped for Ambassador Wei. It is
not clear who, if anyone, helped Litvinov. Stalin appears to have placed Andrei Gromyko
“second in command” at the Soviet Embassy to keep an eye on his boss, not to help him.
Thus while Veatch, Hall and Liu attended all of the four-power meetings, Gromyko was
present at only one of them, but as a substitute in Litvinov’s absence. The Soviet
Ambassador could never permit the emergence of two versions of the story lest he risk
his own life and career.1514
Of the assistants, Veatch and Hall played dominant roles. Roughly the same age,
they were professors trained as economists. Both men worked in economic warfare. One
would think that these two men would have gotten along well, but rivalry and mutual
dislike of the other man’s country colored their interactions. On the one side, there was
Sir Noel the “glorious name-dropper” who, according to the New York Times, knew the
American people and their problems. 1515 On the other side, there was Dr. Roy the
optimistic do-gooder from Oregon whose pedigree and multiple Christian affiliations
made him precise but righteous.1516
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If these four men and their aids drove the four-power negotiations, one
additional individual played a critical role as well. Born in Toronto, Canada, Lester
Bowles Pearson is one of the giants of his country’s history. He served notably in he First
World War, but was injured in a plane crash and discharged from the service. He had a
BA from the University of Toronto, and had taken an Oxford MA. During the early part
of the Second World War, as we have noted, he served in London as a member of the
Canadian delegation, but was transferred to Washington in 1942, where, as Minister
Counselor, he was second in command at the Canadian Embassy. His immediate
superior, however, played no role in the relief discussions. This provided Pearson a
tremendous opportunity.
In at least one way, Pearson, or “Mike,” as his friends referred to him, stood apart
from his interlocutors in Washington. He was a politician long before he ever became
one. Not only did he want to be your friend, he wanted to be noticed. Lester Pearson, like
Lord Halifax, was also very religious: he worshiped at the altar of a stagnant pool. But
where he distinguished himself was in how often and how long he stood there. In short,
Pearson thought highly of himself, and went to great ends to satisfy his ambitions. Along
with his indisputable intelligence, these qualities translated into a career that paralleled
and possibly exceeded that of all of the other principals. The relief negotiations provided
him a critical steppingstone.1517
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The First Meeting of the Four Powers: January 11, 1943

The first meeting of the four powers began poorly. Acheson informed the group
that Hull considered it unwise to allow for a seven-power Policy Committee unless a
“solution could be found for the difficulties that otherwise might result.” Litvinov feigned
ignorance: he did not know why his Government remained attached to the four-power
principle, but surmised that Moscow believed it would be difficult for the Europeans to
select one country to fill the seventh seat. It would be much “easier for four members to
reach agreement” than seven, he argued. Adding members to the Policy Committee
would also “set a pattern which might be embarrassing on other occasions when quite
different matters might require decisions or action by the four Powers.” Halifax refused
to bend. He was “firmly bound” by the instructions of his Government, which considered
the “cordial cooperation” of the supplying countries, especially Canada, essential. While
impressed with Litvinov’s argument, he would have to inform London of any suggestions
they might have. The Chinese Ambassador replied similarly, but everyone knew he
would follow Washington’s lead.1518
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The burden of finding a solution initially fell to the Americans. Not only did
they agree with Litvinov’s claim that selecting the seventh power might prove difficult,
they were unable to convince Brazil to sign the UN Declaration of January 1942. The
Americans dangled the prospect of membership on the Policy Committee before Brazil’s
eyes in an effort to entice them to join the alliance, but they refused despite having
declared war on Germany and Italy in August 1942.1519 Acheson therefore suggested
formulas to make the four-power setup work. He made the comical proposal that Canada
and the United Kingdom share a seat on the Policy Committee.1520 Then, he suggested the
creation of a standing committee on supplies, which would include Canada and the other
major supplying countries. Halifax recorded these options, but argued that they did not go
far enough to remove London’s fear that the European Allies would protest the Policy
Committee. To meet this concern, Acheson thought the Inter-Allied Committee “might
be strengthened” to enlist their “interest and cooperation.”1521
Acheson now refocused the group’s attention on the organization’s authority to
operate in a given territory. The Soviets preferred that the Director General first obtain
“the consent of the government of the state receiving relief.” The Chinese wanted the
Director General’s field operations to be subject to the approval of the recipient state. But
Acheson argued, “It would be difficult to cover these points in the draft.” “Such a
1519
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provision might cause embarrassment in dealings with the former enemy
governments and in determining the proper governments with which to deal in unsettled
territories.” He reassured those present that the Soviet and Chinese Governments would
be the United Nations authority in their respective countries. The Chinese raised no
objections. Halifax did not “feel strongly on the matter.”1522 He was silently pleased that
the Americans were now making an implicit distinction between enemy countries and
members of the United Nations, a marked improvement over the previous week.1523 But
Litvinov, while accepting Acheson’s views on enemy countries, believed the anticipated
difficulties unlikely. “The United Nations would be forced to recognize some government
in each territory without delay.” But with no further instructions, he would have to refer
the matter to Moscow.1524
The group discussed the Director General. Like Litvinov, Acheson agreed that
this individual should file periodic reports with the Council, but he reserved for the
Policy Committee the right to redact any information best left confidential until the war’s
end. He similarly concurred with the Soviet view that procedures should be established to
remove the Director General. He suggested this might be done by a unanimous vote of
the Policy Committee. Litvinov listened, but replied quizzically: “It would be very harsh
to remove the Director General.” Would it not be “easier and less embarrassing for the
Policy Committee merely to fail to reelect him?” To avoid the embarrassment of a direct
dismissal, he responded, the Director General “would be given an opportunity to resign.”
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Halifax voiced agreement. “The Director General should be given the fullest possible
executive power subject to the control of the Policy Committee and the Council.” But he
added, “If it were necessary to find an alternative, the most desirable alternative… would
be to set the Director General’s term of office at a definite period… certainly not less
than two or three years.” Litvinov had heard enough. He would report to Moscow.1525
Acheson then reported that his Government preferred unanimous voting only at
points in the draft where everyone agreed that it was desirable. On other points, he
considered a simple majority adequate. Otherwise the relief organization might encounter
innumerable delays arising “from the opposition of an individual member on minor
matters on which he might hold some personal opinion.” Litvinov reacted in disbelief.
“He could not imagine a situation in which an individual would obstruct action as a
personal matter.” But the Chinese Ambassador expressed agreement with Acheson’s
proposal and Litvinov offered to report it to Moscow.1526 For reasons we cannot yet
know, the Soviet Union accepted this proposal along with the American suggestion that
the Director General could be removed with the unanimous vote of the Policy
Committee. But Litvinov and Maisky repeatedly threatened unanimous voting on all
decisions if Great Britain and the United States refused to accede to their wishes on other
matters, most importantly, their preference for a four-power Policy Committee.1527
This insistence only heightened the importance of the Regional Committees. To
make the four-power Policy Committee palatable to all of the organization’s members, it
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would have to provide them with outlets of influence. The British recognized this
fact, but Acheson’s argumentation of the previous week left them apprehensive, not
because they disagreed with it, but because it contradicted the Soviet habit of attaching
political commissars to military commanders in the field. The Assistant Secretary of
State, in short, adduced the examples of the American Congress, which attached a
committee to General George Washington during the American Revolution, and William
of Orange, who enlisted Dutch Commissaries to keep an eye on the Duke of Marlborough
during the English Revolution, both, in Acheson’s view, with “deplorable effects.” He
believed that “any Regional Committee would be a committee of the council and not of
the executive.” Their purpose, he told Noel Hall, would be to “lay down policy and to
make representations to the Policy Committee if their directions were not properly carried
out.”1528
On January 11, 1943, Acheson abandoned the provocative argumentation and laid
out the principle that guided the American attitude towards the committees. They should
be “concerned [purely] with policy and not with executive or administrative functions.”
Aware that this position created an opening for Great Britain, Halifax quickly
concurred.1529 Leith-Ross, in fact, considered the American point of view promising by
comparison with the obstinate attitude he had faced during his frustrating discussions in
Washington. The Americans now appeared willing to support increased policy-making
powers for the Regional Committees.1530 Noel Hall agreed, and told the group that these
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committees would be in a better position to develop policy than the Council given
their proximity to and knowledge of the actual problems in the areas needing assistance.
The group therefore decided that Acheson should redraft the paragraph in the agreement
on the Regional Committees. He should also draft language for the committee on
supplies, which he had suggested earlier in the meeting. The record of this meeting leaves
no evidence of Litvinov’s views on the matter.1531
Henceforward the talks unfolded as expected. Acheson accepted the Soviet right
to abstain from participation in the solution of relief-related problems in countries at war
with a state with which it was not at war. The Chinese raised no complaint. Though they
had long hoped the Soviet Union would go to war with Japan, they could not afford to
offend the United States. Similarly, Ambassador Wei raised no protest when the group
rejected Chungking’s proposal that amendments to the agreement might be made with a
simple majority vote in the Council and the Policy Committee. Acheson argued that such
modifications “would open the way to changes of great importance without the full
support of the great majority of the member Powers.” Litvinov and Halifax concurred. In
sum, the four wise men agreed that Acheson should prepare a resume of their discussion
with relevant modifications to the draft. The size and composition of the Policy
Committee remained the only sticking point. The position of the Director General, the
Policy Committee’s voting procedures, the creation of a Supplies Committee, and the
relative powers of the Regional Committees depended on the course of this debate.1532
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The Policy Committee Debate Begins: The Four-Power Option

While the Americans endeavored to make the four-power setup acceptable to the
rest of the world without endangering their control over the organization, the British tried
to convince the State Department that the seven-power arrangements were not only
essential but also possible. The British knew that if the Soviets failed to alter their
position, it was better to have shaped a flawed organization in ways that would appease
Canada and quell the fulminations of the governments in exile than to allow discontent to
wreck the entire project. They also knew that by looking out for Canada and Europe, they
could increase their prestige and possibly augment the influence of the Inter-Allied
Committee. For their part, the Americans always thought the seven-power setup could
work well for them. It was best to maximize the benefits of such an arrangement by
molding the organization for the contingency that Moscow might accept seven members.
But if not, the Americans would need to win over the governments in exile, several of
which had considerable resources. They would also have to convince Canada. Ottawa had
much to offer, and was in a position to create trouble for the wartime alliance.
The degree to which Acheson took their claims seriously remains a moot point.
The British and Canadian Government reacted with disbelief at his suggestion that they
share a seat on the Policy Committee. Lester Pearson, then the Minister Counselor at the
Canadian Embassy, dismissed the proposal as “impossible” and evidence of a “surprising
lack of knowledge.”1533 But the proposal was not senseless. Apparently the Canadian
Ambassador to the United States, Leighton McCarthy, had no problem declaring his
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allegiance to the Empire. “A British subject I was born and a British subject I will
die,” he wrote in January 1943.1534 But many English Canadians, Pearson for example,
and especially the French Canadians, despised this attitude. The British High
Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald thought the proposal could even “lead to
the break-up of the British Commonwealth.” It prejudiced the possibility that a Dominion
could have a voice of its own in an international body and suggested members of the
Commonwealth enjoyed something less than full nationhood. 1535 If this ever was
Acheson’s intent, he certainly backed away from the idea when criticism of it began to
emerge.
Its problems were immense. Mackenzie King’s Government considered the
proposal “entirely unacceptable” for nationalistic reasons.1536 The British thought it failed
to meet Ottawa’s claim as a major supplier.1537 According to one telegram, the suggestion
was tantamount to giving a vote to the British Empire, an approach that would undermine
Ottawa’s ability to obtain public support for the relief organization among the Canadian
public. Old school imperialists in the other Dominions would request a share in the vote,
a demand that might lead to disputes with Australian, New Zealand and South African
nationalists. In turn, this could lead the Dominions to consider whether they should
remain members of the Commonwealth at all. From the American point of view, it might
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precipitate similar demands from Latin American countries eager to have influence
on the Policy Committee. Not only would this fracture South America, it would weaken
the American position.1538 It might also offend policymakers in Moscow, who would
suspect the Canadians, as they already feared with regard to the Chinese, would
“perpetually side with the United States.”1539 It was an awful proposal. By the beginning
of February, it had been dismissed by everyone, including Acheson.1540
The fate of Acheson’s second proposal, the Supplies Committee, appeared less
certain. Immediately after the four-power meeting of January 11, 1943, Noel Hall at the
British Embassy provided the first suggestion as to how it might be integrated into the
text, which indicated approval from London.1541 Indeed the Foreign Office recognized its
benefits. In addition to appeasing Canada, it might mollify the European countries with
supplies to offer, such as Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands. As such, it would
provide a check against unilateral action.1542 But as the various ministries considered the
proposal further, a number of policymakers began to worry that it would duplicate
existing supply machinery, particularly the Combined Boards.1543 By early February, one
official at the Foreign Office even called it the “most dangerous suggestion.”1544 LeithRoss also voiced concerns. It would “separate donor from recipient countries.” If every
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country with supplies were included, it would become too wieldy. He also thought it
might even trump the Policy Committee in its importance.1545
Whether the draft agreement included the proposal would depend on two factors:
the reaction of the Soviet Union and the size of the Policy Committee stipulated in the
draft circulated to the United Nations. If the Soviet Union refused to accept a Supplies
Committee, or ultimately agreed to the seven-power Policy Committee, it made little
sense to integrate it into the draft with the problems it could cause.1546 Ironically, neither
the United States nor Great Britain paid much attention to the Canadian point of view at
this point, even though the provision was designed to address their concerns. When the
Canadians learned of the proposal, they informed the British of their opposition and told
the Americans that nothing short of membership on the Policy Committee would satisfy
their claims.1547 However Moscow remained opposed to this setup and agreed to the
creation of a Supplies Committee so long as its policies were “carried out under the
control and with the approval of the Policy Committee.”1548 The Soviet attitude placed
the Canadians in a difficult position. If Ottawa backed down, Canada would look weak; if
it refused to bend, it would wreck the entire endeavor or miss the benefits of
participation.
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Acheson’s final proposal won accolades from everyone. To make the fourpower formula more acceptable, he wanted to strengthen the Regional Committees. But
on January 20, 1943, dispute erupted over the specifics. The drafting, according to the
British, failed to grant the committees sufficient authority to “give directions in regard to
[the] administration of relief in their [respective] area[s].” 1549 London consequently
proposed Regional Deputies, who would liaison for the committees with the Council and
Policy Committee on programs and policy proposals, but who would also “give effect, so
far as practicable, to any recommendations made by” the regions.1550 Confusion ensued.
The British equivocated on whether the Deputies would be agents of the Regional
Committees or the Director General. To give the committees control over operations and
access to the Council and Policy Committee, their proposal circumvented the Director
General.1551 The Americans demurred, forcing the British to put the Director General
back into the equation.1552 Thus the deputies became agents of the Director General and
received the menial task of providing a secretariat at meetings of the Regional
Committees.1553
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The Regional Committees would recommend policy and monitor operations,
but their power to communicate with the Council and Policy Committee would be
circumscribed. On policy, their recommendations would be made through the Director
General. If he disapproved, he could decline to report them to the Policy Committee, or
the Council if it were in session. Regarding operations, the committees would only have
access to the Policy Committee if dispute emerged with the Director General over the
implementation of policy. In this case, the Policy Committee would arbitrate. This
arrangement actually strengthened the Policy Committee vis-à-vis the Director General,
but did little to empower the regions. As for the Deputies, their role would be reduced to
preparing reports at the request of the Director General, and aiding the Regional
Committees administratively. Otherwise they would have little power. Their access to
information and policy recommended by the regions would be at the discretion of the
Director General. In essence, while the British hoped to make meaningful changes to
satisfy the Europeans, the Americans preferred pretence to trick them into believing they
had more power.1554
While the size of the Policy Committee proved the source of conflict in early
1943, the committee’s function and relationship to other entities in the organization had
created problems in 1942. The Americans worried that calling it the “Executive
Committee” might suggest its subservience to the Council or some other United Nations
authority. Moreover, executive authority would reside with the Director General and his
staff, not the “Executive Committee.” The Americans therefore accepted Leith-Ross’
suggestion in the summer of 1942 that the body be renamed the “Policy Committee” to
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more accurately reflect its duties. But now it had become apparent that this title made
the Council and the Regional Committees appear less relevant. The matter so worried
Acheson that he routinely deemphasized the Policy Committee’s importance in meetings
with the British and Canadians.1555 He even pondered its elimination altogether.1556 But
Roy Veatch proposed a new name, “Central Committee,” which would place it on the
same plane as the Regional Committees and remove the “implication that the committee
of four would set policies for the organization.”1557
It was an ironic proposal. The agreement makes it clear that the Central
Committee would be a far more important than the Council or the Regional Committees.
As such, the new title served to conceal the truth rather than to overtly mislead. At the
same time, it was also inexplicitly honest. The Americans always wanted the Central
Committee to be at the center of things, but they preferred that it do far less than any of
the other powers believed. The draft, of course, left no impression of this sort. The
Central Committee would make policy at times when the Council was not in session. But
the real master would be the Director General. The Central Committee’s purpose would
be to rubberstamp his policies. If it refused, the Director General would stage compliance
while carrying out America’s preferences on the ground. For this reason, it was important
to minimize lines of communication between the Regional Committees and the Central
Committee. The Americans did not want the Director General cut out of the policymaking process, and they did not want the Regional Committees informing the Central
Committee that he was acting unilaterally or refusing to comply with their policies.
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The Policy Committee Debate Continues: The Seven-Power Option

While Great Britain and the United States worked to resolve problems with the
four-power setup, they simultaneously struggled to make the seven-power alternative
acceptable. But no one knew whether this approach would ever fly. Cordell Hull had
dismissed it altogether. The Russians would accept nothing other than the four-power
alternative, he argued. If thwarted, they would “simply resort to delaying tactics.”
Sumner Welles disliked the seven-power because he thought the four-power principle
should be well established so that it might also guide political and military arrangements
after the war. 1558 The President certainly shared this view. 1559 However, the State
Department envisioned a scenario in which European ire over the four-power setup
forced the Soviet Union to yield to continental demands for representation on the Policy
Committee. In this case, Roy Veatch believed the United States should “be able to bring
forth the least objectionable plan for meeting such pressure.”1560 The debate hinged on
one issue: How could the three additional powers be chosen?
The Americans made the first proposal on January 21, 1943, but everyone
considered it problematic. In conversations with the British, the State Department
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suggested the creation of three caucuses of the Council, one each for Europe, Latin
America, and the principle supplying countries. These groups would select the additional
members of the Policy Committee by majority vote.1561 Ultimately the Americans and
British concluded that this procedure might lead to unfortunate horse-trading among the
Europeans and Latin Americans.1562 But from the British point of view, it in no way
guaranteed a seat for Canada. With many of the Latin American countries potentially in
the caucus of supplying countries, it was conceivable that Ottawa might not win the seat
it coveted. As such, the British preferred that the three posts be delegated geographically:
one for a British Dominion, a Latin American country, and a European nation,
respectively.1563 But this idea too, presented problems.
Roy Veatch and Noel Hall met on January 22, 1943 to forge an alternative plan.
Instead of assigning the Council responsibility for selecting the three additional members,
they thought the four Great Powers should make the decision annually by unanimous
vote. In this way, they could avoid the problems associated with the other proposal, and
make it unnecessary to establish a Supplies Committee.1564 But these arrangements were
not without flaws. The Americans and British considered it unwise to explicitly reserve a
seat for Canada in the agreement, which might force the great powers to cite other
members as well.1565 If they chose one European country, it could create jealousies. As a
result, there would have to be some advance agreement made with the Soviet Union that
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provided for Canadian and Brazilian membership, assuming that Rio de Janeiro
signed the United Nations Declaration before the relief conference took place. For this
reason, Veatch thought Acheson should reach out to Litvinov to ascertain his views.1566
As we have no record of such discussion, the Americans must have considered this
premature.
For one, it was unclear what the Canadians and Brazilians would do. At the
moment of this proposal, Canada had communicated with the United States very little on
the topic of relief. What purpose would it serve if Ottawa were easily convinced to
retreat? It also made no sense if Brazil still refused to sign the UN Declaration. Rio de
Janeiro, to be sure, had appealed to London in an effort to become involved in postwar
relief. Policymakers in Brazil knew their country would profit handsomely from
participation.1567 But at this point they appeared unwilling to join the Policy Committee if
the price for membership was signing the UN Declaration.1568 It also seems they were
afraid to partake in an endeavor where they would be expected to do as they were told.
Noel Hall told Lester Pearson that Brazil did not want to play the role of “American
protégé on the enlarged Committee.” This attitude, he explained, was “symptomatic of
the general unrest… at United States tutelage.” Small states had become “impatient at
being pushed around, especially in South America, where… the good neighbor,”
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according to Hall, “was ‘in shreds and tatters.’”
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Brazil signed the UN Declaration

on February 8, 1943, but made little fuss over the Policy Committee.1570
The British knew that it would be insufficient to merely devise a workable sevenpower Policy Committee. Officials in the Soviet and American Governments, especially
Sumner Welles,1571 worried that anything deviating from four-power control might set an
undesirable precedent for other postwar organizations. Cognizant of this fact, the British
drew distinctions between postwar economic arrangements, on the one hand, and those
that would manage political and military affairs on the other hand. When political issues
arose in the context of relief, they argued that these issues could be settled through
diplomatic channels.1572 But to erase fears that this procedure might influence future
postwar organizations, they simultaneously expressed the view that “the four powers
should retain ultimate control over post-war military and political arrangements.”1573
Economic affairs were a different matter. While Canada factored heavily in their
analysis of the question, they also considered it inconceivable that the Europeans would
accept four-power control over Europe’s economic life. With a population of 133 million
people and prewar aggregate trade levels more than twelve times that of both China and
Russia, they did not see how the European continental members of the United Nations
could be excluded from the primary decision-making bodies of organizations with
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While Russia and China would be major recipients of

economic aid, many of the European countries – specifically Belgium, France, Holland
and Norway – might have resources of their own to contribute. If the leaders of any of
any of these countries relegated control over their economic life to a four-power
directorate that included China and the Soviet Union, the British believed their
populations would repudiate them.1575 The byproduct of such a reaction would be nothing
short of full-scale social, political and economic instability, the very condition that the
relief organization endeavored to prevent.

Canada and the Trans-Atlantic Triangle

As the British processed the opposition they faced in Moscow and Washington,
they shared all relevant telegrams with the Canadians, who welcomed London’s support,
but repudiated four-power management of postwar political and military affairs. On
January 21, 1943, the Canadian War Committee, concluded that the “United Nations
could not be divided into one group of great powers exercising responsibility for political
and military settlements, and another group excluded from responsibility regardless of
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They conveyed this view to the British High

Commissioner the following day. For the Canadians, the “functional principle” was as
applicable to these domains as it was to economics.1577 The British took notice.1578
Whereas on January 15, 1943, they stated that it was “certainly important that the four
powers should retain control over post-war military and political arrangements,” on
January 24, 1943, they told the Americans it was “almost inevitable that the ultimate
control of postwar military and political arrangements” would “tend to lie in the hands of
the four great powers.”1579
At Britain’s suggestion, the Canadians made their case at Washington directly. On
January 26, 1943, Pearson dispensed the usual arguments with Acheson. But instead of
stressing the political considerations forcing his country to demand membership on the
Policy Committee, he stressed the size of a Canadian contribution, and suggested it
would damage the Canadian economy if it failed to participate. True enough, but the
implication was that economic concerns would force Canada to reach an agreement. By
contrast, he might have argued, as Alex Skelton did with Leith-Ross the previous year,
that the political class would just as well commit economic suicide than to accept an
affront to Canadian prestige. To be sure, he covered all of the relevant ground, but his

1576

Cabinet War Committee, Meeting No. 216, January 21, 1943, C-4875, Vol. 5678, RG
2, LAC.
1577
Telegram No. 179 Secret, Canada (HC) to DO, January 23, 1943, T188/256, PRO;
the Canadians gave the HC the following “Memorandum,” January 18, 1943, File W-221, 1942-43, Vol. 44, RG2, LAC.
1578
The internal discussion over how to back away from the stronger claim can be found
in the following documents: Telegram Relief No. 15, DC to FO, January 21, 1943;
Telegram Relief No. 15, FO to DC, January 22, 1943, both in T188/256, PRO.
1579
I have used the italics to underscore the subtle shift in their position. Telegram Relief
No. 9, FO to DC, January 15, 1943, T188/256, PRO; Halifax to Acheson, January 24,
1943, 840.50/1169, FRUS, Vol. 1, 862-864.

564
approach laid too much emphasis on the wrong facts. Yet still more reproachable, he
contravened the Canadian War Committee’s recent decisions. “In the political and
military field Canada would not expect a position equal to the four great powers.”1580
Acheson must have considered Pearson’s approach weak.
The Canadian diplomat scrambled. Noel Hall informed him that Acheson was
“inclined to take the line that Canadian difficulties regarding the Policy Committee were
not possibly as great as the British thought and that… Acheson thought… a Committee of
Suppliers might meet” Canada’s problem. Pearson wrote Robertson that Acheson “could
not have received that impression from his talk with me… In our discussions about a
possible Suppliers Committee I had stated that this would in all probability not be
considered acceptable.” He then assigned blame for the hardened attitude to Hull and
Welles, and criticized Robertson’s insistence that he restate the Canadian position more
firmly with Acheson. “A more effective procedure,” he wrote, “might be for the Minister
to send a formal note to the Secretary of State putting our position in clear terms.” He
even contemplated an abandonment of the Canadian position, which he admitted, would
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“leave us worse off than if we had not brought the question up.” Alternatively, the
Prime Minister might speak with Roosevelt.1581
If the Americans now considered Canada’s difficulties less than what everyone
had previously thought, the logical next step was to pressure London. The process had
already begun. On January 18, 1943, Acheson, stating a “renewed sense of urgency,”
proposed a second meeting of the four powers by the end of the week, a fact that forced
Noel Hall, in the Ambassador’s absence, to request instructions from London on a fortyeight-hour notice.1582 Due to Soviet delays, the meeting did not take place. But on
January 24, 1943, the British delivered a strong criticism of the four-power setup in
Washington. 1583 Yet Pearson’s performance had undercut them, and the Americans
increased the stakes.
The State Department lobbed a veiled threat at London. As Halifax explained, the
State Department was “embarrassed by the rapid extension” of Herbert Lehman’s
activities. The situation made them “afraid that unless we proceed quickly to set up the
United Nations relief agency he will have built up so large and strong a team on his own
that the agency will not become properly international in its personnel and outlook.” In
this way, they made the consequences of British truculence clear. If London did not
reverse course, then the world would be faced with a unilateral American relief effort. Of
course they preferred otherwise. “The four power Policy Committee might be unpalatable
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to the European nations,” the State Department argued, “but… they would have to
swallow it.”1584 Clearly they felt the same with regard to Canada.
Ironically, the British refused to believe the fib. Roosevelt had appointed Lehman
without consulting the State Department. The decision so outraged Acheson’s preference
for Director General, Paul Appleby that he resigned to return to the Department of
Agriculture in early January.1585 The circumstances made the State Department’s claim
plausible, but concealed the fact that most everyone in the American Government agreed
that if the relief negotiations failed, then the United States would have to go it alone. Yet
the British dismissed this fact, even though they had conjectured this possibility in
conversations with Maisky. Now they considered the story nothing more than “weak”
cover for the American refusal to “get involved in a dispute with Russia.”1586 Evidentially
they decided to do what the Americans refused to do.
In early February, the British asked Maisky to persuade Moscow to accept the
seven-power Policy Committee. Both the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in
Washington thought the Russian Ambassador in London might have more influence in
Moscow than Litvinov.1587 But Richard Law, who met with Maisky on February 2, 1943,
quickly realized that Hull’s assessments were true. “If we pressed M. Maisky to intervene
with his Government in support of the larger policy committee he would probably take
the opportunity to raise all these other questions at the same time and the chances of
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getting any settlement of this issue would be very much lessened.” Law therefore told
Maisky there was no need to raise the matter with Moscow; it was best to leave it up to
Litvinov in Washington.1588
Leith-Ross, however, could not desist. That evening he consulted with Maisky,
who informed him that membership on the Policy Committee could not be considered in
isolation of other points, such as the Director General’s position, the powers of the
Regional Committees, and the relationship between the Relief Administration and the
recipient countries. Maisky also told him that he had already telegraphed Moscow despite
Law’s instructions. But the Russian Ambassador led Leith-Ross to believe that he had
drawn a distinction between economic matters and political and military questions. This
presentation pleased Sir Frederick.1589
Meanwhile, the Canadians deliberated. Robertson worried that if Ottawa
abandoned its position, Canada might find itself “sitting on the side-lines while other and
still more important parts of the post-war settlement are being arranged.” Yet he
questioned the wisdom of “a formal note to the Secretary of State.” Diplomatic protocol
would require a response. “If they took an adverse position it would be very difficult to
bring about a change.”1590 But the War Committee accepted the risk.1591 On February 8,
1943, Robertson instructed Pearson to present Hull a memo that made Ottawa’s most
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“Unless this change is

made…. Canada, and no doubt other countries, will not be able to cooperate in the work
of the administration…” But in trying to avoid the embarrassment of retreating if the
Americans refused to bend, they inadvertently gave them reason to play hardball. The
memo suggested Canada would withdraw if “other alterations with equivalent effects
[were] adopted.” If not, Canada would still cooperate, but “not as fully as [it] would
[otherwise] be prepared to do.”1593
Canada’s prospects for membership on the Policy Committee deteriorated. In
Hull’s absence, Sumner Welles received Pearson. Ottawa’s “position is a very strong,
almost unanswerable, one,” he told the Canadian. Acheson “half jocularly remarked that
the difficulty would be solved if [Ottawa] could prevail on the U.K. to let [Canada] take
its place on a Four-Power Committee.” He warned of American unilateralism if Canada
sabotaged the effort. 1594 While both Americans blamed the problem on Moscow,
Acheson left Pearson with little hope that Canada could “make any impression on the
Russians.”1595 But Welles thought they should try. It failed. The Soviet Ambassador in
Ottawa was hopelessly uninformed and without power.1596 In a further attempt, King
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authorized his diplomats to propose that Sweden or Switzerland fill the seventh seat.
But it remained unlikely that the four powers would permit countries abetting the Nazis a
seat on the Policy Committee. It would have infuriated the governments in exile.1597
Pearson was despondent. “We are pretty well dug in now… and it is going to be difficult
to retreat.”1598
The British had begun altering their strategy to account for Canada’s foibles and
Moscow’s recalcitrance. The Treasury, of course, advocated solidarity with Ottawa on
principle. Keynes had always hated the American relief proposal. He and his colleagues
thought the American position “unrealistic,” and suggested Halifax “resist and… make
no concession.”1599 The Foreign Office, by contrast, proposed complete capitulation.1600
In a worse case scenario, they thought Britain might make the four-power “arrangement
provisional for three months or so.” Leith-Ross advocated a middle-of-the-road approach.
He believed Britain should encourage the Americans to distribute the draft and hope the
Europeans would do what Ottawa was unwilling to do. “If there was strong objection [to
the four-power Policy Committee], then the four powers should meet again to reconsider
the position.” It might then be possible to win acceptance for an enlarged policy
directorate.1601 Sir Frederick’s compromise position won the day.
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The Second Meeting of the Four Powers: February 17, 1943

On February 16, 1943, Litvinov informed the State Department of Moscow’s
reaction to the revisions and amendments Acheson submitted to the three powers the
previous month. While the Russians accepted most of Acheson’s proposals, they
continued to “attach great importance” to their suggestions regarding the organization’s
authority to operate in a given territory. They also refused to alter their attitude towards
the Policy Committee, which they felt should be limited to the four great powers, as
suggested in the American draft.1602 The British disagreed, but were taking precautionary
steps for the contingency that they might fail to convince the other powers to expand the
committee to seven. Now they considered the Supplies Committee, Regional
Committees, and Deputy Director Generals all-important.1603 But disputes had emerged
with the Americans over the place and role of these entities in the wider organization.
The Americans, for their part, had an interesting proposal of their own to introduce.
These issues constituted the agenda for the second meeting of the four powers on
February 17, 1943.
The men first addressed the Soviet proposal that the agreement be amended so
that the organization would have to obtain consent from the government of any state in
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need before administering relief programs. At the previous meeting, Acheson
interpreted Moscow’s concern in a way that allowed him to skirt much of the proposal’s
substance, particularly the idea that the relief organization should also “admit of ways by
which the Government receiving relief” could undertake itself the whole responsibility
for fulfilling these measures. He believed Moscow simply wanted to distribute relief
itself in the Soviet Union. He therefore told Litvinov that those who drafted the
agreement had always believed the Soviet Government would distribute relief in Soviet
territory, not the international agency. The draft, he explained, referred to “appropriate
authorities of the United Nations” rather than governments of territories receiving relief
to “guard against embarrassment and difficulty” that would arise in collaborating with
former enemy countries, or one of several factional or contending governments.
Having consulted Moscow, Litvinov told the group that he could not withdraw
their original proposal. The Russians never intended that the amendment would apply to
enemy territory; rather, they worried about “the position of recognized governments
which would be members of the proposed Administration.” Moscow’s concerns extended
“beyond its own territories.” Litvinov drew a distinction between the demand that the
organization obtain the consent of a recipient state to provide aid, and the ambiguous
proposal that the agency should “admit of ways” by which a recipient country could, with
supplies from the organization, administer relief on its own. The first stipulation, he
argued, should apply in all cases where there was a recognized government, but the
degree to which it could administer aid should be determined by the Policy Committee
using “criteria for judging the soundness” of the proposals formulated by the Director
General in collaboration with the country in question. As such, member states would
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have the chance to make the case that they should be permitted “full responsibility,”
but would also have a veto over any relief scheme the organization might suggest.1604
While this explanation met most of Acheson’s concerns, he disliked the
possibility that a member government might veto relief plans once it had already agreed
to accept assistance. This right, he explained, would “give each government the power to
insist upon undertaking the whole responsibility for relief measures within its territory
since it would be able to veto any other arrangement as unsatisfactory to itself.” Though
left unsaid, he clearly did not like the idea of American aid going to a country where the
United States would not have significant control over its distribution and use. To avoid
this possibility, he suggested that member governments should have “the mandatory
power… to say whether it would wish to receive relief and rehabilitation assistance or
not,” but beyond that it would only be able to “provide or ‘admit’ ways in which” it
“should be able to determine in agreement with the Administration the forms and
methods of administering relief within its territory.” Equally important, he stipulated that
the member government would have to be in “actual control” of its territory.1605
Halifax saw no reason to object to the Soviet suggestion. “As a practical matter,”
the organization “would have adequate bargaining power in reaching an agreement… as
it would be in a position to withhold relief assistance if it felt that the forms of
distribution proposed by any government would not be satisfactory.” Acheson must have
recognized this fact, but if this determination fell to the Policy Committee, which is what
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Moscow preferred, then the other three powers could override Washington. The
Americans would then have to withhold financial and material assistance from the agency
to prevent ventures that might lead to undesirable outcomes. While Acheson wisely said
nothing of such contingencies, Halifax argued that the agreement could be “so worded as
to require consultation and collaboration with the government of the affected area” while
also providing an “escape clause” to “cover territories in which no recognized civilian
government existed or cases in which even recognized governments might not have
effective control of the territory.” In essence, he believed it remained a matter of drafting.
Litvinov readily concurred and Acheson reluctantly agreed to draft new provisions.1606
This procedure left the Chinese in a difficult situation. Like the Russians, they had
requested limits on the relief organization’s ability to operate freely. Yet unlike Moscow,
which put forward far-reaching demands, Chungking had merely suggested the recipient
government have the right to approve or disapprove of the Director General’s operational
plans.1607 However, the new formula threatened this right in cases where a recognized
government had nominal sovereignty, but was not in effective control over its territory.
For the Chinese Nationalists, this idea posed problems. After the Japanese surrendered,
they would have problems occupying and controlling the liberated areas. They would
have to contend with the Communists, who were gaining ground among the peasantry in
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It was not a promising situation. If the Nationalists were seen or

classified as ineffective, it would undermine their legitimacy, and allow the agency to
ignore disputes the Chinese Nationalists might have with the Director General’s plans.
Ambassador Wei believed “it might be dangerous to place with the Policy Committee the
power to decide whether a given government was an ‘effective’ government.” He thought
the “important question would be whether the government was recognized or not.”1609
This complaint failed to move the other powers. Halifax and Litvinov “agreed that
in cases where a recognized government was not in control of its territory, the Policy
Committee would have to determine the authority with which the Administration should
deal.” Acheson’s silence suggested approval.1610 Though the Americans considered the
Nationalist Government the “appropriate authority of the United Nations in China,” a
point they made to the Chinese repeatedly,1611 they also believed “it would be impractical
to leave the distribution of relief solely to the Chinese Government,” a fact they refrained
from telling the Nationalists.1612 With other countries in similar situations, they therefore
discouraged proposals that would prevent the organization from collaborating with local
authorities in territories that had been under enemy control, or undertaking relief alone in
cases where there was no functioning government. Wei’s attempt to prevent future
challenges to his Government’s sovereignty and legitimacy highlighted its weaknesses.
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Once Acheson agreed to draft language putting the Soviet amendment into
effect, the group turned to the problem of the Policy Committee’s size. Acheson wisely
began where the men could reach agreement: the Supplies Committee, which had been
suggested to make the four-power setup more acceptable. While the Soviets wanted to
establish the Policy Committee’s supremacy over the Supplies Committee, the British did
not want the new committee usurping the Director General’s power, particularly his right
to procure supplies for the administration. Acheson therefore agreed to revise and amend
the draft to meet these concerns. To ensure the Policy Committee’s supremacy, he
suggested the Supplies Committee “recommend to the Council and Policy Committee”
rather than “report.” Acheson addressed the British concern by deleting the word
“procurement” from this section of the draft, and suggesting language making the
Director General the central conduit between the Council or Policy Committee and all
other committees of the organization. It seemed that the four wise men had settled these
matters.1613
But the wider dispute remained. Halifax tried to convince the Chinese and
Russians to accept an enlarged Policy Committee. As instructed, he argued that postwar
relief was an economic issue, not a political or military mater. For this reason, he did not
believe the seven-power formula would prejudice the composition of bodies set up at a
later date to address problems in the political or military fields. Ambassadors Litvinov
and Wei could not be moved. They remained adamant that the Committee should consist
of only four members. Acheson, for his part, tried to play the role of “honest broker,” but
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ultimately came down on the side of the four-power setup.
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The Canadians, in his

view, had overestimated the powers of the Policy Committee, which the Council and its
various committees would keep in check. As he put it, the United States did not oppose
the seven-power formula “as a matter of principle,” but simply believed it was time to
move on. It had repeatedly acknowledged Canada’s importance for the plan and had done
everything possible to meet Ottawa’s demands.1615
Halifax was persistent. He asked if it might be possible to leave the size of the
Policy Committee open for decision at the first Council meeting, but Litvinov ridiculed
this idea as likely to lead to a Policy Committee larger than seven. Acheson worried
about “permanent harm to the program” if the four powers were not in agreement prior to
the meeting.1616 Halifax then tried a second proposal. The British Government, he told the
group, would not object if the draft were circulated as it stood, but would reserve its
position. Litvinov appeared receptive to the idea, but Acheson dissented when Noel Hall
informed the group that Britain might still vote for an enlarged committee if a majority of
the United Nations opposed the four-power formula. Thereupon a third and final proposal
was put forward. Hall suggested the Americans circulate the draft; Britain would still
reserve its position, but another meeting of the four powers would take place before the
conference to reconsider the question if wide opposition emerged. This procedure,
Acheson professed, might satisfy the American government, but he still considered it a
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“grave risk to take during the war.”
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The debate now concerned procedure if

Britain refused to bend.
The group next turned to the issue of Deputy Director Generals, positions the
British purportedly proposed to strengthen the Regional Committees. But this idea
aroused fierce skepticism, not because the Americans opposed the idea, but because the
British proposal provided that the deputies would work as conduits between the Regional
Committees and the Policy Committee, an arrangement that disregarded the Director
General. Equally troublesome, the British proposal allowed the Policy Committee to
choose the deputies without any input from the Director General, whom the Americans
believed should have the right to hire and fire his staff. Thus they agreed to the creation
of such positions, but insisted that the Director General make the appointments. They
also introduced language that placed the Director General at the center of all interactions
between the Regional Committees and Policy Committee or Council. Only with the
approval of the Director General could these deputies play a role. Noel Hall tried to
reassure Acheson that Britain had no intention of undermining the Director General, but
to no avail.1618
The matter might have ended here, but it would reemerge with fury. Litvinov read
these proposals and observed this exchange with horror. While the British always made
the case that strengthening the Regional Committees served to convince the exiled
governments to accept the proposed relief organization, they concealed their leadership
aspirations. But more important, Leith-Ross had always wanted to play an important role
1617
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in whatever scheme that emerged. With the position of Director General reserved for
an American, Sir Frederick’s best chance of securing a prominent role for himself
depended on strengthened Regional Committees and Deputy positions. But with his
fierce and well-known anti-communism – to say nothing of his stormy relations with
Maisky – any semblance of a prominent role for Leith-Ross was bound to arouse
suspicions in Moscow. If Litvinov evinced not the slightest misgiving on February 17,
1943, it was because he played poker so well.
Litvinov considered the final point of discussion – changing the name of the
Policy Committee to the Central Committee – little more than needless trickery. Only if
the Canadians would renounce their objections to the four-power setup, or if there were
other clear benefits, did he see any reason to change the name. Another title could do
nothing to remove the facts laid out in the agreement. While the Council would be
nominally responsible for policy, the four-powers would call the shots when it was not in
session. With only two meetings of the Council a year, the Policy Committee would
make most of the big decisions most all of the time. In statutory terms, all other parts of
the organization were only allowed to make policy recommendations, and with the
newest revisions to the draft, their ability to do so depended in large part on the Director
General. Litvinov saw no reason for the name change. As he humorously put it, “the
leadership of the four powers [is] already widely accepted.”1619
The British disagreed, and now appealed to the democratic principle: they wanted
the allies to decide. The Americans, of course, abhorred this idea, but with the Russians
refusing to bend, they turned to a new guise. Roy Veatch had suggested the title “Central
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Committee” as a means of taking the spotlight off the four powers,
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and Acheson

was rehearsing his arguments to this end. He parsed up the organization’s functions to
reduce the importance of what the Americans now called the “Central Committee.” The
Director General and Supplies Committee would play a “leading role” in the provision of
supplies. He would work with his deputies and the Regional Committees to determine
requirements. The Central Committee would merely adjust and coordinate these two
functions. As Veatch put it, the name “Central Committee” would be “more truly
descriptive of the position and functions allotted to the Policy Committee.” It would be at
the center of things but would hardly do anything at all.1621
The Americans were tiptoeing across a tightrope. Finding the right balance was
no easy task. On the one hand, they hoped the Russians would be sufficiently agreeable
such that true power could reside with the Central Committee, yet they wanted to reserve
power for the Director General for the contingency that they were not cooperative. On the
other hand, they recognized the importance of downplaying the importance of the Central
Committee not only to win wide acceptance for the scheme, but to pacify the British and
tame the aspirations of Canada. The name change, the committee system, and the Deputy
Director Generals constituted efforts to achieve this objective.
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Roosevelt Proposes the Food and Agriculture Conference

With the success of the relief program uncertain, Franklin Roosevelt was eager to
find an alternative forum to achieve his immediate objectives. As he told the Pacific War
Council on February 17, 1943, he wanted to “put the United Nations on the map before
the public.” Since the signing of the UN Declaration more than a year prior, nothing had
been done to make a show of allied unity and ingrain the idea of the United Nations into
the global consciousness. If the desired relief conference was delayed, failed, or did not
take place, an alternative would have to be devised.1622 The Roosevelt Administration,
moreover, had come under fire in public for its apparent failure to prepare for the postwar
period. 1623 To address these dangers, Roosevelt thought the United Nations might
convene as soon as possible to discuss a limited and uncontroversial topic.
Food became his preferred subject. A cadre of international experts had been
lobbying for the creation of a global institution to address agriculture, food, and nutrition
issues since the war’s outbreak. They promoted the idea as a means to achieve
Roosevelt’s “freedom from want.” The ploy worked and Roosevelt readily took on their
topic.1624 But his objective had little to do with the problems of food and agriculture. He
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wanted to stage a low risk spectacle that would make everyone feel good. According
to one official, he also “wanted to see if the representatives of the various nations could
work together.” It would be “an experiment in their sitting around a table… a sort of
pattern for other conferences that would follow.”1625
Skeptics only emboldened Roosevelt. Members of the Pacific War Council
criticized his choice of topic: it would “demand far more technical and precise
examination than a formal meeting of the United Nations could possibly give.” Halifax,
who thought the idea “nebulous… thoroughly inchoate and unpractical,” told Roosevelt
this conference would require lots of preparation: if it were to take place soon, time
would only allow for speeches and general resolutions agreed to well in advance.
Otherwise the event would impinge upon other discussions and agreements already
reached. The President of the Philippines, Manuel L. Quezon, also of the Pacific War
Council, thought speeches might be given, but that the important issues should be
referred to a committee that would prepare a report in six months. But nothing deterred
the President, who, according to Halifax, was “keen on doing something to give bones to
the idea of the United Nations.” He wanted to “make all the smaller members feel that
they were part of a live show.”1626
The Americans proceeded to stage a spectacle, while endeavoring to restrict its
scope and substantive impact. The primary purpose, according to one official, was to
remove impressions that Washington had “dragged its feet” in initiating international
discussions of “certain post-war problems.” To limit the conference proceedings, the
Americans chose to focus on the “need for increasing food production in the short-run,
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The conference would be restricted to

speeches and discussions of uncontroversial technical matters. It would consider the
“profitable disposal of agricultural surpluses,” and debate means “to increase the
production of food supplies,”1628 but would reach no substantive conclusions. “The food
problem obviously enjoys a measure of public interest and approval which financial
discussions, for example, would not elicit.” Commercial policy and tariff questions
remained highly controversial. But food “would have the greatest publicity value in the
eyes of the American people and would be the least likely to involve controversial
issues.”1629
In Hull’s absence, Welles assigned Acheson the task of preparing the conference.
“It should be made clear – and completely clear,” he wrote, “that the President’s proposal
is completely divorced from any relief and rehabilitation aspect… There is nothing that
could more rapidly destroy the whole beneficial effects of what we have under
consideration, in so far as public opinion in this country is concerned, than to permit the
implication to be drawn that the proposal is connected with relief.” Then came the
criticism. “I am beginning to think that there exists a morbid complex in the Department
of State which is rapidly creating the impression that every aspect of our foreign policy is
dominated by relief and that those charged with relief should consequently assume charge
of all aspects of policy.”1630 Here, Sumner Welles, hitherto one of the most powerful men
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in the Roosevelt Administration, highlights the paramount importance of relief in
American foreign policy at this juncture in the war.
Yet he had every reason to keep the food conference divorced from the relief
negotiations. On February 24, 1943, the Canadian War Committee unanimously agreed
that failure to press Canada’s case for membership on the Policy Committee further
would “amount to a withdrawal of [Canada’s] claim for effective representation.” The
Canadians even considered reaching out to other members of the United Nations in an
effort to obtain support for a larger committee. But the idea was rejected on grounds that
it “would give the appearance of trying to form a bloc opposed to the proposals of the
four great powers.” Thus with Prime Minister King arguing that capitulation would
“sacrifice the essential support of the Canadian people from the whole undertaking,” the
group decided to reiterate its demands at Washington.1631 On February 26, 1943, Pearson
informed Acheson that “unless Canada is afforded in some way a position in the direction
of the work which is commensurate with the contribution in international relief which
Canada will undoubtedly be expected to make,” then Canada would not participate.1632
This notice was cause for concern. While Roosevelt sought an alternative forum
to meet the propaganda demands of the war, George Atcheson at the State Department
and Noel Hall of the British Embassy tried to salvage the relief proposal. They believed
Canada might accept the four-power proposal if Ottawa were guaranteed the chair of the
Supplies Committee. To make this idea more attractive, they also drafted an amendment
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permitting the chair to attend meetings of the Policy Committee when supply
questions came under consideration. This amendment, Ottawa was told, would “be
tantamount to membership.”1633 Had the War Committee discussed the idea before the
four powers met on February 27, 1943, it remains doubtful that they would have accepted
the four-power setup. At this very moment, the Board of Economic Warfare unilaterally
cancelled all in-transit licenses for Canadian goods in route to South America without
providing Ottawa any warning. This action infuriated the Canadians, reignited their fury
over previous decision to exclude them from wartime decision-making bodies, and
reinforced their belief that the United States habitually ignored their concerns and
interests.1634

The Third Meeting of the Four Powers: February 27, 1943

It remains a curious fact that no record of the third meeting of the four powers
exists in any of the relevant American archives.1635 From the American vantage point, we
only know of the meeting due to correspondence concerning disputes with London over
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But from the British documents, we also

learn the State Department prepared a memorandum of conversation for this meeting.
One telegram even includes a small portion of the memo, though it excludes the most
sensitive portions of the document. 1637 But thanks to Liu Chieh, the Minister and
Counselor of the Chinese Embassy who attended the meetings with Ambassador Wei, we
have a copy. Chieh leaked everything to the Frenchman, Jean Monnet.1638 In due course,
we will have more to say of this individual and his country. For now, let us consider the
context and contents of the gift Monnet left us.
Prior to the meeting of February 27, 1943, the Americans became increasingly
disturbed by the Soviet demand that the relief organization obtain the consent of the
governing authority in all non-enemy territories receiving aid. If the Americans
acquiesced to this stipulation, Acheson thought the “distribution of relief might be used
by an exile government as a means of regaining power and might be abused by an
incompetent administration.”1639 Thus on February 22, 1943, American officials agreed
that the Russians should be talked out of their present stance lest it “raise difficult
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They worried about Congress and the possibility of spending

billions of dollars without significant controls over how it was being used. For the
likelihood that they failed to persuade Moscow, Acheson prepared new language that
included an escape clause. A recipient government would only have veto and consultative
powers in cases where it “exercises administrative control” over its territory.1641 This
condition “must be insisted upon” if the Soviet “amendment is included,” Acheson wrote
Hull.1642
Regrettably for Acheson, Litvinov not only rejected the original draft, he opened
the meeting of February 27, 1943 with an unanticipated criticism: the proposed drafting
excluded the possibility that a member government might assume “full responsibility for
the administration of relief in its territory.” Acheson had carefully drafted the amendment
to suggest “dual responsibilities” for the administration and member government if the
latter were to participate. But Litvinov would not accept language that might provide the
Americans a backdoor into areas the Soviet Union occupied. After much debate, the
group could find only one pathway out of the quagmire: to delete all reference to the
responsibilities “of the Administration.” While Acheson preferred the suggestion that a
member government might play a collaborative role, Litvinov wanted to prejudice the
outcome. For this reason, he preferred the phrase “full or partial responsibility of the
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member government.” Acheson disapproved on grounds that it would “be an
invitation to each government to demand full responsibility as a matter of prestige.”1643
At this point, negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on this
matter stalled. Its settlement would require guidance from a higher level. Litvinov told
Acheson that while the new draft constituted a “definite improvement over the old one,”
he preferred an explicit reference “in the agreement to the possibility of a member
government undertaking ‘full’ responsibility” for the distribution of relief. He would
nonetheless report the latest proposal to Moscow. Acheson knew this procedure would
cost precious time and urged Litvinov to wait until he had discussed the matter with
Welles.1644 Hull, at this time, was in Palm Beach, Florida recovering from illness.1645 This
mater was of supreme importance for American strategy. Even if the Undersecretary
made the decision, it was best that the State Department operate with Roosevelt’s
approval. Welles could make this happen. If he had a formula to escape the impasse, it
might also make Litvinov’s appeal for guidance from Moscow unnecessary.
Acheson thought he had closed the debate, but the Chinese Ambassador reopened
it. The Assistant Secretary, as we have seen, had agreed on February 17, 1943 to draft a
so-called “escape clause” allowing the relief organization to ignore the agreement’s
consultation and collaboration requirements in cases where no recognized civilian
government existed, or where a recognized government did not have control over its
territory. Wei had evinced obvious problems with this procedure, and now requested that
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Acheson explain “the limitation of the provision… to territory wherein a member
government ‘exercises administrative authority.’” 1646 The Assistant Secretary, who
anticipated this question, had rehearsed his response with the Secretary of State.1647
He referred the Ambassador to one of the agreements most important
requirements, namely that “the consent of the military command must be obtained for
activities of the Administration in any area in which hostilities or other military
necessities exist.” “The new addition now proposed,” he explained, simply required “the
consent of the member government in its own territory after it had restored its own
administrative authority following any military control that might have existed.”1648 In
short, Acheson implied that the addition was designed for statutory consistency. It would
be illogical not to require the consent of the member government if the draft had already
required such consent from the military commander. In this way, Acheson evaded the
central issue: what happens when the recognized authority does not have control, either
because it never obtained it or because it lost it?
Acheson, in fact, left loopholes in the text. First, the draft did not stipulate that the
military authority in a given territory had to be some recognized civilian government. For
this reason, Liu Chieh asked whether the provision “referred to the military control of the
member government in areas of hostilities within its own territory.” Acheson deflected
Liu’s Socratic thrust. “Certainly in Chinese and Soviet territory,” he replied, but “some
other territories might, of course, be under the control of other United Nations’ military
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Yet the Assistant Secretary conveniently failed to point out that

there was no guarantee that the United States would agree that the recognized authority
had control over its territory, even after the relinquishment of military control; and there
was no promise that the United States would not conclude, sometime after the recognized
government had presumably assumed control, that that authority had lost its control.
This exchange worried the Chinese. They did not revisit the critical distinction
between a government with “nominal” authority and one that actually “exercises” it. But
Wei requested “the privilege of reserving judgment… until further consideration could be
given to it.”1650 The Minister, however, shared the record of the meeting with Jean
Monnet, which presents us with the question of why? The answer, it seems, has to do
with the fact that China and France faced similar circumstances. Neither country wanted
the United States dominating their internal affairs. But they remained vulnerable to this
possibility. Enemy states occupied portions of both countries; competing factions vying
for power threatened the outbreak of civil war once the invader had been evicted; and
these divisions had the potential to divide members of the wartime alliance. The sum of
these circumstances heightened the possibility that the United States would wield a heavy
hand in both countries. Lieh must have concluded that it would serve Chinese interests to
work with the French on matters pertaining to their relations with the United States.
Yet Monnet had no official affiliation with either of the French groups vying for
power. Wary of Charles De Gaulle, he had refrained from joining the Free French in
1940. Instead, he went to work for the British Government, who sent him as a part of the
British Supply Mission to the United States in August 1940. In this capacity, he helped
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the United States establish its wartime supply and resource machinery, and to
coordinate it with England’s, just as he had done for Britain and France during the First
World War. Roosevelt admired and liked Monnet, who possessed an intimate knowledge
of and love for the United States. He became an unofficial advisor to the President and
“rabble rouser” in the American bureaucracies. 1651 He personified the Marquis de
Lafayette – a fact that lends credence to the possibility that Lieh hoped Monnet work to
restrain the Americans. Whatever the case, Monnet’s connections in Washington –
something neither De Gaulle nor Giraud possessed – meant that he would likely assume a
position of inordinate influence in postwar France. Chieh might have realized this as
well.
Next the group considered recommendations designed to make the four-power
Policy Committee more palatable to Canada and the other United Nations. They quickly
approved the proposal granting the Chair of the Supplies Committee the right to attend
Policy Committee meetings when supplies were discussed, and they authorized the
United States to inform Ottawa of “their intention to secure the chairmanship” for
Canada. The three Ambassadors also accepted the American proposal to change the name
of the Policy Committee to Central Committee. This “colorless name,” Acheson argued,
would help convince Canada and other countries to accept the draft. To avoid criticism
and misapprehension, it was better to make the change now rather than at a conference of
the United Nations. Litvinov reluctantly agreed, but held to the view that it “would not
make any difference.” For his part, Noel Hall preferred “Coordinating Committee” as it
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accorded with the line of argumentation Acheson planned to take with the United
Nations, but the Americans preferred ambiguity. The other powers concurred.1652
The issue of Deputy Director Generals remained a sore point. The Americans had
sabotaged Sir Frederick’s proposals at the previous meeting. Halifax, who was eager to
move on, informed London that the Americans planned to publish an explanatory note
with the draft agreement. He thought it might describe a closer relationship between the
deputies and the Regional Committees. 1653 But Leith-Ross disliked this idea and
suggested new language that would have required the deputies to regularly advise the
committees and consult them “on general questions of programmes and policy affecting
the area.”1654 But the United States held tenaciously to the view that there should be a
“clear distinction between policymaking and administration functions.” The deputies
might keep the Regional Committees “regularly advised on matters affecting the area,”
but the Americans would not consent to language making direct references to policy or
programs.1655 Unlike Leith-Ross, Halifax was not invested on this point. He accepted the
American view. Sir Frederick was furious at an outcome he called “inadequate and
disappointing.”1656
The four wise men next argued over the interminably difficult question of the
Central Committee’s size. But the usual exchange of arguments devolved into a question
of process. Halifax made it clear that Canada’s acceptance of the latest proposals in no
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way guaranteed that Great Britain would abandon its preference for a seven-power
setup. This formula constituted “the best way of securing the support of all the United
Nations,” he argued. He therefore advanced the proposal laid out by Hall on February 17,
1943, but with a different twist. The United States should first circulate the draft with the
four-power Central Committee. Once the opinions of the United Nations had been
obtained, the four great powers should reconvene to consider whether the reaction
warranted a seven-power committee. At this meeting, Britain would be “willing to abide
by the decision of the majority.” If this meant that the other powers still preferred the
four-power setup while Britain desired the seven-power program, the “British
Government would go along ‘with regret but good will.’” Acheson readily agreed to this
procedure.1657
Officials in London did not. By the middle of March dispute had erupted over
what the agreement actually entailed. When Halifax reported the meeting of February 27,
1943, he wrote that Britain’s willingness to be bound by the majority was conditional on
the other four powers doing the same.1658 But when the Americans shared the official
record of the meeting, it stated that the obligation only applied to Great Britain. The
Foreign Office immediately demanded that the State Department rectify this omission in
the official record.1659 Halifax thereupon took the matter a step further. In a letter to
Acheson of March 18, 1943, he not only asked that each of the four powers be obligated
to go along with the majority, he also claimed that London “wished to be assured that the
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This stipulation, no doubt,

was designed to encourage the Americans to accept the British position on the Deputy
Director Generals. As we will soon see, this insistence could not have come at a worse
time. The Russians were wholly unpredictable.
This the Americans and British learned at the close of the meeting on February
27, 1943. While everyone believed Moscow had abandoned its demand for unanimous
voting on the Central Committee, Litvinov informed the group that he wished to explore
the matter further. Veatch apologetically told him that the provision authorizing the
removal of the Director General by unanimous vote “had been omitted inadvertently.”
Litvinov then asked whether the nomination of the Director General should not be by
unanimous vote of the Central Committee. Acheson agreed!1661 In effect, the Russians
now possessed a veto over both the Director General’s nomination and dismissal. But
from the American point of view, they had averted the original Russian proposal that the
Director General’s powers be periodically affirmed, which would have given Moscow the
right to reject the Director General at prescribed points during his tenure. In any case,
Acheson agreed to submit a new draft to the four powers that included the latest revisions
and additions to the draft agreement, which he did on March 12, 1943, a week before
Moscow created aggravating complications for the negotiations that would lead to further
revisions.1662
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Canada and the Central Committee

While everyone awaited Moscow’s reaction to the latest proposals, America’s
relations with Canada deteriorated. Initial signs indicated that the compromise agreed to
on February 27, 1943 “went a long way towards meeting Canada’s wishes.” At least this
is what Lester Pearson led the British to believe.1663 But in Ottawa, most officials disliked
the proposal. Indeed Pearson, who supported the compromise, may have inadvertently
prejudiced their opinion. It “hardly seemed to give satisfactory recognition to the
Canadian position,” he wrote on February 27, 1943. But he suggested they accept the
deal. The “British Embassy felt it would “be difficult for them to stand out against the
compromise clause in respect of the Central Committee as now drafted.”1664 Norman
Robertson disagreed. Although the compromise met the conditions laid down by the War
Committee on February 24, 1943, it left the “‘four power front theoretically unbroken,”
provided Canada no precedent for future use, and failed to embody the functional
principle. Robertson also described Canada’s strategic position in terms that contravened
Pearson’s report. “If we refused to accept” the compromise, he wrote, Britain “is likely to
continue to support our position.”1665
Ottawa’s official reaction, however, was not a foregone conclusion. Robertson
and Wrong agreed with Pearson: it would be foolish to back Canada into an extreme
position from which it would be difficult to extricate itself without damaging the

1663

Telegram Relief No. 33, DC to FO, February 27, 1943, T188/256, PRO.
Telegram WA-931, Canadian Minister in the USA to SOSEA, February 27, 1943,
File W-22-1 1942-43, Vol. 44, RG3, LAC.
1665
“Memorandum for Cabinet War Committee,” “International Relief Administration,”
March 2, 1943, File W-22-1, 1942-43, Vol. 44, RG2, LAC.
1664

595
country’s prestige. If Canada levied threats but then failed to execute them, the
Americans and Russians would henceforward assume that with enough pressure the
Canadians would capitulate. 1666 For this reason, the War Committee considered the
possibility of making a counterproposal whereby the Chairman of the Committee on
Supplies would be made an “ex-officio full member of the Central Committee for all
purposes.” 1667 The four powers had already agreed to alter the language of the
compromise such that the Chairman would attend meetings of the Central Committee as a
“participant” as opposed to a mere observer.1668 But on the very day when the War
Committee considered the compromise, a fatal misstep on the part of the United States
evoked outrage in Ottawa.
On March 3, 1943, Welles dropped a bombshell. In an effort to assume leadership
over efforts to alleviate the plight of refugees, he publicized a note to the British
Government and issued a statement proposing a conference of British and American
officials to discuss the matter. But without informing or inviting the participation of the
Canadian Government, he said that the conference would be held in Ottawa. The
proposal unleashed a groundswell of anger in the Canadian capital.1669 By this point in
the war, the offenses had been too great: Canada, as we have seen, had been excluded
from the wartime decision-making bodies and disregarded when the Combined Boards
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were established. Upon complaint, the Anglo-American authorities offered them an
unsatisfactory compromise with regard to the Combined Food Board, which the
Canadians only begrudgingly accepted. Then the Americans unilaterally stopped all intransit exports from Canada to South America without either informing the Canadians or
explaining why. Furthermore, they proceeded to make threatening demands for full
information on sensitive civil aviation matters.1670
But in Washington Canada’s concerns were dismissed. A quick apology or
retraction might have solved the problem, but Welles was “unrepentant.” He could not
understand how or why it might be “inappropriate to publish” a note so suddenly without
even bothering to consult the Canadian Government. Instead, he blamed the entire affair
on the British, who had taken “all the credit for helping refugees.”1671 “The British
Government was permitting the impression to be created that it was the great outstanding
champion of the Jewish people and the sole defender of the rights of freedom of religion
and individual liberty and that it was being held back in its desire to undertake practical
steps to protect the Jews in Europe and elsewhere and to safe-guard individual rights and
liberties by the unwillingness” of the United States “to take any action for the relief of
these unfortunates beyond words and gestures.”1672
Few documents capture the mood in Ottawa more than the Deputy Minister of
Finance, W.C. Clark’s reaction to the compromise proposal. “Thank you boys, but count
us out,” he wrote Robertson. “We are still trying to run a democracy and there is some
historical evidence to support the thesis that democracies cannot be taxed without
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representation.” Canada would not be able to win the support of its people for this
organization or any program “run as a monopoly by the Four Great Powers.” “I would
refuse to [even] consider a compromise,” he continued, “or have any of our
representatives talk about the terms of a possible compromise.” The relief issue smelled
just like the “Combined Food Board fiasco,” but it was “far more dangerous.” It would
“set the pattern for postwar economic organization as well as for postwar political
organization.” Any Canadian Government that accepted any such proposal “would soon
be brought to realities by the public – and would deserve what they would get.”1673 The
War Committee agreed. Robertson instructed Pearson to convey this decision at
Washington. He also provided Clark’s letter as a guide for Pearson talks.1674
On March 4, 1943, Acheson received Pearson in his office. No mention was made
of Welles’ statement the previous day, but it hovered in the background. The fact that
Pearson had not retreated from his personal view that Ottawa should accept the
compromise led him to stay away from the “strong and undiplomatic language” used in
the instructions he received from Robertson.1675 But he nonetheless told Acheson that his
Government categorically rejected the compromise on grounds that it “would furnish a
pattern for further economic organization.”1676
The Assistant Secretary maneuvered from defense to offense. Neither the wheat
negotiations nor those contemplated for the financial field relied on the four-power
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principle, he responded. Relief was a narrow issue and would not be a precedent. He
then argued that Canada had overestimated the powers of the Central Committee. Real
authority for the relief organization, he told Pearson, would reside with the Director
General, while the Supplies Committee would play an important role. Acheson also laid
out the structural constraints. The Russians not only feared Polish membership on the
Central Committee, they now worried that Britain would seek membership for the
Netherlands. If Canada were also included, then the Soviet Union would face three
Anglo-Saxon nations, Canada, Great Britain and the United States, and two of their
protégés, Brazil and the Netherlands.1677
The prospects for agreement did not look good. Again on March 5, 1943, the
Canadian War Committee reconfirmed its decision.1678 Yet there existed little or no
possibility that they would be permitted full membership on the Central Committee.
Halifax reconsidered the possibility of one vote for the Commonwealth – which would
have avoided the charge from Russia that there would be three Anglo-Saxon powers – but
in Ottawa and London this alternative remained a nonstarter. It would compromise the
foreign policy independence of Canada.1679 Pearson, for his part, thought the solution was
not so much a function of finding a new formula, but rather access to the Prime Minister.
With Robertson in control of the flow of information to King, Pearson told Acheson he or
some American official “fully conversant with the proposed organization” should visit
Ottawa. “The Prime Minister’s knowledge of this subject was slight and that it might well
1677

Ibid.
Extract from Minutes of the War Committee,” March 5, 1943, PCO, Document 680
in DCER, Vol. 9, 787.
1679
Telegram Relief No. 36, DC to FO, March 12, 1943, T188/256, PRO; Lester Pearson
Bound Diary, March 14, 1943, Pearson Papers, LAC; Telegram No. 623, Canada (HC) to
DO, March 16, 1943, T188/256, PRO.
1678

599
be that, upon full presentation and discussion of the problem, he might modify his
view.”1680 But when Pearson put the idea to Robertson, the Undersecretary doubted
whether a visit would affect the situation.1681

The Soviet Amendments and the Fourth Meeting of the Four Powers: March 24, 1943

During the third week of March, the negotiators encountered a new patch of
turbulence. In Lester Pearson’s estimation, it looked as though “Russia was going to save
[Canada] from the position of being the bad boys in this matter.”1682 The amendments
Litvinov shared with Acheson on March 18, 1943 placed formidable obstacles in the way
of reaching an agreement. With the United States now prepared to share the draft with the
other United Nations irrespective of Canada’s point of view, they first had to resolve their
differences with Moscow. Not surprising, the Soviets hung steadfast to their demand that
member governments be permitted the opportunity to undertake full responsibility for the
administration of relief. Additionally, Litvinov introduced three major changes to the
draft. First, he insisted that each of the four powers have representation on the Supplies
Committee. Second, he demanded that reference to the Inter-Allied Committee for PostWar Requirements be deleted in the agreement, a provocative change that suggested the
complete liquidation of the body. And finally, he proposed the nomination of two Deputy
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Director Generals for Europe, one for Great Britain and the other for the Soviet
Union.1683
Several possible causes for these amendments exist. Roy Veatch believed
Moscow sought opportunities to “be in touch with every activity of the organization” in
order “to protest or block action if at any point it feels that its own interests are
threatened.” This seems indisputable. But it also appears that Moscow hoped to check
British influence. In their view, the relief organization would be a political instrument
inasmuch as it would be an administrative entity.1684 According to Acheson, the Russians
suspected Britain of “angling to take over almost complete control of this suspected
political machinery.”1685 By insisting on the appointment of a Deputy Director General,
whom the Russians feared would be Leith-Ross, and by seeking to transform the InterAllied Committee into the Regional Committee for Europe, the British had provoked
Moscow. This assessment seems irrefutable. The Russians detested Leith-Ross and they
hated the Inter-Allied Committee. As a result, they not only called for the liquidation of
this committee; they also wanted a Russian Deputy Director General.
American archives record only one of Acheson’s bilateral meetings with
Litvinov,1686 but with the correspondence of Roy Veatch, we can infer the line he took.
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Acheson probably began by focusing on the British, the Inter-Allied Committee, and
possibly Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. Washington had consistently opposed their “proposals
or insisted on considerable modification to them so as to make it clear that the European
program would not be dominated by any committee or office in London.” Veatch
suggested the Assistant Secretary make this clear to Litvinov, but to also inform him that
Washington preferred the liquidation of the Inter-Allied Committee as well, and that
internal State Department preparations endeavored to strip the British of responsibility.
Like the Soviet Union, the Americans feared English guile. They also considered the
committee’s work insufficiently narrow to meet the problems of postwar relief and
rehabilitation. It is similarly probable that Acheson promised not to support a Leith-Ross
candidacy, or that of any “Britisher,” as Veatch wrote, for the position of Deputy Director
General.1687
In line with Veatch’s recommendations, Acheson likely tried to convince Litvinov
to drop the amendments. Why risk the whole efforts with demands based on concerns
that the United States sought to address without modifications to the draft agreement?
But this line of reasoning failed.1688 The Russians were as worried about the United
States as they were with Great Britain. Promises and reassurances amounted to nothing
for a suspicious nation that preferred concrete guarantees. Moreover, the confidence and
prestige of the Soviet Union had been bolstered with the Red Army’s breathtaking
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victory at Stalingrad several weeks prior. Now there was room to play hardball.
Acheson had little choice but to pursue the next best option: secret agreements, revised
drafting, and unanimous voting on the Central Committee for specific issues.
American policymakers believed it would be far better to make secret agreements
than to alter the draft in ways that might provoke members of the United Nations or the
Congress to obstruct their objectives. To avoid leaks, they also preferred oral agreements.
Acheson first attempted this procedure when the Soviets insisted on new language that
would have incited member states to request “full responsibility” for the administration of
relief in their territories as a matter of prestige. Apparently Acheson’s outreach to Welles
following the meeting of February 27, 1943 had failed. As a fallback, the Russians now
wanted the phrase “complete or partial responsibility” inserted in the draft. Litvinov
refused the offer of an oral agreement, but agreed to abandon the proposal so long as the
minutes of the next four-power meeting made it clear that member states might have the
opportunity to undertake, in agreement with the relief administration, full responsibility
for relief and rehabilitation within its territory. In this way, Acheson’s fear was removed.
The British and Chinese readily agreed to this procedure on March 24, 1943.1689
The Americans similarly worried that any provision in the draft reserving seats on
the Supplies Committee for China or the Soviet Union would elicit outrage. As Veatch
explained, it would “emphasize in the minds of the smaller countries the danger of
domination of the entire organization by the four great powers.” But he also saw benefits.
It might create an imperative for both China and the Soviet Union to make contributions
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This hope proved to be wishful thinking. The Soviet

Union refused to even pay administrative costs, despite having agreed to do so.1691
Acheson nonetheless tried to keep this provision out of the draft, arguing that it was
unnecessary to reserve a seat on the committee for the Soviet Union if the power to make
these appointments rested with the Central Committee. But Litvinov rejected Acheson’s
argument and refused a gentleman’s agreement. For this reason, the minutes of the fourpower meeting on March 24, 1943 stipulated that the Supplies Committee would include
representatives of the four powers. The British reserved their final approval until
Canada’s views could be ascertained.1692
While American policymakers disliked the Inter-Allied Committee, they preferred
a process whereby the body was contained and exploited, but ultimately consumed by the
relief agency. Acheson persuaded Litvinov on this point, but the Ambassador could not
restrain himself. On March 24, 1943, he claimed that Moscow “had no way of knowing
what… the Leith-Ross Committee” was doing, “since it was not a member…” It could
not accept any provision stating that the committee’s work “should be carried on by the
Committee for Europe.”1693 Sir Frederick fumed over these words. In a petty but accurate
report to Halifax, he wrote that Moscow had accepted the St. James Palace Resolution
creating the Inter-Allied Committee, but complained about its secretariat and then refused
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It was a pointless rejoinder. The Chinese and Soviets

accepted Acheson’s alternative proposal, which, ironically, had been suggested by
Halifax!1695 Instead of ignoring the Inter-Allied Committee, his proposal stated that the
“Committee of the Council for Europe” would “replace the Inter-Allied Committee.”1696
Under the influence of Leith-Ross, London did not convey its agreement until March 31,
1943.1697
Resolution to the thorny issue of Deputy Directors would not come so easily. It
proved almost as sticky as the composition of the Central Committee. Veatch believed
the Russians wished for a Deputy to “check [the] influence” of the other Deputy, who
they suspected would be a “Britisher.”1698 But Acheson thought the proposal would turn
administrative positions into “political appointees,” making the “work of the Director
General and his staff nigh impossible.”1699 Veatch feared “competing deputies,” who
would “break the European program up into one for Western Europe, dominated by the
British, and one for Eastern Europe, dominated by the Russians.” When Litvinov refused
to drop the amendment, he proposed unanimous voting on the Central Committee for the
Deputy positions, thereby granting the Russians a veto over any undesirable
candidate.1700 But he refused to bite, which forced Acheson to turn to the next best
alternative.
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If Britain could be convinced to withdraw its amendment creating deputies,
Acheson believed Litvinov might retreat. He worried that the Russian deputies might
compromise America’s freedom of action. But with Halifax, he argued that the Soviet
reaction to the British amendment contravened the original purpose of the proposal: to
make the agency more efficient and the draft more palatable to the United Nations. He
also told Halifax of Litvinov’s belief that Britain hoped to “secure political control of
relief in Europe after the war.” The Russian “felt that he had nearly missed a trick and
that [the] U.S.S.R. now took a very strong line” on the matter. Betraying his usual
stoicism, Acheson requested London’s advice. Halifax, in turn, reported that Acheson
had “showed perhaps more clearly than at any preceding phrase of the negotiations that
he now fully understood and was convinced of the sincerity of our motives…” This
telegram reached London too late to alter the British stance at the March 24, 1943
meeting of the four powers.1701
Acheson advanced another position. The United States would accept the
appointment of British and Soviet deputies, but with conditions. First, the Director
General must have “all responsibility for the appointment of Deputy Directors… without
confirmation by the Central Committee.” This provision guaranteed the Americans a veto
over any individual put forward by London or Moscow disagreeable to them. Second, the
Director General would have the power to appoint other deputies, including an American.
This stipulation, on the one hand, gave the Director General the power to hire as he
pleased, but on the other hand, gave the United States the chance to put forward a Deputy
who might check the British and Soviet deputies. Third, the agreement would not be
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stated in the draft, but would be recorded in the minutes of the meeting as a secret
understanding between the four great powers. This suggestion sparked mixed reaction.
Litvinov quickly accepted the proposal; the Chinese questioned it; and the British
expressed immediate disapproval.1702
The question would remain unresolved for weeks, but the debate of March 24,
1943 produced what we might call the “Litvinov principle.” While Ambassador Wei
wanted to know how responsibilities would be allocated among the deputies, Halifax and
Hall attacked the idea of reserving positions for a specific country. “It had not been the
British Government’s intention to ask for the appointment of a Deputy Director for
Europe of British nationality,” they asserted, “but rather to support the appointment of the
best man for the job whatever his nationality might be.” Litvinov read these words for
drivel and enunciated a principle that informs the attitude of UN employees to this day.
“If there were deficiencies in one of the Deputies appointed for Europe, then that might
be made up by the others appointed.” Halifax struggled to maintain his government’s
disingenuous argument, and pursued another tact. Why, he asked, was the Soviet Union
“concerned with the appointment of a Soviet Deputy for the entire European region?”
Litvinov explained that his Government “had a real interest in the measures to be
undertaken” all over Europe.1703 Acheson’s proposal was in trouble.
Acheson now revealed his belief that Britain bore responsibility for the quagmire.
“The Soviet Government’s suggestion had been made only after the Draft Agreement had
been changed to provide definitely for one Deputy appointed with the consent of the
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Halifax must have been stunned. Previously Acheson had

suggested the Russians were at fault, but that Britain might alter its position to resolve the
issue. If necessary, Acheson had implied that the United States would force the Soviet
Union into a corner, not Great Britain. The Assistant Secretary told Halifax that the State
Department might circulate the draft agreement with the Soviet amendments but with no
invitation for a conference. If the response was negative and Moscow refused to alter its
view, the United States would “withdraw the draft and suggest an alternative procedure.”
With Acheson now hammering London, Halifax requested a record of their conversation
of the previous week. But Acheson refused. According to Veatch, his boss had “gone too
far” and “failed to get support for his suggestion from colleagues.”1705
It is not clear what happened. Acheson’s superiors may have reined him in. A
breach with Moscow would have been disastrous for the war effort and undermined the
chances of four-power leadership in the postwar era. We know that he was capable of
being a Cold Warrior. But it might be the case that Halifax simply called Acheson’s
bluff. The Assistant Secretary was intelligent enough to know that winning the war
exceeded all other priorities, even if “the Russians were trading too heavily upon the
forbearance of all of us,” as he told Noel Hall.1706 Whatever the case, the negotiations had
become a crucial learning experience for the future Secretary of State. “For the first time
in my life,” he privately told Hall, “I can sympathize with a tennis ball, stricken by

1704

Ibid.
The Americans refused to give Halifax the following document: Memorandum of
Conversation, March 22, 1943, 840.50/1430-2/5, NARA. For quotes, see Telegram Relief
No. 43, DC to FO, March 29, 1943; but for clarity on the dates mentioned in this
telegram, see Telegram Relief No. 45, DC to FO, March 30, 1943, both in T188/256,
PRO.
1706
Telegram No. 1343, DC to FO, March 20, 1943, T188/256, PRO.
1705

powerful forehand drives from one racket to another.”

1707

608
Acheson was constrained.

Even the best bureaucrat could not escape the fact that authority for foreign relations in
the American Government derives primarily from the President, but also the Congress.
He might have preferred brinkmanship with Moscow, but exigencies mattered.
While Halifax formally interpreted Acheson’s reversal for the Foreign Office,
Anthony Eden, who was in Washington for talks with Roosevelt and other top-level
officials, privately explained it to Winston Churchill. In Halifax’s assessment, the United
States now insisted that “the four powers must stand together on the main issues and that
they can make no further concessions to smaller United Nations than those already
provided for in the draft.” In essence, they were asking Great Britain “to join with them
in imposing a scheme upon the rest” of the world, and they felt that this could only “be
done provided the big four stand absolutely solid together.”1708 With this end in mind,
Eden informed Churchill that the American Government “felt it essential to secure the
closest cooperation with the Soviet Government, and that they felt bound, for reasons of
high policy, to satisfy Soviet demands, even at the cost of creating friction with other
countries.”1709 The message was clear: Washington was seeking London’s help.

Great Britain Deliberates and Reacts

On March 31, 1943, Leith-Ross convened a group of representatives from the
various departments of the British Government to consider the latest relief telegrams. The
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Board of Trade and Foreign Office thought Britain should “join with the United
States and Russia in forcing on the other United Nations an organization which gives the
four Great Powers the control through the Central Committee.” It was imperative to bring
the relief organization into being quickly, irrespective of the problems. Whatever
misgivings the various ministries had, they believed the proposed setup could be made to
work. It served no purpose to argue with the Americans indefinitely, when they would
make the greatest contribution to postwar relief and rehabilitation. The Dominions Office
disagreed. If the Soviet Union continued bullying the Dominions, it would threaten the
unity of the British Empire. For this reason, Britain could not simply “throw over the
Canadians.” Unable to resolve this dispute, the representatives decided to postpone
further discussion. They would await the outcome of Anthony Eden’s visit to Ottawa
before making final decisions.1710
In the meantime, they responded to the substantive proposals of the latest fourpower meeting. As we have seen, they accepted the secret addendum to the minutes of
the meeting admitting of the possibility that member countries might, in agreement with
the relief administration, undertake relief on their own. They agreed with the secret
procedure stipulating that the four powers should serve on the Supplies Committee, but
chose to reserve their final approval until after the opinion of Canada had been obtained.
And they reluctantly approved the new language Acheson suggested with respect to the
Inter-Allied committee. But while they expressed approval on these matters, they voiced
adamant opposition to Acheson’s proposal providing for an American, British and Soviet
Deputy Director General. His suggestion implied that the deputies “should be political
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appointees.” This was unacceptable. “A Soviet Deputy Director would obviously be
the servant of the Soviet Government and not of the Director General,” they asserted.1711
Leith-Ross deplored the idea that Britain should retract its amendment on Deputy
Director Generals. It had never been the intention of Britain to strengthen the deputies;
rather, they had hoped to empower the Regional Committees. It is for this reason that
their original proposal only required that the deputies “consult” the committees “on
policies and programmes” and “give effect to their recommendations as far as
practicable.” But the American revision of the paragraph’s describing the deputies’
responsibilities raised the specter of these individuals having “full powers.”1712 On this
point, Leith-Ross was correct, but he conveniently disregarded the fact that the American
language granted the Director General the exclusive power to assign the deputies
responsibilities.1713 Leith-Ross must have known this fact, but he had an agenda of his
own. He therefore requested that the Americans accept his original proposal, which was
more open-ended than he was ever willing to admit. As such, the closing sentence of his
telegraph to Halifax comes across as disingenuous: “so far as we are concerned, we
should not wish that any reference should be made to a British Deputy Director.”1714
At the end of March, two outstanding problems remained: the dispute with
Canada over the Central Committee and the issue of national Deputy Director Generals.
With the Americans now unwilling to risk the possibility of an open breach with any of
their most important wartime Allies, it was imperative that solutions be found to these
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problems. Otherwise the United States had every intention of seeking other means of
meeting the requirements of postwar relief. The United States had created the Office of
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) with the intent of going it alone
should the four-power talks or subsequent international negotiations end in failure. In
large part, Roosevelt chose to hold a United Nations Food and Agriculture Conference as
a hedge against failure: he needed a public relations victory. He wanted to give the
impression of a broad wartime coalition preparing for peace. He wanted the world to feel
good. If relief was to have any role to play in these efforts, the onus fell to Great Britain
to make it happen. All eyes were on Anthony Eden.

Anthony Eden and the Resolution of the Canadian Problem

Eden arrived in Ottawa prepared for the worst, but sufficiently versed in the relief
portfolio to meet the Canadian challenge. Both Pearson and MacDonald had warned him:
he and his entourage should expect “a pretty rough ride” on this relief business.1715 The
Dominions Secretary, Clement Attlee, urged caution on the Foreign Secretary. It was
essential that Britain not lay itself “open to a crush” in its “relations with the Dominions.”
The Canadians felt “very strongly on this matter” and the United Kingdom had already
recognized their claims as “irresistible.”1716 Eden’s entourage also received a briefing
from Acheson, who explained the compromise proposal, but laid special emphasis on the
Canadian concern that the relief organization would create a precedent for the future.
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Most importantly, he believed the United States might be willing to prepare a memo
for the Canadians stating that the “relief organization would not furnish the pattern for
future organizations.” This, he added, now “appeared to be clearly the fact.”1717
But the latter statement was misleading. On March 27, 1943, Eden’s entourage
met with Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, Winant, and Harry Hopkins at the White House. The
record of this meeting is both vague and inconclusive, which makes it difficult to know
Roosevelt’s views precisely. But the debate over China – whether it would “be one of the
controlling powers after the war” – makes the President’s adherence to the four-power
formula clear. The record, however, offers no details of his attitude towards the future
United Nations organization, of which the relief agency constituted a model.1718 But if we
take the plan Roosevelt presented to Stalin at Tehran in November 1943 as representing
his views in March, the picture becomes clear. It called for an Executive Committee of
only the four powers, but also a Council, which would include a number of lesser powers
as well. Thus the State Department, which never really shared Roosevelt’s views on the
four powers, could dance around the issue.1719
On March 31, 1943, the Eden met with the Canadian War Committee. To refute
the claim that the relief organization would provide a precedent, he told the committee
that Roosevelt now envisioned a post-war Council of eight to ten members, not unlike the
old League of Nations Council. He admitted that this arrangement presented a problem
for Commonwealth representation, but implied that the compromise proposal for the
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relief organization created an excellent precedent for Canada, which would be chair
of the Supplies Committee. It “recognized Canada’s special position in a very satisfactory
way.” From here, he reported on his most recent visit to Moscow, where he met with
Stalin. The Soviet Dictator, he explained, was an “uncompromising realist, with no
conception of or appreciation of the delays that were made necessary by democratic or
parliamentary procedure.” To illustrate his point, he explained that Stalin had “offered to
make a treaty” with him “at once, establishing the postwar boundaries of Eastern
Europe,” which “he thought could be done quite simply.” Canada’s domestic political
concerns, he insinuated, had no chance of influencing Stalin. But it remained “essential to
keep in as close and friendly touch as possible with Russia.”1720
Eden’s presentation trumped the lackluster performance of the Canadian Prime
Minister. The evidence suggests that neither King nor any of his ministers made the case
for Canadian membership on the Central Committee. King warned of “unfortunate
effects” if the four great powers chose to “constitute themselves as an executive
committee of the proposed organization.” The Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent,
wondered whether it would be possible to obtain the cooperation and support of the other
United Nations if the four great powers controlled the organization alone. But when Eden
met these concerns and put the compromise on the table, it went downhill.1721 Though the
War Committee had formally discussed the compromise twice, a fact of which Eden was
well aware, King told the Foreign Secretary that they “had had no chance yet really of
discussing the compromise.” He expressed concerns that other countries might not react
1720

“Report of Anthony Eden to War Committee of Canadian Cabinet,” in Lester Pearson
Bound Diary, March 31, 1943, Pearson Papers, LAC.
1721
Extract from Minutes of Cabinet War Committee, March 31, 1943, PCO, Document
683 in DCER, Vol. 9, 790-791.

614
positively if Canada chaired the Committee on Supplies. But most striking, he
“wondered whether [there was] a Canadian who was capable of handling the job!” When
King asked those present if they had observations, only Pearson, who flew up for the
meeting, spoke. Naturally he blew more wind into Eden’s sails.1722
But Canadian acceptance of the compromise remained uncertain. Many of the
Ministers were still unconvinced. Pearson hoped to warn Eden, but failed. He telephoned
Acheson to suggest he visit Ottawa immediately “to clinch matters,” but Hull blocked the
trip on grounds that the Canadians were planning “to put him on the spot.” 1723
Fortunately from Pearson’s point of view, Robertson met Eden on the evening of April 1,
1943.1724 When confronted with the news that his talk with the War Committee had not
settled the matter, he suggested an exchange of notes between Canada and the United
States, in which the Americans, on behalf of the four powers, would confirm that the
arrangements for the relief organization would not constitute a precedent. Robertson
demurred. He even suggested that the Council select the members of the Central
Committee and the Supplies Committee. But Eden flatly rejected this idea. He also
warned Robertson. Dr. H.V. Evatt, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had
recently demanded the right to the same position as Canada in the relief organization. He
thought it would be wise for Canada to quickly accept the compromise. If it was “left
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open until after Evatt arrived in Washington, there was no telling what the upshot
might be.”1725
The Australians worried everyone. For much of the war, they had complained
incessantly with regard to their place in Allied War Councils. As a result, the Americans
and British learned to consult them, even if they were usually unwilling to make
substantive concessions. 1726 In large part, Evatt bore responsibility for the attention
Australia received. He was rude and effective. No official in Washington liked him, but
everyone respected him.1727 The news that he had complained to Eden about Australia’s
exclusion from the Central Committee led the State Department to act cautiously. On
March 25, 1943, the Australian Minister in Washington, Owen Dixon, delivered a similar
note from his boss to Cordell Hull.1728 Two days later, he requested a meeting with
Acheson. The Assistant Secretary did his best to calm his fears.1729 But the sum of these
exchanges left Hull sufficiently weary that he denied a second request from Pearson that
Acheson visit Ottawa. If on Evatt’s arrival, Acheson were in Ottawa discussing the terms
of Canada’s relationship with the relief organization, it would create problems with a man
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who knew how to stir up trouble. It was also doubtful that Acheson could arrive in
Ottawa before the War Committee met again to discuss the compromise.1730
Though Eden had the final word, news of two additional factors arrived in Ottawa
before the War Committee met. First, the Canadians learned of the Soviet request that
each of the four powers be permitted membership on the Supplies Committee. While this
provision might have been interpreted as diluting the substance of the compromise,
Pearson and MacDonald argued that this idea heightened the committee’s importance.1731
Second, the Canadians learned that the problems with the Soviet Union had been
resolved. On April 5, 1943, Litvinov conveyed to the Department of State a “definite
acceptance of the draft convention as amended.”1732 The implications of this development
were important. If Canada refused to accept the compromise, then they would run the risk
of being blamed for the failure to set up the first United Nations organization. Inasmuch
as the Canadian Government worried that their population would protest a relief
organization unfair to Canada, they also feared the consequences of appearing
excessively obstinate and obstructive.1733
It now appeared that Mackenzie King was inclined to accept the compromise. “If
he is prepared to take a strong line,” MacDonald telegraphed the Dominions Office, “I
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think that he will prevail.”

This assessment proved accurate.
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On April 7, 1943,

the Canadian War Committee reluctantly agreed to accept the compromise despite
opposition from several ministers. The acceptance depended on two conditions: that the
relief administration would not constitute a precedent for other United Nations
organizations, and that their acceptance in no way altered the Canadian Governments
opposition to four-power control of any other United Nations organizations that might be
constructed.1736 A variety of factors influenced this decision, but fear played the decisive
factor. In his remarks to the War Committee, Prime Minister King noted: despite the fact
that the compromise failed to “remove the basis of the Canadian objection, namely,
control of an important UN agency by the four great powers… the Canadian Government
would be subject to severe criticism both inside and outside Canada if it could be alleged
that we were responsible for the failure of the whole United Nations relief plan.”1737 After
months of fierce opposition, Mackenzie King’s Government had reversed course.

Canadian Wartime Diplomacy: An Episode in Missed Opportunity

How does one explain this remarkable turn of events? Analytically, two issues
warrant our consideration: the Canadian Government’s perception of the international
political structure, and the capabilities and interplay of the personalities involved in the
Canadian decision-making process. While an analysis of the first issue sheds light on the
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Canadian failure to convince the four powers to accept an enlarged Central
Committee, an examination of the second issue explains why a compromise was
proposed in the first place and how the Canadian Government came to accept it.
Each of the four powers displayed varying degrees of support for the four-power
formula. While Great Britain initially supported the setup, London became Canada’s
greatest advocate due to the pressure Ottawa placed on London. The British worried that
their relations with Ottawa would deteriorate, leading to a reduction of Canadian aid to
Great Britain, if they stood steadfast by the four-power setup. They also feared the longrange implications for the British Commonwealth and Canada’s place in it. The magnetic
appeal of the United States threatened to lure Canada away from the mother country.
The United States, by contrast, considered the seven-power setup preferable at the
outset, but reverted to the four-power formula. The American leadership, particularly
Roosevelt, hoped that the four powers would police the postwar world, and that they
would constitute the nucleus of whatever international organizations were constructed.
As such, the relief organization was a precedent for the future, however much Acheson
tried to refute this idea. Policymakers repeatedly made this claim in internal discussions
from the outset. Most likely, the fear of a public relations backlash led Roosevelt to send
a different message in March 1943. Yet he never abandoned the four-power concept. At
the end of April, he told the Canadian Minister at Washington that “there would be no
long-drawn-out Peace Conference [after the war], [and] that he ‘and Winston and
possibly Stalin’ would settle everything themselves.” Thought he left the Chinese out of

the equation, he clearly thought they would step up to this role.
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Whatever the case,

the United States appeared flexible on the matter.
The Soviet Union displayed not one iota of flexibility on this point. In January
1942, Moscow advanced a proposal that envisioned broad leadership on relief matters.
But these views changed. The critical moment came during Molotov’s visit to the United
States in the spring of 1942, during which Roosevelt introduced the four-power concept.
Stalin immediately approved the idea, and held fast to it for much of the war, though he
had serious reservations about China’s suitability. He worried that the Nationalists would
be agents of the United States. In any case, the Soviet Union presented Canada with its
greatest problem. Ostensibly China was also an obstacle, but it remains inconceivable
that the Nationalists would not have altered their views had Washington pressured them.
They were too dependent on American resources. Thus the Canadians were led to believe
the Soviet Union constituted the biggest problem.
But they also believed the way around this problem was for Great Britain and the
United States to convince the Russians otherwise. They therefore threatened to terminate
Canadian assistance to Britain if London refused to support their policy. From here, they
tried to persuade the United States. When the Americans placed the blame on the Soviet
Union, the Canadians even advanced proposals designed to meet Moscow’s concerns.
But Moscow held fast and the Americans did not consider it in their interest to apply
pressure. As a result, certain Canadian officials, especially Pearson, became convinced
that it would be impossible to overcome this structural obstacle. This point of view left
Canada with three options: it could refuse to participate in an organization led by the four
1738
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powers, quietly abandon its position and join the organization, or seek and accept a
face-saving compromise. Ottawa’s immediate rejection of the second option reduced
Canada’s choices to non-participation or compromise.
This assessment of Canada’s alternatives seems perfectly logical, but the
Canadians failed to engage the Russians with the same seriousness of purpose with which
they approached the Americans and British. They delayed in making overtures with the
Soviet Minister in Ottawa and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, and failed to
follow up. 1739 They might have never approached these diplomats had Welles not
suggested direct talks with them in his meeting with Pearson on February 10, 1943.1740
To their credit, the Canadians requested on January 6, 1943 that their Minister in the
Soviet Union approach the Russian Government to explain the Canadian position on the
Policy Committee. But for unknown reasons, he failed to even acknowledge his
instructions until March 29, 1943. 1741 He finally spoke with the Deputy People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Solomon Lozovsky, about the matter on April 16,
1943.1742 But the Canadian War Cabinet had accepted the compromise solution nearly
two weeks prior.
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In these exchanges with the Russians, the Canadians had no apparent strategy.
The documentary record leaves no evidence indicating that they ever considered whether
they had any leverage over Moscow and how they might use it to their benefit. Perhaps
the Canadians provided Moscow no financial or material assistance, but even if this were
the case, they certainly could have argued that their men and resources would be critical
to opening the second front Stalin so desired. But instead of considering what was
possible, the Canadians merely recounted their position to the Russians without ever
explaining why it was in the Soviet Union’s interest to support an enlarged Central
Committee. This job was relegated to Great Britain and the United States, which only
reinforced Moscow’s view that if Canada was not an agent of London, then it was most
certainly one of Washington. Of course the Canadian Minister in Kuibyshev, where the
Soviet Government had taken refuge, refuted this idea in his talks with Lozovsky. But it
was too little too late.1743
It was not a foregone conclusion that Canada would accept a compromise, even
after Ottawa realized its chances of obtaining a seat on the Central Committee were slim.
Almost everyone preferred the hard-line, even Mackenzie King. Moreover, compromises
necessarily require the willingness of both sides in a dispute to negotiate. The Americans
and British always remained open to the idea – the benefits of Canadian participation
were evident – but frustration and the belief in Washington that Canada might not be
willing to play along led Acheson to consider circulating the draft agreement irrespective
of the Canadians. In this situation, two factors mitigated against this option. First, the
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Americans did not want to circulate the draft if Great Britain remained uncommitted.
Second, the Canadian delegation in Washington appeared willing to play ball.
If one individual proved decisive, it was Lester Pearson. From the beginning, he
was the only Canadian who believed Ottawa should display more flexibility in its attitude
towards the relief organization.1744 He was also the first Canadian to think his country
should accept the compromise.1745 But he faced a problem. Stationed in Washington, he
had little access to the Prime Minister, the only individual with sufficient political weight
to bring about reversal in Canadian policy, and he had few chances to refute the
hardliners, such as Clark. In the face of these obstacles, he chose to prejudice his reports
in favor of his point of view. On several occasions he even conveyed false information to
Ottawa. To give the impression that Canada was the sole obstacle to the creation of the
first United Nations agency, he told Wrong that the troubles with Moscow had been
resolved, when in fact they had not.1746 But this approach failed. Robertson and Wrong
controlled the flow of information to both the Prime Minister and the War Committee,
and because they remained skeptical of Pearson’s preferences to the very end, they
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routinely presented a story skewed towards their views.
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Not until Eden’s visit to

Ottawa did Pearson have the chance to speak with King. Naturally he exploited this
opportunity to convince him of the compromise proposal’s merits. This may not have
been decisive, but it helped.
Pearson’s most important deeds took place in Washington. From the beginning of
1943 until Eden’s visit to Ottawa, Pearson routinely ignored or deviated from his
instructions, and he repeatedly disclosed compromising information to the Americans and
the British. Without any authority, he suggested in January 1943 that Canada would be
open to a compromise. 1748 By March 1943, he was pressing American and British
officials to visit Ottawa. As he told Acheson, King’s “knowledge of the subject was slight
and… he might be persuaded upon full presentation of the facts.”1749 Before Eden’s
meetings in Ottawa, Pearson was, in his own words, “disloyal enough to my Government
to give them some off-the-record advice as to the best way to approach Mackenzie
King.”1750
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This behavior had two immediate effects. First, it encouraged Acheson and
the British to apply pressure on King’s Government, but it also drove them to forge a
compromise solution with the Soviet Union. Much of this took place at a moment when
the Americans were prepared to circulate the draft irrespective of Ottawa’s views.
Second, it unnecessarily gave Eden a decided advantage when he met with King and the
War Committee. Doubtless these factors played an important role in the outcome.
Pearson’s behavior, while lamentable, earned Canada an important role in the
organization that exceeded that of all other middle and small powers. It was a remarkable
achievement.1751
But his actions had negative repercussions as well. If he aimed to heighten
Canada’s standing, he achieved that goal, but needlessly erected a glass ceiling below his
country’s deserved stature. In 1943, Canada’s position was stronger than its politicians
recognized. The Soviet Union was still reeling under the Nazi assault; China remained a
weak, divided and occupied; Britain’s financial position was precarious at best. Only the
United States trumped Canada in its position relative to the other Allies. The Canadian
High Commissioner to London, Vincent Massey, saw this clearly. Outraged over what he
considered a capitulation, he wrote Robertson, “One could hardly imagine a case offering
us sounder grounds for making a claim for full membership on an international body.”
Even if “American and Russian objections were too strong to be overcome,” he lamented,
“I cannot help feeling that we would have been in a better position to secure our rightful
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place in international bodies in the future if we had carried out our intention of quietly
withdrawing altogether from the relief administration if our claim could not be met.”1752
Massey was discerning in other aspects as well. Chairing the Supplies Committee
would not increase Canada’s prestige and power. “The membership that will matter,” he
wrote, “is that of the Policy Committee.” With the Council meeting only twice a year, the
four powers would make the big decisions most of the time.1753 The Supplies Committee
was merely an advisory body. “It shall consider, formulate and recommend to the Central
Committee and the Council policies designed to assure the provision of required
supplies.”1754 Massey also thought it foolish to rely on the American promise that the
relief organization would not constitute a precedent. “One of the arguments advanced by
the Russians against our full membership of the Policy Committee of the post-war relief
administration was precisely that it might be a precedent for the future. They will
presumably attach a similar significance to our non-membership and will use it as an
argument on future occasions,” he wrote.1755
In these assessments, Massey was correct. When the issue of the Central
Committee’s composition was reopened in 1945 to grant France a seat, the Americans
initially refused to consider Canadian membership. This fact is astonishing. An invaded
country, France was far weaker than Canada in 1945. Its leader, moreover, maintained
stormy relations with Washington. The Americans only agreed to entertain Canada’s
claims after Ottawa protested: the looming Cold War also made Canadian membership
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attractive. But initially they argued that Canadian membership would lead other
countries to demand equal treatment, which it did. The Russians also appealed to
precedent. 1756 While the scholarship has not yet revealed why they acquiesced to
Canadian membership, their application for UNRRA assistance for the Ukraine and areas
of Belarus during the August 1945 Council meeting may provide an answer. They wanted
aid.1757 But I cannot see why the same logic did not apply in 1943, when the Soviet
Union was in a far more desperate position.
The example of Argentina vindicates Massey further. Like Canada, the Argentine
had food resources, but was not asked to participate in the organization. Buenos Aires
abetted the Nazis and refused to declare war on Germany until March 1945. No country
in the Western Hemisphere presented the United States with more problems during the
war than Argentina. 1758 But when the specter of famine threatened in 1946, the
Americans sent the new Director General of UNRRA, Fiorella LaGuardia, to Buenos
Aires, who pleaded with the Argentines to sell wheat to the organization.1759 They never
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If Canada’s concerns were largely

economic, they would have been satisfied without joining the organization.1761 But their
political concerns might have been met as well. The Americans not only did business
with the Argentines, they sought to seat the Argentines at the UN Conference in San
Francisco despite opposition from Moscow. Here again the prospect of Cold War played
an important role.1762
To be fair, Pearson could not predict the future. He believed the Supplies
Committee would become a powerful body, and that Canada would secure gains as its
chairman. The degree to which these beliefs were true require further research, but like
many others, he considered the agreement a guide. The relief organization would evolve
and adapt to circumstances. For him, it seems the choice was between the path of
cooperation and less influence in the medium term with the specter of increased influence
down the road, and that of non-cooperation and no influence at all. He also worried that a
refusal to cooperate would impair the war effort and possibly postwar international
cooperation.1763 Yet he knew, and this is where his opinion encounters trouble, that the
relief organization was not only a public relations gimmick designed for the American
people and Congress, but also an attempt at American multilateralism. When he
expressed his disapproval at the way conferences were being organized and suggested an
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international committee to do this work, Acheson, Atherton and Dunn all nodded
their heads in agreement. From this Pearson concluded: “The Americans are going to run
these things themselves.”1764
Yet the young civil servant from Toronto who would one day become Prime
Minister preferred at this moment in his career to play along in their geo-strategic show.
In doing so, he only reinforced the impression of the Soviet Union, that if Canada was not
an agent of the British Empire, then it was surely one of the United States. There are
many good reasons why Canada should not have let Russian impressions influence its
behavior, but had Ottawa chosen to quietly withdraw, as Massey preferred, it would have
removed one of the primary obstacles to Canadian independence in international affairs:
the idea that Canada was a token in someone else’s game, a view that was also espoused
by many figures in Washington. Massey also thought that it would have cracked the “Big
Power complex” that had created so many difficulties for Canada. Equally important, it
would have underscored the so-called “functional principle,” which Massey thought
Ottawa should promote “in and out of season.” It is tribute to his patriotism that he would
conclude his April 10, 1943 letter to Norman Robertson voicing these complaints with
the following words: “It is time for toughness.”1765 Lester Pearson was too smart not to
have drawn the same conclusions, but he refused to act upon it. Why?
In large part, the answer has much to do with his personality. By nature, Pearson
preferred friendly and open exchange to conflict, which he went to great lengths to avoid.
A need for self-approbation fueled this behavior and made it difficult for him to advance
policies that would create friction. It drove him to suggest compromise without authority
1764
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from his superiors, and to be forthcoming to the extent of disloyalty, a behavior that
was exacerbated by righteousness and self-assurance. These factors explain why he
repeatedly rejected the stiff language he was instructed to use in his exchanges with
Americans; why he habitually attacked King for being, as he wrote, at “his postprandial
worst”;1766 why he was the only individual, despite his junior status, to speak before the
War Committee in Eden’s presence; and why he expressed frustration with Americans
who remained far less willing to divulge information than he was. Acheson, for example,
was “an intelligent fellow; [but] not easy to know.”1767 “Atherton,” he complained, “does
not give anything away, even over the brandy…”1768 These traits shed light on his efforts
to achieve a compromise. It gave Pearson a deep sense of satisfaction to have solved the
problem. “I saw Noel Hall and Dean Acheson and told them the news,” he wrote in his
diary. “They were delighted. I think that my arguments may have had some effect in
Ottawa. In any event, I was a minority of one when I reached there last week.”1769
But an attendant factor played an equally important role here. Pearson’s need for
self-approbation led to an over-abundance of ambition. As a result, he became something
more than a mere representative of his Government in Washington. He always promoted
schemes that would benefit Pearson. It remains an indisputable fact that the international
conferences that would soon take place, and the postwar organizations soon established,
would provide Pearson a stage on which he could distinguish himself.1770 “I hope we play
our cards right now and put a good man on the Supplies Committee,” he wrote in his
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diary after King’s Government accepted the compromise agreement. “We have a
chance to play a big part in this Organization.”1771 Pearson, of course, played the part.1772
The Americans welcomed him due to his eagerness to help them solve problems. They
even nominated him to be the first Secretary General of the United Nations. But the
Soviet Union rejected him for obvious reasons.1773 Pearson returned home, served as
Secretary of State for External Affairs, and then became Prime Minister. It was a
remarkable journey for “Mike,” but the evidence presented here indicates that it may not
have been the best path for Canada. He made his country appear weak and pliant in
diplomatic circles, an unfortunate impression that was not erased until the ascent of Pierre
Elliot Trudeau.
To be sure, Mackenzie King bears responsibility for this impression as well.
While he was a fierce domestic political fighter whose tenacity as a politician has been
rivaled by few Canadians in the twentieth century, he lacked imagination and strategic
vision in foreign affairs. He was slow to see where the world was headed and unwilling
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to imagine Canada’s place in it.
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When Wrong suggested the “functional principle”

as a guiding light, King embraced it, but lacked the nerve to take the steps necessary to
get other countries to respect it. It was insufficient to play hardball with Great Britain, a
nation in decline. The circumstances required that King get tough with Moscow and
Washington as well, which he was unwilling to do. On repeated occasions during the
war, he caved when the big boys came to town.1775 For the relief organization, Eden did
the job. It might be said that we have exaggerated King’s power, but I can see no greater
leverage than the million men deployed during the war. He just as well might have called
them home. If for Canadian diplomacy the 1930s were the “low, dishonest decade,” as
James Eayrs famously put it, then the war years were a missed opportunity.1776
Subsequent developments underscore the general inconclusiveness of Canada’s
action. Shortly after Pearson conveyed his Government’s acceptance of the compromise
proposal to the Americans on April 8, 1943, difficulties emerged over how best to record
the assurances promised to Ottawa.1777 Much of the debate concerned diplomatic protocol
and the need for secrecy, issues easily resolved and of no importance here. But the
disagreement also concerned the manner by which China and the Soviet Union would
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adhere to the compromise.
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On the first point – guaranteeing the Chairmanship of

the Supplies Committee for Canada – Acheson requested and recorded the adherence of
the Chinese and Russians in the minutes of their next meeting. But on the second issue,
that the Central Committee would not be regarded as a precedent, he refused to ask the
Chinese and Russians to agree to a formal note in the minutes.1779 Instead, he wrote a
letter without Moscow or Chungking’s approval to Pearson in which he merely noted
Canada’s view that the Central Committee should not be a precedent.1780 Of course this
procedure raised eyebrows in Ottawa, but the Canadians did nothing meaningful to
rectify the situation, even after it was escalated all the way to the Prime Minister.1781

The Fifth Meeting of the Four Powers and the Problem of France

It is either a testament to Acheson’s talent, or evidence of his weakness, that on
April 12, 1943, when the four great powers met for the fifth time, that the Soviet Union
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created no problems. The Americans had received their acceptance of the revisions
that emerged in their meeting on March 24, 1943. But neither the British nor the Chinese
had commented. For this reason, the only significant agreement concerned Canada: the
four powers would “use their best endeavors to secure the selection of a Canadian as
Chairman of the Committee on Supplies.” But even this matter proved tentative. With
none of the Ambassadors in attendance, their representatives felt obliged to confirm the
agreement with their governments.1782 Diplomacy is a slow process.
It is unsurprising that the Americans preferred that only four powers participate at
this stage. But in time the number of countries involved would have to increase if they
wanted to achieve the dual objectives of showing wide support for the war effort and
winning legitimacy for American leadership in the postwar period. Just before the UN
Declaration was signed, Roosevelt had written Hull: “It seems to me a distinct advantage
to have as long a list of small countries as possible in this Declaration.” He wanted the
names of all of the Central American countries that had declared war on the Axis Powers
included.1783 He would also want other nations to join the Allied cause. But by the end of
March 1943, only one state south of Panama – Brazil – had declared war on the Axis and
signed the Declaration. 1784 Many of these countries had large Italian and German
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they worried that the Axis powers might attack their

coasts;1786 and they disliked the heavy-handed approach of the Americans.1787 By contrast
with the nations of Central America, these countries were strong enough or
geographically remote enough to remain out of the war. 1788 But the United States
deployed both carrot and the stick to ensure cooperation.1789 Legally, they only had an
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obligation to “consult” with one another if the territory of a country in the hemisphere
was attacked by a non-American state.1790
Roosevelt still preferred that these countries join the alliance, if not for wartime
purposes then as participants in the postwar international organizations he envisioned. So
long as these countries remained outside the United Nations, they created embarrassment
for the United States, which had promoted the Good Neighbor Policy as a model for the
world.1791 It also contradicted Roosevelt’s talk of wartime solidarity in the hemisphere.
Argentina constituted a sore point of course, but when nine of ten South American
countries refrained from declaring war or adhering to the UN Declaration, it appeared
that Washington’s program for the Hemisphere earned less respect than the Americans
suggested.1792 These countries needed to be lured into the fold. Roosevelt therefore
insisted that they receive invitations to the Food and Agricultural Conference. He also
requested that the State Department change the relief agreement so that countries
“associated with the United Nations” could sign the document. This formula was also
applied to the postwar financial arrangements.1793
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Acheson put the proposal before the four powers on April 12, 1943. In total,
he informed the group, this change would mean that all of the South American countries
would be included as well as Egypt, Iceland, Iran and Liberia. As their governments had
already agreed to this procedure for the Food and Agricultural Conference, the
representatives of the Ambassadors thought it would work for the relief organization as
well, but still wanted to check with their governments.1794
If this alteration posed no problem, Roosevelt’s attitude towards France created a
major stumbling bloc. From the beginning, the Americans had been wary of the Free
French Forces and the French National Committee – the military and political entities
Charles De Gaulle established with British assistance to lead the country’s resistance
after the Nazi victory over France in June 1940. The Americans refused to recognize De
Gaulle’s group for two reasons: first, they considered the Free French closet minions of
John Bull; second, they preferred to maintain relations with Vichy France, the
collaborationist Government established under the leadership of Marshal Pétain
following the collapse of the Third Republic. Apart from strategic concerns, Roosevelt
disliked De Gaulle immensely. While these men had incompatible personalities, they
exercised power in ways bound to create conflict. Whenever Roosevelt tried to control,
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restrain, or influence De Gaulle, the defiant Frenchman either ignored or rejected the
preferences of the American President, who was unaccustomed to such behavior.1795
As a result, American policy towards the Free French often had punitive aspects
quite separate from its strategic purpose. The United States, for example, agreed to
provide the Free French lend-lease aid shortly after De Gaulle established the French
National Committee in September 1941. Even if the Americans disliked the Free French,
they figured that they might gain influence and even lure the group away from Britain if
they provided aid to counterbalance British assistance. But the fiasco over the islands of
St. Pierre and Miquelon proved this assumption incorrect. In December 1941, Great
Britain and the United States became alarmed that the Vichy regime was using a radio
station on St. Pierre to relay meteorological data to the Nazis. While the British wanted
the Free French to take over the islands, the Americans preferred a Canadian expedition.
But on December 24, 1941, against the expressed wishes of Roosevelt, De Gaulle
launched an invasion. The President was furious. He cancelled plans to permit the Free
French to sign the United Nations Declaration and even refused to recognize them as
Allies.1796 Roosevelt would welcome all nations willing to declare war on the Axis
Powers into the wartime alliance. But the Free French were duly excluded.
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The deterioration of relations influenced American planning for postwar
France. If De Gaulle could not be trusted, then who would administer the country after
liberation? Reports suggesting a surge in communist activity inside of France created
concern. Vichy elements, too, might vie for power. None of these options showed
promise. The Political Subcommittee worried that De Gaulle would establish a
dictatorship; that a communist regime would show allegiance to the Soviet Union; or that
a Government dominated by Vichy elements would precipitate civil unrest. With no
obvious heir to the French Third Republic, the Political Subcommittee concluded that a
United Nations authority would have to run the country until elections could be held.1797
Roosevelt agreed, but minced no words about what this meant. The United States would
run the country incognito. When the time comes for liberation, he told Sumner Welles,
the “trustee element so far as France is concerned should be bested in an American
civilian authority.”1798
Yet this proposal presented perplexing problems. Unless the Germans completely
destroyed the country upon retreat, its administrative machinery would remain intact. The
United States would have to plan meticulously and enact measures to prevent undesirable
elements from taking control of this machinery. But with limited manpower, Washington
would have to recruit Frenchmen to administer the country, at least at the local level. To
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ensure that these individuals showed full allegiance to the United Nations, they would
have to be chosen carefully. In cases where undesirable individuals or groups threatened
American plans, the Subcommittee concluded that “it might be necessary to use relief as
a political weapon.” 1799 In this way, stability could be achieved. Yet the Political
Subcommittee recognized the limits of their plans. If they went too far, it could backfire,
thereby benefiting the groups they hoped to weaken. In any case, they ultimately agreed
that France could have De Gaulle, but that the French people would have to make this
choice. He could not be permitted an unfair advantage.1800
The mutual distrust escalated nonetheless. The United States launched Operation
Torch, the November 1942 invasion of French North Africa, without even informing De
Gaulle. Strategic calculations made this decision essential. To avoid the loss of life, the
Americans reached an agreement with the French military commanders in North Africa
whereby they would sever ties with Vichy and halt all French opposition to the invasion
in return for leadership of the French Administration in North Africa. The ploy worked
brilliantly. But it outraged De Gaulle, who considered the chosen French leader, Admiral
Francois Darlan, a traitor to France due to his associations with the Vichy Government.
The North African machinations also fell flat with the American and British people, who
disliked the idea of compromising the very principles for which the war was presumably
being fought. Roosevelt had little choice but to reach out to De Gaulle. A tête-à-tête
between the two leaders would have taken place in Washington at the end of 1942, but
the unexpected assassination of Darlan led Roosevelt to postpone the meeting until the
United States had found a replacement. They chose General Henri Giraud, who had
1799
1800

P Minutes 38, December 19, 1942, Notter Papers, NARA.
P Minutes 5, April 4, 1942, Notter Papers, NARA.

640
escaped a Nazi prison in April 1942 and joined with Darlan in November 1942. The
problem of competing French authorities remained.1801
On December 19, 1942, the Political Subcommittee discussed France once again.
But this time, a number of members began to question the intelligence of Roosevelt’s
policy. Again, it was the indefatigable Anne O’Hare McCormick who raised the salient
questions. When Welles insisted that France could only become a member of the United
Nations organization “within a year or a year and a half after the war,” she asked him “if
that meant that France would not be… in the same category as Yugoslavia.” It was a
tricky issue. With Giraud and De Gaulle now poised for confrontation over the control of
postwar France, the Subcommittee worried that the country would slip into a civil war.
Yet everyone knew that Yugoslavia remained equally if not more vulnerable to a civil
war than France. But in the mind of Sumner Welles, France had no functioning
government, which placed it in a league quite separate from Yugoslavia. McCormick,
however, reminded the Undersecretary that these circumstances existed “only because the
United States refused to “recognize the French Government-in-Exile.” Yet most of the
postwar planning assumed that the Roosevelt Administration had no intention of
recognizing any French authority, which made the problems even more perplexing. But
even worse, McCormick suggested, “We seem to be considering [France] as an enemy
power.” Clearly she believed this approach would backfire.1802
The circumstances led Roosevelt to pursue unity between the two French factions,
but De Gaulle proved wholly uncooperative. When Churchill proposed that he meet with
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Giraud at Casablanca in early 1943, he refused to leave London. As Robert Dallek
writes, “He was reluctant to meet under Allied auspices, where he might come under
pressure to compromise with Vichyites, and he was insulted that the invitation did not
come from FDR.” Only after Roosevelt added his name to the invitation and Churchill
threatened to withdraw his support of De Gaulle did he agree to go to Casablanca. When
he arrived, he criticized the venue, reproached Giraud, complained to Churchill, and
rejected a compromise that would have made him the political leader while maintaining
Giraud as the military commander in North Africa. He also refused to acquiesce to a
communiqué between him and Giraud drawn up by the Americans and British. It was
only after much cajoling that the American President finally convinced him to have his
picture taken with Giraud for the press. The whole affair left a bitter taste in Roosevelt’s
mouth: he had hoped to resolve the French problem, but left Casablanca with a mere
photograph.1803
Lest one conclude that De Gaulle’s actions were obtuse and petty, it is critical to
understand why he behaved as he did. It serves as an instructive foil to the behavior of the
Canadians, who grudgingly accepted compromises devised by Great Britain and/or the
United States repeatedly throughout the war, but it also contrasts with the strategy De
Gaulle would later embrace. From the start, De Gaulle had always wanted the Americans
to explicitly recognize the Free French as the sole legitimate French authority, even
though he was sufficiently wise to understand why they would not: they wanted strategic
flexibility. But instead of acting as though this objective had not yet been obtained, he
always behaved as though it were so. Just like the Americans, who relied on spectacle to
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achieve their aims, he made a show in hopes that it would somehow legitimize his
leadership and the authority of the Free French. While this may have been foolhardy in
early 1943, he knew well that it would appeal to the French people in the long run. It
therefore served no purpose to deal with any competing French authority, especially one
that had connections to Vichy, and it made no sense to accept a deal composed by foreign
powers holding a conference in a locale that he considered sovereign French territory.1804
Roosevelt struggled to manage De Gaulle. Initially he treated him like a powerful
bureaucrat engaged in one of his Administration’s many turf wars. Like Cordell Hull,
who had tremendous power in the Senate and support among the American people, De
Gaulle had the backing of Great Britain and a considerable following in France. Unable
to dismiss him, Roosevelt assigned responsibility to one of his rivals. When this failed to
resolve the matter, he sought a compromise solution. But neither charm nor persuasion
could compel De Gaulle to play along. If Lester Pearson considered friendship a means to
influence, De Gaulle thought only of power and spectacle. “France has no friends, only
interests,” he famously quipped.1805 Roosevelt could no more dismantle this mantra than
he could deny De Gaulle a place in it. As a result, he became angry. He mocked and
insulted him in public and private.1806 And just as he failed to invite Hull to most of the
wartime conferences, he kept De Gaulle away from the United Nations. Yet he well knew
that this behavior could create trouble. Privately he was beginning to wonder what to do
1804
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if the Soviet Union became aggressive or refused to cooperate with China, Great
Britain and the United States in the postwar era. He even began to think that it might be
better to abandon his plans to disarm France after the war.1807
For the moment, Roosevelt’s vindictive attitude prevailed. On February 20, 1943,
De Gaulle’s Commissioner for the Economy, Finance, and the Colonies, Hervé Alphand,
met with Acheson and other officials at the State Department to express his fear that the
work of the Inter-Allied Committee would be terminated. If this occurred, he explained, it
would be a tremendous blow to the French National Committee. He had heard of the
American plans for an international relief organization and wanted to know what role the
United States anticipated for France in this scheme. Acheson told Alphand that a plan
was under consideration by the four powers, but that France presented them with
perplexing problems. It would be difficult to include two delegations, one for the Free
French and one for the North African Government. He therefore suggested that if the two
groups could somehow “work out a deal,” then the problem would be simplified, but he
could make no promises. Alphand pleaded with Acheson to give them time.1808 But the
pressure marked the advent of a new strategy towards the Free French. If they refused to
accept the compromise that Churchill and Roosevelt proposed at Casablanca, they would
have to work out their problems with the French in North Africa on their own, precisely
what De Gaulle, who always had sovereignty on his mind, preferred.
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We can accurately speak of a new strategy because the Americans employed a
similar approach to the other postwar matters under consideration at that time. In March
1943, the State Department informed the competing French groups that they would be
able to participate in the postwar financial discussions if they could agree on a joint
representative. 1809 They made a similar proposal in April 1943 with regard to the
impending Food and Agricultural Conference.1810 However these two areas of discussion
differed from the relief negotiations in one critical aspect. At the relief conference, the
attending Governments would be asked to sign an international agreement. No such plans
existed for the financial discussions or the Food and Agricultural Conference. Though
they might lead to an agreement, the Americans considered these meetings “preliminary
and exploratory.”1811 Thus in their eyes, mere participation constituted a lesser form of
recognition than the ability to sign an international agreement.
The Americans also faced another problem. By April 1943, the State Department
had received “something like a hundred requests from various organizations of exiled
peoples… anxious to sign the United Nations Declaration.” If the French were permitted
to sign the relief agreement, numerous other non-governmental authorities would demand
1809
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the same right. In particular, the Americans worried about the Free Danes, a
hodgepodge of Danish groups dispersed in various capitals, but especially in London and
Washington.1812 Here the Danish problem is both analytically useful and revealing.
Following the invasion of Denmark in April 1940,
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the Roosevelt

Administration maintained relations with the Danish Monarchy of Christian X, whose
Government continued to operate under Nazi occupation. Yet at the same time, the
Americans argued that the Danish Government was neither a “free agent” nor a
“sovereign government” so long as the Germans occupied the country.1814 They also
encouraged the Danish Minister in Washington, Henrik de Kauffmann, to act
independently. He refused to recognize the German occupation, labeled Christian X a
Nazi prisoner, and sought to build a coalition of like-minded Danes in the Western
Hemisphere. Then, on April 9, 1941, without authority from Copenhagen, he signed a
treaty with the United States authorizing it to defend the Danish possession of Greenland.
The Americans occupied the territory the following day, citing the approval of a “Free
Denmark.”1815 In turn, they thought Kauffmann should sign the UN Declaration, but legal
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ambiguities, problems with the Free French, and mild protests from the Norwegians,
who believed the Danes belonged in a different category, led them to abort the plan.1816
American plans for Denmark would face further hurdles. After the war, they
thought the Danish monarchy should remain, and that Kauffmann might form a
government in Copenhagen. 1817 Adolf Berle, who became friends with the Danish
Minister, promoted this agenda relentlessly.1818 These aspirations informed the American
decision to allow for Danish participation on the United Nations Information
Committee,1819 and to invite Kauffmann “in a personal capacity” to attend the Food and
Agriculture Conference. 1820 But the relief conference presented difficulties. The
Americans would not have worried over Danish signature of the relief agreement were it
not for the French; despite his ambiguous status, Kauffmann had already signed the treaty
regarding Greenland. But there was another problem: the British. London had embraced
the same policy as Washington towards the Danish Monarchy. But inasmuch as
Washington promoted Kauffmann, the British advocated for the Danish Minister to
Britain, Count Eduard Reventlow, and the Free Danish Council, headed by Christmas
Moeller.
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The United States could not allow two competing Danish groups to emerge,
one backed by Washington, the other by London. The British had similar fears. But while
the Americans abetted Kauffman’s aspirations with little consideration for the
repercussions in London, the British remained circumspect. 1821 When the Danish
Legation in Britain began requesting permission to participate in various technical
committee meetings of the Inter-Allied Committee, they acquiesced, but following the
precedent established in Washington, they would only allow Danes to partake in a
“personal capacity” as experts, and they denied them access to the main Inter-Allied
Committee.1822 The Americans still saw the dangers of division. Following the Danish
uprising of 1943,1823 competition between the London and Washington Danes came out
into the open. The Americans wisely smashed Danish aspirations on both sides of the
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but silently promoted Kauffmann.
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For this reason, the Danes never

established a government-in-exile. These events would be in the future, but in April 1943
the Americans could see the threats.
Thus French politics in particular, but also the looming threat of division among
the Danish groups in London and Washington, influenced American policy towards nongovernmental authorities with respect to the relief agreement. Acheson therefore used the
April 12, 1942 meeting to request that the phrase “or authorities” be expunged from the
draft agreement.1826 Though it had been inserted during the Leith-Ross visit,1827 Acheson
humorously attributed it to a “typographical error.” It appeared that none of the four
powers would oppose this change.1828
But the British considered the deletion unacceptable. This “sort of exclusion,” J.E.
Coulson at the Foreign Office wrote, “will merely encourage them to be non-cooperative
in every possible way.” The French were already making “heroic efforts” to assemble
supplies from their Empire for the day of liberation. They were also trying to remain “out
of wartime machinery for the allocation of supplies.” They preferred to manage their

1824

See the documents included in section entitled “Denmark: Continued Recognition by
the United States of the Danish Minister as Representative of Denmark While That
Country Was Under German Occupation,” FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, 7-21.
1825
Berle to Acheson, October 11, 1943, 840.50/2791; Unknown Author to Berle,
October 12, 1943, 840.50/2791; Unknown Author to Berle, October 16, 1943,
840.50/2791; Unknown Author to Berle, October 12, 1943, 840.50/2791, NARA, all in
Box 4815, RG 59, NARA.
1826
“Memorandum of Discussion in Mr. Acheson’s Office, Department of State,” April
12, 1943, (139) AME 45/1/33, Institute Jean Monnet.
1827
“Memorandum of Conversation,” July 15, 1942; “Memorandum of Conversation,”
August 11, 1942, both in FO 371/31504, PRO.
1828
“Memorandum of Discussion in Mr. Acheson’s Office, Department of State,” April
12, 1943, (139) AME 45/1/33, Institute Jean Monnet. The claim that it was a
typographical error was a lie. See Veatch to Acheson, April 17, 1943, Acheson Papers,
NARA.

649
affairs independently. “Unless we give them some opportunity to associate
themselves with post-war mechanism,” Coulson wrote, “we shall only have ourselves to
blame.”1829 The Belgians, Dutch, Luxembourgers, Norwegians, and the Free French had
jointly petitioned the British with a request to allow them to collaborate with military
authorities to draw up relief plans the previous year.1830 If the United States angered them
further, the possibility also existed that De Gaulle would seek to lure these countries
away from Washington. For this reason, the British had even suggested a seat for France
on the Central Committee, which the American considered, but opposed.1831 Hugh Dalton
nonetheless presented Acheson’s alteration to the War Cabinet. But before they could
consider it, the departments reached a unanimous agreement. It was duly rejected.1832

The End Game: The Final Meeting Resolves the Two Outstanding Issues

At the end of April 1943, Acheson still faced two hurdles. The Canadian problem
had been replaced with the question of French participation, while the dispute over the
national Deputy Director Generals remained unsolved. On April 15, 1943, the British
reiterated their rejection of Acheson’s proposal reserving these positions for three of the
four powers.1833 Then on April 23, 1943, the Chinese informed the Americans that they
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too wanted a Deputy Director General.
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This demand strengthened Acheson’s

hand. The evolving dynamics of America’s attitude towards France also boded well for
the final round of talks. With Roosevelt increasingly doubtful of Moscow’s postwar
intentions, it was likely that the Americans would find a way out of the French
quagmire.1835 They had invited them to the Food and Agricultural Conference and the
postwar financial discussions. For the relief conference, the question was whether they
should be permitted to sign the agreement, not whether they could participate. The British
simply misunderstood the American position. Let us tackle these issues in turn.
By April 24, 1943, the Americans agreed that Deputy Director General positions
should be reserved for China, Britain and the Soviet Union. The issue was secrecy. If
such arrangements could not be stated in the draft agreement, it was considered equally
dangerous to include them in the minutes of the next four-power meeting. In a letter to
Acheson, Roy Veatch implied that the State Department had conceded too much: if
events turned awry, and Congress subpoenaed the records for an investigation, these
arrangements would create political problems in the United States.1836 Ray Atherton also
expressed doubts. “This Government should not be placed in the position of having to
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yield to the desires of the British and Soviet Governments on this matter since most
of the resources of the organization will be provided by the United States.”1837
Yet Acheson refused to reopen the question with Litvinov. He had already agreed
to record the understanding in the minutes of the next four-power meeting.1838 For this
reason, the Americans altered the text of the understanding. Instead of naming the
countries, it referred to members of the Central Committee. But more significantly, it
stated that the four powers would recommend this procedure to the Director General and
use “their best efforts” to help him make the appointments.1839 Prior to the final meeting
of the four powers, the British reluctantly agreed to this proposal.1840
But they disagreed with the American position on France. If the two French
groups could agree to a common delegation, they would be admitted to the relief
conference, but they would not be permitted to sign the agreement. In Acheson’s view,
the two groups were legally akin to a non-governmental organization. Ray Atherton
concurred, but unlike Acheson, who thought the French should be allowed to sign if they
established a “joint authority,” he believed this could only be allowed if the two French
groups established a “government recognized by the United States.”1841 If principle drove
Atherton, tactics motivated Acheson, who believed the French, at least in appearance,
should have some control over their destiny. His view prevailed. The British argued the
French should also be admitted to the organization if they formed a “joint authority” after
1837
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the agreement was signed.
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The Americans wanted this stipulation relegated to the

minutes of he next four-power meeting, but they remained hostile towards the phrase “or
authorities.”1843
On May 4, 1943, the four Ambassadors convened for their final meeting. They
rapidly reached agreement on the issue of Deputy Director Generals, though Litvinov
made an attempt to impose unanimity on their selection by the Central Committee. The
wise men reaffirmed that they would use their best endeavors to secure the Chairmanship
of the Supplies Committee for Canada. They accepted the American proposal to invite
countries associated with the United Nations to the relief conference and permit them to
sign the agreement. France constituted the only sore point. Yet China, Great Britain and
the Soviet Union cornered the United States. While Acheson thought the draft might be
altered to allow for French signature after they had agreed on a “joint authority,” China,
Britain and the Soviet Union believed they should be included from the outset. To meet
Acheson’s concerns, they proposed that no authority be admitted for signature without
unanimous agreement of the four powers.1844 The American Government acquiesced a
few days later.1845 The tortuous four-power discussions had finally come to an end.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGY

Public relations had always played a central role in Roosevelt’s wartime and
postwar strategies. At the conclusion of his January 6, 1941 State of the Union address,
he laid out the four freedoms on which he believed a new world order should be founded:
freedom of expression and religion, freedom from want and fear.1846 Then, on August 14,
1941, he and Winston Churchill released the Atlantic Charter at the conclusion of their
conference aboard the USS Augusta and the HMS Prince of Wales in Placenta Bay. This
bilateral statement ensconced the four freedoms in a wider program that pledged the two
powers to neither seek territorial aggrandizement, nor neglect the political and economic
aspirations of people all over the world.1847 Following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor
and America’s entry into the war, Roosevelt summoned allied representatives to the
White House, where, on January 1, 1942, they signed the United Nations Declaration.
This document turned the unilateral and bilateral statements of the previous year into a
full-fledged alliance, in which the signatories committed themselves to the defeat of the
Axis Powers and to achieve the ideals and objectives articulated in the Atlantic
Charter.1848
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The idea of unity stood at the center of Roosevelt’s strategy. Until his death in
1945, he hammered this theme at every possible turn, despite the fact that the war was
being fought by a small number of countries, primarily Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and the United States. The purpose was to create the impression of a broad alliance that
would win the war and establish a stable peace. This objective served multiple purposes.
It suggested that the burdens of fighting the war and winning the peace would be spread
out across the freedom-loving nations of the earth. Doubtless Roosevelt fashioned this
impression for the American people, who worried that they might shoulder too much of
the burden. 1849 It cloaked America’s hegemonic aspirations in the banner of broad
participation. This impression served to win support in the global community, especially
among people in free or invaded countries fearing imperialism after the war, but also
colonial territories yearning for independence.1850
The substance of these public relations salvos served two aims. At the most basic
level, they aided the war effort. By providing a bright vision for the future – one based on
freedom, justice, equality, prosperity, and democracy – these statements emboldened the

Yale Law School, 2008): http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp (accessed
September 11, 2012).
1849
The examples of Roosevelt emphasizing the theme of unity are too numerous to
enumerate here, but in one example, he explains the purpose of this theme: “The
President Stresses the Need for Allied Unity in a Letter to the Economic Club of New
York,” March 12, 1942, in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1942: Humanity on the Defensive (New York: MacMillan,
1942), 161-162.
1850
On the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations generally, see Theodore A. Wilson,
The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placenta Bay, 1941 (Lawrence, Kansas:
University of Kansas Press, 1991). See also Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the
World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005). On the
issue of colonial territories and the Atlantic Charter, see William Roger Louis,
Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire,
1941-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 20-21, 223-224, 247, 254.

655
global masses, whether in occupied or unoccupied countries, to resist, rise up, or join
the fight against the Axis Powers, which threatened these values. In effect, they gave the
world, and the American people especially, a cause for which to fight. This fact points to
the second purpose of these statements. They abetted American aspirations and provided
a vague but powerful blueprint for the postwar period. While the lofty language and high
ideals worked to obtain global support for American leadership after the war, many of the
programmatic aspects of these statements – free and open markets, universal access to
raw materials, freedom and independence for colonial peoples – constituted an implicit
attack on the British Empire and other colonial powers. It was an effort to de-link these
territories from their colonial masters and integrate them into an American system.1851
The vision Roosevelt touted in public was radical not only in terms of its
substance, but also in its geographic reach. The Atlantic Charter, he imperiously claimed,
“applied to all humanity.”1852 The creation of the United Nations, he argued in a speech
to the International Student Assembly on September 3, 1942, was a “development of
historic importance” that glossed over cultural distinctions. “It means that the old term
‘Western civilization,’ no longer applies. World events and the common needs of all
humanity are joining the culture of Asia with the culture of Europe and the culture of the
Americas to form, for the first time, a real world civilization.”1853 To be sure, these
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claims worked to unify the globe against the Axis Powers, but they also served to
exalt the United States into the position of world leader. Because Roosevelt and many of
the officials in his Administration believed in the inherent goodness of America, they
thought that what advanced U.S. interests would serve the global good as well.
Yet the postwar planners, as we have seen, struggled to turn the Atlantic Charter
into an actionable program. They anticipated wide infractions of its principles, especially
by the Soviet Union, but quite possibly by the United States as well. They also knew that
the Four Freedoms could never be applied on a global scale. Freedom, for one, almost
always comes into conflict with order and stability, which they well knew was a
prerequisite for peace. They also doubted the possibility that countries would surrender
their sovereignty and resources to international organizations, whether in the domain of
security, justice, or human welfare. But despite these realities, the Roosevelt
Administration continued to publicly advance the unrealistic aims and lofty ideals of the
Charter. For Roosevelt, those who called the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter
unattainable nonsense would have been opposed to the Declaration of Independence, the
Magna Charta, and the Ten Commandments of Moses.1854 Yet tragically, as one scholar
explains, these appeals only “heightened the already high expectations about the postwar
world and thus perhaps contributed to some of the disillusionment that followed…”1855
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The Three Central Public Relations Objectives

It is in this context that we consider the public relations strategy that emerged for
postwar relief. Three distinct but interrelated problems converged in the months after the
Congressional elections of November 3, 1942. First, domestic political factors limited the
actions of the Roosevelt Administration. Herbert Hoover remained the dominant voice on
food and relief matters in American politics. Following the November elections, he began
touting his credentials as a possible leader of the country’s food and relief efforts.
Roosevelt again considered the idea, but quickly abandoned it when Hoover’s comments
in the press turned nasty.1856 The former President argued, on the one hand, that the
country’s food policies evinced no “vision of the impending postwar famine”;1857 on the
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other hand, he reignited his campaign to see wartime relief delivered into Belgium,
Finland, Holland, Norway, and Poland. With Great Britain and the United States now
providing relief assistance to Greece, he asserted, the old arguments no longer
applied.1858 The former President’s stature also increased due to the publication of The
Problems of Lasting Peace, a thoughtful contribution to the debate over the postwar
world co-authored with Hugh Gibson and published in early 1942.1859
Herbert Hoover had to be contained. But because the relief negotiations were
proceeding too slowly, and appeared as though they might fail, the Administration could
not call a relief conference just yet. They needed another mechanism to thwart the former
President. As explained elsewhere, the Administration announced on November 20, 1942
that Herbert Lehman would resign as Governor of New York to set up the Office of
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) in the State Department, which
precluded the possibility that Hoover would assume control of the Government’s postwar
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Yet this maneuver did not rule the former President out as a possible

food czar, a position he also held after the First World War. Thus Roosevelt appointed
the Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wickard Food Administrator on December 6,
1942, and gave him sweeping powers over the nation’s food supplies and distribution.1861
In this way, he silenced talk of Hoover joining the Government in either capacity; and he
implicitly deflected the charge of negligence by revealing that relief preparations were
underway in the State Department. Simultaneously, he, Welles and Lehman publicly
heightened the Administration’s commitment to undertake postwar relief.1862
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The second problem concerned the United Nations. Officials had become
concerned that nothing had been done to transform the idea of the United Nations into
something more than a phrase used to describe the wartime alliance. While they desired a
show of unity to bolster the war effort, they also wanted to pave the way for postwar
cooperation among the United Nations. It was insufficient to have “United Nations
Week” in January 1943. Thus they had “United Nations Month” in February 1943.1863
But this was not enough either: something else needed to be done.
Food and agriculture, as we have seen, were the topics chosen for the first
multilateral conference. Uncontroversial, these matters appealed to the American people,
but also provided an opportunity, as one administration official explained, “to see if the
representatives of the various nations could work together.”1864 As a result, Roosevelt
broached the idea on February 23, 1943.1865 Three days later, Sumner Welles indirectly
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referred to this proposal in a speech delivered at the University of Toronto. The
United States, he emphasized, was taking steps to discuss with other members of the UN
ways to achieve the economic objectives of the Atlantic Charter.1866 While wartime and
postwar imperatives played the dominant role in this decision, this proposal also
deflected criticisms raised by Hoover, who was insisting that the United States had not
done enough to prepare for the war’s end.
The Food and Agricultural Conference discussed important substantive issues, but
it was also a dilatory tactic.1867 With the relief negotiations bogged down on account of
disputes with the Canadians and the Soviets, the Administration needed an alternative to
distract in the interim. As Oscar Cox of the Lend-Lease Administration wrote Harry
Hopkins in late 1942, a lot of preparatory and educational work still remained to be
done. 1868 While opinion polls suggested an overwhelming majority of Americans
believed the United States should provide food and supplies to destitute populations after
the war, the Roosevelt Administration worried that the relief proposals would set off
alarm bells in Congress, where representatives feared the costs of relief and
reconstruction, and endeavored to protect their constitutional prerogatives.1869 Here too
Hoover had the ability to create obstructions. He and other Republicans believed
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Roosevelt had run rough shod over the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress,
especially its powers to approve international treaties. 1870 The mere idea of an
international organization evoked memories of the debates over the Versailles Treaty and
the League of Nations. As a result, the Roosevelt Administration needed time to properly
inform the American people, so that Congressional support would be forthcoming when
the time came.
This fact underscores the final problem the Administration faced: it had to shape
public opinion with arguments that would reduce opposition to their relief plans and
thereby isolate opponents in the Congress. To achieve this objective, they followed the
pattern set by Roosevelt and Welles with respect to the broader postwar international
settlement. While Roosevelt spoke in vague and broad-sweeping terms, Welles tested
specific ideas with trial balloons. In this way, the President could shield himself from
possible backlash, but then enter the foray when the mood and circumstances suited him.
In the case of relief, Herbert Lehman and his staff in the Office of Foreign Relief and
Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) did most of the public relations work usually
reserved for Welles. While they crafted their arguments to appeal to the wider population,
they focused on the audiences whose support they most needed, and who would play a
considerable role in their efforts. With many of the nation’s men drafted in the war effort,
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they spoke to women, pacifists, social workers, religious groups, businessmen, and
other entities with experience in humanitarian relief.
This strategy to meet the exigencies of domestic politics, pave the way for
multilateral cooperation, and educate the American people on postwar relief did not
emerge at once. Rather, it unfolded piecemeal. The opening salvo began with the
appointments of Lehman and Wickard, but this decision only precipitated a barrage of
criticism from Hoover, who was attacking the Administration for its failure to centralize
control over food policy and relief in the hands of a single agency, and urging Roosevelt
and Churchill to permit aid through the blockade. In a February 20, 1943 memorandum to
Lehman, Thomas Reynolds, the newly appointed Director of Public Relation in the
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) 1871 described the
problem. First, he claimed that OFRRO had failed “to nail down” its “sphere of operation
and relationships with other agencies.” This fact had entered the public discussion.
Second, Reynolds lamented Hoover’s attempts “to snatch the leadership [of] the relief
problem in any manner possible.” OFRRO, he argued, could not permit him to “break
ground for a problem” that they were “capable of solving.” Third, the former President’s
drive was “spreading rapidly outside the ranks of Hoover followers to… friends or those
who normally should be our friends.” Democrats in the Senate and House had introduced
resolutions for the extension of relief through the blockade, and three days prior, 43
Protestant leaders had demanded the Administration permit “immediate shipments of
dried milk and vitamins for children, mothers and invalids through the blockade.”1872
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These factors set off a wave of activity. Roosevelt, first, called the FAO
Conference. Then the Administration began disputing Hoover’s idea that the United
States should send relief aid through the blockade with the argument that an
intensification of the U-Boat campaign in the Atlantic made it impossible.1873 Throughout
March and into the summer, Administration officials were more forthcoming in their
public statements on the President’s future plans, a process Roosevelt initiated on
February 23, 1943 with the news that Lehman and the State Department were “talking
with other nations in regard to a conference on relief.”1874 A series of speeches by
OFRRO officials to groups such as the American Friends Service Committee and
National Association of Social Workers began in early March, culminating with major
addresses by Herbert Lehman at Swarthmore College on May 31, 1943 and the Foreign
Policy Association on June 17, 1943.1875 Yet internally disputes over the relative powers
of Lehman’s operation vis-à-vis other agencies in the Government continued unabated.
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The outcome of this dispute, which proved a major distraction both inside the
Government and in the press, did not arrive until the end of the year.1876

Educating the American people

“The American people are generous but they are far away from knowing the
needs of mankind and the cause-and-effect relations in world affairs. We don’t like
regimentation and rationing and are easily confused by ill-informed and post-seeking
men into thinking that any foreign relief and rehabilitation is a senseless blunder.”1877 In
this way, Luther Gulick, Chief of the Division of Programs and Requirements in the
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, explained the internal rational for
the Roosevelt Administration’s efforts to educate the American people on the need for
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and purpose of postwar relief. Naturally the Administration designed its public
relations campaign for postwar relief to convince the broad population of its necessity,
but they framed the debate to refute real and possible enemies while seeking to galvanize
support among those individuals most likely to display an interest in the topic of relief.
The Roosevelt Administration worried that three possible groups might oppose
their plans for postwar relief. First, they feared that uninformed Republicans and
Democrats might ally with cautious military officials, and then argue that the
Administration’s preparations for postwar relief were premature and would impair the
war effort.1878 In early 1943, the war appeared far from over. Despite the American
victory at Guadalcanal at the end of January, the Japanese still appeared to have the upper
hand in the Asian theatre. On May 2, 1943, they bombed Darwin, Australia. In North
Africa, the tide was turning, but the Allied landings in Sicily would not occur until July,
and the cross-channel invasion was more than a year in the future. American officials
consequently turned relief into a matter of military necessity. While it had been used as a
propaganda tool to incite insurrection in Axis occupied countries, State Department
officials argued in early 1943 that relief was essential for ongoing operations in North
Africa and the inevitable invasion of Europe. Even more, they contended that it would
shorten the war.
This approach was largely successful. The logic of their arguments was so
damning that no domestic criticism emerged, but it would also have unintended
consequences abroad. According to Lehman, the Allies would “find conditions close to
chaos” when liberation arrived. “Shattered economies, pestilence, starvation and death
1878
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breed riot and anarchy,” he argued. “It should be self-evident that our troops, whether
in North Africa or any place elsewhere in future theatres of operations, will not be able to
take the offensive successfully if they must launch their operations in countries where
famine and pestilence are generating riot, revolution and complete disorder.” Relief was
therefore essential. Yet following the words of Roosevelt, he took the logic a step further.
Yet his diction raised eyebrows. “America must use food, clothing, shelter and the
necessities of life as a real weapon to win complete and overwhelming victory and to
secure the peace which must follow.”1879 The plan to use food as a weapon, as we will
see, raised concerns among foreign observers, who had worries of their own.
Conservatives and so-called isolationists constituted the second group. These
individuals worried about costs, demands on American resources, and the possibility that
other countries would become interminably dependent on the United States. During
January and February 1943, the need for secrecy made it difficult for the Administration
to fully address the question of costs and resources. Instead, officials denied the existence
of plans for a “Utopian system.”1880 The United States would neither play the “part of…
Santa Claus,” nor “bestow its blessings on the entire world.”1881 Rather, it would help
others help themselves. Officials also argued that postwar relief and rehabilitation would
serve the interests of the United States. “The relief and rehabilitation of war-stricken
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nations,” Lehman asserted, “is the necessary first step toward a balanced economy in
which a high level of consumption will prevent the piling up of those great stocks of
surplus goods which would otherwise be quickly accumulated after this war in all the
primary producing countries.” The alternative was a “terrific contraction” or a “shattering
post-war depression.”1882
The argumentation followed the logic of Roosevelt’s remarks of November 24,
1942, in which he used the relationship between the North and South to explain why the
United States should provide relief and rehabilitation assistance. If you raise the standard
of the agricultural south, he explained, then they can buy the products of the
manufacturing north. “Now the same thing,” he claimed, “can be worked out in those
Nations… which today have practically no purchasing power.” Lehman followed this
line, but spoke with more precision: “We in America must not lose sight of the fact that,
once this war has ended, we again will be the greatest producers in the world and will
want markets for our grain, our cotton, our tobacco and other agricultural staples as well
as our steel, our automobiles and the thousands of products of our mills and factories.”1883
To address cost concerns, the Roosevelt Administration deployed two arguments.
First, they made the case that postwar relief would be inexpensive by comparison with
the economic, political and social havoc that would result if certain people in the United
States, as Roosevelt saw it, could “not see the value of putting other people on their
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By March 1943, when the Administration became more forthcoming with

its postwar relief plans, they deployed a second line of argumentation that inadvertently
diminished the force of the first one. While implying that relief would be relatively
inexpensive, their descriptions of the task at hand suggested something otherwise. Relief
and rehabilitation would be a task of “Herculean proportions,” they asserted, requiring
sacrifice from everyone. Thus the Administration publicly expressed the hope that some
agreement could be reached permitting the creation of an international relief organization.
In this way, officials could weld “the resources and personnel of all the governments”
into a “single and unified organization.”1885 In short, the entire world would foot the bill.
Yet they did not abandon the earlier argument altogether. Instead, they reframed it
by comparing the costs of relief with the costs of the war. As Lehman explained in June
1943, “This war right now is costing the American taxpayer about a billion dollars every
three days. The cost in life and spiritual value,” he added, “is incalculable.” For this
reason, it was imperative that the entire world work to forge the downtrodden into a
cohesive group ready to cooperate in the battle of liberation. An international approach to
relief was the most financially astute approach. But the United States remained critical,
he suggested. “Should America’s readiness to bring relief to the weary peoples of Europe
and Asia shorten the war by but a week or two,” Lehman calculated, “the United States
will have saved far more on war costs than the total outlays which can be anticipated in
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Yet they were remarkably circumspect about

what the costs would be. When they gave precise figures, they understated the totals.1887
In more honest moments, they stuck to generalities. “The cost of the supplies required to
prevent starvation when the whole of the reoccupied sections in liberated will run into
hundreds of millions, and perhaps billions of dollars.”1888
In their public assertions, they usually disregarded the costs of many anticipated
undertakings. Aware of this fact, the Wall Street Journal honed in on the term
“rehabilitation.” This word contains “almost endless potentialities. It can mean or be
interpreted to mean not only nourishment, clothing and medicines for physical restoration
of human beings but a host things besides.” 1889 Indeed American and British
policymakers privately worried and debated the meaning of this term. Where does relief
end and rehabilitation begin? Even more problematic, where does rehabilitation end and
reconstruction begin? The scope of the relief organization’s activities, in fact, was never
fully defined.1890 But for much of 1943, American policymakers refused to assign any
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concrete monetary value to the “rehabilitation” component of their plans, and they
claimed that reconstruction was not “the province of a relief and rehabilitation agency.”
They clearly feared criticism. Yet they argued that if the objective were self-help, they
would have to “rehabilitate” the agricultural and industrial sectors of war ravaged
economies, a task requiring much more than food, clothing and medical supplies.1891
Of course the possibility always existed that recipient countries might pay for
these materials. But because the Administration considered this approach unwise in most
cases, they did not address it until the summer of 1943. Experiences following the First
World War weighed heavily in their calculations. “Where Governments had cash or
assets, they were required in some cases to pay cash and in other cases to pledge assets as
security for loans.” But in other cases, the United States forced governments with no cash
or assets to “pay by means of loans advanced to them,” often in circumstances where the
“soundness of the credit was highly questionable.” As a result, governments defaulted on
these loans and the United States “was no better off than if the loans had been outright
gifts.” These developments destroyed the credit of borrowing countries, making it
impossible for them to secure loans “for sound reconstruction projects.” “Economic
recovery was thus impaired,” setting in motion the cycle of events that led to depression,
“the rise of Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese militarists,” and ultimately “global
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conflagration.” To prevent a repeat of these events, officials suggested gifts would be
best in most countries.1892
Humanitarians constituted the final group of concern to American planners.
Persons associated with the various humanitarian aid agencies in the United States,
especially those of a religious character, lamented Churchill and Roosevelt’s refusal to
permit aid through the blockade of Europe. In part, this problem was solved in early 1942
when Swedish aid ships were permitted into Greece.1893 But it would not totally disappear
until the cross-channel invasion had begun. Hoover would not let it die.1894 The events of
1943 in North Africa appeased these humanitarian groups further. With the liberation of
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations
delivered relief into these territories, and won favorable press coverage for their
efforts.1895 Yet American policymakers knew that simply executing the task was not
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enough to satisfy these relief groups, who wanted to be a part of the process.
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For

this reason, OFRRO privately began cooperating with many of these groups to obtain
their knowledge and personnel, and to integrate then into America’s efforts.1897
Lehman’s office reserved most all of its major public addresses on postwar relief
for occasions sponsored by individuals and groups with historic interests in this field of
endeavor.1898 They carefully crafted their messages to appeal to whatever group or sector
of American society they addressed. Thus the diplomatic advisor to Lehman, Francis B.
Sayre, also the former High Commissioner to the Philippines, spoke of drafting a
“Christian peace” to ensure a “post-war world based on brotherhood and understanding”
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Hugh R. Jackson,

Lehman’s Special Assistant, told the National Conference on Social Work of the
enormous social problems that would confront war ravaged territories. The United States
would need their wisdom and assistance when embarking upon plans to reunite families,
repatriate refugees, implement child welfare programs and reestablish school districts.1900
Luther Gulick, Chief of Programs and Requirements in the OFRRO lavished praise upon
the American Friends Service Committee for the “devotion and personal modesty” of its
leadership and the “humility and humanity” of the organization’s rank and file. Then, in
line with the Quaker philosophy, he told them that the United States would deliver aid
without discriminating against anyone based on race, color or political allegiance.1901
In the State Department’s public relations out-reach to humanitarian organizations
one finds the most detailed descriptions of what the Americans expected to find upon
liberation. The extent of the destruction depended on the speed and behavior of the Axis
as the Allies liberated Europe and Asia. 1902 But reports from occupied territories
indicated severe shortages of food, devastated agriculture, and pillaged industry.1903 Maland undernourishment worried everyone. Weight loss among children had reached
dangerous levels in many countries. Possible outbreaks of typhus, tuberculosis, dysentery
and even pandemic loomed.1904 The problem of displacement aroused particular concern.
In addition to four to six million prisoners of war, four million internally displaced
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French citizens and innumerable Soviet citizens, the Nazis had “forcefully moved
over ten million peoples from their homes for industrial and agricultural slavery, for
defense purposes, and as a means of altering their ethnographical distribution to suit the
Nazi blueprint.” Above all, they emphasized the human factor. The Americans expected
to find “broken, sick, ragged, homeless, frightened human animals.”1905
With 540 million men, women and children affected in 35 nations, the task of
addressing these problems was deemed gargantuan.1906 “Measured by any standard,”
Herbert Lehman told the graduating class at Swarthmore College, “the toll of this war has
been without precedent in human history.”1907 Even if sufficient aid and supplies were
available, the Americans explained, delivering these materials would pose extraordinary
challenges. They expected to find roads and railroad lines destroyed or dilapidated.
Water, power and sewage systems would require rehabilitation lest unsanitary conditions
precipitate a public health crisis.1908 Fuel shortages would have to be met.1909 And all of
this would have to be done systematically, rapidly, and amidst chaotic conditions. The
United States and other nations, however, could not supply the affected populations
indefinitely. A crop would have to be planted and harvested as soon as possible. This
would require inputs of all sorts, including seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, livestock and
tractors. 1910 Raw materials would be required to restart vitally important industries.
Commodities and other goods would have to be reintroduced to entice farmers to sell
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their crops. Inflated or worthless currencies would have to be replaced or repaired.

The task was daunting. “Never before in the history of the world has so massive a
problem involving so many millions of people been presented to the nations for solution,”
Lehman asserted.1912
On the supply side of the equation, the problems were equally massive. First, the
United States had to procure the resources and materials required. Second, these items
had to be shipped to strategic posts where they could be warehoused until needed. The
problem was competing demands. According to Hugh Jackson, this task involved
“forward buying and the development of adequate reserves for [relief] as well as for other
contingencies of a military or civilian character at a time when our productive facilities
are taxed to the utmost to meet the needs of our armed forces, our allies, and our civilian
economy.” 1913 Shipping the items posed another problem. “One ton of shipping is
required to feed, clothe and carry medical supplies for a family of four for a year,” Luther
Gulick explained. “Such a problem looks easy until you start multiplying by the millions
that are involved in this undertaking.” Then cargo space on a limited fleet must be
allocated in a manner that does not endanger the success of military operations.
Administration officials repeatedly compared this job to that of “a large-scale business
operation” and they hammered the themes of organization and efficiency.1914
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Human resources posed another problem. Internally State Department
officials knew that they would have to compete with other agencies and the military for
strong personnel at a time when the best and the brightest had already been recruited.
Publicly, this drove them to emphasize the need to engage people abroad. “We do not
expect even on the present basis to send any army of thousands of American relief
workers into the liberated areas. We expect rather, that while Americans will handle the
principle administrative responsibilities and regulate distribution, the great bulk of
operating personnel will be drawn from the extraordinarily rich personnel resources of
the lands in which the work is to be carried out.”1915 Yet the skill sets required were so
diverse as to seem to make this impossible. On the one hand, they would need experts in
transport, warehousing, scheduling, public health, food distribution, and agricultural
development.1916 On the other hand, they would need individuals “with a capacity for
business efficiency, with the touch of human understanding, with the skill of modern
social work, and with knowledge of two or more languages…”1917
Finally, the Administration appealed to the American spirit and invoked the aims
of the war. In messianic terms, Roosevelt explained: “there comes a time in the affairs of
men when they must prepare to defend not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and
humanity on which their churches, their governments and their very civilization are
founded. The defense of religion, of democracy and of good faith among nations is all the
same fight. To save one, we must now make up our minds to save all.” In short, he
argued that the survival of the American way of life and its deepest values depended on
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its ability and willingness to save the entire world.
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Relief was a means to take

what the American people cherished most and bestow it upon all of humanity. “Even in
the midst of battle,” Lehman asserted, “we still must preserve the principles and ideals
which will make possible the reconstruction of a world which may flourish the freedom
and the way of life for which we fight.” Anything short of this aim, he argued, would
mean that thousands of lives would have been lost in vain.1919
If the United States succeeded, it would shed legitimacy on American global
leadership. It was therefore critically important to avoid the impression that the United
States sought to dominate the world. “Those who enter foreign relief in order to sit at the
head table… are, whether they know it or not, dealing not with relief, but with the
struggle for prestige and power,” one State Department official ironically asserted. It was
also deemed vitally important that the United States undertake this important task without
prejudice to any religion, creed or race. 1920 “Freedom from want is the essential
prerequisite of a stable world economy,” Lehman argued, and everyone was entitled to
it.1921 Thus if relief could be distributed without showing any preferences, it would “have
a powerful reaction in demonstrating” that the United States was “working in good faith
towards a new and better world.”1922 In effect, the culminating argument was that by
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displaying kindness and leading benignly, peace and stability would result, and the
world would acquiesce to American leadership.1923

Presenting the Relief Agreement to the Entire World

While the American people and various domestic audiences constituted the
primary targets of the State Department’s public relations strategy in early 1943, officials
in the Roosevelt Administration always kept the rest of the world in mind. Inasmuch as
the promise of postwar relief appealed to humanitarians at home, it gave populations in
occupied countries hope and motivation to revolt against the Axis powers.1924 If officials
refuted the idea that the United States would play “Santa Claus” for the world, as officials
repeatedly put it, the purpose was to not only avoid criticism from conservatives at home,
but to also increase the imperative for other countries with supplies to contribute.1925 Yet
until the middle of 1943, nothing of this sort was said explicitly. It was implied.
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But on May 31, 1943, at the conclusion of his speech to the graduating class at
Swarthmore College, Herbert Lehman made the Administration’s first statement designed
exclusively for the international community. He explained that the conversations on the
establishment of an international relief organization had made great progress, and that he
hoped that “the productive resources of all the producer nations” would be drawn upon
“to meet the needs of the millions who have been plundered, starved and despoiled.” He
underscored the military necessity for relief, and reminded the global community of
America’s historic predilection for unilateralism. The Untied States, he warned, would
not “wait quietly for completion of arrangements for such concerted action.” “At the
direction of the President, we are proceeding with our own plans, confident that if the
United States provides leadership, the other nations of ‘good will’ will join with us in this
all-important work.”1926 This threat of unilateralism came less than two weeks before the
relief proposal was shared with the United Nations and associated powers.
Because the successful implementation of American plans depended on wide
acceptance of their proposal for an international relief organization, policymakers in the
Roosevelt Administration took care, as one official put it, to “dress up” its presentation to
the United Nations and associated powers. Preparations began in April 1943. Roy Veatch
suggested a formal meeting in which the Secretary of State or the President would share
the draft with the rest of the world, with an explanatory memorandum. A “brief statement
to the press would clarify the situation.” If representatives of the British, Chinese, and
Soviet Governments also took part in the event, it “would underscore their support of the
disavow the Santa Claus idea. See “A Publicity Policy for U.N.R.R.A.” Enclosure to
Dipatch No. 9037, W. J. Gallman to SOS, May 11, 1943, 840.50/1955, Box 4809, RG 59,
NARA.
1926
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draft agreement and encourage a feeling of unity.”
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Officials in the Division of

Current Information, the State Department office responsible for public relations, largely
agreed with Veatch’s proposal, but they also believed the draft proposal should be
released to the press within hours of its transmission to the United Nations. It should
include an additional press release that would explain the agreement.1928
The objectives of these proposals were two-fold. First, the Americans wanted to
underscore the participation of the smaller powers and give them “a feeling of
importance.” A press conference would provide the United States a chance to disavow
“any [apparent] desire to railroad [the agreement] through against the wishes of the
separate governments.” Veatch thought the Secretary of State or even Dean Acheson
could impress each of the governments with the opportunity to discuss the matter fully
with the U.S. government.1929 This was especially important. While the Americans had
spent more than a year in negotiations with the British, Canadians, Chinese, and Russians
on the relief agreement, they hoped to persuade more than twenty nations to accept the
draft in “three or four weeks.” “Many of them have been quite impatient with the delay in
securing agreement between the four principal Powers on this draft,” Acheson wrote
Hull, “and we shall… not be in a good position to press them for hurried consideration
themselves.” It therefore seemed logical to impress them with a little spectacle, either in
the Secretary of State’s office, or at the White House.1930
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Second, American policymakers worried about the press. If someone
misinterpreted the draft and turned to the press, it could create obstacles to a speedy
agreement.1931 The explanatory note would ensure proper interpretation of the proposal,
and the opportunity to share views with the U.S. Government would provide avenues to
settle disputes though diplomatic channels.1932 Yet these precautionary measures would
not prevent “leaks, inaccurate reports, and… criticism from the newspaper people.”1933
As Hull wrote the President, “It would seem impossible to keep the text confidential, and
it might very well be undesirable to do so if the alternative were to be rumor and
speculation, distorting the project and causing excitement and misrepresentation…” Hull
recommended releasing the draft to the press when the U.S. Government shared it with
representatives of the United Nations. To avert the criticism that the draft was “being
forced upon them,” he thought an explanatory statement would be adequate.1934 Officials
also decided to delay its release 12 to 24 hours, after it had been conveyed to respective
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To avoid misinformation and “garbled summaries” in the press,

they would also provide a “guide” to help journalists interpret the document.1936
The Americans wanted to avoid impressions of an Anglo-American effort and
four-power domination of the proposed organization. They rejected a British suggestion
that the American Embassy in London share the draft with the press when officials
released it in Washington. It would be impossible, they argued, to make similar
arrangements in other capitals.1937 Yet this refusal was probably baseless. The American
Embassies abroad received instructions to share the draft with their host governments.1938
Why couldn’t they share it with the press of those countries as well? Simply put, the
Americans wanted control of the message centralized in Washington, and did not want to
abet British leadership aspirations. Policymakers also decided to abandon Veatch’s
original suggestion that the four-powers participate in the proposed press conference. As
this procedure might suggest four-power control, they considered it “dangerous.”1939
Instead, they would authorize the four powers as well as the remaining United Nations to
discuss the draft with the press of their home countries at any time after it had been
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Altogether, these measures ensured that the United States

remained in control of the entire effort.
American caution did not end here. Though in late February 1943 Roosevelt
shared with the press the U.S. Government’s intention to call a United Nations
conference to discuss relief, 1941 the State Department – against the wishes of the
British1942 – decided not to announce a date for this gathering until much later.1943
Secretly, they aimed for the summer of 1943.1944 Yet to make these plans public, even at
the point when they shared the draft agreement with the world, would strip them of their
primary tactic in forging agreement: the threat of unilateralism. It might also force them
into the embarrassing position of having to postpone or cancel the conference if excessive
opposition emerged, which would undermine the war effort. As the British understood it,
the Americans hoped “to be assured of a wide measure of agreement before” fixing “the
date of the Conference.”1945 On May 25, 1943, Hull suggested the following procedure to
Roosevelt. “As soon as the responses to the proposed agreement indicate that it is
favorably received, you authorize the issuance of an invitation for a conference of the
Powers concerned.”1946
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The Roosevelt Administration had another related concern. From the outset,
the U.S. Congress had always remained a central factor in its calculations for the postwar
period. Yet until early 1943, the legislative branch of government refrained from
meddling in the planning process. Most of the nation’s elected officials had little
awareness of many committees working on postwar problems, and they had virtually no
knowledge of the State Department’s secret but ongoing negotiations with the British
over postwar relief. But as the process unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that
such activities were underway. As we have seen, Roosevelt became more open in early
1943 about his plans, and the landings in North Africa increased the urgency for postwar
planning. As a result, in February and March of 1943, a number of Senators and House
Representatives began proposing postwar resolutions with a variety of overlapping and
often conflicting aims.1947 This fact caught the eye of State Department officials.1948
Obviously fears of another League of Nations debate amidst the war terrified
some officials. Members of Congress and State Department employees thought it would
precipitate domestic strife, which would spread to the United Nations and impair both the
war effort and their postwar program. Yet the Congressmen who put forward the
resolutions argued that if preparations started now, and if the Congress went on record in
1947
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support of certain broad objectives, it would strengthen the ties binding the United
Nations and help win the war. 1949 State Department officials disagreed. Any public
declarations or debates that expressed opinions that contravened the aims of America’s
co-belligerents would create problems. The difficulty, according to Green H. Hackworth,
was to stifle debate while avoiding the impression that the State Department objected to
the “consideration of post-war problems by the Congress.”1950 If they obstructed debate,
they would sound like the so-called isolationists or non-interventionists, who vehemently
opposed any discussion or declaration on the postwar era.1951 The secret was to permit a
controlled debate that would not continue indefinitely.
Subsequent events make the Roosevelt Administration’s strategy quite clear. In
both the House and the Senate, the various resolutions were deferred to the Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, respectively. The House Committee acted
first, endorsing a resolution from a freshman Congressman, J. William Fulbright,
Democrat, from Arkansas.1952 On September 21, 1943, the resolution passed with a
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stunning 360-29 vote.
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With pressure now on the Senate to act, the Foreign

Relations Committee, chaired by Democrat Thomas Connally of Texas, took up the
Fulbright Resolution, and various other measures. 1954 Initially it looked as though
Connally would try to kill the measures altogether. But incessant debate, and apparent
pressure from Roosevelt, forced him to produce a resolution of his own.1955 Republican
Senators like Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan felt that Fulbright’s formula did too little
to prevent an erosion of U.S. sovereignty and protect the Senate’s constitutional
prerogatives in the making of treaties.1956 These concerns would have invited problematic
amendments on the Senate floor, thereby forcing the resolution into a joint conference
between the Upper and Lower Houses of Congress.1957 With Roosevelt and the State
Department eager to end the debate, the Connally Resolution was introduced and passed
with a stunning 85-5 vote.1958
Altogether, the outcome was positive for the Roosevelt Administration. It put
both houses of Congress on record as supporting U.S. engagement abroad after the war; it
supported U.S. participation in an international authority “with the power to prevent
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aggression and to preserve the peace of the world;” and it recognized the necessity of
establishing an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.1959
Yet it did all of this while avoiding a formula that would have impaired the war effort, or
angered members of Congress worried about American national sovereignty or their
constitutional prerogatives. The debate proved a boon for efforts to create the relief
organization, which seemed less important than the broader postwar international
structure.1960 Yet officials in the State Department knew the decision to introduce the
relief proposal as an Executive Agreement, as opposed to a Treaty, might create
problems.1961 Congress would have to be managed carefully.
The strategy here was quite similar: they tried to avoid debate while bringing the
most powerful Congressmen into their confidence. Yet, as we will soon see, there were
limits to this strategy. While the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions emerged in the
legislative branch of government, the relief agreement did not, and the State Department
had largely kept the Congress in the dark on postwar relief. When in April 1943 it
appeared that Lehman would have to appear at hearings on the Lend-Lease
appropriations for 1943-44, he was instructed to say that he was not in a position to
1959

Quote comes from the “Connally Resolution,” November 5, 1943; but see also the
“Fulbright Resolution,” September 21, 1943, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law,
History and Diplomacy (New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School,
2008): http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/decade.asp (accessed September 30,
2012). The Fulbright Resolution gave the freshman Congressman from Arkansas national
attention, which facilitated his election to the Senate a year later.
1960
This point was mentioned by Ernest K. Lindley, “Draft Agreement: A Mechanism for
United Nations,” WP, 13.
1961
Concern over the decision to introduce the relief proposal as an executive agreement
harkened back to 1942. Acheson, in fact, was advised to abandon the procedure in
December 1942. See EVR to Acheson, December 28, 1943, File #2 Post War – ER & EP
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When Veatch proposed that he should inform the

Congress that either Hull or Acheson would be willing to discuss it them, the Assistant
Secretary rejected the idea. He also ignored a suggestion that he seek the advice of
Congressional leaders as to the best procedure for handling relations with Congress on
the relief issue. These matters, Acheson argued, should be left to the President.1963
But how would Roosevelt manage Congress? On May 25, 1943, at the instigation
of Acheson, the Secretary of State informed the President that complete agreement had
been reached with the British, Chinese, and Russians on the relief proposal. He suggested
the draft be shared with the United Nations and associated powers, including the two
French groups. Once complete agreement had been reached, he recommended that
invitations be issued for a short conference, at which the agreement would be signed.
Afterwards, delegates of the various member states would convene for the first meeting
of the UNRRA Council. Hull also wrote that it was his understanding that the President
would share the draft and accompanying documents with Congressional leaders before it
was released to the world, but cautioned him against the possibility of leaks.1964
However, Roosevelt left for Hyde Park just after Hull’s letter was sent, and would
not return until June 6, 1943. 1965 The following day, the Secretary received the
President’s reply approving the procedure, but the President made no reference to
Congress. Hull therefore insisted that he call a conference of Congressional leaders as
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soon as possible, and he requested that he be allowed to attend the meeting. “It is
important,” he wrote, “that the project be launched at the earliest possible date.”1966 On
June 8, 1943, the President asked the majority and minority leaders in Congress to meet
with him the following day. He invited Hull, Lehman and Acheson to the meeting.1967
They would share the relief proposal and accompanying documents, make the case for
the project, and inform them of the Administration’s plans to sign it as an executive
agreement. To meet possible objections to this procedure, they would highlight Articles
V and VI “limiting financial and other contribution commitments to those which can be
taken within the constitutional procedure of each member government.” 1968 The
Congressional leaders would also be asked to pledge themselves to secrecy until the relief
proposal had been shared with the Allies.1969
Upon learning of this meeting, the State Department made last minute
preparations to release the draft agreement to the United Nations and associated powers.
It would take place on June 9, 1943, the morning after the President’s meeting with the
Congressional leadership. If ever there had been a chance to properly engage possible
opponents to their scheme in Congress, it was now gone. Twelve hours after the
document’s presentation to the Allies and associated powers, the State Department would
issue the relief agreement and accompanying memoranda to the entire world.1970 This
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procedure effectively placed the American legislative branch of government in the
same category as foreign countries, the Congressional leadership notwithstanding. To be
sure, it would have been dangerous to involve Congress at an earlier stage; leaks to the
press might have impaired the entire effort. But, as we will see, there were consequences
for failing to do so. Roosevelt must have calculated that his hand was strong, that
opposition was inevitable, and that the benefits of a surprise attack outweighed the risks.
Perhaps competing demands on his time crippled his judgment. Maybe he was just
negligent.

4, 1943, 840.50/2020J, Box 4809, RG 59, NARA. Additional descriptions included in
documents listed in previous footnotes.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
THE EUROPEANS REACT

The public reaction to the relief agreement in the United States was astonishingly
calm, but quite positive. No major newspaper devoted headlines to the proposal in the
days immediately after its release. Where it was reported, the media wrote favorably but
said little of the endeavor. 1971 Herbert Hoover, too, offered no official reaction. 1972
Abroad reception to the proposal was overwhelmingly positive, especially in London,
where many of the major newspapers lauded and devoted lead stories to the effort. While
the American media initially missed the postwar significance of the proposal, the British
press clearly got it: the United States would remain engaged in the world well into the
postwar period, and the relief organization would pave the way for the future.1973 In other
world capitals – Sydney and New Delhi, for example1974 – the reaction was less euphoric
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than London, but still positive. In some capitals, the reaction came late – in a few
cases as much as three months – but was favorable nonetheless.1975
How did the forty nations who had not been a part of the four-power talks react to
the relief agreement? When they readily accepted the proposal, was their decision the
result of genuine approval or other intervening factors? When they opposed or protested
the agreement, what factors and motivations explain their behavior? What were their
central complaints? Let us begin with Europe, the region that had, according to American
officials, “menaced the world with aggression,” not once, but twice in the twentieth
century.1976
Excluding France, the United States shared the relief agreement with eight
European governments exiled in London.1977 While most of them disliked the proposal’s
most salient features, several accepted it with little complaint. Those who disapproved of
the proposal initially endeavored to forge a unified response to the Americans, but then
disagreed on the course of action to take. Usually their narrow interests, or circumstances
peculiar to their wartime situation dictated the decisions they took. Oddly, when their
representatives in Washington coalesced around an approach or view, the same
governments reacted differently in London. This divergence reveals a lack of
coordination, but also reflects on the Americans and British, who managed the
1975
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governments differently: Leith-Ross and the Foreign Office kept them better
informed than State Department officials in Washington, whose approach, up until June
9, 1943, had been to keep them in the dark. As a result, the Europeans in London proved
more eager to cooperate than those in Washington.1978
Most of the diplomacy took place in the American capital. Of course the
Europeans hoped to divide the Americans and British, and frequently tried to open talks
with the London by sharing their reactions to the draft with the Foreign Office. In most
cases, the British deferred to Washington. But when they considered it wise to intervene,
they did so only in close consultation with the Americans. Thus most of the complaints
and suggestions from exiled governments were managed bilaterally in Washington. In
turn, American officials shared developments with the British, Chinese, and Russians, but
they tried to keep time-consuming talks with the three other great powers to a minimum.
The United States, in sum, ran the show.

Belgium opens the negotiations for Europe

The first reaction to the proposal came from Belgium. 1979 It illustrates the
trajectory these governments often took from concern to acceptance, but also the
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moderation of a country trying to balance between the need to cooperate with the
Americans and the Europeans. At the outset, the Belgians voiced “strong disapproval of
seeking to set up a relief organization in which representatives of the smaller nations
should not be given a more prominent place than provided for in the draft agreement.”
They disliked the Central Committee’s composition and lamented the fact that it could,
under the terms of the proposal, assume responsibility for policy when the Council was
not in session. Either the committee should be “shorn of real power or else it should be
composed in such a way to allow representation for some of the smaller nations.” The
Belgians also reported that it was rumored “around Washington that the Deputy Directors
were to be nationals of the four big Powers.” “If this were true, it would add considerable
fuel to the flames and would produce a feeling of hostility on the part of the smaller
nations.”1980
Yet the Belgians remained cautious. Representatives of the smaller nations had
met at the Polish Embassy after receiving the proposal. Many were hostile to it. But
instead of embracing an open line of attack, which became the preference of several
governments, the Belgians endeavored to understand why the Americans had devised the
draft as they did. 1981 Though they had the means to finance their own relief and
reconstruction, they told them that nothing should mar the creation of the relief
administration. Indeed Belgium would have resources to contribute from its colonial
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But they also hoped the Americans would widen the

scope of the organization to include industrial reconstruction, which they considered
essential. 1983 They would require American assistance elsewhere as well. During
discussions with the Dutch and Norwegians over postwar security cooperation, they
concluded that no security framework would be effective without American
participation.1984 Thus they kept complaints to a minimum.
However important cooperation with Washington might have been for the war
effort and postwar stability, strong relations with their neighbors remained essential.
During this period, the Belgians were engaged in complex negotiations with Luxembourg
and the Netherlands to unify their economies, efforts that led to the Dutch-Belgium
Monetary Agreement of October 1943, and the Benelux Customs Union of September
1944. These arrangements set the stage for the European Coal and Steel Community,
which emerged after the war.1985 Yet to achieve cooperation in Europe, they could not
ignore the concerns of their Allies, who, as we will soon see, were outraged over the
relief proposal. Thus they made similar complaints, but in moderated terms. The
Americans and British realized quite rapidly that the Belgians would accept the
agreement. U.S. Ambassador John Winant believed that with membership on the
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The British thought the

Belgians would accept the draft as it stood.1987
These assessments were correct. On July 19, 1943, the Belgians became one of
the first Governments to accept the relief proposal. But for the record, they reiterated the
views of their Allies: that the Central Committee was too exclusive and circumscribed the
Council’s policymaking functions. To rectify this shortcoming, they suggested that all
decisions taken by the Central Committee should be subject to the approval of the
Council at its next meeting; that the regional committees should be strengthened to give
them more power over policymaking; and that member states should be given voting
rights when the Central Committee permitted them to participate in meetings discussing
matters impinging on their interests. They also maintained that the four-power formula
should not provide a precedent for future international organizations. A few additional
reservations notwithstanding, it was a warm and measured acceptance from a country
whose role in the creation of postwar European order is too often overlooked.1988

The Peculiarities of Greece, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia

Like Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia accepted the draft with
few reservations. In each case, strategic considerations informed their decisions.
Following the Axis invasion of Greece in 1941, King George II and his Government, led
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by Prime Minister Emmanouil Tsouderos, fled the country. He had little support
among the most important Greek resistance group, the National Liberation Front (EAM),
and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (ELAS). This alliance consisted of
diverse factions unified not by political ideology, but by hostility towards the Axis
invaders and the Greek monarchy. King George II had been pro-Nazi before the 1941
Axis invasion and had lent his support to the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas, which, in
turn, smashed all anti-monarchical forces in prewar Greece. Thus during the war, the
central fault line in Greek politics existed between republican and constitutional forces,
on the one hand, and the monarchy and traditionalists, on the other hand.1989
Britain played the critical role. With the aim of defeating the Axis, London
provided military assistance to ELAS while supporting the exiled government doggedly.
In their view, only the King could prevent civil war, tyranny, and instability in postwar
Greece. Yet attempts to convince EAM and other groups to back the monarchy failed
miserably. For his part, the King knew that his return to Greece depended on the British,
and he also recognized that Britain could satisfy his territorial aspirations. ELAS posed
the only major hurdle. If they could not be persuaded to support the monarchy, they
would have to be sidelined. To achieve this aim, the King and his Prime Minister
exploited Britain’s fears. Though communists constituted a mere one-tenth of the ELAS,
they held most of the important positions. Fearful that it might loose its strategic foothold
in the Mediterranean, Britain began looking for alternative means to ensure the King’s
return. Thus they turned to a rival resistance group, the National Republican Greek
League (EDES). This group was pro-Republican, but anti-communism served as its
1989
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central unifying ingredient. By the fall of 1943, Britain had withdrawn all aid to
ELAS.1990
The complex jockeying for postwar Greece took place while the relief
negotiations entered their final stages. In March and April 1943, the British sought
American support for their position on Greece. In the past, they argued, republican
governments had only led to instability. They urged the Roosevelt Administration to back
the King’s return to Greece after the war. But the Americans, while recognizing the
Greek government in-exile, refused to do so because of the anti-monarchical sentiments
of the Greek-American population. They suggested the matter be resolved at a later date,
once the Greek people had had the chance to express their will. This reaction, delivered
to the British one day after the Greek response to the relief proposal, in no way precluded
the King’s return, but it meant that he would have to secure the legitimacy through the
will of his people.1991 George II found himself in a tricky position. He had no room to
complain over the contents of the relief agreement. British support alone would not
ensure his return; it required acquiescence from Washington, and officials there thought
the King should also have the backing of his own people. He broadcast the next day that
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the Greek people would be “invited to decide by popular and free vote the
institutions” of democracy.1992
Yugoslavia bears resemblance to the case of Greece. Like King George II, the
Yugoslav monarch, King Peter II, faced challenges to his authority at home. Yet here the
British embraced a different policy. If in Greece they became reluctant and eventually
withdrew their support of ELAS due to its communist contingents, in Yugoslavia they did
the opposite. Initially they supported Peter’s Minister of War, General Draza Milhailovic,
but by June 1943, just after the Americans shared the relief agreement with the Allied
powers, they withdrew their support of Milhailovic’s Chetnik army and turned to Josep
Broz Tito, leader of the communist-led Partisans. 1993 Though Tito was a Croat, his
movement included all of Yugoslavia’s minorities and proved far more effective at
dislodging the Germans and Italians. Milhailovic, for his part, had refused to fight the
Italians; instead, his army focused on Tito, and even revealed intelligence on his Partisans
to the Nazis.1994 The British concluded that he was hopelessly compromised and that Tito
was the only figure capable of unifying Yugoslavia after the war. It became their policy
to control him, but they maintained their support of Peter II as leverage.1995
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Although the British break with the Chetniks did not occur until January 1944,
the opening acts of this drama played out during the final stages of the relief negotiations.
Throughout 1943, the position of Milhailovic weakened, while Tito’s strengthened.
Naturally the Government in exile sought to counter these developments by maintaining
strong American support. Its representatives in Washington not only attacked Tito, they
countered charges levied against Milhailovic, namely that he was more eager to destroy
his own people than the Nazis. 1996 In this context, it makes perfect sense that the
Yugoslavs would rapidly accept the relief proposal, and even express disappointment
upon learning that they had not been the second government to do so.1997 Yet they
appeared desperate. It made no sense to accept the agreement with no reservations. What
mechanisms prevented their rivals from exploiting the agency at their expense, they
might have asked. But like the Greeks, they were concerned about their existence in the
short-term, and that meant complete and unequivocal solidarity with the United States.
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The Czech Government’s speedy acceptance of the relief agreement resulted
not from a domestic challenge to its legitimacy, but from broader strategic
considerations.1998 The Czech President, Edvard Benes, and his Foreign Minister, Jan
Masaryk, had elaborate plans for the postwar period.1999 They dreamed of building “a
nation of one hundred million people, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia
and Greece under an arrangement” that would be “open to adherence by Hungary,
Bulgaria and Rumania.” This “new substitute for the old Austro-Hungarian Empire”
would run north south from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, and east west from the Black
Sea to the Sudetenland. The Czechs hoped that “hegemony within this group” would
“revolve around Prague.” But they believed that any such arrangements depended
primarily, though not exclusively, on Moscow. If Soviet Russia disapproved, then they
thought the scheme could not work. Thus they argued that the proposed scheme would be
“subject to Russian influence,” but they also thought it would be “large and strong
enough… to prevent the Russians from unduly interfering with the social structure of
these countries.”2000
The Czechs were not alone in their thinking. To varying degrees, Poland, Greece
and Yugoslavia shared this vision, and began discussing it in 1941. 2001 American
policymakers also weighed options for the unification in Eastern Europe. As Sumner
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Welles explained, “Such a unit would balance Germany, the Soviet Union and Great
Britain. It would make the establishment and maintenance of world organization simpler
than if a large number of small jockeying powers were in existence.”2002 It would also
have strategic implications: it would make it easier for the United States to control
armaments in Europe.2003 Yet everyone, especially Welles, realized that animosity among
the region’s diverse groups would make unification difficult. But he believed mutual
hatred of the Great Powers, particularly Germany and the Soviet Union, would make it
possible. The real problem, as he and his colleagues in the U.S. Government saw it, was
how to construct such an organization without arousing hostility among the Eastern
Europeans, and in Moscow. Economics constituted the answer. “We could devise
economic methods that would make such an organization work even though not
conceived primarily for economic ends.”2004
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Disagreement among the Eastern Europeans and the Great Powers erected
intractable barriers to the creation of this union. Initially Benes obstructed Polish attempts
to pursue unity due to disputes over the coal-rich Zaolzie region of Silesia, which he
coveted. But when internal political pressures drove him to negotiate, leading to an
agreement in January 1942, Moscow intervened, such that by November 1942, Benes had
suspended the talks.2005 He considered Soviet acquiescence essential if he were to obtain
Zaolzie. Yet the Poles wanted to hasten the process: despite having signed agreements of
cooperation and friendship with the Soviets in July and December 1941, their relations
with Moscow were deteriorating.2006 At this point, the British, who were determined to
keep “Stalin in good humor,” applied the brakes, and no other East European government
objected.2007 Greece and Yugoslavia, who had reached an agreement for unity in January
1942, needed their support in the face of challenges to their legitimacy from within their
territory.2008
The initiative at this juncture resided with the Czechs. In February 1943, they
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of May 1942 modified to include a non-intervention clause in return for a Czech
pledge to remain aloof from any anti-Soviet blocs in Europe. Moscow accepted the offer
on April 23, 1943, precipitating Czech efforts to win American and British acquiescence
to the treaty. The Czechs, primarily Benes, couched the proposed treaty in a larger
program of cooperation between East and West. The British, for their part, decided to
make friendly Soviet-Czech relations a reward to the Russians for cooperation on Poland.
They believed the treaty would doom the Polish-Czech alliance and any East European
federation.2009 Benes, however, considered the treaty a prerequisite for an accord with
Poland. As he explained the previous November, “It would not be possible or friendly if
the nations directly concerned agreed among themselves on these important matters and
sought to present the Great Powers with a fait accompli.”2010
The Americans appeared non-committal, but the evidence makes their opinion
clear. As Atherton wrote Welles the previous March, “Benes continues to be one of the
most astute and devious politicians of Europe.” In an apparent attempt to secure
guarantees for Czechoslovak frontiers by all of the Great Powers, he has agreed to
support “certain Soviet foreign policies.” To win Anglo-American approval, he “tries to
play on both the hopes and fears of the British and the American Governments.” If the
Soviet Union should become displeased with Anglo-American actions, then they will
“proceed to carry out their own plans with regard to Europe, including an increase in the
activities of the Communist international and a resurgence of Bolshevik revolutionary
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The Americans abhorred these tactics. If the

Soviet Union feared the possibility of Polish membership on the Central Committee, then
the Americans opposed Czech membership. They “regarded the Czechoslovakian as the
least secure of European Governments in exile and would not wish to see that power on
the… committee.”2012
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the Czechs would support the relief
proposal with little comment. Benes traveled to the United States days before the
Americans shared the agreement with the United Nations. But he failed to secure support
for the treaty with Moscow: it was considered “a step backward” in American “efforts
toward international understanding.”2013 The Czechs had no reason to give Washington
further grounds to obstruct their aims, at that, over a proposal that seemed to advance the
east-west cooperation Benes claimed to support. Indeed they tried to rectify false
impressions in Washington with an about-face on East European Union. But alongside
the Poles, who were pleading for a “far-reaching agreement,”2014 their suggestion of a
customs union must have fallen flat. If not, their explication of the conflict with Poland
over disputed territories, followed by the devious suggestion that the United States exert

2011

“Memorandum,” by Atherton to Welles, March 23, 1942, 740.0011 European War
1939/20193, FRUS, Vol. 3, 120-21. See the following quote: “Your comments with
regard to Benes are interesting. We have the impression here that the Czechs may be
rather heavily committed to the Russians and may be working more closely with them
than they would like for their other allies to realize.” In The Acting SOS to the
Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London, April 4, 1942,
740.0011 European War 1939/20193, FRUS, Vol. 3, 146-137.
2012
Telegram Relief No. 17, DC to FO, January 31, 1943, FO 371/35267, PRO.
2013
Kolko, The Politics of War, 124-125.
2014
“Memorandum of Conversation,” June 3, 1943, 840.50/2172, Box 4811, RG 59,
NARA.

707
pressure on any country or countries reluctant to join the scheme, certainly did. The
Americans remained non-committal.2015 The Czech leaders could not be trusted.
Apparently the Czechs worried that their own people did not trust them either.
When they conveyed their official acceptance of the relief proposal to Washington, they
drew a reservation to the four-power Central Committee, not because they disapproved of
the formula – in fact, they considered it essential – but because their own people
remained sensitive towards the appearance of dictation by the larger powers.2016 It was an
ironic reservation if not because of their suggestions to the Americans a month earlier,
but because of what would come. By the end of 1943, the Americans and British would
acquiesce to the Czech treaty with the Soviet Union. Of course Czechoslovakia would
obtain large swathes of the disputed Zaolzie territory. But in their efforts to achieve this
outcome, they helped ensure the disunity of Eastern Europe. By 1948, both Poland and
Czechoslovakia had succumbed to communist takeovers engineered in Moscow.2017

Poland’s Worst Fear: The Use of Food as a Weapon

No criticism riveted the Roosevelt Administration more than the one Poland
levied against the United States. Like most other countries, they worried about the
composition of the Central Committee, and for many of the same reasons. It offered no
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representation to smaller countries, and in the case of Europe, none of the continental
powers save the Soviet Union. They also feared that this model would provide a
precedent for the future. But the Polish critique differed fundamentally from the others.
By referring to statements made in public and private by top-level American officials,
including Herbert Lehman and Franklin Roosevelt, they argued that the U.S. Government
intended to use the relief organization to affect the postwar political order of Europe. In
short, the Roosevelt Administration planned to use “food as weapon.”2018 By contrast
with many of the other powers, neither pride nor prestige motivated the Poles: they
worried about their national interests and the threat of Soviet power. The Soviet Union
would be one of “the largest recipients of relief and would give nothing,” they asserted.
“The Russian Government had no ‘right’, apart from ‘power politics’ to membership on
the Central Committee.”2019
These criticisms did not emerge out of thin air. Polish relations with the Soviet
Union had deteriorated precipitously the previous three months. On April 13, 1943, the
Germans announced that they had discovered the bodies of 20,000 Polish military
officers who had been murdered and buried in the Katyn Forest, just outside of Smolensk.
When Stalin blamed the Germans for the atrocity, the Poles rejected the explanation.
Their Prime Minister, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, requested an investigation by the
International Red Cross, but Stalin refused to cooperate and severed diplomatic relations
with the Polish Government in exile on April 26, 1943.2020 These events took place
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amidst the four-power negotiations over the relief organization and explain the Soviet
rejection of a larger Central Committee. Polish membership on the Central Committee
worried Moscow the most. These developments meant that the Soviet Union would most
certainly support a rival authority once Poland had been liberated. This inevitability
lurked in the background of the relief negotiations.
Dean Acheson’s attempts to calm the Poles failed. During meetings that took
place with the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski, the Commercial Counselor,
Wieslaw Domaniewski, and the Chief of the Economic Section of Polish Ministry of
Commerce, Tadeusz Lychowski, the Assistant Secretary expressed alarm “at [the Polish]
conception of the role of the new organization.” His Government “had had exactly the
opposite intention,” he claimed, and had done everything possible to guard against the
possibility that food would be used as a weapon. If the relief organization “was to be used
in any way by any of its participants to further political objectives,” he asserted, “the
entire project would be endangered.” The Poles were unmoved. Roosevelt had suggested
the contrary during talks with Sikorski and these views had been confirmed in talks with
Lehman, who had also bandied them in public. “The matter could not be disposed of so
easily,” Lychowski asserted. According to reports in London, “food would be used as a
weapon in the hands of the supplying countries to restore as quickly as possible the whole
political order on the continent of Europe.”2021
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But this was not their primary concern. “It would be even worse,” Lychowski
continued, “if a receiving country should have an opportunity to use its position on the
controlling body of the new relief and rehabilitation administration (namely the Central
Committee) for the purpose of effecting the type of government, and the policies of
governments, to be established in Europe after the end of hostilities.”

Either by

withholding aid to an established authority, or by providing it to a rival, presumably one
supported by Moscow, the Soviet Union could use its position on the Central Committee
to undermine the Polish Government in exile. To prevent such an outcome, the Poles
thought the committee’s membership should be broadened to include a continental
European country in addition to the Soviet Union. They refused to accept the argument
that relief supplies could be distributed without influencing political arrangements:
whoever provides food to starving populations has power over them, and an increased
capacity to win their allegiance. Ciechanowski suggested it was misguided to think
otherwise. “This approach might prove to be very useful in chaotic postwar Europe.”2022
It appears that Acheson, for the first time during this lengthy process, suddenly
faced an argument that he could neither brush aside nor attack head on without
undermining the entire American program. Unlike Roosevelt, he lacked the imagination
to meet a realistic criticism with plausible fiction. But it probably would not have worked
anyway. He also remained reluctant to meet the Polish concerns with the naked truth: that
Washington intended to dominate the organization via the Director General, and ignore
the Soviet Union if it stood in their way. Yet by this point he was probably concluding
that even this possibility was unrealistic. Thus he told the Poles that he “took a serious
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view of any such misunderstanding,” and would have to “discuss the matter with the
Secretary of State and with Governor Lehman.” He would also see that these issues were
“brought to the attention of the President.”2023 Though his speech at Swarthmore College
suggested otherwise, 2024 Lehman argued that he had been misunderstood. 2025 Hull
reported the matter to Roosevelt, who refuted Sikorski’s account of their meeting as
“utterly contrary to the fact.” His reply did not arrive until July 10, 1943.2026
In the meantime, discussions with the Poles continued. They feared the Central
Committee would refrain from making difficult decisions until just after the Council’s
biannual meeting; then they would push through policies that suited their interests. Of
course the Council could override the Central Committee at its next meeting, but six
months would pass before such an opportunity arose. If the request of at least one half of
the organization’s members were required for a special session, which is what the draft
stipulated, it remained unlikely that the Council could be convened immediately. The
Poles thought the requirement for a special session should be lowered to one third of the
organization’s members. Acheson believed this arrangement could be secured, but he
assured the Poles that one member of the Central Committee could not deny Poland
assistance. “Failure of either the Council or the Central Committee to take action would
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not prevent the Director General from acting.” Within limits, he suggested the
executive side of the organization could and would do as it pleased.2027
The Poles, however, remained unsatisfied with these explanations. They reminded
Acheson that the draft, under Article I, paragraph 2(c), called for unanimous approval by
the Central Committee of any individual proposal put forward by a member state, but the
Assistant Secretary correctly informed them that this only applied to areas of action that
extended beyond the stated mandate of the organization. While accurate, this response
aroused further concern: it implied that the only possible way for Poland to influence the
agency was through the Council. Here again Acheson refuted this interpretation. Poland
would have other opportunities through the various committees of the Council, which
would be in constant session and in regular contact with the Director General and his
staff. But the Poles disputed this point as well. The committees possessed only advisory
powers, they argued, and the mechanisms for collaboration with the executive were
remarkably weak. The purported liaisons, the Deputy Director Generals, were not even
required to attend meetings of the committees, they argued.2028
The issue of Deputy Director Generals raised additional concerns. How many
would there be? How would they be chosen? Would they be limited to specific
nationalities? Acheson knew where this inquiry was headed.2029 A few days prior, as we
have seen, the Belgian Minister of Finance informed Francis Sayre of “reports around
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Washington that the Deputy Directors were to be nationals of the four Big
Powers.”2030 Acheson therefore disavowed any plans to reserve these positions for the
Big Powers. A proposal permitting the Central Committee to make these appointments
had been summarily rejected and was not in the draft agreement. In fact, there was no
limit on the number of deputies the Administration could employ, but like Governor
Lehman, he thought that there should be many. Regardless, the decision would rest with
the Director General, not the Central Committee. Acheson’s response was filled with
half-truths and misleading statements. He knew it, but secrecy meant that he could only
tell the Poles that the Director General would consult with the Central Committee before
making appointments.2031
These demonstrations did little to remove Polish fears. Thus they laid down
proposals to limit the powers of the Central Committee and reduce Soviet influence over
their country’s fate. With a population of 135 million people, or 260 million if overseas
possessions are included, Europe, they insisted, should have representation on the Central
Committee. They proposed a rotational seat. They enumerated powers that should be
transferred to the Council including but not limited to the admission of new members, the
appointment of standing committees, the removal of the Director General, and the
exclusive responsibility for policy. Relief programs, they argued, should be based on
“national plans” to be vetted by the regional committees, which would in turn suggest
revisions if problems of supply, shipping or finance made them unreasonable. Finally,
they believed the regional committees should be granted real powers, particularly the
Committee for Europe, which could draw upon the work of the Inter-Allied Committee.
2030
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Unless some variation of these proposals was adopted, the Poles suggested that they
would refuse to participate.2032

Chez vous, sur vous, sans vous! The Netherlands and Norway

Though it initially appeared that the Netherlands would place no obstacles in the
way of establishing the proposed organization, this impression quickly dissipated. Shortly
after the draft was shared with the Allies, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Eelco Van
Kleffens complimented the proposal. He considered the draft a “good piece of work” and
told Acheson that it would provide an “acceptable basis for the organization.” He
nonetheless expressed his hope that the size of the Central Committee would be expanded
to include countries from occupied Europe and Latin America. Like the Canadians, he
argued that their experience with the combined machinery for the war effort suggested
that other countries would not be consulted when matters of pertinence to their interests
arose. The proposal, he added, would also create an undesirable pattern for future
international organizations. Acheson addressed his concerns with many of the same
arguments deployed in discussions with Canadian officials earlier in the year.2033
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But by late June 1943, the situation had changed drastically. Lord Halifax
learned that representatives of the exiled European Governments stationed in Washington
had met informally to discuss the draft agreement. While they praised the “democratic
procedure” followed at the Food and Agriculture Conference, they lamented the
“autocratic procedure” now being used in the case of relief. These representatives
expressed particular anger over the American decision to release the draft to the press
before they had had the time to study it.2034 As the Counselor of the Polish Minister of
Finance, Josef Rucinski later explained, the agreement “had been circulated in such a
form that it seemed to be a fait accompli which the smaller powers were asked to
accept.”2035 Procedure aside, the European allies were equally perturbed by the draft’s
substance. The Dutch Ambassador in Washington, A. Loudon, told Halifax that he
“hoped Goebbels would not get hold of a copy of the draft.” The Reich Minister would
certainly “use it for propaganda in occupied territories against the United Nations.”
Under the draft scheme, “the status of the Governments of occupied countries,” Loudon
added, “would be worse than that of the satellite Governments in the New German
Order.”2036
The Americans and British believed such interpretations could be corrected
through diplomatic channels and modest revisions to the draft. Halifax reported that when
the Europeans learned more about the organization, particularly the powers accorded to
the Director General and the whole concept of a United Nations Civil Service working in
conjunction with liberated countries, “their criticisms sensibly diminish.” Like Acheson,
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he also believed that the number of member states required to call the Council into
emergency session might be reduced from a majority to one-third or even 25 percent.
Though Van Kleffens still remained “very critical of the four power Central Committee,”
Halifax reported that Loudon expressed satisfaction with the explanations.2037 In short, it
seemed that the differences could be managed quietly with no serious ruptures.
Yet the tone of the complaints worsened. On June 28, 1943, just after the
worrisome exchanges with the Poles, the Dutch delivered a formal reaction to the relief
proposal at the State Department. They attacked the agreement vehemently, but
expressed particular opprobrium for the Central Committee. It was “too exclusive and
restrictive,” they asserted. None of its members, especially China and the Soviet Union,
stood in a position that would allow them to respect the interests of Netherlands. Worse,
the language of the draft did not respect sovereignty. If it were not changed, the Germans
would argue that the four great powers intended to use a United Nations victory to
resurrect the notorious principle established with the 1713 Peace of Utrecht: chez vous,
sur vous, sans vous! The Netherlands represented 70 million people around the globe, yet
the draft afforded few avenues for Dutch influence. As such, they argued that the size of
the Central Committee should be increased, the powers of the regional committees
expanded, and the language describing the relationship between the administration and
recipient countries revised.2038
Apparently the United States failed to respond rapidly enough. The Dutch
released the note to the press. On July 5, 1943, the State Department learned of the news
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and decided the Greeks should immediately inform the news media that they had
accepted the draft proposal.2039 The following day, The Washington Post ran a piece
recounting Dutch dissatisfaction.2040 A parallel article in The New York Times devoted a
mere two paragraphs to the Greek decision.2041 On July 8, 1943, the damage spread. The
New York Times now reported that dissent on the relief proposal was widespread.
Belgium, Norway, Poland and even Canada had opposed the procedure placing the Big
Four in charge of the relief organization’s Central Committee. 2042 Potentially more
damaging, the Dutch ordered Radio Orange to broadcast their discontent in occupied
Holland. Although the Office of War Information and British censors caught the release
and managed to tone it down before it hit the airwaves, the original transcript of the
broadcast had been leaked to American reporters.2043 The damage was done. Under fire,

2039

Frederick Kuh, “Dutch Not Fully Satisfied With United Nations Postwar Plans,” July

6,
1943, WP, 18; “Memorandum of Conversation,” July 5, 1943, 840.50/2196-5/8;
“Memorandum of Conversation,” July 6, 1943, 840.50/2196-2/8, all in Box 4811, RG 59,
NARA. On June 29, 2943, the NYT ran an article speculating that certain of the European
exiled governments in London were unhappy with the relief proposal: Raymond Daniell,
“Small Allies See Rule by Big Four,” NYT, 7.
2040
Lee Carson, “Netherlands, Congress Score United Nations Relief Pact,” July 7, 1943,
WP, 15.
2041
“Greece Backs Relief Plan: Accepts Agreement Drafted for Forty-three Nations,”
July 7, 1943, NYT, 9.
2042
John MacCormac, “Dissent on Relief Held Widespread: The Netherlands’ Objections
to Draft Convention Reveals Still Other Opposition,” July 8, 1943, NYT, 10. Newspaper
coverage continued for several weeks. Ernest K. Lindley, “Draft Agreement: A
Mechanism For United Nations,” WP, 13; Mary B. Palmer, “Smaller Nations: Ask Voice
in Europe’s Peace Plans,” August 25, 1943, WP, 15.
2043
Leith-Ross to President of the BOT, July 6, 1943; To Harrison [name of author not
clear], July 6, 1943; “Netherlands and the UNRRA,” by the Dutch Government in Exile,
July 6, 1943; To Harrison [name of author not clear], July 8, 1943; “Dutch Broadcast for
Radio Orange,” all in FO 371/35272, PRO; A.J. Drexel Biddle to Hull, August 14, 1943,
840.50/2418, Box 4813, RG 59, NARA; Telegram No. 4686, FO to DC, July 16, 1943,
FO 371/35271, PRO.

718
Cordell Hull told reporters that the proposal would be reconsidered, and that the
problems would not delay final agreement.2044
But this was certainly incorrect. In London, the Dutch had shared a copy of their
note to the Americans with the Foreign Office, but the British became entangled in a
dispute over how to address the matter. While Leith-Ross thought the State Department
should handle the dispute in Washington,2045 Jebb believed the real problem resided in
London. By contrast with the Polish grievances, which stemmed from a realistic
assessment of their particular situation, prestige and internal political bickering among
the Dutch politicians in London precipitated the reckless behavior. The problem had to be
attacked at the “fountain-head.” 2046 This procedure, however, would require timeconsuming coordination with Washington, which in turn resurrected old disputes over the
powers of the regional committees.2047 As a result, the whole saga would drag on until the
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Fortunately Leith-Ross successfully persuaded his

colleagues to refrain from highlighting differences with Washington over the
committees.2049
The Americans would draft a stiff reply to the Dutch note,2050 but the important
breakthrough occurred in London on August 3, 1943. In an off-the-record conversation
with the Dutch Ambassador to Great Britain, Edgar Michiels van Verduynen, Nigel
Ronald explained that the Foreign Office, on the one hand, had always thought the
regional committees would be the real policymaking bodies, whatever the Americans
preferred. But they deemed cooperation between Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the
United States in the immediate postwar period so important that they felt it necessary to
support the four-power setup. Otherwise they would run the risk of nasty disputes
erupting in public. On the other hand, they believed they would have to “play up the idea
of a Washington façade.” If Britain gave the Roosevelt Administration and Congress and
the American tax-payer… the impression that they were running the show,” then they
would “be all the more inclined to be generous as they must be if the scheme” is to be
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successful. Positions for the Dutch on the regional and supplies committee would
certainly result if they played their hand well. He therefore cautioned Baron Michiels to
be “patient and not to attempt to force the pace.”2051
Finally, he made an appeal to realism. The real concern, Ronald explained, was
“not that the three Great Powers should run everything, but that they should not run out
of things.” The British had never abandoned the “democratic principle.” They simply
embraced reality. The Netherlands, he added, should not be worried about a “three-power
dictatorship” but about the risks if two of them – Great Britain and the United States –
withdrew from Europe. “The Dutch and others,” Ronald suggested, “would find it
inconvenient if Russia alone were left in Europe.” In other words, the objectives
according to Ronald were two-fold. First, Great Britain wanted to secure as much
American largesse as possible; the policy mechanics of controlling the resources would
ultimately fall to the regional committees. Second, it was important to keep the United
States engaged in Europe. If Washington abandoned the continent, Britain might have to
follow suit. This would leave Europe facing the Soviet Union alone.2052
The Dutch, of course, recognized this fact, 2053 but pride made it extremely
difficult for them to accept the Central Committee. The Soviet Union constituted one
matter, but what irked them most was the presence of China on the committee. They
2051
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resented the fact that “all of the United Nations having territory” in the Far East
would be “represented on the committee with the sole exception of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.”2054 As they complained to John Winant, “China is only potentially, and
from a long-term aspect, a great power in the sense of not being in an economic position
to contribute, in the near future, to either relief or rehabilitation.” In their view, the
Chinese would “not be a noteworthy factor in world reconstruction for at least another
decade.”2055 This country, Baron Micheils told Ronald, “would have little to offer.”2056
On August 25, 1943, the Dutch Ambassador delivered his Government’s reply to
the State Department. While acquiescing to the American proposal, its defiant and
prideful tone did more to underscore Dutch weakness and humiliation than to conceal it.
“The Netherlands Government… does not find the” arguments advanced by the United
States “entirely convincing.” Whatever avenues the Council might have to appeal the
decisions of the four powers, it remained possible that those countries without
representation on the Central Committee could be confronted “with accomplished facts
from which no appeal is possible.” For this reason, the Dutch maintained their objections
to the proposal even while accepting it. This decision, they asserted, derived merely from
the urgency of establishing a relief organization to aid war victims. It in no way implied
acceptance of the “principles involved.” If at “any time in the future… a similar setup
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should be proposed with regard to other international organizations or arrangements,”
the letter suggested that the Netherlands would not accept it.2057
Without access to Dutch documents, it remains difficult to draw firm conclusions
here, but several facts merit our attention. First, political jockeying within the Dutch
Government appears to have precipitated the escalation with the United States. Most
likely, the views of Van Kleffens hardened in the face of criticism from the Prime
Minister, Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy; the Minister for Trade, Petrus Kerstens; and the
Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, Hubertus van Mook.2058 Second, the Dutch
Monarch, Queen Wilhelmina had taken a very public stand on postwar relief, which
inadvertently highlighted the marginal role of the Netherlands in the American scheme.
This fact only underscored the decline of the Dutch Empire and made the four-power
setup an affront to their pride.2059 The Queen apparently played a role in drafting her
country’s reply to the United States.2060 But she and her servants knew well the dangers
of non-cooperation: postwar disunity in the face of Soviet power.
Though the Dutch ultimately accepted the draft without abandoning their
contempt for it, the Norwegians pursued a different course. To be sure, the possibility of
facing the Soviet Union alone after the war always loomed large in their calculations.
Norway could not afford to risk relations with London or Washington. Over the course of
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a “thousand years,” Trygve Lie told Berle in March 1943, “Britain had never
threatened Norway, and he was certain that the United States would never do so.” The
problem, he explained, resided in the east. “Russia, after all, was a dictatorship and…
until there was a popular government, responsible to the will of the people, there was a
degree of danger.”2061 These views do not accord with the decision to accept the fourpower Central Committee with little protest. If anything, they suggest the exact opposite,
which is what happened. But how does one explain the Norwegian roundabout? How did
Norway, which disliked the proposal as much as the Dutch, come to not only accept it,
but to laud it as well?
In late June 1943, the Norwegians lined up with the other Europeans to voice their
discontent, yet they displayed considerable caution. Doubtless their confrontation with
the Americans and British over independent postwar purchases taught them to be careful,
yet it also saved them from having to engage in a counterproductive duel over a matter
that would impact the system of postwar security in Europe. Indeed the Norwegians
refrained from putting their protests in writing. They delivered them informally, and
without the public outcry that accompanied the Dutch reaction. In this way, they saved
themselves from the humiliation of having to reverse course after having made a dramatic
show of their discontent. Yet their feelings were no different than those of their European
colleagues. One Norwegian official “attributed the success of the Food Conference to the
fact that it made no distinction between great and small powers, and commented bitterly
that the Relief Conference was apparently going to follow the opposite course.”2062
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The Norwegians nonetheless drafted the “least critical” of all the
responses.2063 It referred to the “immense task” awaiting the Allies upon liberation and
appealed to the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. The Norwegians praised the
United States for embracing a program that would permit all of the United Nations to
participate, and they ironically lauded the provisions in the agreement protecting the
sovereignty of nations. Of course they lamented the composition of the Central
Committee as “inconsistent with the principle of equality between states,” but they also
praised it for “meeting the demands of the interests involved.” Like the United States,
they argued that the four powers maintained a “special position… because of their vast
resources and the importance of their participating in the solution of these problems.”
Therefore, the problems with the draft were better resolved by adjusting the powers of the
Central Committee vis-à-vis the Council than by abandoning the four-power setup. With
this aim in mind, the Norwegians laid out a series of sensible revisions.2064
How does one explain this remarkable divergence in unofficial and the official
reaction of the Norwegian Government in exile? In part, the answer resides in the actual
response. “In view of the restrictions which in the common interest have been laid upon
the different countries with regard to their free purchases of post-war supplies,” they
wrote, “the Norwegian Government consider it to be of the greatest importance that an
inter-allied organization should be established which can ensure that the necessary
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But this explanation does not constitute

the whole story. The aggressiveness with which they executed their purchasing plans
allowed them a degree of flexibility unavailable to the other European countries,
especially those in Eastern Europe. If they could secure sufficient provisions to undertake
postwar relief independent of the relief organization, and they were well on the way to
achieving this aim at this point in the war, then they could participate without worrying
that Moscow would divert potential supplies elsewhere, leaving them with little or
nothing.2066
It therefore made no sense to anger the United States or to disrupt their ongoing
buying program. In terms of their long-term security and economic wellbeing, the
Norwegians needed the United States. They envisioned a security system consisting of
two components: membership in a Scandinavian regional organization, but also in a
security framework for the entire Atlantic community. The United States remained the
only power that could bring such a system into place. Norway also hoped the Americans
would assist them in adjudicating disputes with their neighbors. A seafaring nation, they
worried that either Britain or Sweden would obstruct their ability to restore their fishing
and maritime fleets. “The sea,” as Lie told to Berle in March 1943, “was part of
Norway’s national wealth.” 2067 But in the immediate future, they simply wanted to
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Oddly, the Canadians were holding up

Belgian and Norwegian orders until an agreement could be reached on the relief
proposal.2069
While their interests drove them to cooperate, the Norwegians disliked the plan.
Nothing captures their sentiments more than the words of Carl Joachim Hambro, the
President of the Norwegian Parliament, who lambasted the agreement in an interview
with a Norwegian newspaper in Brooklyn, New York. “There is no understanding
whatsoever of the importance of the small nations either in Washington or London,” he
asserted. The “lack of understanding,” he explained, resulted from a “lack of
intelligence.” The four-power setup would lead the world “back to the conception of
great power politics before the days of the League of Nations.” If the United States
continued hustling the smaller powers, then the “gratitude which the American people
enjoys” would “turn to bitter ill will.”2070 A Conservative his entire life, Hambro was not
a member of the Norwegian Government, which was dominated by the Labor Party.2071
Though they privately shared his views, it was of embarrassment to them when the Office
of War Information uncovered this interview, and reported it to the State Department.2072
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This affair might not have created such a stir had it come from a lesser man,
but Hambro was a widely respected figure in international politics. Like Winston
Churchill, he was one of a very few European politicians who recognized the threat the
Adolf Hitler posed well before his murderous reign began. Unlike most of his colleagues,
he predicted the German invasion and made preparations to get the royal family, the
Government, high-ranking members of Parliament, and the country’s immense gold
reserves out of the country literally thirty minutes before the Nazis entered Oslo. A
journalist and former President of the League of Nations, he published in 1942 an
important book on the postwar peace that appeared alongside works on the same topic by
Herbert Hoover, Henry Wallace, and Wendell Willkie. The Americans therefore insisted
that the Norwegian Embassy take steps to correct the “erroneous and undesirable
impression” his comments had made. They were instructed to “get Mr. Hambro better
informed and more sympathetic toward UNRRA.”2073
Coincidentally, Mr. Hambro’s book, How to Win the Peace, expounds upon the
problem Norway and the other European governments faced in the summer of 1943: how
to achieve unity in the face of American power.

To have a strong national or

international polity, he argued, unanimous decision-making had to be avoided. This
procedure had not only destined the American Articles of Confederation to failure, but
the League of Nations as well. If the diverse entities that make up a nation state or an
international organization refuse to relinquish power or sovereignty, then paralysis and
weakness will result.2074 Belgium, Holland, Norway and Poland all disagreed with the
American proposal, but they could not present a unified stand on how to alter it to meet
2073
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everyone’s views. For this reason, they hoped France would take the lead in forging a
consensus. Ironically, the man now revered as the father of the European Union, Jean
Monnet, would wreck this prospect. His concern was not the unity of Europe, but of his
own country. For Charles De Gaulle, UNRRA was a grand opportunity.

France Cannot Be France Without Greatness

France constituted a critical lynchpin in the security and stability of postwar
Europe. It therefore remained critical that the two competing French groups should unite
around a single authority. Coincidentally, a possible pathway out of the French impasse
opened in late February 1943, literally at the moment when Acheson told Alphand of the
conditions for French participation in the relief conference: unity. At the instigation of
Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt authorized Jean Monnet to visit North Africa, where
he was given wide authority to bring about French unity. Doubtless the American
President hoped Monnet would help Giraud consolidate his power. Perceived as
administratively incompetent, it was believed that he could use Monnet’s assistance.
Thus on February 23, 1943, the Frenchman departed Washington for Algiers, and by
early June, the two groups joined together under the auspices of a new authority, the
French Committee of National Liberation. For the moment, Giraud and De Gaulle would
share the presidency, but these arrangements would not last. Disputes emerged almost
immediately.2075
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The two men took remarkably different attitudes towards the relief proposal.
Giraud, like the exiled European governments, believed four-power leadership of the
Central Committee would create a “dangerous precedent” that ran counter to “democratic
principles.” The exclusion of France, in his view, made no sense. The French Committee
of National Liberation was not a refugee government, but existed on sovereign French
territory. Alone with Belgium, France was one of two European countries with only part
of its territory occupied, and it was the only significant continental power apart from
Soviet Russia. Thanks to the French Empire, France also had resources to contribute. For
these reasons, he argued that the French Committee should insist on membership on the
Central Committee, but also a seat on the European Regional Committee and the Supplies
Committee. He also thought France should demand restrictions on the Director General’s
powers.2076 It was a forceful set of demands to make in July 1943. Neither Great Britain
nor the United States had extended any recognition to the French Committee.
During the early summer of 1943, this line of argumentation informed the French
discussions in London and Washington,2077 but by the end of July, De Gaulle had begun
to outmaneuver Giraud.2078 As a result, the French attitude towards the relief proposal
changed. Jean Monnet played the critical role. Before the French Committee’s meeting of
Liberation, see G. E. Maguire, Anglo-American Policy Towards the Free French (New
York: St. Martins Press, 1995), 75-95; For a more recent account, see Charles L.
Robertson, When Roosevelt Planned to Govern France (Boston: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2011), 70-98.
2076
“Note contenant quelques observations du Général Giraud au sujet du projet d’accord
relatif à l’administration des nations unies pour l’assistance et la reconstruction,” by
Henri Giraud, E) U.N.R.R.A - 1943 (81 à 103), Dossier 2 – Organisations internationales
(Pièce 45 à 195), 3AG1/262. Affaires étrangères, De Gaulle Papers, ANF.
2077
Telegram Relief No. 56, FO to DC, June 29, 1943, FO 371/35271, PRO. For the
American attitude, see “Memorandum” by Ray Atherton, July 7, 1943, 840.50/2154, Box
4810, RG 89, NARA.
2078
Maguire, Anglo-American Policy Towards the Free French, 86-89.

730
August 5, 1943, he set forth the arguments that became De Gaulle’s. He worried that
if France insisted on an enlarged Central Committee, the United States might propose a
formula allowing for rotating membership, which would have placed France in the same
category as the small powers. Monnet worried that this alternative would set an awful
precedent. He therefore believed the French Committee should accept the proposal, but
reserve its position until France had established an internationally recognized
government, whereupon it would then demand a revision to the agreement. He also
feared that any expansion of the committee beyond five would weaken it. France, he
argued, could not join a weak committee. It should be an exclusive club of the Five Great
Powers. 2079 Doubtless, this approach accorded with De Gaulle’s personality and
sentiments.2080

2079

“Organisation du ‘Secours Immediat’ (Relief) et de la ‘Reconstruction Economique’
(Rehabilitation) à prevoir pour les territories occupes, au fur et a mesure de leur liberation
par les armies des nations unies,” July 28, 1943, Commissariat a l’Armament, a
L’approvisionnement et à la reconstruction, No. 298 AAR/RLF, E) U.N.R.R.A - 1943
(81 à 103), Dossier 2 – Organisations internationales (Pièce 45 à 195), 3AG1/262.
Affaires étrangères, De Gaulle Papers, ANF. I assume that Monnet authored the
document from the minutes of the meeting of the French Committee of National
Liberation held on August 5, 1943, “No. 26. Résumé des decisions prises au cours de la
Séance du 5 août 1943,” (1274) AME 35/3/4, AME 35/3 - Les antecedents de
l’organisation du Relief (La Conférence de Hot Spring), Institute Jean Monnet,
University of Lausanne.
2080
For a first hand look at De Gaulle’s personality, see Charles De Gaulle, The Complete
War Memoirs (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc. 1998). For the most exhaustive
portrayal of De Gaulle’s life, see Jean Lacouture, DeGaulle: The Rebel 1890-1944 (New
York: Norton, 1990) and Jean Lacouture, DeGaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (New York:
Norton, 1992). For a less interesting but much briefer account, see Charles Williams, The
Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General DeGaulle (New York: Wiley, 1997). As far as
I can tell, De Gaulle wrote no complete document on the relief organization, but his
attitude is abundantly clear in the notes he wrote on the draft letter to the United States.
See “Projet de reponse au gouvernement des Etats-Unis,” August 6, 1943, Commissariat
a l’Armament, a L’approvisionnement et à la reconstruction, No. 346 AAR/RLF, E)
U.N.R.R.A - 1943 (81 à 103), Dossier 2 – Organisations internationales (Pièce 45 à 195),
3AG1/262. Affaires étrangères, De Gaulle Papers, ANF.

731
Monnet had other concerns as well. If France refused to cooperate in the effort
due to the composition of the Central Committee, it would run the risk of angering the
American Congress and British Parliament, the source of the proposed agency’s
resources. Without supplies, he feared that France and all of Europe would slip into a
state of general chaos with detrimental effects for the long-term stability of the continent.
It would be far better, he believed, to seek membership on the regional and supplies
committees while reserving France’s pretensions for later. If the French Committee drew
a clear line between relief and reconstruction, it could make it clear that France would
insist on a seat on the Central Committee once the initial stage of relief had come to an
end. By that time, a provisional government would be in place and the country would
have a legitimate claim. France, he argued, might permit outside actors to assist with
postwar relief, but this task could not be allowed to obtain a “political character,” and it
should involve French nationals. In the meantime, the organization should be established
and the French Committee should reach an accord with the agency as soon as possible.
Here again, De Gaulle agreed.2081
By August 5, 1943, De Gaulle had completely sidelined Giraud. Thus the French
Committee endorsed Monnet’s report and instructed him to work with the Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs, René Massigli, to draft a reply to the American Government. Yet
even after the letter had been written and approved by De Gaulle, Massigli had doubts.
Like Giraud, he expressed concerns over the “considerable powers” the Director General
would have in France, but he could think of no other approach given the possibility that
they might not be able to undertake relief without assistance. A future demand to revise
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the agreement, he also speculated, might endanger the entire organization, thereby
putting any future French Government at risk. The United States, he believed, should
therefore be informed of their intentions at the outset. He wondered if the French reply
might not also anger their European allies, who had hoped France would take the lead in
opposing the four-power Central Committee. He even pondered the idea of composing a
joint reply with them, but this thought went nowhere.2082
De Gaulle probably objected. For him, the relief proposal presented opportunities.
If he could not obtain official recognition for the French Committee from Great Britain
and the United States, then he believed he could secure de facto recognition by acting as
though the committee were the sole French authority, and then negotiating as many
agreements with London and Washington as possible. While Monnet disagreed with this
logic, Roosevelt’s political advisor in North Africa, Robert Murphy, clearly considered it
plausible. For this reason, he refused to share the proposed relief agreement with the
French until he had investigated possible procedures to avoid recognition.2083 But there
were none, and De Gaulle knew it. His notations on the draft letter indicate his jubilation
over the chance to negotiate, a fact that certainly expedited the French Committee’s reply
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to the United States. Yet opportunism alone does not explain De Gaulle’s eagerness.
He also worried about chaos and disorder at the moment of liberation.2084
On August 15, 1943, René Massigli delivered the letter to the United States
Consul General at Algiers.2085 But before its contents reached London, Hervé Alphand
suggested that if France could not be recognized as one of the “Big Five,” as he had
proposed during the Food and Agriculture Conference, 2086 then he wondered if the
French Committee might chair the European Regional Committee. If Britain planned to
assume this position, then he thought France should serve as Vice-Chair.2087 The British
rejected this suggestion.2088 Until Great Britain had a clear idea of “when and in what
form a French Government” should emerge, they deemed it unwise to make such
commitments.2089 The idea was never broached in Washington, but the letter made their
long-term aspirations clear. “It appears inconceivable,” they wrote, “that France should
not, when the time comes, resume its place by the side of China, the United States of
America, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. on a footing of equality, in an enlarged central
committee, as well as in the Councils of the United Nations charged with establishing
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peace and determining the European and world conditions which shall govern the
world after the war.”2090
Recognition would come well before the agency came into being, but it was much
less than De Gaulle had hoped for. After considerable debate and dispute, Great Britain
and the United States issued statements of qualified recognition on August 24, 1943.
According to the statement prepared by Adolf Berle, the French Committee’s new status
only applied in cases where it administered “territories which acknowledge its authority.”
These words did “not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French
Empire by the Government of the United States,” but merely signified “recognition of the
French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations
during the war,” after which the French people would choose their own government.2091
For De Gaulle, this insulting statement meant that their strategy should be maintained.
They would negotiate as many agreements as possible while fighting relentlessly for the
use of the French language in all diplomatic conferences. Through it all, De Gaulle would
never abandon his guiding principle: “France cannot be France without greatness.”2092
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE COLOMBIA INITIATIVE

Latin America has often been a source of frustration for the United States.
Throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, American policymakers
considered the presence of European power in the region threatening. The Monroe
Doctrine of 1823 served to confront this menace by discouraging future colonization and
asserting Washington’s right to intervene in instances where American interests came
under threat. The emphasis, according to Walter Lefeber, was on the protection of “Latin
American revolutionaries against foreign interventions.” This would change. Theodore
Roosevelt announced his Corollary to the Doctrine in 1904 for reasons not unlike
Monroe’s, but instead of supporting revolutionaries, he asserted Washington’s right to
intervene against them to prevent the sort of instability that led British and Germans to
blockade the Venezuelan coastline in 1902. As Walter McDougall explains, the United
States would now play the role of “gendarme and bill collector in the region.”2093
Roosevelt’s new policy had unfortunate consequences. Between 1904 and 1928,
Washington intervened in various Latin American countries either militarily or covertly
nearly twenty-five times.2094 By the late 1920s, hostility towards the United States in
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Latin America had reached such heights that a new way was deemed necessary.
Humbled by the Great Depression – a fact that made the United States more
compassionate towards the plight of its southern neighbors – the American Government
set out on a new path. With the so-called Good Neighbor Policy first enunciated by
Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt disavowed America’s right to intervene in the region
with military force. A new wave of good relations emerged; cultural exchange flourished;
it appeared that the dawn of a new era in hemispheric affairs had beckoned.2095
But with the threat of global war looming, the circumstances quickly changed.
Washington became increasingly concerned about its security, and by default, the
security of the entire Hemisphere.2096 As we have seen, officials in Washington began to
worry that the countries of Latin America – many of which had fascist sympathies, and
most of which had large German, Italian and Japanese populations – would abet
dangerous regimes on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific. It quickly swooped in to
reach hemispheric agreements for collective action, first, to ensure the neutrality of Latin
America when war broke out in 1939, and then to secure cooperation once the United
States entered the war in December 1941. Of the Latin American countries, those in
Central America quickly declared war and signed the United Nations Declaration. Most
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of the nations in South America continued in their neutrality, but aided the United
States. Yet two nations, Argentina and Chile proved uncooperative.2097
Three inter-related issues drove American policy. First, the United States wanted
to ensure the security of the continent. Foremost among their priorities was the defense of
the Panama Canal, which permitted the quick passage of warships between the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. The United States also desired cooperation to manage the problem of
Axis attacks on Allied shipping. Second, American policymakers wanted maximum
control over the economic affairs of the hemisphere to ensure that resources of strategic
value did not end up in Axis hands. This policy effectively severed Latin American trade
linkages with the rest of the world, a fact that created major problems: economic malaise
and the accumulation of surpluses. Third, the United States feared the possibility of antiAmerican and/or subversive activities among firms with Axis ties, or individuals of
German, Italian or Japanese heritage. Thus American policymakers wanted to put in
place mechanisms to crack down on these firms and individuals.
Washington undertook a series of initiatives to meet these concerns, but to also set
the stage for its postwar plans. It pressured the Governments of Latin America to enter
into a range of bilateral agreements whereby they received various forms of military and
economic assistance in return for their cooperation. The United States bought up
surpluses, erected military bases, invested in industries vital for the war effort, and
undertook an array of development projects to either buy off the Latin Governments or to
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improve their geo-strategic position in the Hemisphere.
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While efforts to out Axis

sympathizers facilitated immediate war aims, they also served to rid the hemisphere of
European influence. Yet here, Germany and Italy were not the only victims. As Sumner
Welles made clear in October 1942, the United States should seek the complete
“obliteration of European power” in the region, and that applied to Great Britain too.2099
Washington observed London’s relations with the American states with suspicious eyes.
Policymakers also remained determined to forge, if not in reality, at least in
appearance, the image of hemispheric solidarity. This objective necessarily meant that
intra-continental conflicts would be repressed or resolved with stick and carrot. It also led
American officials to encourage Latin Governments to unilaterally adhere to the United
Nations Declaration in cases where it seemed unwise for them to enter the war, the
prerequisite for signing the document. American officials believed the appearance of
stability, solidarity, and cooperation would increase their prestige and legitimacy as a
global leader. American planners – Sumner Welles above all – had always believed the
prerequisite for American global leadership resided in its ability to assert complete
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.2100 By 1943, this aim had been largely achieved.
While the Chileans had severed relations with the Axis powers, internally at least, the
Argentines, too, were questioning their position. The Good Neighbor policy and the
tranquility of the Americas were touted as models for the entire world.2101
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Yet inescapable realities and increasing anger over Washington’s tactics in the
region revealed a façade. No serious observer missed the illiberal nature of the Latin
American regimes, especially the people who experienced them. The region’s dictators
smashed free speech, hoarded money and guns for themselves, and brutally repressed
political opponents. Old intra-state rivalries resurfaced in new ways, exposing
“hemispheric solidarity” for the pretense that it was. American espionage, heavyhandedness, and attacks upon the sovereignty of these countries drove many of them to
anger, despair, and disappointment. It exposed these regimes to attacks from opposition.
Wartime revolutions or attempted coup d’états took place in roughly half of these
countries. Often instability correlated with American aid: with the hemisphere no longer
threatened by the summer of 1943, the flow of money and guns diminished, and projects
were unilaterally shut down. Latin America worried that it would be forgotten and
excluded from the peace. Such was the mood when the relief proposal arrived in their
capitals.

Argentina and Brazil make the first move

On relief matters, America’s most powerful ally in Latin America, Brazil, pursued
a path not unlike Argentina, which abhorred Washington’s efforts to achieve economic
and military hegemony throughout the hemisphere. This similarity deserves explanation:
the wartime behavior of these two countries, which historically rivaled one another, has
often been portrayed as counter-opposites.2102
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Yet in the case of Argentina, recent scholarship reveals that Buenos Aires
aided the United States considerably by providing both raw materials and food for the
war effort. Indeed the Argentine people loved American culture, and the Government in
Buenos Aires wanted strong relations with the United States for economic and military
reasons. At the same time, this country simply refused to submit to American pressure
tactics, which made future aid contingent on the country’s willingness to break relations
with the Axis powers. In retaliation, Argentine officials sought assistance from Germany,
which outraged American policymakers, who wanted Argentina to crack down on its
sizeable and influential German and Italian populations. Argentina served as the central
hub for Nazi intelligence and covert operations in the Western Hemisphere.2103
Sentiments in Brazil were not unlike those in Argentina, but policymakers in Rio
de Janeiro pursued a different course. The population, for one, overwhelmingly supported
the Allied war effort, while the Government recognized the immediate and long-term
economic and military benefits of cooperation with Washington. Thus when the United
States entered the war in late 1941, Brazil agreed to host the January 1942 Pan-American
meeting of foreign ministers that led much of Latin America to sever ties with the Axis
powers, and in many cases, to declare war. In return, Brazil received handsome assistance
in the form of arms and financial aid. It obtained promises of no less than $165 million in
early 1942, a sum that increased drastically after Nazi submarine attacks on their ships
precipitated a declaration of war on August 22, 1942.
Though his time would eventually run out, the Brazilian strongman, Getúlio
Vargas, played his hand with consummate skill. He understood the give-and-take of
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international politics, and was willing to not only assume a subservient role, but to
also sacrifice the lives of Brazilian citizens for money, guns, and influence. Yet through it
all, he obeyed the axiom: give nothing without receiving something in return.2104 As such,
he did not sign the United Nations Declaration when his country entered the war. When
pressed to do so just prior to a meeting with Franklin Roosevelt in January 1943, he
agreed. “However,” he said, “this might be an opportune moment to say again that we
need equipment from you for our military, naval and air force.”2105 Then, when the great
northeastern bulge of Brazil lost its strategic importance as a staging ground following
the successful landings in North Africa, he sent troops to join the fight. Vargas worried
that he would lose influence and aid would diminish.2106
When it came to postwar relief, Brazilian officials were no less manipulative.
Like the Argentines, they requested that Great Britain permit them the opportunity to join
the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements in London. As “an important
producer of raw materials and foodstuffs,” the Brazilian Ambassador wrote in December
1943, “the Embassy considers that both from the point of view of its own interests as
from those of the commission its regular association with the work of the committee
should be facilitated to keep the Brazilian Government informed.”2107 The Brazilians
hoped to secure lucrative contracts for food and other relief supplies, and to shape the
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postwar era to their benefit. Indeed it perturbed them immensely when they learned in
March 1943 of the four-power Central Committee.2108 Brazil, as Noel Hall explained, did
“not want to be put up by, and chosen as a protégé of the U.S.” That they desired
membership was but another “indication of the general feeling of uneasiness in [the]
South America countries at increasing American influence there under the guise of a
good neighborhood and war co-operation.”2109
The sum of these factors created both dilemmas and opportunities for the British.
Initially they rejected the idea of including Brazil in the work of the Inter-Allied
Committee. For one, the work of the committee concerned the postwar requirements of
the European countries, not supplies. But with the United States on the Committee, how
could they reject the Brazilian request on such grounds? Complicating matters further,
how could they permit Brazilian membership while denying similar requests from the
Argentines simply because of the outrage it would evoke in Washington?2110 But Winston
Churchill would have none of this: “Vargas should be petted,” he told members of the
British Government. Even if it seemed unwise to court the Argentines, both countries
provided avenues for continued British influence in the Western Hemisphere after the
war. Brazil should participate.2111 Thus Leith-Ross and the Foreign Office endeavored to
incorporate Brazil into the Inter-Allied Committee’s work.2112
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The British always worried that the United States would exclude them from
the economic affairs of the Western Hemisphere. In Latin America, as one British official
explained, American inquiries into the allocation and production of goods had been the
case of “wild rumor.” Individuals throughout the hemisphere believed American efforts
to control supplies “from the raw material stage… to the ultimate purchaser of the
finished article” constituted “the first step towards the economic domination of South
America by the United States.” Despite the argument that such control remained essential
for the war effort, these individuals suspected Washington strove to ensure the “economic
slavery of all these countries” by excluding the rest of the world from the region. While
supporting efforts to control supplies, the British argued that Pan-Americanism could not
be “an isolationist doctrine,” but should lead “to a more efficient universal cooperation.”
Just as the United States wanted to crack the British Empire, London hoped to undercut
American hegemony in the Americas.2113
Statements with such implications raised eyebrows in Washington. Welles
insisted that the Brazilians should be invited to participate in the relief organization as
soon as the other four reached out to other nations to join in the endeavor. “From the
standpoint of policy,” he informed Acheson, “it would be a fatal mistake if this were not
done.” But under no circumstances should the Argentina receive an invitation. “The
political effect on the other American republics… would be disastrous.”2114 Veatch had
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his doubts. Brazil, at this point, had not even signed the UN Declaration, he
argued.2115 Laurence Duggan, head of the Latin America desk, thought the relief proposal
should be used to lure Brazil into the United Nations, but he thought Rio should not be
permitted to join the Leith-Ross organization.2116 Cleverly, the British eased their way
around the problem by proposing that Brazil only participate as an observer. 2117
Washington accepted, but the Brazilian request had given American policymakers further
reason to move forward rapidly. Yet they insisted that the British continue in their
“stalling process” with Argentina.2118
For the Brazilians, this development constituted a hemispheric breakout; it created
an opportunity for the British as well. When the fiasco over the Central Committee arose
in March 1943, Britain duly blamed it all on the United States. Thereupon the Brazilians
reminded the Foreign Office of their country’s friendliness towards Britain, and claimed
that they would be more than happy to help London overcome difficulties with the
Central Committee. While the British expressed the hope that they might benefit from
such cooperation, their efforts, as we have seen, went nowhere.2119 The whole affair,
nonetheless, serves to illustrate the general frustration and fear the Latin American
countries felt towards the United States. Brazil, as we shall soon see, was not alone. The
Argentines were angry, but the smaller countries were perturbed and frightened. The so-
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called associated powers (cooperating nations that had not declared war), worried that
they would be treated in a second-class manner at the war’s end. For one of them, the
relief proposal appeared to provide an opportunity.

In Comes Bogotá: The Colombia Initiative

On August 3, 1943, the Colombian Foreign Minister, Gabriel Turbay, informed
the American Ambassador in Bogotá, Arthur Lane, that association with the relief agency
would “imply a change in the juridical and political status” of Colombia vis-à-vis the
war. But, as his Government had no desire to alter its position “without consulting the
other nations” in South America, he had sent a telegram the previous day to Chile,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela suggesting that their ambassadors in
Washington consult with one another and the State Department to arrive at an agreement
on the relief proposal. Colombia believed these nations, which shared its status as an
associated power, should work to minimize or eradicate the distinction that existed
between them and those countries that had declared war. Turbay implied that these
nations might adhere to the UN Declaration and possibly declare war. The purpose of this
initiative, he explained, was to “bring about greater unification of the American nations,
and if possible to influence Argentina,” which refused to break relations with the
Axis.2120
Bogotá’s wartime cooperation with the United States made their explanations
seem plausible. The first constitutional democracy in Latin America, Colombia shared
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many of Washington’s ideological preferences. President Eduardo Santos of the
Liberal Party had always been a staunch Francophile. He disliked Germany, and
condemned the country’s aggressive behavior. Yet the rival conservative party
considered Washington a greater menace to Colombia’s interests than Berlin. Doubtless
their views placed restraints on the Government’s cooperation with Washington.
Consensus existed, nonetheless, over the strategic importance of the Panama Canal,
which made it easier for Santos to conclude military agreements with the United States
formalizing cooperation for the defense of the canal, and ensuring for Colombia that
Washington would come to its aid if its territory or interests came under attack. Still,
conservative forces compelled Bogotá to insist on strict limits on U.S. military operations
from its territory.2121
Economic and financial cooperation also intensified, but here again political
divisions created problems. Like many countries in the region, state revenues declined
with the outbreak of war. No longer capable of exporting to Europe, Colombia became
dependent on U.S. markets and financial and other forms of assistance. Bogotá relied on
U.S. manufactured imports and received $16.5 million in lend-lease assistance. To
facilitate highway reconstruction, agricultural development, and the construction of a
hydroelectric plan, the country received more than $30 million in loans from the ExportImport Bank.2122 Conservatives, however, believed this aid made Colombia unfortunately
dependent on the United States. While it benefited export industries, it did nothing for
2121

George M. Lauderbaugh, “Bolivarian Nations: Securing the Northern Frontier,” in
Latin America During World War II, eds. Leonard and Bratzel, 115-119; Christopher
Abel, “Colombia, 1930-58,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. 8, Latin
America Since 1930: Spanish South America, ed. Leslie Bethell, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 606-610.
2122
Lauderbaugh, “Bolivarian Nations: Securing the Northern Frontier,” 115-119.

747
small producers in the country and created no incentive to attract international
business from other countries. The conservative leader, Laureano Gomez, argued that an
“autonomous poverty was preferable to the cultural degradation and materialism of close
ties with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers….”2123 Despite these views, Colombia became one
of the “staunchest supporters of the Allies in Latin America.”2124
The Americans had little reason to suspect ulterior motives. They knew of the
limits on Colombia’s liberal Government, now led by a new President, Alfonso Lopez.
For this reason, they managed the Colombian initiative gingerly. Eager to secure
agreement for the relief proposal as soon as possible, but weary from efforts to avoid
offending allies whose cooperation they deemed essential, they argued that accepting the
agreement would in no way alter the country’s wartime status. They even encouraged
consultations among the American states so long as they could facilitate the process.2125
This message they shared with other relevant embassies in South America. 2126 The
primary concern at this juncture was not an anti-American front in Latin America, but
rather British machinations in the Americas. 2127 Laurence Duggan warned Hull and
Welles: “There are certain signs indicating that the British are taking steps to implant in
the other American republics certain seeds regarding postwar arrangements.” He advised
taking Latin leaders into their confidence “on certain subjects.” “Careful cultivation
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now,” he concluded, “would result… in favorable support by them and, through them,
by the other American republics in our postwar scheme.”2128
While State Department officials feared Britain, apologies and explanations from
the leadership in Bogotá worried Ambassador Lane. Turbay informed him on August 6,
1943 that his Government remained sympathetic to the relief proposal and did not want to
delay matters, but that they had only received replies to their telegram from four of the
seven recipients. They wanted them to sign the agreement, mechanisms for cooperating
with the agency, and possible adherence to the UN Declaration. Peru and Venezuela, he
reported, accepted these objectives. Uruguay had not decided on the third point. Ecuador
believed adherence to the declaration might adversely affect Argentina, which, they
falsely suspected, was about to break relations with the Axis.2129 On August 10, 1943,
Turbay reported further. The Chileans appeared noncommittal on the declaration, but
wanted to discuss the other points. A negative response from Uruguay, he claimed, was
due to their misinformed Ambassador at Montevideo, who bungled his presentation.
Confused and unimpressed, Lane requested a copy of the Colombian telegram. Turbay
agreed to share it with the State Department.2130
A promise unfulfilled, the Colombians tried another tactic. It was Sumner Welles,
President Lopez reported to Lane on August 11, 1943, who provoked him to seek
“greater solidarity of the continent.” 2131 Following Lopez’s address to welcome the
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Bolivian President, Enrique Penaranda, to Bogotá in June 1943, Welles had written
the Colombian President to express agreement with his assessment of the situation in
Argentina, where the military had just overthrown the government of Ramón Castillo,
which paved the way for the presidency of Juan Perón in 1946.2132 Lopez believed these
events increased the need for continental solidarity, and an opportunity for the associated
powers to apply pressure on the Argentines.2133 Lopez explained to Lane that he had also
consulted with President Isaias Medina of Venezuela, who agreed that something should
be done.2134 Medina had long promoted a regional bloc of the Bolivarian nations to deal
with items of common interests.2135 But unlike Medina, Lopez insinuated, he was not
“taking advantage” of UN victories for the purpose of promoting the interests of these
nations. His sole aim, he asserted, was to achieve solidarity around the relief proposal and
give them “an opportunity to discuss the matter frankly among themselves and with the
Department.”2136
Yet Lopez undermined the sincerity of his presentation. “Instead of being able to
render physical aid, most of [the nations whose cooperation he solicited] require such aid

2132

On the coup, see Scheinin, “Argentina: The Closet Ally,” 184-185. Due to Perón’s
participation in the coup, he earned several key positions in the new government of
President Pedro Ramírez, first as an assistant to the Secretary of War, and then as head of
the Department of Labor. In the latter position, he built strong ties to the Argentine labor
movement. Following the January 1944 San Juan earthquake, he also headed the relief
efforts, which made him a national celebrity. When Argentina broke relations with the
Axis powers in January 1944, General Elemiro Farrell orchestrated a junta and took
power from Ramírez. Perón became Vice President and Secretary of War under the new
President. The sum of these experiences set the stage for Perón to run for and win the
Argentine presidency in 1946.
2133
Lane to Hull, August 10, 1943, 840.50/2354, FRUS, Vol. 5, 45-46.
2134
Lane to Hull, August 11, 1943, 840.50/2363, FRUS, Vol. 5, 46-47.
2135
On Medina’s proposal for a regional bloc, see Lauderbaugh, “Bolivarian Nations:
Securing the Northern Frontier,” 119-123.
2136
Lane to Hull, August 11, 1943, 840.50/2363, FRUS, Vol. 5, 46-47.

750
from the United States,” he told Lane. The question was how to define their status as
associated powers in a manner convenient for the war effort without forcing them to
provide more “physical aid” to the cause. Lopez, however, declined to explain what unity
would mean for postwar planning. His aims appeared immediate. Indeed he admitted that
this initiative served him domestically. Gomez, the conservative leader, supported the
President’s efforts to unify the nations of South America and had agreed to preside over
Colombia’s Advisory Commission for Foreign Affairs. Lane also learned from another
conservative leader, Francisco Urrutia, that they might even support adherence to the UN
Declaration by all the American states.2137 For Lopez, these developments presented an
opportunity to bolster his weakening political position: the conservatives had close
relationships with the military, who disliked the President’s support of their rival, the
police force. In 1944, the military would attempt a coup, though Lopez survived.2138
In the meantime, the Americans had every reason to be concerned about
Colombia’s initiative. Though presented as an effort to forge wartime unity, it was easy
for American diplomats to ascertain ulterior motives. The conservative endorsement, for
one, provided reason to worry: Gomez, a blatant anti-American, had exhibited fascist
sympathies and feared American economic imperialism.2139 Moreover, the initiative
circumvented the pan-American system, thereby excluding possible checks against antiAmericanism, notably Brazil and the Central American countries, whose smaller size and
proximity to the United States made them less likely to endorse such behavior.
Washington usually preferred to interact with these countries on a bilateral basis, at least
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until sufficient agreement, or a concentration of power permitted them to dominate
any multilateral gathering, and isolate recalcitrant states.2140 Though unlikely given the
American largesse flowing into the region, Washington could never close its eyes to the
possibility of a unified protest against its postwar plans. Nothing could have been a
greater disaster: the Western Hemisphere was being touted as a model for the entire
world.2141
Yet the Good Neighbor Policy was coming apart at the seams. Many Latin
American countries resented Washington’s heavy-handed approach, particularly efforts
to remove purported Axis influence from the continent by targeting individuals of
German, Italian and Japanese heritage, and blacklisting firms employing these people.
Naturally certain countries complained that they received too little assistance for their
wartime sacrifices, or that other countries unjustifiably got more.2142 This dissatisfaction
generated support for regional efforts to seek equality with UN members in the
2140
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This fact became clear when the Colombian Ambassador to

Venezuela, Alejandro Galvis, told the Chamber of Commerce in Maracaibo that the
President of his host and home country were promoting a “unified movement… directed
towards obtaining the good offices of the United States before the other United Nations”
so that they would “be admitted on the same plane of equality at the peace
conference.”2144 A few days later, FBI informants disclosed Chilean efforts to sound out
the Colombian government on the matter.2145
Like Argentina, Chile refused to suspend relations with the Axis powers at the
January 1942 Pan-American Summit. Santiago held deep animosities towards the United
States, dating back to the late 19th century, when Washington opposed Chile’s annexation
of Bolivian and Peruvian territories. The 1930 Hawley-Smoot Tariff, moreover, had
blocked Chilean imports into the United States, aggravating economic tensions and
forcing the country to seek European markets. Even after a German sub sank a Chilean
merchant ship in late 1941, they refused to sever relations. A large German population
and strong relations with the Nazi regime left the Government unwilling to take action.
But fear of their neighbors forced a change. Both Bolivia and Peru had broken relations
with the Axis powers at Rio, and received American military assistance in return. These
developments frightened the Chilean Foreign Minister, who worried that American
diplomatic and military assistance to Bolivia and Peru could be turned against them in a
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They had

witnessed how the Americans rapidly intervened to shut down the 1941 Peruvian war on
Ecuador, forcing the latter country to accept a humiliating loss of its territory.2147
But the United States was a good neighbor. When a fearful Chile finally severed
relations with the Axis powers in March 1943, the money and guns started to flow.2148
The balance of power would be restored. But Bolivia, with no plans to make any
significant contribution to the war effort, and no coastline to defend – thanks to Chile –
decided to declare war on the Axis powers and even suggested that the other Bolivarian
nations, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, do the same. They cited the fear that
Chile might declare war, but also the fear that the Europeans would not be treated as
equals in whatever postwar conferences might take place.2149 The Bolivian Government’s
decision angered officials in Santiago, who believed it was directed at Chile.2150 The
United States, not surprisingly, welcomed the Bolivian decision and immediate plans
were drawn up to send additional military assistance to the country. 2151 These
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developments placed the Chileans on alert and presaged their reaction to the
Colombian initiative.
Santiago wanted to hear from Paraguay and Uruguay before replying at
Bogotá.2152 Paraguay also worried about Bolivia. The previous decade the two landlocked countries fought the most devastating Latin American war of the century. Control
of the Chaco region, presumably blessed with oil resources, would provide access to the
Paraguay River, the only navigable route to the Atlantic Ocean. Bolivia, while securing
marginal access to the river, lost nearly two-thirds of the territory. The conflict resulted in
nearly 100,000 deaths. While in Bolivia it sparked a coup, in Paraguay it ignited a
nationalist revolution and a counter-revolution, which led to the dictatorship of General
Higinio Morinigo. With La Paz jockeying for influence in Washington, it seems that
Paraguay, like Chile, hoped to offset Bolivia’s strategic machinations. Though Morinigo
severed relations with the Axis Powers in 1942, fascist sympathies and Argentine
influence in the country placed limits on what he could do.2153 Colombian efforts to
change the juridical and political status of this country faced enormous obstacles.
Uruguay, too, would have problems with the Colombian initiative. For most of
the 1930s, this country had been led by an authoritarian regime that included an antiAmerican and pro-fascist contingent of the Nationalist party, which governed the nation
in collaboration with a similarly minded element of the Colorado party. These odd
arrangements came undone with the outbreak of the Second World War, when liberal-
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minded sectors of the Colorado party reentered the government and the nationalist
wing withdrew from the Cabinet. The Uruguayan population overwhelmingly supported
the Allied cause. These factors made it easier for the Governments of Alfredo Baldomir
and Juan José Amézaga, who served from 1938 to 1942, and 1943 to 1947, respectively,
to cooperate with Washington.2154 Uruguay’s primary international concern in 1943 was
to obtain assistance from the United States to meet their petroleum requirements, improve
public works, and complete the Rio Negro hydroelectric plant. 2155 Relations with
Argentina naturally soured. Yet the Nationalists maintained influence: thus proposals to
establish an American naval airbase in Uruguay never came to fruition.2156
Uruguay and Paraguay revealed their views to the Americans before they shared
them with Colombia. On August 24, 1943, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, José Serrato,
told the U.S. Ambassador in Montevideo, William Dawson, that his country had no plans
to join in “an attempt to form a ‘league’ for the purpose of imposing conditions on the
United States and other United Nations in return for collaboration.” Uruguay, he
explained, “opposed blocs in America.” 2157 Two days later, the Paraguayan Foreign
Minister, Luis A. Argana, shared a similar message with the U.S. Ambassador in
Asuncion, Wesley Frost.2158 But while Uruguay did not want to upset its efforts to obtain
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American aid, Paraguay worried of offending Argentina. Frost also learned that
Paraguay hoped to sign an economic treaty with Buenos Aires in October, and thought
that joining a bloc would impair his country’s ability to secure concessions in the
negotiations. Argana, for his part, feared an Argentine-supported coup d’état by the
Paraguayan military, and lend-lease assistance constituted the best check against this
possibility.2159
While Uruguay and Paraguay worried that Colombia’s initiative would damage
their ability to obtain aid, Ecuador and Peru had already received assistance through the
Lend-Lease program and the Export-Import Bank. In 1942, Washington promised
Ecuador nearly $60 million in aid;2160 Peru obtained agreements in excess of $20 million,
but had secured much of the territory over which they had fought a brief war with
Ecuador the previous year.2161 In return, Washington earned the right to construct military
installations on their territory.2162 These countries either desired more aid or renunciation
of liabilities and responsibilities previously incurred vis-à-vis the United States. 2163
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Adherence to the UN Declaration depended on benefits. They agreed with the
Colombian suggestion that the status of the associated powers should be defined: but
Ecuador claimed it would not adhere to the UN Declaration if the definition failed to
meet their expectations; Peru demanded outright equality with the other United Nations.
But their responses diverged on one critical point. While Ecuador accepted the idea of
consultations among the seven associated powers, Peru thought they should take place on
a Pan-American basis. Lima took offense at another country trying to push them into the
war.2164
By this point, it was not only clear what the Colombians were doing, it was
apparent that the effort would fail. Of the four nations who had replied at Bogotá, only
Ecuador agreed to seven-power negotiations among the associated power. This fact
placed the Colombians in an embarrassing position. In meetings with Ambassador Lane,
President Lopez openly criticized Turbay for leaking the initiative to the press. He also
began distancing himself from the whole affair, though Lane suspected him of using the
effort to forge reconciliation with the conservatives and distract the Colombian
population from the country’s unfavorable political fortunes. 2165 When Lane asked
Turbey if the original memorandum had been shared in Washington, the Foreign Minister
dodged the question. When he was told that other countries preferred that consultations
take place on a pan-American basis, he did not object, but believed it would be
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“cumbersome.” He remained wedded to the idea that the initiative would succeed. It
all depended on Chile, Venezuela, and Paraguay.2166 The Paraguayans, quite humorously,
had shared their reaction with the Americans, but had not bothered to convey their views
at Bogotá.2167
The Venezuelans prevaricated. Like Colombia, they had been staunch supporters
of the Allied cause, while having maintained a policy of strict neutrality. In return, they
obtained considerable U.S. material and financial assistance, and found opportunities to
recover a greater share of the profits made by the American companies that dominated
the Venezuelan oil industry. Caracas curiously asked for little military assistance,
reasoning that if the country came under attack, Washington would come to its aid. The
Venezuelan President therefore had little desire to anger the Americans, even though he
liked the idea of unifying the Bolivarian nations.2168 The problem, it seems, was that the
Colombian conception included Chile, which had attacked Bolivarian unity as hostile to
its interests.2169 Medina might also have worried that President Lopez sought to steal his
assumed position as leader of the Bolivarian nations. Of course Turbay claimed that
Colombia did not seek “national prestige.” But if such claims served to appease Caracas,
the idea that Chile might serve as the group’s spokesman in Washington probably had the
opposite effect. Thus mixed motives, coupled with wide opposition to the Colombian
initiative, led Medina to join those advocating pan-Americanism.2170
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Initially the Chileans showed modest sympathy towards the initiative, and
insisted that they serve as the group’s spokesman in Washington. But they wisely held off
until after Foreign Minister, Joachin Fernandez’s scheduled talks in Washington.2171
Chile remained engaged in complex negotiations with the United States over the control
of materials of strategic interest for the war effort;2172 for their cooperation, Fernandez
hoped to obtain further financial and material assistance for the country’s industrial
program and postwar economic development. 2173 It made little sense to take steps
towards adherence to the UN Declaration before the country had wreaked the benefits of
severing relations with the Axis powers, and it served no purpose to anger Washington by
joining a unified effort to apply pressure, even if the Chileans abhorred the heavy-handed
approach of the Americans. By late September, the Colombians knew failure was
imminent. They hoped to sign a trade deal with Santiago shortly, and they could not
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ignore Chile’s wishes at this juncture.
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President Lopez duly told Lane that

“Turbay’s idea” was going nowhere, and the Foreign Minister was removed.2175

Why the Americans Successfully Defeated the Colombia Initiative

The Americans managed the whole affair adroitly. Instead of applying pressure
and making promises of aid, they let national rivalries, fears, and jealousies undo the
effort. It serves as testament to their skill that Turbay complimented American “wisdom
and tact,” and praised Washington for “using no pressure whatever on the other American
Republics.” The decision to encourage informal discussions among the associated powers
won accolades as well, even if it did not, as we will soon see, lead the Latin American
countries to accept the relief proposal without criticism.2176 Yet the Americans, who
preferred bilateral discussions with the Latin American nations, disliked the idea of an
inter-American conference on postwar problems. Laurence Duggan, head of the Latin
America desk, believed the Department should take Colombia into its confidence. “I feel
that these countries if properly handled will support this Government’s policies in
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connection with the postwar provided that they are given the feeling of being
consulted in connection with the formulation of these policies.”2177
American diplomats neither neglected nor missed an opportunity to protect and
advance their interests. Consultations among the associated powers could take place, but
with State Department participation.2178 Surveillance remained critical, and if the Latin
American countries refused, American intelligence entities had penetrated many of the
key governments. On September 24, 1943, FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, confirmed
what State Department officials already believed about the Colombia initiative. Bogotá
feared it would be denied full participation rights in postwar discussions. 2179 Thus
American officials had been wise to suggest there would be no distinction between the
associated powers and the United Nations.2180 Welles told one Latin Ambassador that it
was doubtful that the Europeans would agree to such a formula, but implied that the
United States would insist upon it.2181 The Americans also reminded the Colombians that
they could always “adhere” to the UN Declaration without signing it, which required
open belligerency.2182 At this juncture in the war, Washington believed declarations of
war would needlessly subject miles of Latin American coastline to attack.2183
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Apart from the delays it created, the Colombia initiative would seem
insignificant had the United States not considered the “American system” a model for the
entire world. It was thus important to give an impression of stability, cooperation, and
hemispheric solidarity. In 1942, Roosevelt had told the press corps: “I should say that the
outstanding feature [of the Hemisphere] is the very great unanimity of thought, not just as
illustrated by my talks with” Lopez, but “as illustrated also with many other talks I have
had with other heads of other governments to the south of us.”2184 But the reality was
much different. Unanimity had been purchased at high cost by the United States. The
South American countries were at constant odds with one another over territory, trade,
and relations with Washington. Where imbalances led to or threatened war, the United
States intervened, not with overt military operations, as in the past, but with financial,
military and development assistance. In return, Washington received cooperation.
Yet resentment towards and fear of the United States still existed. The Colombian
initiative constituted but one manifestation of this fact. But when fear of or opposition to
American aims arose, the United States strove not for unity, but permitted and even
promoted disunity. Withdrawal and reserve usually did the task, but aid to competing
countries did so as well. It was not, to be sure, the crude divide-and-conquer tactics of
earlier empires, but it served Washington’s hegemonic aspirations nonetheless. As
Christopher O’Sullivan explains, “before the United States could begin to play a great
role in the world, it had to first establish its leadership in the Western Hemisphere.”2185
Benign relations might have served this purpose, but power politics did so too. “We must
2184
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convince them that we mean business,” one American diplomat wrote.
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appearance of unity and cooperation, achieved preferably in some institutional context,
worked to conceal this toughness. UNRRA was yet another ploy in this grand strategic
game.

They All Accept, But Santiago Proves Difficult

The reaction to the relief proposal of the countries involved in the Colombian
initiative is amusing and revealing. Few of these countries responded promptly enough to
have any impact, even had this been possible: the United States simply ignored the Latin
replies when contemplating revisions.2187 Bogotá ironically accepted the draft agreement
with no complaint.2188 Bolivia did not want to contribute any of its resources, but offered
its “moral support”;2189 Peru agreed to offer material and financial assistance only after
their domestic requirements had been met, and insisted the draft be altered to guarantee
that the United States could not force them to give up their resources.2190 Paraguay
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worried about contributions too; indeed Ascuncion had been perpetually delinquent in
paying what it owed the Pan-American Union. 2191 Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela
complained about the Central Committee, and insisted that it should not become a
precedent. But these nations accepted the proposal nonetheless.2192
Chile, however, constituted a case unto itself. Like many of the other Latin
American Governments, Santiago made it clear that its “possible” participation was
“subordinate to her economic situation,” which depended on foreign trade. If the United
States erected an international economic regime unfavorable to Chilean interests, the
country would be unable to contribute even if it accepted the agreement. Chilean officials
issued a stiff critique of the draft: it suffered from “vices and defects,” and was “rigid and
confused.” The Central Committee, they claimed, might possibly “arouse suspicions and
misgivings” that would impair the organization’s work. They therefore insisted that it be
enlarged to include other countries. Of course many governments made this same
suggestion. But the Chileans distinguished themselves by insisting that both the Central
Committee and the Council utilize unanimous voting.2193
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The Americans tried to deal with the Chileans reasonably. If unanimous
decision-making were required of the Council, then the responsibility for policy would
inevitably fall to the Central Committee, they argued. But if this body also had to take its
decisions by unanimous vote, then there might be no policies at all. As a result, the
Director General would have no choice but to run the whole show.2194 The Chileans,
however, believed the Americans planned to do it this way in any case. More worrisome,
they expected Washington to push resolutions through the Council and Central
Committee that would burden Santiago with financial and material obligations against its
will. For this reason, the Americans told the Chileans that only governments would have
control over what they contribute.2195 They then insisted that the Chileans accept the draft
immediately. The American Government, Acheson wrote the Chilean Ambassador in
Washington, Don Rodolfo Michels, had “plans for expediting action” on the matter. With
the war progressing, other nations were becoming anxious.2196
On October 9, 1943, the Chileans accused the United States of demanding “joint
signature” of a “proposed agreement without previous discussion of it and [a] conference
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between the delegates.” Thus the same government that had played the greatest role
in smashing Colombian efforts to forge a united front in the face of American power now
bemoaned the absence of an opportunity to do just that. Further, it falsely accused the
United States of providing no opportunity to discuss the agreement bilaterally.2197 An
angry Cordell Hull upbraided them. But in doing so, he confirmed the premise of their
argument: that Washington was avoiding joint discussions of the draft. “In conversations
with representatives of all interested Governments,” he wrote, “officers of the
Department made it clear from the first that this Government had no intention of calling a
conference for the purpose of discussing details of the agreement, and that a conference if
called would be only for the purpose of formal final action by Governments upon the text
of an agreement which had already received general approval.” While he agreed to a
“further exchange of views,” he urged them to swiftly accept the agreement.2198
The Chileans still proved uncooperative, prompting an exchange of words. They
instructed their Ambassador in Washington, Don Rudolfo Michels, to request a brief
conference before the signing ceremony and to insist upon an enlargement of the Central
Committee.2199 On October 21, 1943, the Chilean Ambassador made his country’s case to
Acheson, who rebutted their arguments and argued that a meeting of the United Nations
before the signing ceremony would wreck the whole plan. It was “certain,” he claimed,
“that the agreement would never be signed if the governments should begin to discuss the
composition of the Central Committee.” By this point, time had run out. The Chileans
2197
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begrudgingly agreed to sign, but insisted that the four-power Central Committee
should never become a precedent. Michels also made it known that Chile, unlike the
United States, considered the relief agreement a treaty. As such, it would require the
approval of the Chilean Congress. That, he added, could take months.2200

Central America, the Caribbean and Back to Brazil

The Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama all accepted the relief proposal with little
complaint.2201 Like most of the Hemisphere, these nations had faced immense pressure
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from the United States to cooperate in the war effort. Washington expressed grave
fears over the security of the Panama Canal, the transport of Venezuelan oil, and the
viability of the Caribbean sea-lanes. To ensure their protection, they insisted on military
bases and various forms of cooperation. In return, Central America received far less than
South America: a total of $4.1 million in lend-lease assistance, slightly under ten percent
of all aid given to Latin America under the program. Yet the United States agreed to
purchase their surplus goods, often at above-market prices, and to develop industries
producing for the war effort.2202
Were it not for two factors, it would seem odd that these countries did not create
more trouble for Washington during the war. First, proximity to the United States and the
relative size of these states meant that they often had little choice but to acquiesce to
American demands. Second, dictators ruled all but one of these countries, Costa Rica.
Their ability to remain in power, in no small part, depended on the United States.
Certainly they had witnessed the events that took place in Panama in October 1941. The
United States showed not the slightest reluctance to support a coup that led to a more proAmerican regime in the country. It is hardly surprising that all of Central America
declared war on the Axis powers shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that these
nations were among the original signatories to the United Nations Declaration.2203 The
hope for assistance and the requirements to remain in power made cooperation all but
inevitable.
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These factors certainly influenced decision-making with respect to postwar
relief. For much of 1943, most of Central America remained engaged in negotiations with
Washington over the War Department’s sudden cancellation of various highway projects
running through Central America. Though no longer deemed strategically necessary for
the war effort, the affected countries considered them essential for domestic reasons. The
financial largesse, on the one hand, was attractive, but on the other hand, the resulting
displacement of workers, left them worried about political consequences.2204 With warinduced scarcities and high inflation, the cost of living in these countries had swelled by
as much as 700 percent, as was the case in Nicaragua.2205 These countries necessarily
hoped for concessions or recompense from the United States.
Not unlike South America, regional disputes, not only in Central America, but
also among the Caribbean nations, played a role as well. Honduras and Nicaragua
became embroiled in a territorial fight over areas along their border rich in rubber
trees. 2206 Tensions also flared up between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, quite
astonishingly, over a Haitian refusal to withdraw from circulation a series of postal
stamps that depicted all of Hispaniola as greater Haiti. Of course there were deeper issues
involved: in 1937, the Dominican strongman, Rafael Trujillo, had order the slaughter of
between 17,000 and 35,000 Haitians living in his country. His government thus renewed
the assault: offensive postage stamps ignited conflicts over fishing rights and the
revamping of border posts, and the Dominican Republic threatened to terminate various
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In all of these conflicts, the disputing

parties looked to Washington to advance their cause. Thus there was no reason not to
agree to the relief proposal, even if its significance was not apparent to many of these
nations.2208
Chile and a number of other countries worried that the United States would use
the organization to expropriate resources from their territory. Thus while these nations
agreed to its provisions, they insisted that they would only contribute after they had met
their own resource requirements.2209 Most of these countries turned a blind eye on the
composition of the Central Committee. Cuba and Mexico, however, clearly disliked the
idea of placing so much power in the hands of the four powers. Mexico insisted that the
Council annually elect four additional members to the Committee to serve alongside the
four powers. But when the U.S. ignored this proposal, they agreed to participate anyway,
reasoning that the four-power setup could be justified so long as hostilities existed. But
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they insisted that this procedure could not constitute a precedent.
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The Cubans, for

their part, concurred with this view.2211
Likewise, the Government in Rio de Janeiro expressed its disappointment at
having been excluded from the Central Committee. “The appointment of Brazil as one of
the four chairmen of the committees at the Food Conference had made a favorable
impression,” they told the Americans.2212 It would have sent a positive message had the
United States considered this conference a pattern. Yet they warmly – perhaps we should
say smarmily – accepted the agreement.2213 But behind the scenes they worked to protect
their interests. They accepted the British proposal that they be allowed observer status on
the Inter-Allied Committee, and continued working to improve their relations with
Argentina. 2214 They also created an awkward situation in the State Department by
demanding access to published and non-published documents on America’s postwar
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plans. How could Washington refuse the request after all that they had done?
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But

back home, the Brazilians, who knew of the immense demands on resources to come,
began destroying large portions of their coffee crop. The immediate stability of prices
was important, but like everyone in Latin America, they also wanted to make money.2216
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
CONGRESS AND THE WORLD

As we have seen, certain groups and individuals within the American
policymaking establishment, particularly the New Dealers, believed the Second World
War provided an opportunity to erect a global system of governance led by the United
States. While many of these policymakers considered the inter-American system a model
for the entire world, they also looked to the U.S. constitutional structure as a template for
the United Nations system. But for these people, the apparent stability of the United
States was not only a product of the system itself, but also the country’s cultural and
historical evolution. As such, they believed it would be dangerous to simply replicate
American constitutional governance at the global level: their plans would have to account
for culture and history. They took the criticisms of certain conservatives seriously.
Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, for example, argued that American ideas on liberty and
government came into conflict with the history, culture and values of many countries.
Two historical developments led serious thinkers in the Administration to believe
such problems could be surmounted. Adolf Berle argued that modern communications
technologies would “minimize cultural differences” in time, and serve as “the foundation
for a flowering of a human civilization,” or what Roosevelt called a “world civilization.”
These men believed that radio, television, and telephones would allow the United States,
through vehicles such as the Office of War Information (OWI), to project the best of
American culture into every nook and cranny of the globe, thereby making the exterior
world more like the United States. Though Berle never commented on the possibility that
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illiberal aspects of other cultures might also penetrate the United States, thus sowing
the seeds of the very instability he hoped to prevent abroad, he appears to have believed
that the allure of American culture would prevail in the face of any such challenges.2217
Paul Appleby argued that the war provided an opportunity to establish patterns of
peaceful cooperation that would persist well into the postwar period if they could be
institutionalized to make non-cooperation after the war painful. The “necessities of the
war,” he wrote, “dictate [a] closer and closer collaboration of the United Nations.” This
cooperation could be developed into “organisms,” which in turn could be “supported by
separately developed organisms for common action in the late-war and post-war periods.”
If states were to become “so deeply and widely involved” in these entities of cooperation,
it would make “withdrawal in the early post-war years very difficult.” 2218 Appleby
appears to have believed, as constructivists in the field of international relations theory do
today, that through repeated iterations of collaboration durable patterns would be forged,
and the entire world would “learn” how to live together in peace. The byproduct, of
course, would be stability.2219
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Appleby’s thought did not end here. Unlike Acheson and a few other
conservative nationalists in the State Department, he believed the “post-war settlement
must be as far in the direction of establishing international government as it is possible to
go.” This system of “organisms,” as he called it, should be modeled after the U.S.
constitutional system.2220 Throughout the negotiations that led to the relief proposal,
especially those that took place in the State Department and with Sir Frederick LeithRoss, he and others, particularly Milo Perkins, had been adamant that the relief
organization should draw upon the division of powers in the American government
borrowed from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws.2221 Appleby’s departure from the
State Department in early 1942 hardly signified the end of these ideas. Dean Acheson and
his accomplices would use the American constitution to sell the relief proposal to those
countries that protested it.
The meaning of this fact can only be ascertained through an assessment of the
events that played out on Capital Hill during the summer and fall of 1943. Its antecedents
go back to the Treaty of Versailles, which was defeated on the Senate floor in 1919. But
our story begins in May 1943, when Herbert Hoover penned a letter to the Republican
Senator from Michigan, Arthur Vandenberg, encouraging him to use his power in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to obtain copies of the executive agreements of
which he was unaware.2222 The Senator duly replied, “I entirely agree with you that it
would be well worthwhile to put a microscope on all of the agreements which are being
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made by the executive department in respect to international economic
relationships.”2223 By early July, the two men had agreed to rendezvous.2224 This meeting,
of which there is no apparent record, precipitated a hurricane in Congress.
Here we seek to understand how the final negotiations over the proposal for the
international relief proposal played out, both in the Congress, and among the diverse
powers that criticized the UNRRA agreement. What issues motivated the two houses of
Congress? What solutions were found to work through the ordeal precipitated by
Vandenberg and his colleagues in both houses on both sides of the aisle? Equally
important, how did Acheson and his colleagues in the State Department meet the
challenges posed by the United Nations? What proposals did other powers put forward to
meet their concerns? To what degree were these proposals accepted by the United States,
but also the other three great powers? Did they compromise the integrity of the agreement
or Washington’s ability to achieve its objectives? As we will see, the two sets of
discussions implicitly turn on one another. The story is dripping with irony.

The Congressional Storm

Shortly after the State Department released the relief proposal to the press,
Senator Vandenberg carefully read it. His private reactions are unknown, but thereafter
he wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, asking whether the Roosevelt Administration
2223
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On June 22, 1943,

Hull replied: “It has been decided, after consultation with the majority and minority
leaders of both houses of Congress that the United States’ participation in the
establishment of this United Nations’ administration should be through an executive
agreement.” 2226 Thereupon Vandenberg inquired with his Republican colleagues, the
minority leaders in the Senate and House, Charles L. McNary of Oregon, and Joseph
Martin of Massachusetts, to know “exactly how far [they had gone] in giving their
approval to this proposition.” Both men replied that they had not agreed to any procedure
allowing the Administration to bypass the Congress.2227 Thus in this way, the clouds of a
“severe cyclonic disturbance,” as Dean Acheson described it, gathered in the United
States Congress.2228
The hurricane not only consumed the Upper House of Congress; Republicans in
the Lower House, too, began questioning the relief proposal. Two Congresswomen,
Frances Payne Bolton of Ohio, and Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts, were the
principal protagonists. While Bolton met with Acheson and other members of the House
in early July,2229 Rogers led a brief but important debate on the House floor on July 7,
1943. To her astonishment, the press had hardly reported on the proposed organization,
which, she worried, would have “far-reaching” powers. Her Republican colleague, Roy
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O. Woodruff of Michigan, expressed similar annoyance at the lack of press coverage
and promised “to enlighten the people of this country where we are being led and what
we are being led into by an administration that thinks it is wise enough, powerful enough
and rich enough to bring the ‘four freedoms’ to all the people of the world.” Before
Roosevelt “attempts at our expense, to bring the ‘four freedoms’ to the peoples of all the
world, we should first establish them here.”2230
Meanwhile, Vandenberg had taken action in the Senate. On July 6, 1943, he
introduced a resolution instructing the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he was a
member, to investigate the relief agreement to determine “whether in its judgment” the
relief proposal constituted an executive agreement, as the Administration claimed, or a
treaty.2231 In the latter case, American participation would require a two-thirds majority
vote in the Senate, as stipulated by the Constitution.2232 The following day, as Acheson
explained years later, he and Hull “made their pilgrimage to do penance at Canossa on
Capital Hill.”2233 In a sensational session, the committee unanimously agreed, “without
regard to political parties,” that the agreement should be “promptly explored,” not with
“respect to the merits of the arrangements… but in respect to the procedure involved in
the creation of this tremendous instrumentality.”
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administration of trying to bypass the Congress. In a pique, Hull attempted to storm
out of the meeting, but Acheson and Vandenberg interceded and persuaded him to
remain.2235
For the Senator from Michigan, procedure constituted the central issue. “To what
extent is it safe, to what extent is it wise, to what extent is it constitutional for executive
authority to proceed independent of Congress with respect to the great decisions now
pending,” he asked his colleagues on July 8, 1943. This question, in his view, had farreaching implications: what transpired with respect to relief would become a precedent
impinging on the many “transcendental questions involved in the liquidation of the war.”
The international machinery proposed by the Administration, he told the Senate, was
“reminiscent of the League of Nations,” yet the State Department had planned to “totally
bypass the Congress of the United States except at that ‘long last’ moment when finally
an appropriation is to be sought… to implement… pledges and promises… made in the
name of the total resources of the United States, by the President and his executive
associates.” To have chosen this procedure in “this initial venture” on a matter of such
“incalculable magnitude in respect not only to policy but to resources” was, in his view, a
“substantial error.” The investigation was justified.2236
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Although Vandenberg disavowed any attempt to attack the merits of the
proposed program – postwar relief, in his view, was essential – he justified his efforts
with direct references to the draft agreement. Nothing aroused his indignation more than
Article V, in which each government would pledge “its full support to the administration,
within the limits of its available resources, and subject to the requirements of its
constitutional procedure, through contributions of funds, materials, equipment, supplies,
and service for use in its own, adjacent, or other areas in need, in order to accomplish the
purpose of” the organization. This language, according to Vandenberg, entailed a “moral
commitment… of all the available resources of the United States” to an administrative
agency that would be “world-wide in scope.” The country, he implied, could not “recede”
from such a “commitment” without exacting damage to its reputation. It was not only
unconstitutional to ignore the Congress, but undemocratic as well. “We pay the bills –
that is, the people do – but we have nothing to say about what the bills shall be. I
respectfully submit that government by executive decree could not aspire to much greater
totalitarian authority.”2237
On the House side, the denunciations of the Administration were less sharp, but
equally forceful. While the Constitution provides the Lower House no powers with
regard to treaties, this body’s importance could not be ignored. By convention,
appropriations bills function like revenue bills, which, according to the constitution, must
originate in the House of Representatives.2238 Thus the State Department took notice
when representatives criticized Roosevelt for his failure to invite members of the Senate
2237
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Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to the White
House during the President’s consultation with the Congressional leadership. Here again,
Representative Bolton led the charge. “If the executive department is committing the
United States to an agreement of vast implications imposing a moral obligation on the
Congress for the fulfillment of these commitments, every Member of this House will
want to be thoroughly informed.” “Even a superficial reading [of the draft],” she asserted,
“develops the certainty that this proposal can well be the outline of a possible pattern
contemplated… for the post-war international structure.” It was, in her view, a “shadow
of things to come.”2239
Until this point in our story, the press, as many members of Congress noticed, had
given very little attention to the relief proposal. Apart from the New York Times, which
covered the release of the UNRRA agreement, few other news outlets even bothered to
mention the initiative with any analysis. 2240 Acheson considered this fact “most
extraordinary.” He told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Department of
State had received bitter criticism from the press for its failure to share all of the relevant
information on the Food and Agriculture Conference. Thus he and his colleagues had
decided to give the newspapermen everything on the UNRRA agreement. But they failed
to report it. “If you hand out everything,” one journalist told Acheson, “they just take it
and send it in to the newspaper office and nobody reads it because they do not think it has
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any importance.” But if you “say it is terribly confidential or you don’t give it to them
or say the national security be involved,” Acheson explained, “then they are terribly
excited about it.” For this reason, he surmised, the newspapermen neglected it.2241
Yet, as he wrote years later, Vandenberg “huffed and puffed in the Senate press
gallery.” In turn, his “indignation” gave the hound dogs a “controversy, which is to
journalism what a fox is to fox hunting.”2242 By mid July, the eye of the storm was
approaching the capital. So-called isolationist newspapers lashed out at the President for
“world planning, world WPAing, and world spending of U.S.A. money,” as the
Washington Times-Herald charged.2243 These press outlets coalesced around the Senator
and commenced smashing Roosevelt for his “autocratic and socialistic activities.” They
accused the Administration of seeking to put the United States in “this post-war agency…
by chicanery.” They ridiculed the relief proposal, claiming that Vice President Henry
Wallace’s “provision of a quart of milk a day for every human being” was “child’s play
for the relief administration as projected.” Arthur Sears Henning of the Chicago Daily
Tribune attacked so-called internationalists in the Administration for desiring a “world
state with an international police force supplied by the member governments in the
manner that food, fuel, and clothing” were to be “supplied to the relief
administration.”2244
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The Executive Meets the Storm

When the tempest arrived, administration lawyers were pondering how to obtain
resources from Congress for the relief organization. They considered siphoning off lendlease funds for the agency, but Congressional critics attacked this procedure when the
State Department attempted it for OFRRO.2245 It became clear that another device would
be necessary, either an amendment to the Lend Lease Act, or a separate appropriations
bill. Oscar Cox of the Lend-Lease Office worried that if the Administration pursued an
amendment, it would come up for renewal in six months, forcing them to go back to the
Hill again.2246 Myres McDougal, the State Department’s Legal Council, preferred a new
appropriations bill, but wanted it introduced before the President had signed the relief
agreement.2247 But Roy Veatch believed the legislature would never sign a blank check
before the agreement’s final form was known. 2248 The storm’s arrival made this
assessment even more probable.
Alarm bells went off in the executive branch. Cox advised his office to withhold
funds and supplies from UNRRA until Congressional action had been taken. Under no
circumstances would he acquiesce to a procedure that might endanger the lend-lease
program.2249 The situation did not look good. “I have a hunch,” he wrote Harry Hopkins,
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“that UNRRA will not be set up this year or possibly at all.”
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The Administration

had miscalculated. “Herbert Hoover stayed away from an allied organization on relief” as
he feared “the political consequences.” If the American public were to “stand for the
Allies deciding how American supplies should be divided and distributed,” it was
imperative, he had written Acheson in June, 1943, that they “do a proper educational job
with the public and Congress.”2251 Now he urged the same advice onto Hopkins. But he
wondered if Congress would “ever be satisfied” without the “chance to either approve the
agreement, or to pass on this issue by an amendment to the Lend-Lease Act, or
otherwise.”2252
Veatch had urged Acheson to take action as well. To avoid “unnecessary
suspicion and criticism,” he suggested in April that the State Department “voluntarily”
discuss the relief proposal with the relevant congressional committees. He also
encouraged Acheson to consider appointing members of Congress to the American
delegation assigned to the relief conference.2253 But the Assistant Secretary, as we have
seen, left responsibility for congressional relations to the President. He took no decisive
action.
With the relief agreement now in peril, Veatch redelivered his advice in altered
form. Members of the interested congressional committees should be invited to assist in
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preparing the legislation necessary to implement the agreement, he argued, and a
group of Congressmen established to liaison with the State Department on relief and
related matters. He also thought the President should inform the legislature of his
intention to invite two members of Congress to serve on the American delegation to the
first UNRRA Council meeting. 2254 By this point, it was unnecessary for Veatch to
suggest discussions with Congress. Consultations had begun in early July, but these
meetings were neither the result of Veatch’s suggestions nor the consequence of
Acheson’s initiative: Bolton and Vandenberg had forced the Assistant Secretary to come
to Capital Hill. The Congress was both critical and suspicious of the Administration’s
motives.
The circumstances placed Dean Acheson in a difficult position. If on the Senate
side the challenge was to avoid having to obtain a two-thirds majority vote to win
approval for the UNRRA agreement, on the House side it was to ameliorate the fear that
another power would assume control over American resources, though the Senate
worried about the financial aspects as well. Meeting these challenges proved difficult.
Whatever Acheson told the Congress could be subjected to the scrutiny and criticism of
another power if it were to become public knowledge. While Dean Acheson ventured
across the tightrope, the Congress threw stones. The show began in the United States
House of Representatives.
Here Representative Rogers led the charge. Clearly she believed England would
assume control of the Council and dominate the allocation of American resources. “Does
the United Kingdom have one vote or more than one vote [on the Council],” she asked?
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Acheson replied that it would only have one. In disbelief, she asked him about
Canada and New Zealand? Would they not vote in accordance with London’s wishes? “I
do not think so,” the Assistant Secretary replied. But then Rogers insisted that this
interpretation could not possibly be true. Acheson, who was eager to squelch the debate,
retorted: “I suppose the British would say the same thing about us. We are going to have
Nicaragua, Cost Rica, El Salvador, and a good many more.”2255 In effect, the United
States intended to balance against any anti-American coalition in the Council by hustling
Latin America.
Franklin Roosevelt clearly shared this point of view. As a candidate for the Vice
Presidency in 1920, he had confronted similar criticism over the League of Nations.
Republicans charged that Britain would control six votes in the League Assembly due to
its imperial possessions. Instead of disputing this claim, Roosevelt argued that the United
States would control at least a dozen votes in Latin America. He then went on to brag
about having written Haiti’s new constitution, which Washington imposed upon the
Caribbean nation. These comments angered America’s southern neighbors, and provided
Republicans fodder with which to attack the campaign. Roosevelt consequently had little
choice but to backtrack on his remarks, claiming that he had been misquoted. 2256
Acheson, by comparison, had it much easier. He simply expunged his remarks from the
record.2257
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Meanwhile, he faltered again. When the Republican Representative from New
York, James W. Wadsworth, Jr., countered Rogers with the argument that “the Central
Committee and the Director General” were “going to run the show,” Acheson agreed, but
then realized that this viewpoint would offend the smaller powers that had complained
about the Central Committee’s composition. “I do not think it will run the whole show,”
he insisted. It “will be the steering committee.” Wadsworth immediately accused the
Assistant Secretary of exaggeration. Now aware that he had offended the sensibilities of
the body that would fund the organization, he told the group what they wanted to hear
and what his colleagues in the State Department hoped to be so: “I think the real center of
power and authority in the organization is the Director General,” who will “have control
over the property of the organization.” He need not say anything further; he had already
assured them that the Director General would be an American.2258 Weeks later, he also
asked that his mistaken agreement with Wadsworth be deleted from the record.2259
With no written account of Acheson’s July 1943 discussions with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, it is impossible to know if he had comparable exchanges in
the Upper House of Congress.2260 But we know that he and his colleagues worried about
another possibility. To evade the constitutional requirements of a treaty, they had to
convince the Senate that the relief proposal constituted an executive agreement, which
required nothing more than a simply majority vote in both houses on an appropriations
bill. With the Democrats in control of Congress, this could be achieved. The Foreign
2258
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Relations Committee, however, refused to accept the procedure and the State
Department proposed an alternative in which the appropriations bill would be preceded
by “an authorizing act of Congress.” Acheson later claimed that they had merely changed
the semantics of an executive agreement.2261 For reasons we will soon see, this is correct.
But for the Senate to accept this procedure, the State Department had to modify the relief
agreement.2262
But here is where they faced a critical challenge vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
The agreement could not be changed significantly without forcing the State Department
to renegotiate its terms with the other nations. Any requirement of this sort would lead to
incessant delays, particularly if the Soviet Union became involved.2263 Similar fears, in
fact, had driven Woodrow Wilson to refuse to entertain reservations to the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919. Like Acheson, President Wilson believed reservations would obviate
many of the promises and tough compromises he made with the Europeans.2264
But fears of possibly having to renegotiate portions of the agreement hardly
constituted the only problem. If drastic alterations in the draft were introduced to lessen
the obligations of member states in order to appease the Senate, Veatch wrote Acheson,
then the “other Powers would become lukewarm towards the agreement in the fear that
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This

impression would undermine one of the central purposes of the multilateral approach to
postwar relief: to secure as much largesse from the rest of the world as possible.
Nonetheless, the State Department had little choice but to try this procedure.
Two additional issues would also require decision: what would the act authorize
the President to do, and when would Congress debate and vote on it? These two issues
turned on one another. If the Administration sought an immediate vote on a bill, it would,
according to McDougal, “disarm… congressional critics… insisting that they have not
been properly consulted.” But more important, McDougal believed the Administration
could seek wide powers for the President to procure through any department or agency
any type of material, and to transfer it as outright gifts to the relief organization, but also
governments, associations of governments, agencies of the United Nations, or any group
of individuals representing any people anywhere in the world. If UNRRA never came
into being or proved unworkable, then these powers would permit the President to act
unilaterally to achieve American objectives, or to use the threat of unilateralism to
pressure the organization to act in accordance with Washington’s wishes.2266
This procedure, in McDougal’s opinion, had other benefits as well. He worried
that Congress might commence debating the relief agreement after the summer recess
even if no legislation were introduced. In this case, tensions could escalate; disunity
would result; Congress would take offense at the President’s decision to sign the
agreement without its consent; and funding for the organization would be jeopardized.
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Even worse, a Congressional revolt against the organization could possibly break out
during the United Nations conference.2267 Veatch conveyed these dangers to Acheson. “It
would be a catastrophe of major importance with repercussions much wider than the
relief and rehabilitation field, if Congress should launch any sort of a major attack on the
UNRRA program while the representatives of the United Nations are in session in this
country at our invitation, or if Congress should refuse to provide funds or supplies for
distribution through UNRRA once it had been established.”2268
Yet this procedure, according to Veatch, presented one major problem. It would
most certainly delay the UN conference until December or January. With the war turning
in the Allies favor, he did not believe the United States could afford further
postponements. The authorizing act and related appropriations bills, he argued, should be
introduced after the President had signed the relief agreement, and after the first UNRRA
Council meeting. This approach entailed grave risks, to be sure, but if the Administration
would accept the advice he advanced in April, and then again after the crisis erupted in
early July, Veatch believed it would reduce the risks: “there would be minimum…
Congressional opposition to our program in Congress if we give all of the interested
committees and all of the major leaders of both Houses… an opportunity to know
everything that we are doing and to participate in our planning.” He also advocated a
vigorous public relations campaign.2269
Acheson finally accepted his advice. But to read his memoirs, you would never
know it. Though Veatch backstopped for Acheson during the complex four-power
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negotiations, the discussions with the United Nations, and the debate in Congress,
providing incisive advice, countless proposals, and innumerable suggestions, the future
Secretary of State is not known to have paid him one iota of tribute. But even more
striking in view of the warnings Veatch provided the Assistant Secretary, Acheson
explained years later that he had been completely surprised by the actions in
Congress.2270 “In extenuation,” he wrote, “I can only plead that it no more occurred to me
that Congress would feel left out of organizing a relief organization than in not being
included in a Washington Community Chest drive.” Understatement to be sure, but
Acheson recognized the real problem. Foreign policymaking requires secrecy. But this
necessity, he implied, requires that the executive either exclude the legislature, or include
it… at the last minute. The problem, he confessed, was that either approach affirmed
Congress’ “right to be indignant.”2271
Matters rapidly escalated to the Oval Office. Cordell Hull advised the creation of
a Congressional liaison committee consisting of influential members of the relevant
committees in both Houses of Congress. He suggested it work with the State Department
on relief matters, but also other postwar planning issues. Hull also requested the
President’s approval of an immediate public relations campaign. 2272 To this date,
educational efforts had been targeted towards narrow interest groups, and the press had
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Now the time had arrived to widen the

campaign. Roosevelt readily accepted these proposals. He also agreed to announce plans
to place members of Congress on the U.S. delegation to the UNRRA conference, and his
intention of recommending legislation to authorize American participation in the
endeavor and appropriations. This procedure would provide Congress the opportunity to
discuss and debate the UN relief plan.2274 By this point, it appeared the Senate leadership
would accept this course of action.

The Critical Breakthrough: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?

The critical meeting took place on August 16, 1943 in the office of Rhode Island
Senator Theodore Green, who served on the Foreign Relations Committee. Vandenberg
was the only other member who participated.2275 Acheson attended the meeting with
Francis Sayre, a former professor at the Harvard Law School who joined the State
Department as Hull’s Special Assistant in 1933. With Harry Hawkins, he negotiated
many of the trade agreements signed before the war. Doubtless he attended the meeting
due to his position at Deputy Director of OFRRO, a position he assumed after serving
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several years as the American High Commissioner to the Philippines.
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But his legal

expertise certainly played a role as well. When the constitutionality of the 1934 Trade
Agreements Act came under attack, Sayre defended the Administration with a fierce
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rebuttal in the Columbia Law Review.
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Many of his arguments would serve as the

legal basis for the procedure advanced for the UNRRA agreement.2278
At the August 16, 1943 meeting, Acheson and Sayre endeavored to convince the
two Senators to accept enabling legislation as a substitute for the treaty ratification
formula provided for in the constitution. It was important, Sayre pointed out, to avoid
partisanship and conflict. Though a Democrat, Senator Green shared Vandenberg’s view
that the relief agreement “should constitute a treaty and handled as such.” But if the State
Department would accept certain changes to the text, which had been discussed with
Acheson the previous week, he agreed to “withdraw his insistence that this [matter] be
handled as a treaty.” Thus the men had to agree to the revisions in the draft agreement
proposed by the State Department. Yet Acheson and Sayre conveniently refrained from
discussing the crucial issue of when the required pieces of legislation would be
introduced in Congress. Vandenberg, for reasons that will become apparent, seemed more
enthusiastic about the general arrangements than Green.2279
The State Department’s tactics had apparently angered the Senator from Rhode
Island. Instead of consulting with Congress early in the process, the Administration had
shared the relief plan at the last minute and under circumstances that made noncooperation difficult without undermining the war effort and damaging the postwar
interests of the United States. Acheson let Sayre remind the two Senator’s of this fact. If
the United States were to “preserve the fruits” of victory, he argued, relief assistance was
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essential to prevent “chaos and disaster” after the war. The multilateral approach, he
explained, was necessary to prevent the American people from having to undertake “such
a worldwide and stupendous task single-handedly.” Vandenberg “expressed hearty
agreement with this general view.” Green clearly agreed but said nothing of the position
the State Department had put the Senate.2280
To understand how the debate played out, we must say something of the
distinction between a treaty and an executive agreement. The two legal forms had been
blurred by the actions of previous Presidents, but also the Roosevelt Administration’s use
of the war to circumvent the Congress. 2281 In 1941, Wallace McClure of the State
Department, had published a book, International Executive Agreements: Democratic
Procedure Under the Constitution of the United States, which concluded, according to
one scholar writing in 1946, “that anything that could be done by a treaty could also be
done by executive agreement, with the approval of Congress if necessary, without its
approval if possible.” Although many State Department officials accepted this line of
reasoning, others did not. 2282 It serves, nonetheless, to illustrate the trend towards
increased Presidential power over the management of international affairs in the
Roosevelt Administration.
Under this school of thought, the distinction between the two forms revolves
around procedure. If an international agreement enters into force only after ratification by
the Senate with a two-thirds majority vote, then it constitutes a treaty. If its entry into
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force occurs in any way other than through the “advice and consent of the Senate,” it
is classified as an executive agreement. While this distinction appears to grant the
executive arbitrary powers, legal scholars have pointed out that the constitution
establishes certain limits, even under this interpretation. An executive agreement, for
example, can neither grant the Congress nor the President powers unstipulated in the
constitution. Such feats can only be achieved through a treaty, which requires a twothirds vote, a procedure not unlike that required of a constitutional amendment. (Though
an amendment also requires three-fourths approval from the states). An executive
agreement, moreover, cannot repeal an act of Congress.2283
These distinctions are significant. The State Department offered a few alterations
that clarified the proposed organization’s mandate, but none of them had any bearing on
the constitutional issues at hand.2284 According to Acheson’s memoirs, the only change
that flowed “from the congressional teapot” occurred in Article V, which dealt with
appropriations. 2285 While the original version utilized the phrase “pledges its full
support,” the final draft employed the words “insofar as its appropriate constitutional
bodies shall authorize.” This change might have meant something, but the original
version, as we have seen, also subjected appropriations to congressional procedures, only
the stipulation came at the end of the sentence, not at the beginning.2286 As such, the
revision did little more than add emphasis to the necessity of following constitutional
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procedure. Oddly, the Senators considered these revisions sufficient, as well as
similar changes to Article VI, which concerned the organization’s administrative
expenses.2287
If one assumes the President could implement the agreement without obtaining
additional powers, then both drafts qualify as executive agreements. But the accepted
procedure assumed something different. A general act, or enabling legislation, as it was
sometime called, would be introduced in Congress authorizing the executive to “expend
such sums as Congress might from time to time deem appropriate for the purpose of
carrying out the American participation in the UNRRA agreement.” Then, an
appropriations bill would be submitted to Congress for approval. As such, the first action
constituted a delegation of power; the second merely provided resources to the executive.
Thus the procedure accords more with the requirements of a treaty than an executive
agreement. A week prior, Green and Vandenberg had already agreed to this procedure.
Now Acheson tried to bargain for more. He asked that the enabling bill give the President
wide powers, such as those McDougal suggested. But Vandenberg rejected the idea,
claiming that the bill would never pass.2288
Another aspect of the procedure poses further problems. According to Article IX
of the draft proposal, the UNRRA agreement would enter into force at the time of
signature. This stipulation implied that the President should possess the power to
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implement the agreement before he signed it. Yet by this point the State Department
planned to have the enabling legislation in Congress after the President had signed the
agreement, while Green and Vandenberg appear to have accepted this procedure.2289
Ironically, the Administration could have avoided the constitutional problems this
decision caused by opting out of the entry-into-force mechanism at the time of signature,
which the agreement permitted. In total, fourteen countries considered the UNRRA
agreement a treaty and utilized this procedure. But the United States did not, certainly
because they did not want the Soviet Union acting similarly, probably because they did
not want to set a precedent that would have weakened the executive vis-à-vis the
legislature.2290 The State Department believed the President already had the powers to
implement the agreement, but appears to have supported the enabling legislation to
ensure that the Congress passed the essential appropriations bill.2291
Legal officials in the State Department ignored the general act and its implications
when they made internal preparations to defend the adopted procedure’s constitutionality
should it come under attack. The cases they cited – all from Sayre’s scholarship – to
justify their behavior involved no authorizing acts at all: Congress merely passed
appropriations bills to allow for participation in the Pan American Union (1889), the
International Postal Union (1874), and the International Labor Organization (1919).
Reasoning by association, these officials argued that UNRRA paralleled these
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organizations in both structure, which was correct, and the scope of its mandate,
which is debatable.2292 If this logic applies, then the enabling act was a ruse,2293 and the
case can be made that the procedures utilized were constitutional. Yet even this
interpretation did not allow the Administration to totally escape the constitutional
problems they created, with the Senate’s acquiescence of course.
The agreement stipulated that each member government would determine the size
and content of its own contribution in accordance with its constitutional procedure. Yet it
was the UNRRA Council, not the constitutional bodies of the individual member states
that ultimately made the determination.2294 To ensure no country contributed less than
any other nation as a percentage of its wealth, the Council approved a resolution
stipulating that all countries would contribute one percent of their annual gross domestic
products. Now of course this plan did not originate in the Council. Harry Dexter White of
the U.S. Treasury devised the formula, which the State Department promoted at the first
Council meeting.2295 Congress had also approved the plan, but in strict statutory terms, it
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originated with an international organization, not the United States Congress. In view
of this procedure, an international treaty would have been a more appropriate instrument
for the agreement.
In fact, the State Department actually considered presenting the UNRRA
agreement to Congress as a treaty in December 1942.2296 Officials probably held to the
belief that executive agreements were only suitable when the related negotiations
involved a single transaction, which is how they justified the procedure for the Britishbases-for-destroyers deal of 1940. 2297 UNRRA, by contrast, would involve future
commitments and repeated transactions. But when the Chinese and Russians began
demanding curbs on the power of the Director General during the four-power
negotiations, officials suddenly changed their minds.2298 Herein one finds a final reason
for the executive agreement: they are much easier to abandon than treaties. Either the
President can unilaterally withdraw from such an agreement, or the Congress can repeal
it. Treaties, by contrast, usually persist until their terms have expired, even if they are
violated.2299
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Final Reactions: Vandenberg and the Dissent of Others

But what can be said of the Vandenberg’s behavior? Why did he accept minimal
changes to the relief proposal in return for the bogus procedures employed? It is quite
possible that the legal complexities of the issues consumed him. But that remains
doubtful. Ulterior motives were in play. He hoped to retrieve lost political capital by
ingratiating himself with the so-called isolationist press and constituents who had turned
against him for his increasingly internationalist positions.2300 But, as Acheson explained
years later, his actions “threatened to engulf him.” When his “erstwhile isolationist
friends” learned of the final deal, they accused him of “selling out.”2301 This left him with
little choice but to stage a grand victory. He would boast in a letter to one prominent
newspaperman that he had “forced” the Administration “to substantially rewrite the text
[of the agreement].” “I shall consider it a one man victory against the precise Executive
Dictatorship to which you feel it would be the final symbol of surrender,” he wrote.2302
Several months later on the Senate floor, he explained it in this way:
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“The entire agreement was rewritten in its fundamental character. It was
stripped of every general obligation and responsibility. It was brought back to a
simple authorization of appropriations for an international purpose, and it was
written in a form which textually undertakes to limit our obligation without any
question whatsoever to the specific appropriations that are to be made under the
authorization from time to time by the Congress. I repeat, we entirely changed the
character of the document, and obviously I think it ceased to be a treaty.”2303
While Vandenberg’s political fortunes explain much, they do not help us
understand why the entire Senate Foreign Relations Committee, especially the
Democrats, accepted these arrangements. Like Vandenberg, they found themselves in a
difficult position. They had supported the Senator’s investigation because, on the one
hand, they agreed with its premise, but on the other hand, because they feared
Vandenberg and constituent scorn for ignoring the constitution. But with the
Administration holding firm, they could not risk a rift with Roosevelt with elections due
in 1944. They also worried of incessant delays or even inaction: either of these scenarios
would have imperiled the possibility of achieving a sustainable postwar peace. It
therefore made little sense to obstruct the organization on procedural grounds. If the relief
organization failed to serve American purposes, the Congress could always cut its
funding down the road. The Republicans probably accepted the procedures for the latter
reason.
As for the House, they were more than happy to be consulted and to receive the
opportunity to vote on the new agencies. Inasmuch as Wallace McClure hoped to wreck
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the old treaty prerogatives of the Senate, members of the House hoped to do the same.
During the war, the Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sol Bloom, published
a widely read pamphlet proposing a constitutional amendment that would have given
both houses of Congress the opportunity to vote on treaties through a simple majority
vote. These and other efforts went nowhere,2304 but when the State Department presented
the procedures for the relief agreement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in late
September 1943, they were more than happy to accept, even if the vote occurred after the
President had signed the agreement.2305 In any case, they knew that they always had
power over the purse, and could later pull the string on any commitment that they
opposed.
The debate over the constitutional status of the UNRRA preserved and
aggrandized the President’s power. The United States joined all but one of the
international agencies set up during and immediately after the war using similar
procedures. The United Nations organization created in the summer of 1945 constitutes
the only exception to this rule. The Senate ratified several bilateral treaties with former
belligerents, to be sure, but on matters concerning global governance, the executive
agreement became the norm. In most every case, the objective was to prevent excessive
public debate, and to avoid the two-thirds majority procedure that wrecked the League of
Nations and the Treaty of Versailles. Doubtless the Administration made this process
easier by embracing an incremental strategy whereby the postwar order was erected
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piecemeal, one agency or agreement at a time. The Senate agreed to this procedure so
long as it was consulted.2306
Acheson and Sayre accepted these arrangements when proposed by Vandenberg
on August 16, 1943. The official account fails to mention it. But the following day, Ray
Tucker of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported: “President Roosevelt has flatly refused to
approve an arrangement by which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should be
informed in advance of all private and postwar covenants.”2307 Vandenberg took notice.
Perhaps his fears resided when the New York Times reported the opposite on August 18,
1943,2308 but he rapidly wrote Acheson about the Tucker story.2309 Sayre responded that
though he and Acheson had not yet discussed their meeting of August 16, 1943 with the
President, Roosevelt had “frequently indicated… that he would most heartily welcome
proposals for Congressional cooperation.” 2310 Acheson reiterated these words after
returning from vacation. “I do not think that you need to be concerned by this article
which I am sure does not represent the attitude of the President.”2311
Not everyone approved of these developments, even if they led to more
cooperation between the State Department and the Congress. On November 8, 1943, just
before the UNRRA agreement was signed, the Democratic Senator from Georgia, Walter
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George, made it clear during a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee that “he
would have preferred to have the United States do the relief and rehabilitation job by
itself through an American agency.” Though his reasons were peculiar – he worried that
the Europeans would horde American aid at the expense of China – there was an implicit
message in his statement. Neither the Congress nor the American people ever had the
opportunity to express their opinion on what type of agency would be created.2312 This
would be equally true with the many other agencies established much later. Although
Congress was consulted on a more routine basis, the Administration usually manipulated
the process to achieve its desired outcome.
While Senator George worried about the mechanism for delivering relief, the
Republican Senator from Ohio, Robert A. Taft, attacked the underlying premise of not
only the relief organization, but of Roosevelt’s objectives for the entire postwar era. In
his view, the Administration stood to squander a great opportunity by “reaching out to
create utopias of individual freedom where individual freedom has never existed and
might not be recognized.” The “talk of bringing… the four freedoms… to the rest of the
world” constituted a “dream language.” But he was most incisive when he spoke of the
dangers of the Administration’s wide program. “If we crusade for the four freedoms,” he
warned, “Russia can crusade for communism.” 2313 Perhaps he could have said the
opposite, but his logic is irrefutable nonetheless. Roosevelt’s program risked legitimizing
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Soviet aggression. As such, it increased the likelihood of conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union.

The State Department Explains the Agreement to the World

Negotiations with Congressional leaders unfolded alongside efforts to appease the
representatives of the allied nations in Washington, especially those that had attacked the
relief proposal. In meetings that spanned five months, Acheson and Veatch addressed an
array of concerns. Most of the complaints, as we have seen, concerned the powers and
composition of the Central Committee. While explaining how each country would have
the opportunity to participate in and influence the organization, these men downplayed
the committee’s importance. Paradoxically, they accomplished this task by comparing the
proposed relief organization to the American system of government. The Council, they
explained, would serve a role similar to that of Congress, which was to legislate policy
and allocate funds. The Director General would play a part like the American President.
As for the Central Committee, it would be of and subservient to the Council.2314
Within this framework, various avenues would permit member states
opportunities to participate. Each government would have a vote in the Council, but also
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the chance to partake in its committee system. In Congress, the “committees have
tremendous power,” Acheson told the Belgians. When a committee brings a problem
before one of the houses of Congress, its members debate the general policies involved,
but the committee settles the language of any bill submitted for a vote. Similarly, the
regional committees of the UNRRA Council would “study and propose the main lines of
policy,” after which they would come before the Council for debate and vote. This
process, he implied, would work for the supplies and technical committees as well.2315
Acheson did not discuss voting procedures until the Canadians forced it on him,
whereupon he proposed simple majority voting unless stated otherwise in the agreement,
or by action of the Council.2316
Acheson and Veatch routinely stressed the “very special role” of the Director
General, who would assembly an international staff with technical expertise in diverse
fields. Each nation could contribute to the administration’s personnel, but the Director
General would have the exclusive power to hire and fire. In appointments, the Central
Committee would have little more than advisory powers. The Director General would
also “consult more or less constantly” with the various committees of the Council to
glean and share information about the circumstances in the relevant countries, and the
experience of actual operations on both the supply and demand sides of the equation.2317
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The Director General would serve as the organization’s fulcrum, revolving around
and turning over the diverse entities and aspects of its work.
As a way of illustrating, Acheson described how the regional committees would
provide the Director General information on the requirements of the countries in the
region, and the supplies committee would offer data on the available resources. The
Director General would then coordinate the two arms of the organization, and provide
information to both committees so that they could write policies. In turn, he would lay
their policy recommendations before the Council for debate and a vote. As such, the
organization would have three focal points: the Supplies Committee, the Regional
Committees, and the Director General.2318
Acheson told the angry allies that the Central Committee would play virtually no
role in this process. With neither the knowledge nor the technical expertise to make
policy, it would serve as a mere nominating and steering committee that would provide
agendas for meetings of the Council. It would enter into the field of policy only on rare
occasions, when an emergency required immediate action so the Director General could
meet the exigencies of some unanticipated situation. To rebut the claim that the Central
Committee might seek to make policy while the Council was not in session, Acheson
argued that it would serve no one’s interest for the four powers to enter into a “trial of
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strength” with the Council, and that the Council could always revisit whatever
decisions the Central Committee might take while it was not in session.2319
While eager to draw comparisons with the American system of Government,
Acheson also drew distinctions when it served his purposes. A number of countries
worried that the Council might force obligations on the member states against their
will.2320 But Acheson pointed out that it would not have the full powers of a typical
legislature. As the Council would neither tax nor wield police power, it would not be a
sovereign entity. But if nations refused to cooperate and contribute, even if these deeds
were voluntary, then the entire effort would be to no avail and the whole scheme was
pointless. In such a case, he suggested the only alternative would be American
unilateralism.2321
Acheson addressed the problem of the organization’s scope. Just as he told
members of the Congress, he claimed the agency’s scope was limited to the
“rehabilitation” of industries vital for the provision of relief.2322 While he wanted to
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ensure members of Congress that they were not signing up for commitments of which
there were no limits, he endeavored to erase aggrandized hopes of recipient nations.2323
Many allied delegations had protested the Central Committee’s power to veto plans to
“formulate and recommend” actions by “any or all of the member governments” to
undertake tasks “related” to relief and rehabilitation.2324 Acheson explained that the
power of the Central Committee over this matter had nothing to do with curbing the
Council’s prerogatives. Rather, it was a provision to prevent the organization from
expanding into fields of endeavor beyond what it was established to do, unless wide
agreement could be secured, most importantly, from the American Congress.2325
The issue of a precedent also occupied much of Acheson’s time. Like the
Canadians earlier in the year, the Allied nations had lambasted the four-power Central
Committee as setting an undesirable pattern that would be used in future international
organizations.2326 Acheson refuted this suggestion incessantly. He suggested to the Dutch
and the many other allied delegations that the evidence made this inference wholly
2323
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unreasonable. The wheat discussions of 1941 had not utilized the four-power formula;
the ongoing monetary discussions were not using it; and the Interim Commissions
recently established at the Food Conference had not employed it either. The methods of
organization proposed for the relief administration, he asserted, had been chosen to meet
the peculiar task at hand.2327 This argument was misleading: the four-power concept had
been chosen to unify the powers to win the war and set a pattern for future international
organization. Yet the complaints brought Roosevelt’s formula into question.

The Great Contradiction and its Meaning

In this description, Acheson digressed from the draft agreement and the
separation-of-powers principle employed in the American constitution. The relief
proposal suggested that the regional and supply committees would present policies to the
Council or Central Committee,2328 but Acheson claimed the Director General would play
this role.2329 The flow of information, according to the draft agreement, would be from
the Director General to the committees so they could act on this knowledge to craft
policies.2330 Acheson, however, indicated that it would flow in the opposite direction as
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In effect, the Director General would play a central role in the policymaking

process.
This fact underscores a contradiction in the American position. In the summer of
1942, the postwar planners, particularly Paul Appleby and Milo Perkins, had endeavored
to keep the Council out of the Director General’s executive operations, citing the division
of powers in the American constitution as their model. Officials did not want to provide
the British undue influence by giving the regional committees any power beyond
advisory functions in the making of policy. Yet they did not want to exclude the Director
General from the policymaking process. In short, the separation-of-powers principle
applied only up to the point where it might limit American influence.
This logic also applied elsewhere. The State Department had followed
Roosevelt’s preference for four-power leadership. Officials imagined that these countries
would work in a committee that directed the relief organization’s executive. For this
reason, the body earned the title Executive Committee. But the desire to give the Director
General a free hand led the planners to propose a Policy Committee instead. In this
arrangement, the Director General had a non-voting seat on the committee, presumably to
influence policy. Yet his control over the administration would give him the power to act
unilaterally in any case. However, this conception conflicted with the Council’s apparent
policymaking functions and the four-power body became the Central Committee, though
the draft still permitted the four-powers to make policy between biannual meetings of the
Council.
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Before the State Department shared the draft with the world, officials
imagined the following. The Council would devise policy on functional and technical
issues, but on matters of supreme importance, the Central Committee would make the
decisions. If either pathway to the desired policy appeared destined for failure, then the
United States could turn to the other body regardless of a topic’s importance. In any case,
the Director General would play an influential role due to his access to information on the
supply and demand sides of the equation, but also his relationship to the American
Government. Yet he would maintain the power to act unilaterally in all cases if necessary.
Should this path prove dangerous, the United States could easily scuttle the organization
given that it was signing an executive agreement, not a treaty.
By July 1943, there was an apparent effort to place the policymaking functions
more firmly in the hands of the Council, particularly the regional and supply committees
where many of the European countries would have legitimate claims to membership. This
change paralleled a concomitant effort to reduce the reputed importance of the Central
Committee, except in emergency situations requiring immediate action. This fact raises
critical questions. Was this shift a mere ploy to convince countries that disapproved of
the Central Committee’s composition, or does it constitute a more fundamental change in
the State Department’s attitude towards the relief organization, and more broadly, the
postwar period? If the latter explanation holds true, what explains this apparent change?
The need to convince countries that disapproved of the Central Committee played
a considerable role. But when numerous countries urged the State Department to alter the
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draft providing more powers to the regional committees, Acheson ultimately
refused.2332 While this outcome may suggest no real change, the State Department had no
desire to precipitate time-consuming negotiations with the Soviet Union, and Moscow
evinced no real commitment to alter the power relationships in the organization as
defined in the agreement. Yet officials in the U.S. Government also realized that the fourpower Central Committee could not dominate the policymaking process if the
international organization were to have any degree of legitimacy with the wider
international community.2333 Thus Acheson made verbal commitments while keeping the
Director General involved in the policymaking process. Leith-Ross, of course, expressed
hearty approval when he learned of Acheson’s arguments.2334
The State Department, by this point, had come to consider the Soviet Union a
fundamental problem. While American officials always hoped to dominate the postwar
international system, it was never prepared to achieve this end crudely, but through ruse,
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pretense, and its largesse. It would deploy the stick only when absolutely necessary.
The Soviet Union, by contrast, knew only the stick, and believed that military power
alone should be the legitimizing factor in the management of international affairs. Ray
Atherton noted this fact when he refuted the claim that the reaction of the exiled
governments to the draft was preliminary and “need not be taken seriously.” “I am
afraid,” he wrote, “that the problem is basic, arising from the fear of the smaller States,
who definitely regard the pattern of the Relief Administration as a precedent for other
international organizations, of an international order dominated by the great powers.” The
dilemma, he continued, is that “the Soviet Government apparently has just such an order
in mind.”2335
The State Department, it seems, no longer planned to rely primarily on the Central
Committee, but now hoped to use the regional and supply committees of the Council to
make policy. Acheson and other officials claimed the Director General would work with
these committees, but their behavior vis-à-vis the American Congress suggests that this
individual would use whatever stratagems were necessary to achieve their objectives,
even if it went against the spirit of the UNRRA agreement. Acheson’s willingness to
diverge from the word of the draft to persuade the allies to accept it constitutes an
implicit confession of this fact, but also indicates his hope that the nations of the world
would simply trust the United States. Each of the prospective member states was well
aware that the Director General would be an American. But for many, even this fact was
difficult to accept. Acheson’s maneuvers inevitably aroused suspicions.
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The Allied Proposals and the End Game

Despite Acheson’s explanations, many nations barraged the State Department
with proposals to rectify what they considered an undemocratic form of organization. The
suggested revisions usually accorded with the peculiar interests of the state making the
proposal. The Norwegians, for example, advocated a Transportation Committee. They
did not want their merchant fleet to be used for relief purposes without their consent, but
they also knew their ability to contribute considerable shipping would give them a strong
claim to chair the committee.2336 The Canadians, for their part, believed the Council
should appoint members to the various committees to reduce some of the hostility
towards the Central Committee. But they did not want the four-power body stripped of its
nominating powers. They feared difficulties that might make it difficult for Ottawa to
assume the chairmanship of the Supplies Committee, as promised to them.2337
The Poles suggested that each of the recipient nations should prepare “national
plans” that would be “coordinated by the proposed regional committees.” To facilitate
this idea, they believed the regional committees should have a “voice in determining…
the ultimate extent of aid for the various regions and countries.” Like the British, they
believed the regional committees should have a “voice in determining… the ultimate
extent of aid for the various regions and countries.”2338 Obviously they aimed to contain
the Director General and knock the Soviet Union out of the process altogether. Veatch
reminded them that they would have the opportunity to collaborate with the Director
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General in drafting plans, and that no relief scheme would be implemented in Polish
territory without their consent. But the poor Poles read the writing on the wall: if they
refused, they might receive nothing at all.2339
The State Department faced the unwieldy task of assessing these and other
proposals to determine if changes could be made to entice the weary allies into
cooperation. How they managed this work bespeaks of the complexities involved in
reaching international agreement. With more than forty countries involved, U.S. officials
eliminated nations from their analysis that voiced no complaint, failed to respond
promptly, or were simply too weak to matter. Not one single Latin American country
figured in their assessments.2340 Mexico’s response came too late and Brazil made no
substantive suggestions.2341 The State Department considered the views of Australia,
Canada, and most of the exiled allied governments. Officials devised a chart with roughly
two-dozen rows, each representing a specific section of the draft either under dispute or
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where revisions had been proposed; columns were delegated to the various countries,
and their ideas placed in the rows corresponding with the section of the draft in
question.2342
Of the complaints and proposals received, the single most difficult one concerned
the Central Committee. With most of the allied countries insisting on its enlargement or a
reduction in its powers, officials concluded that they had four options. They could refuse
to make any changes, but this option would have damaged perceptions of the United
States. They could reopen negotiations with Moscow and try to increase the size of the
committee. Though Britain still preferred this option, Acheson never forcefully advocated
it. They could abandon the four-power formula altogether, and devise another scheme,
but this alternative received no support due to time constraints. Or they could strip the
committee of modest prerogatives without altering the fundamental power dynamics of
the organization as stated in the draft. Here they found the best alternative.2343
The allied governments provided them a variety of options. If some combination
of them were acceptable to the other great powers, officials believed the draft would
become more palatable. Without foreclosing any of the four options, Acheson shared
several of these ideas with the British, Chinese and Soviets on July 21, 1943. He
suggested that one-third of the member states might call the Council into special session
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as opposed to a simple majority. The power to nominate committee members and
admit new states to the organization could be transferred from the Central Committee to
the Council. Unanimous voting of the Central Committee and the Council should be
required to pass amendments. Finally, he thought the draft might formally commit the
Central Committee not to reverse decisions of the Council and explicitly limit its
policymaking powers to emergency situations. Acheson asked the other three powers to
consider these changes.2344
On July 31, 1943, the British responded. A nominating committee of the Council,
they argued, would offend the Canadians, who would wonder how the Big Four intended
to secure for them the chairmanship of the supplies committee under such arrangements.
If amendments to the draft became desirable, the requirement of unanimity would make
them impossible: any country could obstruct to suit its purposes. The British accepted the
remaining suggestions. But they reiterated their preference for an enlarged Central
Committee and wanted to know what the State Department thought of proposals to
permit countries invited to participate in its meetings the right to vote as members. They
also suggested that no matter could be taken up by the Central Committee without first
referring it to the appropriate committee for action.2345
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By mid August, the State Department had embraced a series of revisions
despite not having received China and Russia’s views on the July proposals. With the
exception of voting on amendments, Britain’s suggestions were uniformly rejected. The
American changes stripped the Central Committee of its power to choose the Council’s
committee members, and denied member states called to participate in the four-power
committee’s meetings the right to vote.2346 Clearly they hoped to manipulate the Council
into selecting Canada to chair the Supplies Committee.2347 They also worried that smaller
powers attending Central Committee meetings might outvote the four great powers.
Eager to maintain secrecy, the State Department also rejected a proposal from Norway
suggesting that any power have the right to invite itself to the four-power body’s
meetings. 2348 Finally, they refused to delegate any explicit powers to the various
committees of the Council, despite the degree to which they had pumped up their
importance.2349
Yet the State Department made several concessions. The Council obtained the
power to set its own rules and admit new members. Unless stipulated otherwise, it would
vote by a simple majority vote. One-third of its membership, for example, could call the
body into emergency session at any time of its choosing. The Council also secured the
right to appoint members of the regional and supplies committees, though the member
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states could assign the Central Committee the power to make emergency
appointments. Most importantly, the new draft explicitly stated that the Central
Committee would only make policy in emergency situations, and that decisions would be
communicated to the Council for possible review at its next meeting. Yet the State
Department discarded the idea of committing the Central Committee to never overturn
decisions of the Council. These modest changes constituted an attempt to appease the
fretful.2350
The Soviet Union remained the problem. In late July, the Russian Chargé
d’Affairs, Andreas Gromyko, expressed bafflement over the tepid reaction of the United
Nations. Why had so few countries responded favorably, he asked Acheson, who
informed him “that the delays were due to genuine apprehension about the powers and
composition of the Central Committee.” Yet nothing was forthcoming from Moscow.
Gromyko could have cared less. He wanted the note drafted to the Dutch circulated to all
of the United Nations.2351 The Soviet attitude placed the United States in a straightjacket
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Thus the changes amounted to little. When shared with the
British, Chinese and Russians on August 20, 1943, Halifax reported: “None [of the
alterations] appear to me to raise any point of substance and all have been designed to
make text acceptable both to U.S. Senate and to a number of Allied governments.”2352
From here, it became a waiting game. Acheson continued meeting with the
various allied representatives in Washington to persuade them to accept the draft, but he
could not share the revisions with them until he had received approval from Britain,
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China and the Soviet Union did not convey their approval until the middle of
September.2355 At this juncture, the United States shared the draft with the rest of the
world along with an invitation to sign it and participate in the first meeting of the
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Acheson

deployed Sayre and Veatch to the Senate and House of Representatives to close the
deal.2357 Acceptances of the new draft arrived until the week before it was signed at the
White House. While many nations still complained, and many stated reservations to the
agreement, everyone accepted it. The long ordeal had finally come to an end.
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CONCLUSION

Just before noon on November 9, 1943, Franklin Roosevelt rolled into the White
House’s historic East Room. It was exquisite. Dazzling chandeliers hung from the high
ceilings, flickering light off the gilded mirrors resting above the fireplaces. A crimson
drapery brought the long green felt-covered table stretching the length of the room into
relief. Roosevelt’s wheelchair maneuvered behind it and followed a palisade of 44 flags
stationed against the wall – one for each of the United Nations and associated powers – to
his seat. Upon arrival he lifted his flaccid legs over onto the high-backed chair waiting for
him. Taller and more ornate than the 44 seats around the table, its embroidered carvings
gave it the look of a throne out of a late medieval castle.2358
Roosevelt just sat there, with a beautiful copy of the UNRRA agreement before
him. The State Department had duly prepared it for signature as if it were a treaty. The
event was too important to do otherwise, whatever they told Congress.2359 Arrangements
for the photographers, cameramen, and journalists had been completed. Invitations had
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Anybody who was anyone in the nation’s capital was going to be

there: Supreme Court Justices; the leadership of Congress; the Vice President and
members of the Cabinet; figures critical for securing appropriations; peoples whose
cooperation remained essential for the endeavor to work. In all, nearly 250 people would
attend. Roosevelt had wanted it this way. He had helped with the planning from the
beginning, choosing the location,2361 determining who would attend,2362 and deciding to
sign the agreement himself despite the absence of other heads of state.2363
The affair would signify the inauguration of something new. What had begun in
1941 at St. James’s Palace, the official residence of the British monarchy, had moved to
the White House. Ambassador Halifax would sit across the table from Roosevelt. From
there he would see Stuart Gilbert’s famous portrait of Washington looking over
Roosevelt’s shoulder. One hundred and thirty-one years prior, Dolly Madison and one of
her husband’s slaves rescued that painting just before the British set the White House
ablaze.2364 The Americans understood that new beginnings always come with trial, but
this one brought opportunity as well. To defeat Hitler, the British had sought a closer
2360

For information on the planning, see Memorandum Regarding November 9th ,
October 28, 1943, File UNRRA 1943, Box 2, Official File 4966, Roosevelt Papers,
FDRL.
2361
Memorandum for the SOS, September 6, 1943, File UNRRA 1943, Box 2, Official
File 4966, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
2362
Many people played a role in determining who would be invited, but Roosevelt made
the final call. See Lehman to Kelchner, October 27, 1943; “Suggestion with Regard to
Persons to be Invited to the Signing of the UNRRA Agreement,” October 27, 1943;
George T. Summerlin to General Watson, October 27, 1943; “Memorandum for General
Watson,” October 28, 1943, File UNRRA 1943, Box 2, Official File 4966, Roosevelt
Papers, FDRL.
2363
Memorandum for President by Stettinius, November 3, 1943, File UNRRA 1943,
Box 2, Official File 4966, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
2364
Davie Gura, "Descendants Of A Slave See The Painting He Saved," August 24, 2009,
NPR Online: http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2009/08/descendants_of_the_slave_who_s.html (accessed September 12, 2012).

826
relationship with the United States, but weakness made them vulnerable to
exploitation. Proximity allowed Roosevelt and his men to use the knife. American
strategy has always had a dash of Clausewitz in it: that shameless “desire to wait for a
better moment before acting.”2365
The irony of Washington’s portrait notwithstanding, the Administration focused
on internationalism. Roosevelt would retain references to the Anglo-American
partnership in his remarks, but insist that it yield to multilateralism. He also deleted
references to the Big Four in his draft speech. The displeasure caused by the composition
of the Central Committee taught him a lesson: the image of power politics could not be
allowed to undercut the desired feeling of internationalism. In his remarks, Roosevelt
would speak the words “United Nations” nearly twenty times in a mere twelve minutes.
To widen the net, he inserted “and associated powers” at every opportunity.2366 If the
location and attendees of the event alluded to American history and constitutional
governance, the flags stationed behind the President symbolized 44 voices. They were the
United Nations and associated powers.
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Gallons of ink have been spilt on the mysteries of Franklin Roosevelt. Five
accounts are especially useful here. The President’s most brilliant defender, Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., argued that Roosevelt was a pragmatist who saved American democracy.
In international affairs, Schlesinger wrote that Roosevelt’s “realism kept American
participation in the Second World War closer to a sense of national interest than of world
mission.”2367 These claims, it seems to me, are spurious. If he saved democracy, it was at
no small cost: the expansion of presidential power over domestic and international affairs
came at the expense of constitutional governance. Roosevelt, to be sure, was a realist, but
his Administration’s understanding of the national interest, as we have seen, translated
into a global mission to spread an American ideology around the world. Relief
constituted his Administration’s pipeline into the world.
In contrast to the court historians, James MacGregor Burns’ assessment remains
more critical. He derides the President for pursuing a contradictory grand strategy, which
placed too much emphasis on minimizing the cost of the war in American lives, while
promoting the advancement of the Four Freedoms around the world. This contradiction,
Burns argues, paralyzed American relations with Russia and Asia.2368 But we have shown
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that the Administration’s pursuit of the ideal often served realistic aims; the medium
of relief shows that Roosevelt endeavored to mediate the imperial designs of Britain and
the Soviet Union. While garnering international support, the idealistic proclamations
worked to strip the British of what they had, and keep the Soviets away from what they
wanted. These aims were prerequisites for an American system.
Here Fredrick Pike’s thoughts are useful. In his view, the controversy surrounding
Roosevelt’s career stems from one fact: he was a “trickster.” Individuals of this sort, he
wrote, can be “seen from different perspectives.” They can be both a “culture-hero” and a
“‘chaos-maker’ who ‘sows discord among human beings by wantonly breaking the
taboos’ that heretofore had helped maintain social cohesion.” “Tricksters,” Pike
continued, “lack a moral center…” Yet they can “provide images and visions that…
inspire… ‘a more tolerant and comprehending psychological world-view’ – one that
transcends mere rationality.” Tricksters “respond to the persisting human need ‘to
imagine the socially unimaginable and thus to envisage the possibility of social change.”
Roosevelt, in effect, was a gifted hustler. As Pike explained, his talents transcended “the
identifying gift of the vast majority of political leaders: mere trickiness.”2369
Well before Pike provided this descriptive framework, two other scholars
assessed Roosevelt’s conflicting behaviors and manipulative ways in a more positive
light. In the past, court historians had denied or downplayed the existence of Roosevelt’s
more sinister attributes; when the revisionist attacked this position, they faulted the
President for his deceit and chicanery. Robert Dallek, however, attributed the President’s
trickery to the context of the times. He believed Roosevelt’s proclivity for saying one
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thing and doing the opposite was essential for success in the circumstances he
inherited.2370 Warren Kimball explained the President’s policy inconsistencies in much
the same way. Yet he provided more evidence, quoting Roosevelt verbatim:
“You know I am a juggler, and I never let my right hand know what my left
does… I may have one policy for Europe and one diametrically opposite for
North and South America. I may be entirely inconsistent, and furthermore I am
perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war.”2371
This logic applied just as well to the postwar peace. For Roosevelt, internationalism was
a play for American hegemony; multilateralism served to conceal possible unilateralism.
The United Nations, which captured it all, was his greatest trick.
Roosevelt exploited the idealism of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations and
the concomitant principles of liberal internationalism in hopes of stabilizing the system of
states, and making the world over in America’s image. He wanted the United Nations,
both as a unifying concept and a future international organization, to embody these ideals
and principles. If Washington championed and even endeavored to fulfill them, he and
officials in his Administration believed the United States would secure a strategic edge
over its primary competitors, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. London’s imperial
record and Moscow’s aggressive behavior undermined their leadership potential. But for
Washington to become the alternative, it would have to avoid impressions of imperialism
or aggression. The United Nations helped the Administration achieve this aim.
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Strategically, it was a dynamic device conceived to exploit the opportunities
and meet the challenges of diverse scenarios. When countries joined the UN and evinced
support for the principles behind its mission, American policymakers believed the United
States would accrue opportunities to lead and shape the world in ways commensurate
with its interests. In situations where a country proved skeptical of Washington’s
motives, the UN would provide a forum where the United States could work with other
countries to sway the wavering officials of these nations. More dramatic perhaps, the UN
might also send missions to the country for any number of purposes, and the United
States could use its presence to influence the internal politics of the host country. This, in
fact, was what the Americans planned to do with postwar relief.
If the recalcitrant behavior of a specific country obstructed these and all other
efforts to build an American-led system in certain areas of the world, as occurred in
Eastern Europe and several other areas of the world, the United States would then use the
United Nations to construct alignments against this nation. It would also use the
organization and its principles to wage a propaganda war against the obstructionist state.
The postwar planners, as we have seen, considered the UN a potential makeweight
against possible enemies, and thought the Soviet Union the state most likely to assume
this role. In such as scenario, it is clear that the Americans intended that the UN would
become an instrument through which to execute a strategy of containment.
In this way, the United Nations would facilitate the creation of an imperial edifice
under American leadership, while also providing for the contingency that circumstances
in certain countries might make it difficult, at least in the short to medium term, to
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achieve this objective on a global scale. In its conception, the United Nations was as
alluring, complicated, and wily as Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The Signing Ceremony

When the clock struck noon, ushers opened the doors of the East Room and
escorted Washington’s political elite to their seats. The diverse foreign delegations took
their places around the table where Roosevelt sat. According to the New York Times, the
President was in “fine fettle and a gay mood.” He grinned at everyone as they came into
the room, whispered confidentially to some, and even engaged in “an occasional joke,
which left him and those close to him chuckling.”2372 Once everyone had been seated, an
aide to the President opened the meeting. Then, in alphabetical order, each of the
delegates came to the front of the table, where he bowed to the President, shook his hand,
sat down next to him, and then signed the document. By fifteen minutes after noon, each
of the 44 nations represented had joined UNRRA. It happened too fast, and Roosevelt
told those present too enjoy themselves for fifteen minutes.
As scheduled, the microphones came on at half-past noon. Samuel Rosenman and
Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt’s speechwriters, had prepared the President’s remarks using
drafts written by Oscar Cox, Thomas Reynolds and Herbert Lehman. Ultimately they
decided on brevity to increase the addresses’ dramatic impact, which was to be delivered
in a national radio broadcast.2373 The speech endeavored to accomplish three aims. First,
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it sought to recount the signing ceremony that had just taken place, and explain the
purpose of UNRRA. Second, it would address real and anticipated criticisms of the
President’s management of postwar affairs, particularly attacks on UNRRA. And finally,
it would hammer the themes of unity and cooperation on a global basis. Roosevelt, in
effect, would seek to turn the United Nations into something more than the name of an
alliance.
His opening remarks captured the public essence of his entire postwar project. It
placed the United States at the helm of a grand endeavor to build a brighter future for the
entire world. “Seated about a table in the historic East Room,” he explained, “are
representatives of forty nations – United Nations and those associated with them.” These
countries, he added, “include approximately eighty percent of the human race.” Implying
that there could only be one world civilization, Roosevelt stated that these people were
“devoted to the cause of civilization and by a common determination to build for the
future a world of decency and security, and above all peace.” For this reason, he told his
countrymen and the world, they have just signed an agreement establishing “the United
Nations’ Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, commonly known as UNRRA…”
The agency’s objective, Roosevelt explained, was “to put into practical effect
some of the high purposes that were set forth in the declaration of the United Nations…”
It would therefore provide food, clothing and shelter for destitute populations; assistance
against pestilence and aid in rehabilitating the health of the sick; and sustenance for the
displaced as well as the resumption of basic services. The destruction wrought by the
Axis Powers meant that upon retreat they would leave behind “a generation of half-men –
undernourished, crushed in body and spirit, without strength or incentive to hope.” If the
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world failed to ensure a “fair distribution of available supplies” or “ward off death by
starvation of exposure,” the results would be catastrophic. As he put it: “It would be a
supreme irony for us to win a victory, and then to inherit world chaos simply because we
were unprepared to meet what we know we shall have to meet.”
Roosevelt stared down the critics. For those who had attacked his Administration
for failing to plan for the future or meet the humanitarian problems Europe faced, he had
these words: “this agreement means that we mean business in this war in a political and
humanitarian sense, just as surely as we mean business in a military sense.” For those
inclined to denounce the endeavor as soft, or excessively generous, he argued, as Lehman
had done months earlier, that it was “a clear matter of enlightened self-interest – and of
military strategic necessity.” He also cited the example of French North Africa to show
that the organization would not play the role of Santa Claus.
To conservatives, like Arthur Sears Henning at the Chicago Daily Tribune, who
would reprimand UNRRA on cost grounds that morning,2374 and the foreign delegations,
who had attacked the agency’s structure as authoritarian during the previous months, he
had these words: “The sufferings of the little men and women who have been ground
under the Axis heel can be relieved only if we utilize the production of all the world to
balance the want of all the world.” Thus the funds and resources would be drawn on a
United Nations basis; thus the effort would have to be global. “In UNRRA,” he
continued, “we have devised a mechanism… based on the processes of true democracy,”
which, he asserted, would “go far toward accomplishment of such an objective in the
days and months of desperate emergency that will follow the overthrow of the Axis.”
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In Roosevelt’s view UNRRA was an agreement of historic importance. It was
the first international operational organization with the United Nations name. As such, it
was not only a “strong link joining the United Nations and their associates in facing
problems of mutual need and mutual interest,” it was an opportunity for the world to
learn to work together. “As in most of the difficult and complex things in life,” Roosevelt
explained, “nations will learn to work together only by actually working together…. Such
is the spirit and such is the positive action of the United Nations and their associates at
the time when our military power is becoming predominate, when our enemies are being
pushed back – all over the world.” Unity, in sum, was an objective unto itself.
Yet it would serve a cause. According to Roosevelt, the United Nations had never
“deviated from adherence to the basic principles of freedom and tolerance, independence
and security.” UNRRA constituted a step towards the fulfillment of these principles. It
would take “bold steps.” It would move the world “toward the practicable, workable
realization of a thing called freedom from want.” In Roosevelt’s view, this freedom was
an essential steppingstone to security. On that note, he concluded. “The forces of the
United Nations are marching forward, and the peoples of the United Nations march with
them.” He then lifted his head, and departed from his prepared remarks. “So, my friends,
on this historic occasion, I wish you all the success in the world.”2375
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The Central Role of Public Relations: The United Nations as an Alliance

Our story began with Herbert Hoover, who precipitated the debate over relief
during the Second World War. His wartime statements and experiences as a humanitarian
during and after the First World War led the exiled leaders of various occupied countries
to appeal to him for assistance: these individuals wanted relief delivered through the
British blockade of Europe to their home populations. On the one hand, they worried that
failure to provide assistance would undermine their legitimacy after the war; on the other
hand, they had genuine concern for the wellbeing of their people. Following Churchill’s
assumption of the premiership, the British concluded that aid allowed into Europe would
defy the purpose of the blockade: to prevent imports that would abet the Nazi economy,
and strike at Germany’s ability to wage war. Thus divisions erupted among the Allies,
pitting Britain against those governments who wanted immediate relief for their people.
The blockade caused another problem. Large areas of the world depended on
European markets for their economies to flourish. Both the dependent and independent
colonies of the British Empire relied on Europe, as did the colonies of the invaded
countries – Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Absent this market, these areas of the
world faced economic catastrophe and possible political instability. The British worried
that the Nazis would exploit the situation to undermine their empire. A similar situation
existed in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the countries of Latin America, which
relied heavily on exports to Europe. If these problems went unaddressed, the British
reckoned they would be exposed to blockade runners and Nazi incursions into these areas
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of the world. Inasmuch as Hoover had to be confronted, something had to be done to
avert economic disaster in these countries.
On August 20, 1940, Churchill spoke on relief. His immediate aim, to be sure,
was to undermine Hoover. But in promising that the Allies would provide immediate
relief to any and every country liberated from Nazi oppression, the British Prime Minister
also encouraged the populations of these lands to rise up against the Germans. Yet this
pledge meant that Britain would have to accumulate supplies for the day of liberation.
For this purpose, they reasoned it made sense to buy up surplus commodities. Financial
restraints, however, undermined the degree to which London could pursue this policy,
and it seemed foolish that Britain would take on this responsibility alone. As a result, the
British turned to the United States in hopes of cooperating on surpluses, but also in their
efforts to thwart Hoover. It was in this context that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross first
proposed an international organization, not for relief, but to direct the production,
stockpiling, and marketing of surplus commodities.
Yet the forces of disunity prevailed. Though the Americans ultimately agreed to
cooperate with the British when surpluses existed for the same commodity in the colonial
empires and the Western Hemisphere, they preferred unilateralism: they did not want the
British meddling in South America. And while the United States generally agreed with
the British on cross-blockade relief, Roosevelt forced London, against its wishes, to
permit minimal supplies into unoccupied France to keep Hoover at bay. This, however,
angered the European Allies who received no relief, which in turn fueled the forces of
disunity and gave the Nazis fodder for propaganda. Were it not for London’s dependence
on the United States for financial assistance and war materials, Britain might have shifted
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away from Washington. But Churchill desperately hoped that the United States would
enter the war. Consequently all energies focused on pro-British propaganda in the United
States, which meant relentless attacks on Hoover, efforts to sanctify Anglo-American
relations, and stratagems to obtain aid and lure America into the fight.
Meanwhile, Britain had to dispel all appearances of disunity. In October 1940,
Churchill proposed a meeting of the Allies. He wanted the British Empire and exiled
governments to formally commit themselves to work together until victory. But the
Canadians criticized the plan as pretense; the Greeks refused to participate, citing fears
that it would provoke the Germans into attacking them. Thus the British postponed the
meeting until June 1941, after the Germans invaded Greece. At this meeting, or “parade”,
as Churchill called it, the participants signed the St. James’s Palace Resolution, which
bound them together in war and peace. Though a milestone towards the creation of the
United Nations alliance, it left the rump governments with little to show their people, and
the British suggested another meeting. Held in September 1941, this event led to a second
St. James’s Palace Resolution on relief. It established the Inter-Allied Committee for
Postwar Requirements, which assumed responsibility for preparing estimates of postwar
relief needs for the occupied countries. Yet everyone knew this step meant little without
commitments from the major supplying countries, particularly the United States.
By this point, Roosevelt had begun preparing public opinion at home and abroad
for American leadership of the postwar world order. In January, he gave his famous four
freedoms speech, an idealistic appeal to rally the American people behind his policies,
and the world behind the United States. Then, in August 1941, he and Churchill released
the so-called Atlantic Charter. The governments attending the second allied meeting at St.
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James’s Palace, which by this point included the Soviet Union, adhered to this
statement. While the British limited the Charter’s principles to “Western Civilization,”
Roosevelt touted it as blueprint for a new “World Civilization.” As such, it was global in
its application. Following the American entry into the war, all of the nations at war with
the Axis Powers signed the so-called United Nations Declaration, in which they adhered
to the Atlantic Charter and agreed to fight in common until ultimate victory.
The United Nations alliance emerged incrementally and resulted from an array of
factors, but one theme runs through the entire story: the primordial importance of public
relations. The allied meetings held in London and the creation of the Inter-Allied
Committee served the purpose of propaganda. These efforts sought to make a show of
unity when disputes over surpluses and relief, both the result of the British blockade of
Europe, threatened the war effort. The economic and military might of the United States
placed it in a revered position, which allowed the Roosevelt Administration to subsume
these British initiatives in a program of its own. With lofty appeals and promises of
freedom, justice, democracy, security and prosperity for people all over the world, the
administration downplayed the problems of the war, provided a program around which
the alliance could coalesce, and implicitly assaulted the British Empire and other
potential challengers such as the Soviet Union.

The Machinery Behind the Glamour of Public Relations

The world could not be built on public relations alone. American officials knew
that they would have to devise concrete policies for the postwar period. Yet impediments
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to action abounded. If insufficient staff and present demands delayed action,
Roosevelt’s administrative style all but paralyzed the American bureaucracy. By
assigning competing officials overlapping responsibilities, not least in the area of postwar
planning, he ensured disputes would erupt, which guaranteed that decisions were brought
to him. The resulting inefficiencies meant delays. As a result, little planning had been
done before the United States entered the war. But four factors – all either directly or
indirectly related to postwar relief – helped break the logjam. Though they did not have
simultaneous bearing on the planning process, each of these factors influenced it to
varying degrees and at different points during the first half of 1942.
First, American officials realized that the need for postwar relief would come fast
and furious as the Allied armies defeated the Axis powers. If the United States could not
manage the problem, Europe would face famine, possibly pandemic, an uncontrolled
refugee crisis, and even outright revolution. Any combination of these developments
would hurt the war effort and the postwar peace. Acheson would later capture the gravity
of the situation: “there could not possibly be a greater disaster to our armies and to the
United Nations than to have our forces, the British forces, or any other United Nation
forces occupy any area and then find themselves unable to feed that area. If we then had a
famine with hundreds of thousands or millions of people dying after our people assumed
control, it would be one of the greatest blows to our conduct of the war, to say nothing of
the prestige of the United States throughout the world.”2376
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Second, American officials, particularly Adolf Berle, worried that if the
Roosevelt Administration failed to have an adequate plan and infrastructure in place to
address the demands of the postwar period, then the British, perhaps in collaboration with
the Soviet Union, which submitted a proposal for an international relief organization in
December 1942, would assume the responsibility themselves. Notably, Berle worried that
the Inter-Allied Committee would blossom into a full-scale operational agency with
mandates to manage relief and reconstruction after the war. The British, he feared, would
then use this entity to advance policies that served the narrow interests of the British
Empire. Though Berle evinced the most vitriolic Anglophobia in the Administration,
most everyone shared his worries to varying degrees.
Third, impatience drove the European Governments exiled in London to engage
in independent purchases of scarce resources for the immediate relief of their populations
after the war. These governments, on the one hand, wanted to send a message to their
people that they would be prepared for liberation; this impressions would enhance their
legitimacy. They also wanted to ensure that they would have adequate material resources
to address the many problems they would face. This behavior, however, created problems
for the war effort. It angered the allied governments unable to make purchases due to
inadequate resources, which in turn created conflict and disunity. It also placed demands
on resources that, in many cases, were no longer in surplus. These efforts had to be
coordinated and controlled in some broader framework.
Finally, key bureaucratic conflicts paralyzing the Roosevelt Administration found
a degree of resolution. Dean Acheson outmaneuvered his competitor and rival in the State
Department, Adolf Berle, to assume complete control of the relief portfolio. Cordell Hull
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facilitated the process. After a lengthy absence from the department due to illness, he
returned and sidelined his bête noire, Sumner Welles, who aided Berle’s efforts. In turn,
Acheson’s power increased. Yet he still had to fend off incursions from the New Dealers.
This faction controlled the Board of Economic Warfare, which also secured postwar
planning responsibilities from Roosevelt. These individuals considered the relief portfolio
a gateway towards rebuilding the entire world. Their presence and influence with the
President inevitably meant that Acheson would have to compromise to maintain control.
When the Soviet relief proposal and fears of British chicanery prompted the State
Department into action, officials decided that political as opposed to economic factors
should guide the Administration’s approach to relief. These officials intended to use
relief to thwart the actions of what they considered the two central obstacles to the
construction of an American-led international system: the British Empire and the Soviet
Union. In the first case, the Americans did not want the British to use the Inter-Allied
Committee to channel trade through London, and they did not want them to use this
entity, or relief supplies, for the purpose of maintaining their influence or imperial
possessions. Similarly, they hoped to undercut Soviet ambitions in Central and Eastern
Europe. Relief constituted a means to this end. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
would need American assistance after the war; and they thought the United States should
use its financial and material supremacy to obtain what it desired in these countries.2377
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The international approach to postwar relief had advantages. Officials
believed it would prove an immediate asset for the war effort if an international relief
organization could be constituted under the United Nations mantra during a multilateral
conference held at the earliest possible date. With the war effort going poorly and the
impression that the alliance lacked unity, they reasoned that such an event would provide
immeasurable propaganda benefits. This international approach would also allow the
United States to subsume the Inter-Allied Committee without offending its members, and
would provide the world a favorable vision of what was to come: Washington hoped to
establish a global system in which every country had a voice in the management of global
affairs. The approach would have domestic advantages as well. It would provide the
Roosevelt Administration a means to obtain resources from other countries, thereby
giving the impression that the United States would not foot the entire bill for postwar
relief.
Yet everyone knew this approach had risks. If the American Government hoped
to achieve its goals, it would have to maintain control. This fact increased the importance
of the organization’s structure, which would include three bodies: a Council representing
the United Nations; an Executive Committee reserved for Roosevelt’s four policemen;
and an administrative arm led by an American Director-General. A debating society, the
Council would have no real authority. On paper the Executive Committee would wield
most of the policymaking power, but if it moved in a direction that ran counter to
American interests, the Director General and his staff, to be dominated by Americans,
would see that the organization operated in accordance with Washington’s preferences.
Overtly the administration would procure supplies and implement relief programs, but it
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would secretly see that these tasks were carried out the “American way.” It would
also provide a means to influence political outcomes in areas of interest to the United
States, particularly those occupied by the Red Army.
How could the United States bring such an organization into being? If it were set
up multilaterally, it would have maximum legitimacy. But with this approach came the
risk that the United States might lose control of the constitutive conference and its ability
to craft the organization in a manner commensurate with its wishes. For a period, they
thought the United Nations might establish a four-power directorate, which would have
the authority to create subsidiary agencies, one of which would be a relief agency. But
delays, bureaucratic shuffling, and time constraints made this approach impossible. The
relief agency would have to be created first. But this sequence of events had benefits. It
would provide a model for postwar international organization, and an example of how the
global system should work.2378 The process of bringing it into being would unfold
piecemeal. The first step involved negotiations with Britain.
While in Washington politics quickly won out over economics, in London the
story unfolded differently. American officials spent their time thinking about how to
structure the organization and bring it into being; the British, by contrast, wondered how
much they should contribute in the way of resources. The Board of Trade and the Foreign
Office preferred that Britain make some concrete pledge to show the country’s goodwill,
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and entice the Americans into action. Officials in London believed Britain’s influence
and ability to preserve its global position depended on its willingness to make a
commitment. The Treasury, however, worried of the country’s diminishing resources and
weakening balance of payments position. These differences of opinion locked the groups
into a struggle that escalated all the way to the War Cabinet.
The controversy erupted before Leith-Ross’s scheduled visit to the United States:
the Americans had invited him to discuss postwar relief. He and his allies hoped to make
reference to the Prime Minister’s speech of August 1940 during the talks, but officials at
the Treasury believed the British Government should abandon these pledges. Leith-Ross
also wanted Britain to publicly pledge that it would maintain rationing after the war. In
this way, he could demonstrate the country’s willingness to sacrifice in order to relieve
Europe. If pressed on possible contributions, he would mention Britain’s raw material
resources and other stocks held abroad. But the Treasury disagreed on both points. LeithRoss should make no further pledges and commit no resources unless he received
assurances that Britain would receive something in return. Highly controversial, his
instructions were still not finalized when he departed for Washington.
American officials liked the appearances of multilateralism and internationalism,
but hated the risks these forms of governance entailed. Thus they pursued them only after
their desired outcome had become just short of inevitable. In this way, they could seek
legitimacy for the system they envisioned while remaining true to their unilateral instincts
and strategic preferences for bilateralism. For the Americans, two facts always remained
axiomatic: it is less frustrating to act without having to consult anyone, and much easier
to achieve hegemony in one-on-one negotiations with diverse parties than through a
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multilateral forum, where any combination of countries can endeavor to obstruct the
ambitions of a superpower. Consequently, the Americans sought to amass sufficient
power and obtain broad agreement before widening the net to include other states. They
would begin by seeking agreement with Britain.

Uncle Sam Corners, Rejects, and Ignores John Bull

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross arrived in Washington D.C. with two objectives: to get
the Roosevelt Administration to move forward as rapidly as possible towards the creation
of an international relief organization; and to secure as much influence for Great Britain
in that organization as possibly. Sir Frederick’s emphasis on speed revolved, first and
foremost, around the need to appease the European allies, particularly those undertaking
independent purchases threatening to the war effort. It also stemmed from his concern
that the organization might not be functional in time if delays persisted. In terms of
influence, Leith-Ross wanted Britain to be in a position to shape the European postwar
settlement, and to preserve its Empire.
To achieve these aims, he employed a double-pronged strategy. As evidence of
Britain’s commitment to postwar relief, he reminded the Americans of Churchill’s
August 1940 promise to relieve suffering populations after the liberation of Europe, and
he provided them a copy of a statement making clear Britain’s intention to continue
rationing after the war. He also suggested Britain would be willing to provide from its
raw material resources and stocks held abroad. In turn, he hoped the Americans would
agree to decentralize the organization by creating regional committees and deputies,
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which would work with the agency’s operational arm. He suggested the Inter-Allied
Committee take on this responsibility for Europe, and that additional committees and
deputies be established at outposts in the British Empire, namely Cairo and New Delhi.
The Americans refused to devolve power away from Washington. Instead of
viewing potential British contributions as signs of strength and commitment, they saw the
opposite. If Britain contributed, it would only weaken its ability to rectify its worsening
balance of payments position; the statement on rationing, while welcomed, was further
evidence of Britain’s inability to make significant material contributions. The Americans
had no incentive to back away from their plans. While in agreement with the concept of
regional committees, they insisted that the committees remain completely detached from
the agency’s operational arm. The Director General, they reasoned, should reign supreme
with no infringements upon his prerogatives. The more Leith-Ross endeavored to place
checks on this position, the more they sought to increase his powers and weaken the
regional committees. Several American officials even tried to abolish them altogether.
British officials in London responded to the resulting draft agreement with horror.
The American plan evoked words like “dictator” and “empty show,” provoking one
official to advocate for the creation of a non-American system after the war, and another
to suggest pouring “cold water” on the plan. The British worried that the New Dealers
sought to grant the Council powers over reconstruction. Acheson ultimately agreed that
the Council could discuss reconstruction and make suggestions, but that action would
require a unanimous vote of the Central Committee. Yet this proposal worried the British.
These factors and a variety of interpretive questions led them to recall Leith-Ross, and to
begin reaching out to the Russians. Both efforts failed. When the British learned that
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Leith-Ross would meet with Roosevelt, they agreed that he should remain in
Washington. The Russians, for their part, agreed with the Americans on most of the
critical issues.
The British secured only one clear victory, but the Canadians challenged it before
Sir Frederick left the continent. Divisions within the Roosevelt Administration over the
composition of the Executive Committee provided him an opportunity to secure the fourpower setup, which the Foreign Office preferred. Leith-Ross quietly worried that the
formula would anger the Governments in exile. In this assessment he was correct, but at
this juncture, the Canadians created a stir. Ottawa had hitherto made little fuss over its
exclusion from the Anglo-American war councils. But the leadership became fearful that
its exclusion would anger the Canadian people. Thus on relief they decided to put up a
fight. During Sir Frederick’s visit to Ottawa during the summer of 1942, he endured a
fusillade of attacks on the four-power committee. The Canadians, citing the principle that
a country’s representation on international bodies should equal its contribution, even
threatened to withdraw financial support for the British war effort.
In this environment, the British retreated to another strategy. Rather than push for
immediate changes in the draft agreement, and thereby anger the Americans or thwart the
entire effort, they decided to wait. As Leith-Ross and others reasoned, circumstances
would bring about the desired decentralization whether the Americans wanted it or not.
They also figured that they would have other opportunities to secure changes that
accorded with their preferences. It might even be the case that other powers – the Chinese
or the Russians – would do their dirty work for them. Keynes believed the Soviet Union
would never accept the extraordinary powers granted to the Director General, and would
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take steps to resolve this matter. Yet he still feared that Congress would always have
the ultimate say on account of its power over the purse. Anything that should not go the
way of the American interest would lead Congress to terminate the agency’s work.
Asymmetries of power between Britain and the United States allowed American
policymakers to run roughshod over the British. After obstructing Sir Frederick’s efforts
to decentralize the organization, they shared the draft agreement – against London’s
wishes – with the Chinese and the Russians. This decision infuriated the British, who had
not had the chance to respond to the Soviet relief memorandum of the previous year.
When Churchill insisted that Leith-Ross retract the rationing statement, the Americans
declined to accept it. They also failed to share their program to stop the allied purchases
with the British. And finally, they ignored Leith-Ross’s concerns that their relief program
and procedures for bringing it into place might offend the European Allies. When he
sought a statement to share with them upon his return to London, the State Department
used language, which Roosevelt endorsed, that looked as though they intended to “inter”
the whole program. When protest from one American official led to changes, the revised
version exalted the United States and left Leith-Ross looking weak and out of control.

Four Power Reflux: The Policemen Negotiate

Following the elections of November 1942, the Americans shifted into high gear.
Acheson began pressuring the British, Chinese, and Russians to provide their views on
the American draft agreement for the relief organization. Roosevelt appointed Herbert
Lehman to head America’s relief efforts. Without consulting anyone, either within his
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Administration or among the Allies, he asked the Governor of New York to resign his
office and join the State Department, where he would set up the Office of Foreign Relief
and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO). If the relief negotiations succeeded, this new
office would become the operational arm of the new international organization. If they
failed, OFFRO would undertake relief unilaterally. The British, Chinese, and Russians
each responded to this threat differently.
The country that worried the most about American unilateralism – Britain – found
itself constricted in its ability to stop it. Canada’s threat to eliminate or reduce its
financial and material support for the British war effort forced officials in London to
reconsider their preferences for a four-power Policy Committee. As a result, the British
War Cabinet decided to reverse course on the Executive Committee, which, by this point
had been renamed the Policy Committee, and support a seven-power setup despite the
enormous difficulties this formula presented. The British also elected to maintain their
preference for strengthened regional committees, which served two purposes: the
maximization of British influence, and the appeasement of the European Allies. The
degree to which they would pursue this agenda, however, would depend upon their
success in obtaining support for the seven-power Policy Committee.
The Chinese worried less about American unilateralism: the Nationalists saw little
benefit in turning to the British, whose empire threatened their rise, or the Soviets, who
might abet the Chinese communists. Thus they would rely on bilateral relations in any
case. They would need massive amounts of assistance from the United States for relief,
reconstruction, and to reinvigorate their forces, who would face a communist threat as the
Japanese retreated. For this reason, they had no reason to obstruct the relief plans of the
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United States, which elevated China to a great power despite its weaknesses: China
was fractured, occupied, and dependent. Chiang Kai-shek, moreover, could not afford to
anger top-level American officials at the moment when he sought to outmaneuver
General Stillwell, whose agenda would have threatened his hold on power. The Chinese
also agreed with what the Americans planned for the postwar period: they embraced the
Atlantic Charter and preferred postwar international organization.
China consequently made a mere two suggestions for the relief organization. The
Nationalists disliked provisions for unanimous voting for amendments due to fears
emanating from their experiences with the League of Nations following the Japanese
invasion. They also wanted some restrictions on the Director General’s ability to operate
on Chinese territory. Yet they made it clear that they would not obstruct in either case.
Despite a confluence of interests on a wide array of matters, the Chinese clearly had
regional ambitions: though Chiang sought to repress any appearance of these aspirations,
they hoped to establish a hegemonic position in the region. The United States could abet
the Nationalists in this objective.
Soviet behavior proved more complex. Moscow feared independent American
action, but also collaborative efforts Washington might pursue with the British, Chinese,
or any other country. They therefore tried to reduce American influence, preserve their
own, and ensure that they would have access at every level and in all aspects of the relief
organization’s work. These contradictory aims – blocking American machinations while
preserving and even increasing opportunities for themselves – required a careful
balancing act. If Moscow went too far, it might hurt the war effort, undermine its ability
to obtain American resources after the war, or even provoke the United States into
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outright hostility. But if Moscow did not go far enough, it might find itself threatened
by American capital, finance, and technological prowess. In either case, the menace of
German or Japanese arms in the postwar period remained a paramount concern; the
United States could either help avert or abet this danger.
The Russians altered their strategy to account for such nuances. Stalin’s regime
fell back on Russian tradition to survive. It abandoned its non-cooperative posture and
overt revolutionary doctrine to maximize the benefits of working with the West. Yet
Moscow secretly intensified its support of communist parties in Europe, but instead of
urging them to foment revolution, they encouraged them to promote national fronts, of
which the communists would be members. Therein they hoped to manipulate the
domestic politics of Europe to fashion support for their programs, hopefully with few
Western objections. In time, this strategy would lead to the creation of regimes controlled
by Moscow all over Europe. On the defensive side, they feared the United States would
use the relief agency to execute a similar strategy. They therefore insisted that the agency
obtain the consent of the governing authority in recipient countries to provide relief, and
where possible to help that authority undertake the whole responsibility for relief itself.
This proposal and differences over the composition of the Policy Committee
made negotiations among the four powers, which the Americans had hoped to avoid,
essential. Two central fault lines framed the discussions. The first line existed between
Great Britain and the Soviet Union over the composition of the Policy Committee. While
the United States proved flexible on the issue – Brazilian and Canadian membership
would have made it easier for the Americans to achieve their aims – the British could not
support the four-power formula due to pressure from Ottawa. The Soviets, by contrast,

852
would not support an enlarged committee. They worried that it would diminish their
power and ability to achieve vote outcomes that accorded with their interests. For this
reason, they raised the specter of unanimous voting to keep this possibility at bay.
The second line existed between the United States and the Soviet Union over the
organization’s ability to operate in a given territory. While the Russians worried about
giving the agency’s operational arm a free hand to operate with few limits on its ability to
enter into a given territory, the Americans insisted upon such provisions because they
controlled the funds, on the one hand, and because they hoped to use the agency to pursue
their geopolitical objectives, on the other. But the Soviets insisted that the organization
obtain the consent of the government in a territory before initiating operations in that
area; moreover, they wanted the relief agency to endeavor to make it possible for that
government to undertake “full responsibility” for the distribution of relief in its territory.
These two issues proved so intractable that failure appeared imminent, leading
Roosevelt and other American officials to propose the Food and Agriculture Conference.
They had hoped the public relations benefits of a relief conference would abet the war
effort. The specter of the United Nations deliberating over a postwar issue in a
multilateral forum would have given the world the impression that everyone would have
a seat at the table, and a role to play in postwar global governance.
But Canada refused to yield on its demands for a seat on the Policy Committee.
Thus to deemphasize its importance, the Americans changed its name to the Central
Committee. Then they proposed a supplies committee as a substitute to meet Ottawa’s
demands. But nothing worked. Worse, the British exploited the conflict in their campaign
to strengthen the regional committees, and even proposed regional deputies to facilitate
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this objective. Such proposals looked like chicanery to Moscow, which insisted that it
obtain a Deputy of Russian nationality, and membership on the newly proposed supplies
committee. In the end, the powers had little choice but to meet these requests, albeit
through secret agreements permitting each of the four powers similar rights. Yet while
these arrangements helped the Russians, the Canadians held steadfast.
They believed they had been taken for granted. Despite the sizeable contribution
they made to the Allied cause, the Americans and British excluded them from most all of
the wartime decision-making bodies. As the political consequences became apparent to
Mackenzie King’s government, the Canadians determined to play hardball on relief.
Foolishness in Washington made them even more determined: the Americans called an
international conference to be held on Canadian soil without informing Ottawa. Only
after Anthony Eden visited Ottawa did a solution emerge; this, however, was the result of
the self-promoting machinations of Lester Pearson. The Canadians accepted as a
substitute the chairmanship of the Supplies Committee and the right to participate in
meetings of the Central Committee when it discussed supplies.
The remaining problem concerned control over the distribution of relief. The
Soviet proposals insisting on consultation and collaboration rights for governments in
areas receiving aid served two purposes: they worked to reduce American influence in
the field, and to provide the Russians or their proxies tools with which to influence the
political makeup in those countries. The Soviets, however, were not alone in their hopes
of influencing operations to their advantage: the British also wanted in on the action: they
wanted to strengthen the regional committees to have increased influence not only over
policy, but also operations. While the Americans thwarted the British with ease, they
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struggled with the Russians. They reached an agreement on the first provision that left
the United States a minor loophole: consent of the government would only be required if
it had “administrative control” over the territory in question.
But the second aspect of the question proved more difficult to resolve: the
Americans simply refused to include provisions in the draft requiring the agency to aid
the government in the assumption of either “complete or partial responsibility” for the
distribution of relief. To be sure, they feared that this provision would provoke every
government to demand full responsibility for reasons of prestige. They also worried of
the reaction of Congress. But most importantly, they disliked the measure because it
increased the likelihood that they would lose control. Ultimately, they had little choice
but to accept the measure lest they damage the war effort. However, they convinced the
Russians to secretly record the measure in the minutes of the last four-power meeting.
Throughout the negotiations, each of the powers had means of leveraging the
others: The British cited Canada and concerns over the European allies to advance their
agenda. While the Russians repeatedly threatened to reintroduce their demand for
unanimous voting procedures on the Central Committee, they maintained a catalogue of
obstructionist ploys up their sleeves. The Americans, for their part, flashed the unilateral
card or revealed their strong suit: the possession of vast resources. Even the Chinese had
means of shaping outcomes: by simply supporting one side or the other. On the Central
Committee and the debate over the organization’s ability to operate, the Chinese view
accorded with the Soviet position. This fact raised questions about the suitability of
Roosevelt’s concept of the four policemen, which assumed Britain and China would side
with the United States during conflicts with the Russians.
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Yet the more enduring results of these conversations turned on America’s
ability to pursue its objectives via the relief organization. From Washington’s point of
view, the agency had been conceived to obtain as much legitimacy as possible for an
American-led postwar international system. Yet the Canadian challenge to the fourpower formula suggested this setup might be perceived as illegitimate. The organization
was also designed to provide the United States a public relations tool, and a means of
influencing the postwar political arrangements of Europe. Perhaps the Russians did little
to hurt the organization’s usefulness in the realm of propaganda, but they most certainly
dealt the United States a blow in the other realm. By forcing the organization to obtain
the consent and involve the governing authority of a recipient territory in the distribution
of supplies, they restricted Washington’s ability to use relief for political ends.2379
If the United States failed in these negotiations – still a debatable question – the
Second World War bears responsibility. Acheson might have preferred to play hardball
with the Soviets, but this option presented dangers so long as the war continued. He
might have linked concessions on the size of the Policy Committee to the Soviet Union’s
willingness to concede in areas concerning the powers of the Director General and his
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agency’s ability to operate. Indeed he could have pursued any number of different
strategies. But the circumstances did not allow for such options. Had Acheson pursued
any of these routes, or simply backed out of the relief negotiations in early 1943, he
might have endangered the wartime alliance. Thus the United States ultimately spent
millions on relief for Eastern Europe,2380 but failed to achieve its political objectives in
the region.2381 By 1945, its policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was
shifting.2382
The expenditures spent on relief in this region and elsewhere certainly saved
lives, and we know that the food and various forms of assistance provided by UNRRA
helped improve perceptions of the United States in several of the recipient countries.2383
But they did not stop the Soviet Union from erecting communist regimes in Eastern
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Europe, and they clearly did not preserve the Nationalists in China. Perhaps the costs
should be added to the ledgers listing those sums paid out to defeat Germany, Japan, and
Italy during the Second World War. Maybe they attest to the decency of the American
people, who, along with the inhabitants of the British Dominions, paid higher taxes and
donated their scarce resources in hopes of preventing starvation and famine, and making
the world a better place. But there is always the more cynical view, namely, that charity
got the best of them: the American people were hustled by their Government.2384

The United States and the World

It is inconceivable that any Administration in American history devoted more
time and resources to propaganda than that of Franklin Roosevelt’s. Following his visit to
Washington in mid 1942, Richard Law, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, reported on the centrality of public relations in Roosevelt’s
universe, but also his failure to shoot straight with the American people: A number of
officials “whom I have hitherto regarded as being among his staunchest supporters are
beginning to wonder whether he is anything more than a fool of genius, with an
extraordinary nose for public opinion.”
Law explained further. “A fairly intelligent newspaperman gave me the sardonic
advice that I should visit Hollywood, for, he said, no one who does not understand
Hollywood can possibly understand contemporary Washington.” The Roosevelt White
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House, he told his colleagues, “was already spending $30 million annually on public
relations.” Yet he lamented the President’s failure to properly prepare the American
people for the postwar world, and his apparent refusal to shoot straight with anyone. “It
struck me that this kind of feeling, that the President is far more interested in effects than
in results, and that he has become incapable of dealing honestly with his own people, is
gaining ground.”2385 The time had come for the Administration to shift gears.
As the four-power negotiations came to a close, the diplomatic process gave way
to the demands of public relations. Domestic pressure to move forward on planning for
the peace, the need to turn the United Nations into something more than a mere idea, and
the fear of Congressional opposition to the Roosevelt Administration’s relief plans led
American officials to piece together a propaganda strategy. To avoid criticism from those
who would argue that relief planning was premature, officials explained its importance
for military strategy. To rebut criticism from conservatives and non-interventionists, they
framed the financial aspects of relief in a positive light. And to ensure the support of their
most natural allies – humanitarians and specialists who could help them – they began
integrating them into the process. It was in the latter context that they painted the most
vivid picture of what they expected to find following the liberation of Asia and Europe.
The Roosevelt Administration both succeeded and failed in its presentation of the
relief agreement to the world. Domestic press outlets largely ignored the endeavor; those
abroad considered it evidence that the United States would remain engaged in the world
after the war. Yet in Congress and diplomatic circles the reaction was different. If the
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Administration succeeded in its efforts to repress debate over the postwar world when
the House and Senate debated the Fulbright and Connelly Resolutions, respectively, key
individuals in Congress, notably Arthur Vandenberg, expressed outrage at the way in
which the Roosevelt Administration shared the relief agreement with the legislature. The
Congressional leadership learned of UNRRA twenty-four hours before the agreement
was distributed. The rank-and-file received the proposal only when the Administration
shared it with the rest of the world. Debate became inevitable.
Foreign delegations expressed concern with American antics as well. The State
Department sought to avoid the impression that Britain and the United States conceived
the agreement bilaterally. It tried to downplay the fact that the Big Four had agreed to its
provisions in advance. But these efforts could not cover up the contents of the agreement,
and they did little to diminish the fact that the United States gave the relief proposal to
the press and foreign governments at the same time. The State Department threatened
unilateralism and let it be known that Washington would not play the role of Santa Claus.
They wanted complete agreement with the proposal within three weeks and refused to set
a conference date until this aim had been achieved. For many diplomats, the entire affair
looked like a fait accompli, even though officials hoped to avoid this impression.
Two competing factors made it difficult for the European governments in exile to
stand up to the Roosevelt Administration. First, many of these governments believed their
ability to stay in power depended on the United States. When, for example, domestic
factions challenged the recognized governments of Greece and Yugoslavia, they clearly
believed it would harm their interests to anger Washington, which they considered
essential for their survival. Even in cases where a particular government harbored the
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deepest of resentments over the relief agreement, as was the case with Holland and
Poland, the threat of Soviet power in the postwar era ultimately led them to acquiesce to
American wishes. Many of these governments also worried that if they played their hand
foolishly, then they might receive little postwar assistance.
Had these governments wanted to stand up to the United States, a second factor
made it impossible: no country possessed sufficient power to forge a unified response to
the United States. Division resulted. The Czechs hoped to reassemble the AustroHungarian Empire under the suzerainty of Prague, but knew they would need Moscow’s
approval. This brought them into conflict with the Poles, whose relations with Russia
were fast deteriorating. Similarly, countries such as Belgium and Norway did not possess
sufficient reason to join the agreement’s fiercest opponents – the Netherlands and Poland.
If one country might have had the ability to forge unity, it was France. But when De
Gaulle outmaneuvered Giraud to assume leadership of the French Committee of National
Liberation, he decided to use the relief agreement, and any other opportunity to negotiate
with the allies, as a means of obtaining legitimacy for the French Committee. It made no
sense to oppose the United States at this juncture.
Yet an important distinction is worth making. While considerable aid poured into
Eastern Europe, very little UNRRA assistance went to Western Europe.2386 The Western
Europeans feared the organization, especially the powers the agreement granted the
Director General and the Central Committee. Thus they were quite happy to accept an
UNRRA Council resolution whereby countries with resources would pay for their own
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postwar relief without assistance from the new organization.
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But the countries of

Eastern Europe, as well as China, did not have the resources to take this route. For the
United States, these facts had ironic consequences. While Washington pumped enormous
sums via UNRRA into areas that would fall into the communist camp, Western Europe,
which would become a bulwark for the policy of containment, exhausted its exchange
resources paying for its immediate relief and reconstruction needs. This fact threatened
the economic recovery of Western Europe, an essential prerequisite for the new policy
towards the Soviet Union. The result was the Marshall Plan.2388
A parallel set of factors shaped the outcome in Latin America. Many countries in
the region worried that they would be excluded from the peace table, or treated poorly at
the end of the war. These fears were especially pronounced among countries that had not
declared war, a decision pushed over on them by the United States: military officials had
2387
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expressed concern that they would be unable to defend the long coastline of south
America if it were to come under attack. Thus Colombia tried to use the relief agreement
to eliminate the juridical distinctions that existed between those countries that had
declared war and those that had not. They sent a memorandum to six Latin countries in
the same category, seeking to forge cooperation in the face of what most of them
considered an American threat. But disunity and dependence on the United States
guaranteed that the entire effort would fail. Indeed a conglomeration of similar factors
brought the entire Hemisphere into fold.
If the Latin American Governments feared the United States, they worried of
external and internal challenges as well. Consequently, they maneuvered to obtain
assurances, weaponry, or economic support from the United States; this was deemed
necessary for protection against potential aggression from their neighbors or internal
insurrection. Often intrastate conflicts went back to the nineteenth century, as was the
case with Chile, Peru and Bolivia; often these disputes simmered over from the previous
decade, as was the case with Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaos War. Sometimes these
disputes were outright petty: words on a postage stamp almost brought Haiti and the
Dominican Republic to blows. In need of American support, these nations, especially the
smaller ones, had little reason to evoke the wrath of Washington by either opposing the
relief scheme or conniving with Colombia. While Chile sought to frustrate American
efforts, the country’s size and resources permitted this behavior to a degree unimaginable
for one of the smaller countries in Central America. Yet even Santiago knew it would
ultimately have to go the American way.
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In all of this something larger was at play. These countries had endured the
American hand since the threat of global war emerged in the 1930s. Washington worried
about military threats to the hemisphere, Axis exploitation of the region’s economic
resources, and other forms of subversive or anti-American activity. The Roosevelt
Administration therefore turned to the Pan-American system to secure cooperation in
managing these matters, but more importantly, it employed stick and carrot on a bilateral
basis to secure collaboration and resolve the wartime problems of the hemisphere. It
ultimately angered and disappointed most every country in the region, especially when
the aid suddenly dissipated after threats to the hemisphere abated. Thus by 1943, the
Good Neighbor Policy was in tatters. Yet the United States still touted the Hemisphere as
a model for the world, which was ironic to begin with: few places in Latin America knew
the Four Freedoms; repressive dictatorships propped up by Washington abounded; the
entire region lived under the microscope of American surveillance.
By analyzing why Europe and Latin America responded to the relief agreement as
they did, we see the degree to which the United Nations was a façade to conceal deep
fissures on both continents. Competing interests, circumstances peculiar to each country,
and age-old rivalries fractured both the old and the new worlds. Ultimately the source of
wartime unity was a common threat and American power. But when the objectives of the
United States encountered opposition, officials in Washington were more than happy to
watch as regional conflicts shattered all hope of opposing or speaking to the United States
in one voice. Indeed Washington saw no need to intervene in these disputes if they were
limited and remained below the radar of what could be seen.
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Yet these circumstances did not mean Washington could ignore the
complaints of Europe and Latin America. The legitimacy of the organization depended
on America’s ability to convince them of its merits. Thus while making modest changes
to appease those who complained about the Central Committee and the Director General,
State Department officials explained the UNRRA agreement as an international extension
of the American constitutional system of governance. The Council, they repeatedly told
delegations at Washington, would operate like the American Congress. Its regional and
technical committees would function like the powerful committees of Congress. In this
way, they suggested that every country would not only have an important voice, but
would have the chance to shape policy as well.
The State Department undercut its message by seeking to avoid the treaty-making
procedures required of the American constitution. It sought to push the UNRRA
agreement through Congress as an executive agreement. A trend long in the making but
clearly on the rise during the Roosevelt years, this procedure set the stage for all but one
of the postwar international organizations. While the constitutionality of executive
agreements can be defended in many cases, its use here remains suspect. Congress would
vote on enabling legislation, which suggested the agreement should have been considered
a treaty: historically executive agreements had been reserved for instances in which the
President did not need additional powers from Congress to sign and implement an
agreement. Oddly, the vote took place after the President had signed the agreement,
which contradicted the legislation’s purpose: to give the President the power to sign and
implement the agreement. More striking, the procedures for determining contributions to
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the organization did not emanate from the specific member states, but by a vote of the
UNRRA Council, a procedure that also suggested the agreement constituted a treaty.
But it was a ruse designed to meet unusual circumstances. The procedure allowed
angry members of Congress to save face before their constituents. Senator Vandenberg
could boast of the great changes he had secured in the agreement, but they amounted to
very little. He and other members of Congress confronted a fait accompli; they had little
choice but to support the endeavor. The Administration’s public relations campaign
increasingly left Congress vulnerable to the charge that it would threaten the entire
postwar peace if it obstructed the organization’s creation. Furthermore, the United States
could not significantly alter the agreement without forcing the State Department to
renegotiate portions of the text, or giving the impression that the United States was less
committed to the endeavor than it claimed. Otherwise it might compromise the country’s
ability to secure resources from the rest of the world.
The Director General, like the President of the United States, would be at the
center of the entire process. Herein resides a final irony. The evolving role the Americans
envisioned for the individual in this position necessarily contradicted the theoretical
underpinnings of the American constitutional system: the separation of powers. Just as
Roosevelt attacked and then used the Great Depression and later the war to reduce the
checks on his power, American officials cited postwar expectations of chaos, threats of
revolution, and the need to act rapidly to justify powers of a similar if not broader scale
for the Director General. This position was nothing less than an extension into the world
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of what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called the imperial presidency.
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He was to be an

agent of America’s aspirations, a sort of global arm. In thinking of him, and how the
institution he led came about, we can understand why UNRRA symbolizes a movement
away from what the United States once was, and we can know more of how America and
its relations with the world changed in the process. The emergency that led to this
transformation at home and abroad would not end, and has not to this day.
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